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Traditionally, Church teaching has examined the Eucharist in metaphysical terms (‘what 
is it?’: substance, presence, and causality) and its liturgical celebration as a sacrifice (a re-
presentation of Christ’s self-sacrifice on the cross).  Prompted by Vatican II’s exhortation to the 
faithful for ‘full, conscious, active participation’ in the liturgy (cf. Sacrosanctum Concilium 14, 
27, 30), this dissertation re-interprets the Eucharistic liturgy and participants’ role in it through 
the root metaphor of gift: a gift of desire, which impacts participants’ desires, relationships, and 
selfhood.  It proposes a ‘relational approach’ to the Eucharist by asking: What is going on 
‘relationally’ in the Eucharistic celebration?  How might the Eucharist impact our desire, 
relations, identity?  How does or ought the liturgy of the Eucharist concern relationships between 
the participants and others?  What specifically does the Church celebrate in its liturgy of the 
Eucharist?   
Louis-Marie Chauvet’s ‘symbolic exchange’ model of the Eucharistic Prayer, when put 
in conversation with both Jean-Luc Marion’s phenomenology of gift and René Girard’s mimetic 
theory, yields an understanding of the Eucharist as God’s gracious and scandalous gift of divine 
desire.  The gift is gracious as an embodied expression of divine love, and also scandalous as it 
challenges recipients’ autonomy with a radical call to charity demanding an existential response.   
This dissertation upholds Christ’s self-gift as the ultimate decision to love in a perfect 
reversal of sacrificial violence, which Christians are called to imitate.  It emphasizes the liturgy’s 
structure as a dynamic event of being encountered by God’s gift of himself and reception of this 
gift through particular responses.  This understanding aims to re-appropriate traditional Catholic 
teaching on the Eucharist in more contemporary terms.  It aims to explain how ‘fully conscious 
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I.  Seeking a More Relational Focus in Eucharistic Theology 
1.1.  Eucharistic Theology in a Postmodern Context 
 
 From its beginnings the Church has very clearly emphasized the importance of the 
Eucharistic celebration.  The Second Vatican Council’s Dogmatic Constitution on the Church 
Lumen Gentium described this importance in emblematic fashion when it declared the Eucharist 
is the “fount and apex” (or ‘source and summit’ -- fontem et culmen) “of the whole Christian 
life.”1  Church teaching repeatedly emphasizes the profound importance of the Eucharist as the 
highest expression of worship that the Church can offer:  
General Instruction on the Roman Missal (2003) 
Chapter I: The Importance and Dignity of the Eucharistic Celebration 
The celebration of Mass, as the action of Christ and of the People of God arrayed 
hierarchically, is the center of the whole of Christian life for the Church both universal and 
local, as well as for each of the faithful individually.  For in it is found the high point both of 
the action by which God sanctifies the world in Christ and of the worship that the human 
race offers to the Father, adoring him through Christ, the Son of God, in the Holy Spirit.  In 
it, moreover, during the course of the year, the mysteries of redemption are celebrated so as 
to be in some way made present.  As to the other sacred actions and all the activities of the 
Christian life, these are bound up with it, flow from it, and are ordered to it.2 
 
As faithfully, however, as the Church has celebrated the Eucharist across millennia and 
declared its importance, a clear account of why and how the Eucharist is the source of Christian 
living remains underdeveloped.  How the Eucharist ‘causes’ or communicates grace is typically 
explained by Church teaching in language many people today find somewhat foreign: efficacious 
signs of grace, causality, and presence according to medieval metaphysics.   The Church’s 
teaching on how the Eucharist is the source of Christian living -- how it sanctifies human beings 
and expresses worship of God -- remains archaic in both its terminology (failing to provide 
                                               
1 Second Vatican Council, Lumen Gentium [Dogmatic Constitution on the Church], November 21, 1964, sec. 11, 
accessed May 17, 2016, http://www.vatican.va/archive/hist_councils/ii_vatican_council/documents/vat-
ii_const_19641121_lumen-gentium_en.html Cf. Sacrosanctum concilium 10, Catechism of the Catholic Church 
1324, Ecclesia de eucharistia 1. 
2 General Instruction on the Roman Missal, 16.  Cf. Sacrosanctum Concilium 41, 10, 102; Lumen Gentium 11; 
Presbyterorum Ordinis 2, 5, 6; Christus Dominus 30; Unitatis Redintegratio 15; Eucharisticum Mysterium 3e, 6. 
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genuine understanding for its hearers) and concerns (neglecting genuine existential concerns).  
Its terms, concepts, and analogies have become foreign and lack meaning for many; they no 
longer communicate effectively to people of our contemporary era.  Steady declines in mass 
attendance in recent decades may well indicate the inability of many faithful to articulate for 
themselves why the Eucharist is the source of Christian living.  Insofar as the Church expects 
assent to these teachings which are incoherent or irrelevant for many, it exacerbates a difficult 
situation.  Explanation of just how the Eucharist accomplishes transformation -- beyond ‘as a 
means of communion,’ or, as a localized presence of the divine -- remains implied, unexplained, 
and assumed.   
The saving ‘logic’ that the Eucharist presents through its liturgical celebration seems not 
to be self-evident.  Yet insofar as the Church cannot articulate well for its own faithful what it 
celebrates, why it celebrates, and how the celebration is meant to transform recipients themselves 
-- i.e., the Eucharist as ‘source’ of the Christian life -- it fails its own sanctifying mission.  
Insofar as the Church cannot articulate these things well for the world -- i.e., the Eucharist as 
‘source and summit’ of the Christian life -- it fails as a witness to the glory of God and as a 
sacrament for the world.  The ‘mystery of Christ’ which people are meant to encounter and 
participate in through the Eucharist has become too mysterious -- but not in the complimentary 
way the Church speaks of ‘mystery.’  Rather, it has become inaccessible, even to the faithful.   
Several factors have converged against a lived, meaningful, existential understanding of 
the Eucharist.  This chapter will first give a very brief overview of how the terms of Eucharistic 
doctrine took shape.  Next, it will highlight some ‘external’ cultural challenges to traditional 
Church doctrine which have undermined the deposit of faith concerning the Eucharist.  
Subsequent sections will address developments leading to Vatican II’s theological warrant for a 
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new approach, some attempts to address these challenges in the decades that followed, and a 
proposal of the Eucharist as a gracious and scandalous gift. 
1.1.1.  Cultural Challenges to Traditional Church Doctrine 
I lived in a time when a huge change in the contents of the human imagination was occurring.  
In my lifetime Heaven and Hell disappeared, the belief in life after death was considerably 
weakened [and so on]… After two thousand years in which a huge edifice of creeds and 
dogmas has been erected, from Origen and Saint Augustine to Thomas Aquinas and Cardinal 
Newman, when every work of the human mind and of human hands was created within a 
system of reference, the age of homelessness has dawned. 
-- Czesław Miłosz3 
(1911-2004) 
 
 Reasons why the Church’s teaching became inaccessible run wide and deep.  The scope 
of cultural change within the past 50 years -- not to mention the 450 years since the Council of 
Trent -- is difficult to overstate.  Even while the Church’s answers to questions of Eucharistic 
doctrine remained constant, the meaning and importance of the questions and concerns have 
changed.  This section will trace some reasons how and why that situation emerged.   
1.1.1.1.  Magisterial Teaching on the Eucharist Before Vatican II 
For its first several centuries in existence, the Church had rather little internal controversy 
concerning the nature of Eucharistic practice and teaching -- something of a miracle in its own 
right.  In the absence of sustained debate or controversy, Eucharistic theology lacked the 
catalysts driving the development of trinitarian and Christological theology.  Only with the 
controversies surrounding Paschasius and Ratramnus in the 9th century and Berengarius in the 
11th century was the precise nature of the change in Eucharistic elements even brought into 
                                               
3 Czesław Miłosz, Road-side Dog, trans. Czesław Miłosz and Robert Hass, Reprint edition (New York: Farrar, 
Straus and Giroux: 1998), 105.  Cited in “A Sophiology Between Scatology and Eschatology,” Lost in the Cosmos 





sustained question.4  Even so, these controversies only concerned how -- not whether -- a 
substantial change in the elements occurred.  Even so, no papal or conciliar decrees for the 
universal Church were promulgated at that time.   
Not until 1215 did an ecumenical council (Lateran IV) make a doctrinal statement 
concerning the nature of the Eucharist: “[Christ’s] body and blood are truly contained in the 
sacrament of the altar under the forms of bread and wine, the bread and wine having been 
changed in substance by the divine power (Latin, transubstantiates pane in corpus et vino in 
sanguinem potestate divina) into his body and blood.”5  This teaching on transubstantiation was 
subsequently reaffirmed at the councils of Constance (1415), Florence (1439), and Trent (1545-
1563).  So even about 1500 years after Jesus walked the earth, the scope and depth of Eucharistic 
theology remained relatively underdeveloped.    
The Protestant Reformation of the 16th century disputed the nature of the sacraments in 
general and of the Eucharist in particular.  Catholic doctrine found expression in the Declarations 
of the Council of Trent.  These declarations’ concern with Eucharistic consecration, Real 
Presence, sacrifice, and the priestly power (potestas) to consecrate the Eucharist established 
these issues as the chief categories of Eucharistic doctrine ever since.  Furthermore, the Church’s 
use of hylomorphic terminology (substance/accident, form/matter, act/potency) embedded 
official Eucharistic doctrine within a particular Thomistic-Aristotelian philosophical vocabulary.   
While neither a conciliar document nor directly concerned with Eucharistic doctrine, 
Pope Leo XIII’s Encyclical Letter of 1879 Aeterni Patris lauded the writings and thought of 
                                               
4 Cf. Edward Kilmartin, The Eucharist in the West, edited by Robert Daly (Collegeville, MN: Liturgical 
Publications, 1998), 82-102.   
5 Norman Tanner, “The Eucharist in the Ecumenical Councils,” Gregorianum 82:1 (2001), 42. 
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Thomas Aquinas above those of every other thinker.6  This testifies to the desire, at the papal 
level at least, to preserve and express the Church’s official teaching in Thomistic/scholastic 
categories -- even 600 years after Thomas’ death. 
1.1.1.2.  Scientific and Philosophical Challenges 
Various developments in science and philosophy in recent centuries have created vast 
challenges to traditional Church teaching which erode both understanding of and belief in God 
and (more particularly) the Eucharist.   A series of scientific and cultural revolutions have 
gradually rendered the Church’s scholastic worldview inaccurate, outdated, or even meaningless.  
Some examples include:    
 Evidence for a heliocentric solar system, mounting across centuries by Nicholas 
Copernicus (1473-1543), Galileo Galilei (1564-1642), Johannes Kepler (1571-1630), and 
Isaac Newton (1642-1727), raised questions concerning human beings’ place (literally 
and figuratively) in the universe.   
 
 The rise of scientific empiricism, exemplified in the work of Francis Bacon (1561-1626), 
John Locke (1632-1704), and David Hume (1711-76) laid a foundation for science as 
verifiable only by empirical data.  The critique of metaphysics by Immanuel Kant (1724-
1804) further eroded a worldview founded in Aristotelian-Scholastic hylomorphism and 
its corresponding metaphysics.  The theory of evolution proposed by Charles Darwin 
(1809-1882) posed challenges to the biblical account of creation and of God as creator.   
 
 Openly atheistic worldviews found stronger expression in Voltaire (1694-1778), Arthur 
Schopenhauer (1788-1860), Ludwig Feuerbach (1804-72), and Karl Marx (1818-83).  
Friedrich Nietzsche (1844-1900) wrote strong critiques of Judeo-Christian morality; 
Sigmund Freud (1856-1939) likewise considered religion an infantilizing phenomenon 
attributable to unconscious needs.  The burden of proof for theistic faith began shifting 
from non-believers onto the faithful.   
 
 With the rise of linguistics and semiotics in the writings of Ferdinand de Saussure (1857-
1913) and Charles Sanders Peirce (1839-1914) as a field of study unto itself, a purely 
instrumental notion of language became less tenable.  The formative roles language plays 
for thought and identity came to clearer light, finding expression as ‘the linguistic turn’ in 
                                               
6 Paragraph 22: “[The] chief and special glory of Thomas, one which he has shared with none of the Catholic 
Doctors, is that the Fathers of Trent made it part of the order of conclave to lay upon the altar, together with sacred 
Scripture and the decrees of the supreme Pontiffs, the Summa of Thomas Aquinas, whence to seek counsel, reason, 




philosophy.  The writings of Ludwig Wittgenstein (1889-1951) illuminated many 
difficulties posed by language, particularly for theology (“Whereof one cannot speak, 
thereof one must be silent”).  This ‘linguistic turn’ culminated in the structuralism of 
Claude Levi-Strauss (1908-2009), in which language constructs all reality and meaning.   
 
Not least among major challenges to the deposit of faith has been the philosophical work 
of Martin Heidegger (1889-1976).  Forty-eight years after Pope Leo XIII’s Aeterni Patris, 
Heidegger’s writings posed a withering critique of ‘onto-theology:’ theology (and/or philosophy) 
which had forgotten ‘the ontological difference’ between entities and ‘Being.’7  Heidegger’s 
work posed a unique challenge to the philosophical premises of Christian doctrine, since (at the 
least) it required reassessment of the metaphysics and ontology upon which the Church had 
relied so heavily for several centuries.  The philosophical reasoning undergirding Church 
doctrines of God, grace, the Church, the sacraments -- to name a few -- suddenly had large fault 
lines, not easily remedied.   
1.1.1.3.  Growth of Historical Consciousness 
 Developments in the field of history impacted Church teaching as well, forcing 
reassessments of the foundational events of revelation, the effects of historical conditioning, and 
the direction of history.   
 After the printing press gave greater access to texts, the Sacred Scriptures were 
scrutinized critically beyond the bounds set by reverent faith communities.  Gradually, 
skepticism eroded a naïve fundamentalism that (for instance) considered Moses the author of the 
Pentateuch, the gospels to be unbiased eyewitness accounts, and the New Testament letters to be 
written by the Twelve apostles themselves.  The 19th century writings of David Friedrich Strauss 
(1808-74) and Ernest Renan (1823-92) cast doubts on the historical veracity of the gospels.  This 
historical criticism dismissed accounts of miracles, including the resurrection, as heavily biased 
                                               
7 Cf. Martin Heidegger, “The Onto-theo-logical Constitution of Metaphysics,” in Identity and Difference, trans. Joan 
Stambaugh (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2002), 42-74. 
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by believers.  Nineteenth and 20th-century historical-criticism (particularly ‘demythologization’) 
of the Bible debunked dominical institution of the sacraments and apostolic succession, 
important links in Catholic teaching on the sacraments.  The burden of proof moved more and 
more upon those who upheld such matters as historical fact.   
 This advent of historical consciousness -- that texts, meanings, and even ‘truths’ were 
subject to biases as well as changes across generations and cultures -- called foundational truths 
into question even more radically.  The possibility that biblical or theological terms could have 
different meanings in different eras further undermined the presumably unchanging bulwark of 
truth that was the doctrine of the Church.   
 Furthermore, in recent times human beings have seen that, contrary to modernist notions 
of progress, history does not always develop in a benign manner.  The 20th century’s World Wars 
I and II and genocides put an end to notions of ‘unbridled progress.’  Technological and 
scientific advances proved to empower humans’ murderous capacities rather than usher in an era 
of peace.     
1.1.1.4.  Existential Concerns in ‘the Age of Anxiety’ 
Destruction of large populations -- or even the world itself -- used to belong exclusively 
to the imagination of apocalyptic literature.  Detonation of atomic bombs at Hiroshima and 
Nagasaki in 1945 and proliferation of nuclear weapons in the ‘Cold War,’ however, 
demonstrated that destruction ‘on a biblical scale’ is now an all-too-real aspect of the human 
condition.  More currently and vividly, the rise of terrorism throughout the world and the 
persistence of civil strife (racism, economic and social injustice, etc.) raise urgent questions 
concerning violence, reconciliation, and peace amid a pluralistic world.  Since eucharistic 
doctrine has been traditionally more concerned with personal sanctification for a future life in 
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heaven, the Eucharist appears to many to be far removed from and irrelevant for present-world 
matters of social justice.   
All of these cultural challenges -- philosophical, scientific, historical, technological -- 
have complicated appropriation of a faith that makes sense in and of the present-day world.  If or 
when the Church dismisses the impact of these cultural challenges -- meanwhile expecting assent 
to scholastic metaphysics to explain its central act of worship -- it again risks failing its own 
sanctifying mission, for both its own faithful and people of the world. 
1.1.2.  Pre-Vatican II Liturgical and Eucharistic Theology 
The 19th and 20th centuries witnessed a development of attention to liturgical theology as 
its own field, yielding the ‘Liturgical Movement’ of the mid-20th century.  Through a revival of 
communal liturgical practice, a papal motu proprio, and theological ressourcement, a more 
meaningful relation between ‘liturgy and life’ emerged from aspiration to theology to re-
examination of the Church’s liturgical principles and practice.  Concern for this relation emerged 
so strongly that Vatican II incorporated the necessity of the assembly’s ‘full, conscious, active 
participation’ into Sacrosanctum Concilium, the Church’s dogmatic constitution on the liturgy.   
The roots of this development reach back into the 19th century.  At the Benedictine abbey 
of Solesmes, France (re-established 1833), its founder Dom Prosper Guérangér (1805-1875) 
began writing The Liturgical Year, a 15-volume set of reflections on the Church year as 
celebrations re-presenting the history of salvation; this fostered a stronger understanding of the 
liturgy as celebration of the mysteries of the faith.  Solesmes also became a center of revival of 
liturgical study and Gregorian chant.  The massive retrieval of patristic and medieval texts by the 
Jesuit J.P. Migne (1800-1875) in Patrologia Graeco-Latina restored access to theological (and 
liturgical) texts that enabled a theological ressourcement into the mid-20th century.   
11 
 
Pius X’s 1903 motu proprio on sacred music (“Tra le sollecitudini”) proved pivotal for 
the concern for liturgical participation when he stated “active participation in the most holy 
mysteries and ... [the] prayer of the Church” is “the true and indispensable source” for the 
Christian life.8  The phrase ‘active participation’ caught the attention of Dom Lambert Beauduin 
(1873-1960) of Mont César (Kaizersberg) Abbey in Leuven, Belgium (est. 1888, elevated to 
abbey in 1899), who presented on that topic at a national Catholic labor conference in 1909 in 
Malines, Belgium.  The journal Les Questions Liturgiques et Paroissiales followed starting in 
1910, advocating full and active participation by all and emphasizing the liturgy as a dialogue.  
Beauduin published Liturgy: Life of the Church in 1914.9   
Liturgical theology took another important step with the writings of Odo Casel (1886-
1948), a Benedictine of Maria Laach Abbey in Germany (founded in 1893).  The journal 
Ecclesia Orans (begun 1918) and his exploration of the sacraments as initiation into religious 
mysteries in Paul and the earliest centuries of the Church moved discussion of the liturgy and 
sacraments outside of neoscholastic categories.10  Also published in 1918 was Romano 
Guardini’s (1885-1968) The Spirit of the Liturgy, a foundational text of ‘the Liturgical 
Movement’ of the 20th century.11  It revived the patristic principle lex orandi lex credendi, the 
                                               
8 The original Italian text of Pius X, prepared 10 years earlier in a set of draft comments to Pope Leo XIII on the 




9 Lambert Beauduin, Liturgy: Life of the Church, trans. Virgil Michel (Collegeville, MN: Liturgical Press, 1926).  
Bernard Botte, a confrere of Beauduin, noted that “The Liturgical Movement, at its beginning, was not a reformist 
movement.  Dom Beauduin .... regarded the Liturgy as a traditional given which we first of all had to try to 
understand.”  Bernard Botte, From Silence to Participation: An Insider’s View of Liturgical Renewal, trans. John 
Sullivan (Washington, D.C.: Pastoral Press, 1988), 15. 
10 Odo Casel, The Mystery of Christian Worship, ed. Burkhard Neunheuser, Introduction by Aidan Kavanagh, 
Milestones in Catholic Theology (New York: Crossroad, 1999).  Originally published in 1932, English translation 
1962 by Darton, Longman, and Todd, London. 
11 Romano Guardini, The Spirit of the Liturgy, trans. Ada Lane, introduction by Joanne M. Pierce 
(New York: Crossroad, 1998).  Originally written in 1918, English translation first published by Sheed & Ward in 
London, 1930.   
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liturgy as a teacher of faith and prayer, and placed an emphasis on the liturgy as celebrated by 
the entire assembly, as members of the mystical body of Christ.  It called for full and active 
participation by the assembly, particularly through use of vernacular language.  All these themes 
proved fundamental to the liturgical theology and practice of the latter half of the 20th century. 
The nature of the Eucharistic sacrifice was examined as an oblation (gift) by Maurice de 
la Taille (1872-1933) in Mysterium Fidei, unifying the Last Supper, Calvary, and the Church’s 
celebration of the Eucharist.12  This inquiry examined the notion of sacrifice as something other 
than an immolation, an important advance for Eucharistic theology.  A Thomist/neoscholastic 
rejoinder (though it never names de la Taille) appears in Dom Anscar Vonier’s (1875-1938) 
1925 text A Key to the Doctrine of the Eucharist, asserting a strong distinction between the 
perfect sacrifice upon Calvary and the sacramental signs of that sacrifice in the Last Supper and 
eucharistic liturgy, reviving another important sacramental theme.13   
The mid-20th century saw a theological ressourcement that prepared a way for Vatican II.     
In 1944, French Jesuit Henri de Lubac’s (1893-1991) historical study Corpus Mysticum 
advocated a “return to the sacramental origins of the ‘mystical body’.... The Church and the 
Eucharist are formed by one another day by day.”14  This study revived the patristic 
understanding of the ‘mystical body of Christ’ as referring to the Eucharist rather than the visible 
Church.  Karl Rahner (1904-1984) work on revelation as God’s self-communication restored an 
emphasis on encounter with God (rather than revelation of truths ‘about’ God), and his theology 
                                               
12 Maurice de La Taille, The Mystery of Faith: Regarding the Most August Sacrament and Sacrifice of the Body and 
Blood of Christ (New York, Sheed & Ward, 1940).  Originally published in 1921.  For a contemporary study of de la 
Taille’s theology, cf. Michon M. Matthiesen, Sacrifice as Gift: Eucharist, Grace, and Contemplative Prayer in 
Maurice de la Taille (Washington: Catholic University of America, 2013). 
13 Anscar Vonier, A Key to the Doctrine of the Eucharist, preface by Peter Kreeft, introduction by Aidan Nichols, 
O.P. (Bethesda, MD: Zacchaeus, 2003). 
14 Henri de Lubac, Corpus Mysticum: the Eucharist and the Church in the Middle Ages : Historical Survey, trans. 




of symbol moved discussion of the sacraments outside the category of causality.15  Edward 
Schillebeeckx’s (1914-2009) Christ the Sacrament of the Encounter with God had a similar 
emphasis on personalist categories for proper discussion of the sacraments.16  These (and several 
other) thinkers prepared the way for important developments at Vatican II.  
1.1.3.  Theological Shifts at Vatican II  
The need for a newer approach to Eucharistic theology also finds warrant within the 
Church’s own magisterial teaching.  Shifts of emphasis in the constitutional documents 
Sacrosanctum Concilium and Lumen Gentium signaled the need for a more accessible and 
relevant account of the Eucharist for a new cultural milieu -- especially as they raise questions 
for which onto-theology provides irrelevant answers.  While these shifts merit their own detailed 
study, they are simply noted here to indicate the need to expand our understanding of the 
Eucharist.  As a result of these developments in Church teaching, new theological questions arise 
which traditional teaching fails to address or answer.  Aside from ‘external’ scientific, 
philosophical, and cultural challenges to the faith, Vatican II’s liturgical reforms and new 
questions for theology expose an internal exigency to update Eucharistic doctrine.   
1.1.3.1.  Sacrosanctum Concilium: Unpacking the Riches of the Liturgy   
Both as the Council’s first document and according to its stated purpose, the Dogmatic 
Constitution on the Sacred Liturgy (Sacrosanctum Concilium) expressed forcefully how the 
liturgy was and is a central concern: 
This sacred Council has several aims in view: it desires to impart an ever increasing vigor to 
the Christian life of the faithful; to adapt more suitably to the needs of our own times those 
institutions which are subject to change; to foster whatever can promote union among all who 
believe in Christ; to strengthen whatever can help to call the whole of mankind into the 
                                               
15 Karl Rahner, Foundations of Christian Faith: An Introduction to the Idea of Christianity, trans. William V. Dyck 
(New York: Crossroad, 1978). 
16 Edward Schillebeeckx, Christ, the Sacrament of the Encounter with God, trans. Paul Barrett, English text rev. by 
Mark Schoof and Laurence Bright (New York, Sheed and Ward, 1963). 
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household of the Church.  The Council therefore sees particularly cogent reasons for 
undertaking the reform and promotion of the liturgy.17 
 
It is noteworthy that, in order to address the challenges facing Christians, the Church undertook 
as its first task reform and promotion of the liturgy. Whether consciously or led by inspiration, 
the Church looks to reinvigorate the integrity of its life through a ressourcement of the liturgy:  
not theology or doctrine per se, but the action -- divine and human -- taking place there.  In this 
the Church is being true to its own nature in the best possible way: it looks to the place where 
human beings seek to listen to and cooperate with God’s loving will.   
As clearly as the constitution will relate the liturgy and the life of the faithful, it calls for 
liturgical reform; this is suggestive of weaknesses that crept into Eucharistic doctrine or practice.  
New questions raised by doctrinal points and reforms in Sacrosanctum Concilium (SC) suggest 
the need for a renewed Eucharistic theology.18 
1.1.3.1.1.  Relation of the Liturgy to Apostolic Work 
 SC situates the relationship of the liturgy to apostolic work, a first for an ecumenical 
council.  SC acknowledges that liturgy is not utterly separate from living in the world; liturgy is 
                                               
17 Sacrosanctum concilium [Dogmatic Constitution on the Sacred Liturgy], 4 December 1963, Accessed on June 6, 
2016 at http://www.vatican.va/archive/hist_councils/ii_vatican_council/documents/vat-
ii_const_19631204_sacrosanctum-concilium_en.html, 1.  Hereafter SC.  As noted below, the theme of ‘font and 
apex’ also appears in Lumen Gentium 11, in reference to the Eucharist.   
18 The nature of the liturgical reform for which SC called remains a matter of ongoing articulation and debate.  See  
Congregation for Divine Worship and the Discipline of the Sacraments, Redemptionis Sacramentum (Instruction on 
certain matters to be observed or to be avoided regarding the Most Holy Eucharist), April 23, 2004.  Accessed at 
http://www.vatican.va/roman_curia/congregations/ccdds/documents/rc_con_ccdds_doc_20040423_redemptionis-
sacramentum_en.html on April 18, 2017.  Also by the same congregation,  Liturgiam Authenticam (Fifth Instruction 
for the Right Implementation of the Constitution of the Sacred Liturgy of the Second Vatican Council), May 7, 
2001.  Accessed at 
http://www.vatican.va/roman_curia/congregations/ccdds/documents/rc_con_ccdds_doc_20010507_liturgiam-
authenticam_en.html on April 18, 2017.  (Paragraph 28 speaks of Sacred Liturgy engages “the whole person, who is 
the ‘subject’ of full and conscious participation in the liturgical celebration.”).  Regarding interpretation of liturgical 
reform since Vatican II, see Massimo Faggioli, True Reform: Liturgy and Ecclesiology in Sacrosanctum Concilium 
(Collegeville, MN: Liturgical Press, 2012); John F. Baldovin, Reforming the Liturgy: A Response to the Critics 
(Collegeville, MN: Pueblo, 2009).   
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meant to impel lives of charity and works in and for the world (cf. 9).  Such charitable works 
amid the world, however, have their origin and goal in the liturgy:  
[The] liturgy is the summit toward which the activity of the Church is directed; at the 
same time it is the font from which all her power flows.  For the aim and object of 
apostolic works is that all who are made sons of God by faith and baptism should come 
together to praise God in the midst of His Church, to take part in the sacrifice, and to eat 
the Lord's supper.19 
 
So both the Church’s apostolic work and its celebration of the sacraments include an orientation 
to the world -- even if in view of an ultimate goal of glorifying God.   
The liturgy in its turn moves the faithful, filled with ‘the paschal sacraments,’ to be ‘one 
in holiness’; it prays that ‘they may hold fast in their lives to what they have grasped by 
their faith’; the renewal in the Eucharist of the covenant between the Lord and man draws 
the faithful into the compelling love of Christ and sets them on fire.  From the liturgy, 
therefore, and especially from the Eucharist, as from a font, grace is poured forth upon 
us; and the sanctification of men in Christ and the glorification of God, to which all other 
activities of the Church are directed as toward their end, is achieved in the most 
efficacious possible way.20  
 
So the liturgy is both the source and goal of apostolic work; a relationship of liturgy and work is 
established.  Yet, as beautiful as it may be for believers to hear that the liturgy ‘moves the 
faithful,’ ‘renews a covenant,’ or sets believers ‘on fire’, such poetic images have limited 
explanatory value.  They do not articulate how liturgy might relate to human desire, identity, and 
relationships.  SC clarifies the relationship of liturgy and apostolic work some, but new questions 
emerge: How can the metaphors of liturgy as ‘summit and font’ be understood in terms that are 
neither poetic nor dependent on causality?  How ought liturgy redirect human desires, values, or 
relationships to make one’s work and life apostolic or charitable?  How is apostolic work an 
outgrowth of liturgical (and especially Eucharistic) worship?  What do people need or receive 
from the liturgy to do their apostolic work in a properly Christian manner?  But as important as 
                                               
19 SC 10. 
20 SC 10. 
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these questions are, none of them are answered by the traditional Thomistic metaphysics of 
presence or causality.   
1.1.3.1.2.  Paschal Mystery: Broader Emphasis  
Across several centuries, the ‘satisfaction atonement theory’ of Saint Anselm acquired 
major influence as an expression of the Church’s doctrine of redemption.21  Though never 
endorsed outright by any ecumenical council or papal encyclical as ‘the official teaching of the 
Church,’ many expressions of Church doctrine (including the Thomas Aquinas’ Summa 
Theologiae) shared Anselm’s concise reasoning for how the cause of redemption was Christ’s 
sacrificial and atoning death.  Gradually Anselm’s insights -- as they were handed on through 
Church teaching -- were oversimplified into a reductive understanding of redemption, which to 
various degrees excluded reference to Christ’s incarnation, life, teachings, healings, resurrection, 
or ascension.  Furthermore, both soteriological thought and Eucharistic theology followed suit, 
expressing redemption and the purpose of the Eucharist in sacrificial terms without providing a 
genuinely Christian notion of sacrifice.   
Reflecting the influence of the 20th century liturgical movement and Pius XII’s encyclical 
Mediator Dei, SC bases the liturgy and the life of the Church upon the broader theme of the 
redemptive work of Christ’s paschal mystery, with reference to Christ’s passion, resurrection, 
and ascension.22  It was by means of Christ’s own paschal mystery that redemption was 
accomplished: Christ’s death has redemptive meaning because he is the incarnation of the divine 
Word whom the Father raised from the dead.  Christ’s ascension and sending of the Holy Spirit 
are by no means incidental to human beings’ salvation.   It is into this broader paschal mystery 
that we are initiated and incorporated by means of the sacraments.   
                                               
21 Cf. Anselm of Canterbury, Cur Deus Homo.   
22 Cf. SC 5, specifically mentioning the resurrection and ascension; also cf. 6, 10, 47, 61, 104, 106, 107, 109. 
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This shift prompts the Church to consider anew how Christ’s life, teachings, resurrection, 
and ascension might relate to aspects of Christian living ‘in the world.’  More specifically for our 
interests, aspects of the Eucharist ‘beyond the sacrificial’ deserve attention: in what senses is the 
Eucharist memorial, meal, or eschatological sign -- and what can or ought they teach us?  How 
might the Eucharist be understood more fully in light of the resurrection of Christ, and his 
assurance he will drink ‘the fruit of the vine’ again at the coming of the kingdom?  Does the 
notion of ‘sacrifice’ reveal or obscure a proper understanding of the atonement and/or the 
Eucharist? 
1.1.3.1.3.  Presence of Christ in the Assembly as Such 
To accomplish so great a work [of salvation], Christ is always present in His Church, 
especially in her liturgical celebrations.  He is present in the sacrifice of the Mass, not only in 
the person of His minister... but especially under the Eucharistic species.  By His power He is 
present in the sacraments.... He is present in His word.... He is present, lastly, when the Church 
prays and sings, for He promised: "Where two or three are gathered together in my name, 
there am I in the midst of them" (Mt. 18:20).23 
 
 It easily escapes notice that, with SC, the magisterium expressed for the first time a 
recognition of the presence of Christ in the whole liturgical assembly in its own right -- and not 
merely by virtue of the presider or ‘his’ act of consecrating and offering of the Eucharist.  This 
simple change has profound implications, historical and theological, which merits its own 
detailed study.  For our purposes however, we note the Church’s recognition of the assembly 
among whom Christ is ‘already’ present ‘before’ consecration or offering of the Eucharistic 
elements.  The Church thereby recognizes the assembly both as a gathering of praying subjects 
and as already-graced recipients of God’s gifts.   
 As a result, Eucharistic theology must address anew: If Christ is ‘already’ present in the 
assembly, what is going on in the mass?  Especially in light of Heidegger’s critique of ‘onto-
                                               
23 SC, 7. 
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theology,’ is the mere presence of Christ -- whether amid the assembly, word, priest, or ‘really, 
truly, substantially’ in the Eucharist -- ever meant to be the final word?   
1.1.3.1.4.  Liturgy as Dialogue Among Active Subjects 
 While ‘already-graced’ subjects, members of the assembly must still dispose themselves 
properly to receive God’s gifts well:    
[In] order that the liturgy may be able to produce its full effects, it is necessary that the faithful 
come to it with proper dispositions, that their minds should be attuned to their voices, and that 
they should cooperate with divine grace lest they receive it in vain.... [The] faithful [must] take 
part fully aware of what they are doing, actively engaged in the rite, and enriched by its 
effects.24 
 
As much as the Church has used the motif of causality to interpret the sacraments, human beings 
are not mere passive recipients.  SC recognizes the cooperation of recipients’ disposition as 
necessary for a fully fruitful liturgy.  This calls greater attention to the participant as a subject 
who must actively respond to God’s word and action.  The liturgy is dialogical in nature:   
Mother Church earnestly desires that all the faithful should be led to that fully conscious, and 
active [plenam illam, consciam atque actuosam] participation in liturgical celebrations which 
is demanded by the very nature of the liturgy.  Such participation by the Christian people as "a 
chosen race, a royal priesthood, a holy nation, a redeemed people (1 Pet. 2:9; cf. 2:4-5), is their 
right and duty by reason of their baptism.  In the restoration and promotion of the sacred 
liturgy, this full and active participation by all the people is the aim to be considered before all 
else; for it is the primary and indispensable source from which the faithful are to derive the 
true Christian spirit.25 
The Council recognized the “right and duty” (emphasis added) of the faithful for “fully 
conscious, and active participation” in the liturgy.  The faithful are therefore “encouraged to take 
part by means of acclamations, responses, psalmody, antiphons, and songs, as well as by actions, 
gestures, and bodily attitudes.  And at the proper times all should observe a reverent silence.”26   
                                               
24 SC, 11. 
25 SC 14.  Also cf. SC 27, 30. 
26 SC 30.   
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When celebrating the Eucharist, Christ’s faithful “should not be there as strangers or 
silent spectators,” removed from either understanding or engaging in the liturgy, such that 
“offering the Immaculate Victim, not only through the hands of the priest, but also with him, 
they should learn also to offer themselves.”27  The Council called attention to the dialogical 
dynamic meant to unfold in the liturgy: 
[In] the liturgy God speaks to His people and Christ is still proclaiming His gospel. And the 
people reply to God both by song and prayer.... [The] prayers addressed to God by the priest 
who presides over the assembly in the person of Christ are said in the name of the entire holy 
people and of all present....[W]hen the Church prays or sings or acts, the faith of those taking 
part is nourished and their minds are raised to God, so that they may offer Him their rational 
service and more abundantly receive His grace.28 
 
Responses by the congregation are called for to properly express their ‘offering of themselves’ 
along with the Victim offered by the priest.  The liturgy is permeated by a dialogical encounter 
between God and human beings, characterized by God’s call and the faithful’s response.   
 Ever since the promulgation of SC, the proper nature of this fully conscious and active 
participation in the liturgy continues to be a topic of magisterial teaching and theological 
debate.29  The nature of the Eucharist as a metaphysical cause of grace has been taught 
consistently for centuries; however SC calls greater attention to the response demanded of the 
                                               
27 SC 48.  The notion of self-offering by the faithful in celebration of the Eucharist also appears in Lumen Gentium 
11. 
28 SC 33. 
29 Pope John Paul II, Vicesimus Quintus Annus (On the 25th Anniversary of the Promulgation of the Conciliar 
Constitution Sacrosanctum Concilium), December 4, 1988.  Accessed at https://w2.vatican.va/content/john-paul-
ii/en/apost_letters/1988/documents/hf_jp-ii_apl_19881204_vicesimus-quintus-annus.html on April 18 2017.  Pope 
John Paul II, Ad Limina Address to Bishops of the United States On Active Participation in the Liturgy, October 9, 
1998. Accessed at https://adoremus.org/2007/12/31/Active-Participation-in-the-Liturgy/ on April 18, 2017.  Also, 
Pope John Paul II, Address to a group of Bishops from the United States of America on their Ad limina visit, 9 
October 1998, n. 3: AAS 91 (1999) 353-354.  For interpretations of liturgical participation leading up to the Second 
Vatican Council, see R. Gabriel Pivarnik, Toward a Trinitarian Theology of Liturgical Participation (Collegeville, 
MN: Liturgical Press, 2013).  For interpretations since the Second Vatican Council, see Cardinal Joseph Ratzinger 
(Benedict XVI), The Spirit of the Liturgy (San Francisco: Ignatius, 2000); Massimo Faggioli, True Reform: Liturgy 
and Ecclesiology in Sacrosanctum Concilium (Collegeville, MN: Liturgical Press, 2012); Kevin Irwin, What We 
Have Done, What We Have Failed to Do: Assessing the Liturgical Reforms of Vatican II (Mahwah, NJ: Paulist, 
2013); Joris Geldhof, ed., Mediating Mysteries, Understanding Liturgies: On Bridging the Gap Between Liturgy and 
Systematic Theology, Leuven Encounters in Systematic Theology IX (Leuven: Peeters, 2015); Alcuin Reid, ed., 
Liturgy in the Twenty-First Century: Contemporary Issues and Perspectives (New York: T&T Clark, 2016). 
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assembly to divine presence and grace.  New questions concerning this participation and 
response thus arise: How does or ought a dialogical understanding of the liturgy reshape 
Eucharistic theology?  How is ‘fully conscious and active’ participation in the liturgy 
cooperative with divine grace, and formative for participants?  How might the dynamic of God’s 
speech and gifts to a fully participating assembly -- and their response -- accomplish a 
transformation?    
1.1.3.1.5.  Vernacular in the Liturgy 
Even if taken for granted by most people today, the liturgical reform with likely the 
greatest impact throughout the world was permission to use the ‘mother tongue.’30  One can 
appreciate this development more deeply in light of the philosophical “linguistic turn” of the 20th 
century.  To celebrate the liturgy in native languages fosters a more natural and direct formation 
of disciples that would simply not be possible by means of Latin.  Liturgy in the vernacular 
creates new associations and connections with recipients’ daily lives that did not previously 
exist.  Language is an essential part of the process (along with personal decision or conversion) 
which forms subjects.  The importance of language for cultivating Christian subjects is vastly 
facilitated by use of the vernacular in the liturgy.  Use of the vernacular heightens understanding 
of and consent to both the gospel message and the intentions expressed by the praying Church.31   
As the liturgy becomes more accessible to understanding, new issues once again arise: 
What can ‘the linguistic turn’ teach us concerning what the Church and/or liturgy of the 
Eucharist imparts to the faithful?  Does the vernacular have a special importance for the 
                                               
30 Cf. SC 36, 54. 
31 Analogously, this is again why Church doctrine needs to explain traditional teaching -- concerned with 
metaphysics, universals, and causality -- in concepts more conducive to contemporary concerns, which include 
verifiability, ethics, and existential questions.   
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relationships involved in the Eucharist?  Again, these are questions that traditional Eucharistic 
theology would neither consider, address, or be able to answer with genuine depth.   
1.1.3.1.6.  Granting Communion Under Both Species to the Laity 
Another important reform implemented by SC was to grant communion under both kinds 
to the laity.32  The reasons for this change were not given by the text.  A traditional Eucharistic 
theology of metaphysical presence and causality, with its notion of ‘concomitance’ (whereby in 
each element is found the Body and Blood), struggles to assign a meaningful ‘additional’ value 
to receiving under both kinds.  What is the importance of receiving under both kinds?  Why 
could or does it make any difference?  Is bodily experience related to ‘fully conscious and active 
participation’ in the Eucharist?  If so, what is this relation?   
1.1.3.2.  Lumen Gentium: Sacramental Nature of Christ and the Church  
The present-day conditions of the world add greater urgency to this work of the Church [to 
unfold its nature and mission] so that all men [sic], joined more closely today by various 
social, technical and cultural ties, might also attain fuller unity in Christ.33 
 
 Promulgation of the Dogmatic Constitution on the Nature of the Church Lumen Gentium 
was its own watershed moment, marking the first declaration by an ecumenical council on the 
Church as such.  As the document itself notes above, a new context demands a clearer teaching.  
LG both reflects changes in worldwide culture and calls for newer articulations of Eucharistic 
doctrine.   
1.1.3.2.1.  The Church’s Relation to Christ and the World 
 In various ways Lumen Gentium expresses the nature of the Church as a sacramental sign 
of Christ.  The Church “is in Christ like a sacrament [veluti sacramentum] or as a sign and 
                                               
32 Cf. SC 55. 
33 Lumen Gentium 1.  Hereafter LG. 
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instrument” of both union with God and the unity of the human race;34 it is “the universal 
sacrament of salvation,” with a universal mission.35 
God gathered together as one all those who in faith look upon Jesus as the author of salvation 
and the source of unity and peace, and established them as the Church that for each and all it 
may be the visible sacrament of this saving unity.36  
 
As it is ‘like a sacrament,’ the Church -- while not ‘of’ the world -- is both present in it and has 
loving concern for all human beings.  The Church is meant to be present to the world (relating 
liturgy and life), not utterly separated from it.  Can the quasi-sacramental nature of the Church 
teach us more about the Eucharist?  How does the Church as ‘like a sacrament’ shed light on 
relationships between the Church and the world, between liturgy and work?   
1.1.3.2.2.  The Church as the Ecclesial Body of Christ  
 Lumen Gentium revived a notion of the Church as the (ecclesial) Body of Christ.37  This 
shift corrected an imbalance in which the Glorified Body of Christ and Eucharistic Body of 
Christ were so emphasized as to neglect Christ’s presence in the liturgical assembly.38  Those 
assembled, while certainly seeking ever-greater unity with Christ, are those baptized in Christ 
who have been given the Holy Spirit.  The assembly is not a mere passive recipient or witness to 
Christ’s presence, ‘waiting’ for Christ to become present only upon the consecration of the bread 
and wine.  Because Christ is already present among the assembly, it actively petitions the Father 
to strengthen the community in unity and peace as a fuller embodiment of the Body of Christ.  
This creates a need to clarify this relation of the Ecclesial Body of Christ to the Eucharistic 
Body: what is the ecclesial Body of Christ doing in the liturgy of the Eucharist?   
1.1.3.2.3.  Missions of Christ and the Church  
                                               
34 LG 1.   
35 LG 48; cf. 1.   
36 LG 9. 
37 LG 23, 28, 32, 33. 




Lumen Gentium describes the mission of the Church as analogous to Christ’s mission in 
the world:  
Christ was sent by the Father "to bring good news to the poor, to heal the contrite of heart," "to 
seek and to save what was lost."  Similarly, the Church encompasses with love all who are 
afflicted with human suffering and in the poor and afflicted sees the image of its poor and 
suffering Founder.  It does all it can to relieve their need and in them it strives to serve Christ.  
While Christ, holy, innocent and undefiled knew nothing of sin, but came to expiate only the 
sins of the people, the Church, embracing in its bosom sinners, at the same time holy and 
always in need of being purified, always follows the way of penance and renewal.  The Church 
... presses forward ... announcing the cross and death of the Lord until He comes".... that it 
might reveal to the world, faithfully though darkly, the mystery of its Lord.39  
 
A common thread runs through the missions of Christ and of the Church, providing both 
similarities and differences.  Yet there is also need to understand these missions more clearly.  
What impact might this analogous relationship of the missions of Christ and the Church have 
upon an understanding of the Eucharist?  Can the Eucharist help clarify this similarity-and-
difference in missions?   
1.1.3.2.4.  The Laity and the Universal Call to Holiness 
One of the major contributions of Vatican II and of Lumen Gentium was its 
acknowledgment of the active, extra-liturgical lives of the vast majority of its members, the laity.  
The document repeatedly specifies a relation between the Eucharist and the laity:  
[By] the sacraments, especially holy Eucharist, that charity toward God and man which is the 
soul of the [lay] apostolate is communicated and nourished.  Now the laity are called in a 
special way to make the Church present and operative in those places and circumstances where 
only through them can it become the salt of the earth.  Thus every layman [sic], in virtue of the 
very gifts bestowed upon him, is at the same time a witness and a living instrument of the 
mission of the Church itself.40 
 
Both echoing and refining Sacrosanctum Concilium, LG calls  
 
                                               
39 LG 8. 
40 LG 33. 
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the Eucharistic sacrifice ... the fount and apex of the whole Christian life, [which the faithful] 
offer the Divine Victim to God, and offer themselves along with It.  Thus both by reason of 
the offering and through Holy Communion all take part in this liturgical service.... 
Strengthened in Holy Communion by the Body of Christ, [the lay faithful] then manifest in a 
concrete way that unity of the people of God which is suitably signified and wondrously 
brought about by this most august sacrament.41  
 
The Eucharistic sacrifice itself -- ‘alone,’ as opposed to liturgy as a whole -- is now called the 
fount and apex of the whole Christian life.   
Really partaking of the body of the Lord in the breaking of the Eucharistic bread, we are taken 
up into communion with Him and with one another. "Because the bread is one, we though 
many, are one body, all of us who partake of the one bread".  In this way all of us are made 
members of His Body, "but severally members one of another".42 
 
All these citations raise questions that traditional Eucharistic theology of presence and causality 
does not truly address: how does the Eucharist bring about unity among its recipients?  Also, 
given the violent and oppressive aspects of sacrifice brought to light by its critique, how else 
might the Eucharist serve as fount and apex of charity and unity?   
1.1.4.  Post-Vatican II Liturgical Theology 
 With these developments, liturgical theology had several avenues to pursue.  Orthodox 
theologian Alexander Schmemann (1921-1983) engendered a vigorous sense of Christ present in 
the liturgical assembly, correcting a western tendency to delimit Christ’s ‘real presence’ to the 
consecrated gifts.43  Benedictine Aidan Kavanagh (1929-2006) wrote of the liturgy as what 
shapes the theology of the Church, recalling Prosper of Aquitaine’s dictum ‘ut legem credendi 
lex statuat supplicandi.’44   
                                               
41 LG 11.  Cf. SC 10. 
42 LG 7. 
43 Alexander Schmemann, The Eucharist: Sacrament of the Kingdom, trans. Paul Kachur (Crestwood, NY: St. 
Vladimir’s Press, 1987). 
44 Aidan Kavanagh, On Liturgical Theology: The Hale Memorial Lectures of Seabury-Western Theological 
Seminary, 1981 (New York: Pueblo, 1984).  The text is dedicated ‘In memory of Alexander Schmemann.’ In his text 
Elements of Rite he wrote: “The liturgy ... exists not to educate but to seduce people into participating in common 
activity of the highest order, where one is freed to learn things which cannot be taught.”  Cf.  
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Louis-Marie Chauvet, featured in the next chapter, made a major contribution by 
recasting sacramental theology that incorporates a Heideggerian perspective on the necessary 
mediation of language and symbol.  Joseph C. Mudd’s Eucharist as Meaning brings Chauvet’s 
thought into dialogue with Bernard Lonergan, pointing out as a corrective the unavoidable 
necessity of metaphysics for meaningful discussion of the sacraments.45  David Farina 
Turnbloom likewise works to balance the traditional sacramental theology of Aquinas with the 
attention Chauvet calls toward the roles of the Holy Spirit and the assembly in regard to the 
Eucharist.46  David N. Power been a major post-Vatican II sacramental theologian, emphasizing 
a richer understanding of the liturgy as a symbolic event.47  From this theological context the 
following is situated and proposed.  
1.2.  Celebration of the Eucharist as Mediating Relations  
Faith throws a new light on everything, manifests God's design for man's total 
vocation, and thus directs the mind to solutions which are fully human.48 
 
The preceding section sought to bring to light the questions raised, the challenges posed 
for Eucharistic theology.  Mere repetition of traditional doctrines has failed and will continue to 
fail to articulate the meaning of the Eucharist for people in the contemporary world.  A different 
analogue, a different approach is required in order to speak to the imagination and understanding 
of the contemporary People of God.  The desired goal is to work toward a Eucharistic theology 
                                                                                                                                                       
http://www.saintmeinrad.edu/alumni/obituaries/?show=256 Accessed April 9, 2019.  Aidan Kavanagh, Elements of 
Rite: A Handbook of Liturgical Style (New York: Pueblo, 1982).  
45 Joseph C. Mudd, Eucharist as Meaning: Critical Metaphysics and Contemporary Sacramental Theology 
(Collegeville, MN: Liturgical Press, 2014). 
46 David Farina Turnbloom, Speaking with Aquinas: A Conversation about Grace, Virtue, and the Eucharist, Kindle 
Edition (Collegeville, MN: Liturgical Press, 2017). 
47 David N. Power, Unsearchable Riches: The Symbolic Nature of the Liturgy (New York: Pueblo, 1984).  David N. 
Power, The Eucharistic Mystery: Revitalizing the Tradition (New York: Crossroad, 1992).  David N. Power, 
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which is faithful to scripture and tradition, can dialogue with contemporary philosophy, and 
addresses existential questions.  We seek to articulate a Eucharistic theology that can and ought 
to illuminate God’s design for humans’ ‘total vocation,’ and ‘thus direct minds to that which is 
human.’   
To do just this, we propose looking at that which relates the divine and the human.  We 
look to how God acts by means of the liturgy of the Eucharist upon human desire, identity, and 
relationships: we attend to all that God gives through the liturgy.   
1.2.1.  Relational Model and Concerns 
Instead of an ‘onto-theology’ concerned with metaphysical nature, presence, and objects, 
we propose exploring the Eucharist by way of the philosophically rich notion of mediation.  It is 
by way of mediation that ‘things’ are related to each other; all the more so are subjects related to 
each other.  Aside from God’s own ‘mediation of Himself’ through the incarnate Word and the 
Holy Spirit, the Eucharist is the mediation par excellence between God and human beings.   
Since the early Church fathers, the Church has recognized the sacraments as God’s 
chosen mediations between God and human beings.  As mentioned above, traditional theology 
often used ‘sign’ and/or ‘cause’ as the chief metaphor with which to speak of the sacraments.  At 
the present time the theme of gift emerges as a more viable option.   
1.2.1.1.  Relational Theme: Gift 
 
[N]othing is as truly powerful as the gift. 
-- Hans Urs von Balthasar49 
 
The theme of gift both runs throughout the Bible and, particularly since Marcel Mauss’ 
Essai sur le don in 1924, has received special attention in postmodern philosophy and theology.  
Exploring the implications of ‘es gibt’ in the writings of Husserl and Heidegger, thinkers such as 
                                               
49 Hans Urs von Balthasar, Theo-Drama IV: The Action, trans. Erasmo Leiva-Merikakis (San Francisco: Ignatius, 
1994), 326.   
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Emmanuel Levinas, Jacques Derrida, Jean-Luc Marion, Dominique Janicaud, John Milbank, 
Jean-Louis Chretien, and Michel Henry have written at length on the possibility (or 
impossibility) and nature of the gift.  This confluence of contemporary philosophy and the 
biblical notion of gift offers an analogue by which the supernatural gift of the Eucharist might be 
understood.50   Furthermore, the notion of gift is common to every culture and is meaningful for 
people of all ages.   
 Phenomenology provides a helpful method to explore ‘gift’ since it takes account of 
inter-subjectivity and relation as fully real.  There is no dichotomy of the-objective-as-real versus 
the-subjective-as-unreal.  A phenomenological approach allows incorporation of existential 
realities that science and metaphysics have traditionally ignored but are necessary to understand 
reality as it is lived.  Matters of mediation, desire, identity, and consciousness require an 
approach that accounts for such data and experience.   
A phenomenological approach toward liturgical theology will be especially helpful to 
account for nuances and dynamics of the various relationships involved that are typically never 
addressed in Eucharistic theology.   For instance, the scandalous nature of the gospel’s demands 
upon disciples, since this approach can account for inner conflict and Christian discipleship 
entails ‘taking up one’s cross.’  As an exploration of liturgical theology it will also allow account 
for the celebration as an ecclesial or social reality, breaking from a tendency to consider the 
individual recipient in isolation from fellow members of the congregation.   
While gifts have their role, the gift ‘alone’ is not the object of narrow focus which would 
too closely replicate ‘onto-theology.’  More importantly, there are persons who have roles and 
actions to undertake: the giver and the recipient.  The gift ‘is’ a gift because of its relation -- or, 
                                               
50 This motif for Eucharistic theology also has implications for a theology of grace which, while outside the scope of 
this dissertation, can only be suggested by the current study.   
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mediation -- between the giver and recipient.  The gift is a point of entry or access into the 
relationship of the persons involved.   
1.2.1.2.  Relational Model and Concerns 
So to understand the Eucharist more fully, let us pose the question, “What is going on 
relationally in the Eucharistic celebration?”  This question deliberately moves the emphasis from 
ontology to relations-between-subjects, for a more vivid sense of the gracious and scandalous 
gift the Eucharist celebrates.  Some auxiliary questions can further guide our study of this 
fundamental question, which will be revisited in Chapter 5:   
 How does or ought the Eucharist concern the relationships between the persons  
involved? 
 Who are the agents, givers, recipients -- and what is given or received? 
 How might the Eucharist challenge or transform our desire, identity, relations? 
 Does the Eucharist-as-gift communicate any unique kind of participation in the  
Paschal Mystery of Christ?  
 What specifically does the Church celebrate in its liturgy of the Eucharist? 
 
 Locating this study within the field of liturgical theology establishes a wide array of 
premises that permit a relational focus.  The presence and action of God through Christ and the 
Holy Spirit in the liturgy, while acknowledged as faith assertions, may be accepted as givens.  It 
is neither a merely sociological nor psychological study, both of which would exclude or 
discount the reality of God speaking with human beings.  As a study by means of postmodern 
thinkers it will address several postmodern concerns, which have immediate application for 
understanding the Eucharist: embodiment, presence and absence, and relation to ‘the other.’  Its 
focus is upon the relationships, subjects, and gifts involved, and explores how these interact 
and/or change in the course of the liturgy.   
This exploration aims toward ‘practical’ value in that it concerns present-day believers in 
their historical, relational, and existential experience, rather than as mere observers of elemental 
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potencies that are transubstantiated ex opere operato into the Real Presence of Christ, ‘there’ 
upon the altar.  It speaks in terms which, while more complicated than our usual language, relate 
directly to the most meaningful realities of our lives: how we relate to God, ourselves, and 
others.   
We explore the Eucharist as a present-day liturgy (leit-ourgos), as an action of God and 
the faithful, not in its historical origins, context, or development.  This perspective will hopefully 
allow aspects of the Eucharistic gift to shine forth which are overlooked or neglected by ‘onto-
theological’ concerns and questions.  It also seeks to engage all the persons present at the liturgy 
-- not merely what is on the altar or sacred vessels -- that each may fully, consciously, and 
actively participate as they are capable.  This may well offer lessons in discipleship concerning 
our relationships outside of mass, connecting celebration of the Eucharist to the ‘other 167 
hours’ of the week. 
1.2.2.  Relational Thinkers: Chauvet, Marion, Girard 
In order to address our questions we look to a liturgical theologian, a philosopher, and an 
anthropologist.  Approaching their topics from vastly different fields of study, Louis-Marie 
Chauvet, Jean-Luc Marion, and René Girard each address various aspects of relationships at the 
core of their thought.  Employing their thought on the Eucharist (Chauvet), givenness (Marion), 
and the mediation of desire (Girard), we seek to explain what is going on relationally in the 
Eucharistic celebration.  Their collective contributions will bring to light aspects of the Eucharist 
often neglected by ontologically-focused accounts of the Eucharist.   
Some readers may complain that such analysis does not address the Eucharist ‘as it is in 
itself’ directly enough -- precisely as traditional metaphysical study would.  The Eucharist, 
however, neither comes about by itself nor exists for itself.  It comes about by God’s grace amid 
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a community of the faithful which, presided over by a priest ordained by the bishop, petitions 
God for it.  It exists precisely for the sake of God’s transformative relationship with human 
beings: the unity of the Church as the ecclesial Body of Christ.  How celebration of the Eucharist 
concerns and/or effects relationships, therefore, unveils the meaning of the Eucharist much more 
directly than does a metaphysical study, as it is meant to transform subjects.   
Similarly, this study will not reduce the Eucharist to a sociological reality, in which a 
self-enclosed community constructs its own meaning.  The God of Jesus Christ has established 
and hosts this community of the faithful, and gives gifts greater than human imagination, 
understanding, desire, or identity can handle.  Among these gifts He imparts a mission, such that 
if the Church is to be true witnesses of the gifts received, it cannot remain either unchanged or 
self-enclosed.   
1.2.3.  God’s Gracious and Scandalous Gift of Desire 
The desired goal, once again, is to work toward a Eucharistic theology which is faithful 
to scripture and tradition, can dialogue with contemporary philosophy, and addresses existential 
questions.  We aim toward an expression of faith that makes sense of the world and in the world.  
We employ the help of Chauvet, Marion, and Girard, to propose a notion of the Eucharist as 
God’s gracious and scandalous gift of divine desire.   
As a liturgical ritual the Eucharist has many familiar elements: bread, wine, and their 
respective vessels; an altar/table; a vested priest; the traditional prayers.  The Eucharist’s logic, 
however, and how it can transform persons and relationships, is not necessarily clear.  God 
makes use of this liturgy as a mediation of His own self-giving through the Word, Holy Spirit, 
and the ‘matter’ of bread and wine.  As God’s free and loving gift of Himself toward human 
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beings, the Eucharist is first a gracious gift: a tangible, particular gift enabling intimacy with 
God.  This much is ‘familiar enough’ to many.   
Too often lost amid Eucharistic theology, however, is a meaningful notion about how or 
why the Eucharist is scandalous to us morally.  Traditionally, the intellectually scandalous aspect 
of the Eucharist (appearing to sense data as bread and wine, but by faith are received as the Body 
and Blood of Christ) has received the greater emphasis; this emphasis is deliberately reversed 
here.  God’s implicit claims upon us are not merely demanding but offensive to our natural self-
sufficiency, ego defenses, and sense of ethics.  As the Eucharist embodies God’s offer of 
forgiveness to us, we become obligated -- as Jesus reminds his disciples repeatedly in the gospels 
-- to forgive as we have been forgiven.  The Eucharist thereby implicates us in our own social 
relations: full reception of the gift is meant to transform the way we relate to others.  We are 
called to become Christ-like in our relationships.  It makes other claims upon our lives that will 
be explored in depth later.   It is important to begin, however, by simply noting that Eucharist is 
scandalous to us morally, and not merely or even primarily intellectually.  The Eucharist is not 
merely gracious, but scandalous, and these two go together: God’s grace enables the internal 
transforming work that is capable of orienting us toward love of God and love of neighbor.  
The Eucharist is a gift of desire in two senses.  First, the Eucharist expresses God’s own 
embodied loving desire for us sinners.  We receive a tangible expression of God’s loving desire 
to commune with us.  Secondly, the Eucharist bestows a gift of God’s own loving, of God’s own 
desire to love.  We are called to yield our own desire, our own will to God, and to then give of 
ourselves accordingly.  We are bidden to ‘Do this in memory of’ Jesus, of God.  We are 
impelled, not merely commanded, to love (cf. 2 Cor. 5:14) through the Holy Spirit that has been 
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given to us (cf. Rom. 5:5).  We receive a gift of mission into the world, to reorder it according to 
the loving will of God.   
In order to fulfill its intended task, this dissertation must exclude several important 
theological matters.  A larger or broader “theology of gift,” particularly in light of Marion’s 
phenomenology, merits its own theological investigation; it can only be exemplified here as 
regards the Eucharist.  While historical-critical studies of scripture and liturgy are necessary and 
valuable foundations, these are secondary to the purposes of a phenomenological analysis.  
Though the Eucharist is but one of three sacraments of initiation (with Baptism and 
Confirmation), this dissertation will not explore themes related to this process; neither will it be 
directly concerned with the relation of the Eucharist to the sacraments of Anointing, Matrimony, 
or Holy Orders.  The relationship of the Eucharistic celebration to the prayer of the Church in the 
Liturgy of the Hours must also remain outside the scope of this dissertation.  
1.2.3.1.  Eucharist as Sacramental Mediation Between Persons  
We seek the implications of the gift of the liturgy of the Eucharist upon human desire, 
identity, and relations; the result is a subversion of our common-sense views of desire, identity, 
and relations.  This work of conversion, of repentance (‘meta-noia’) that subverts one’s ego, 
liberates a person to lose one’s life in order to save it (cf. Mk. 8:35).  This transformation entails 
not only a subject’s encounter with God through the Eucharist, but encounters with the rest of the 
Ecclesial Body of Christ and the world.  A person is dependent upon both God and other human 
beings, but also responsible for the suffering members of Christ’s Body and of the world.  With 
the help of Chauvet, Marion, and Girard, the dynamics of this conversion -- catalyzed by the 
liturgy of the Eucharist -- can be accounted for in direct and precise terminology.   
1.2.3.2.  Eucharist as Divine Intervention of Violent Reciprocity and Exchange  
33 
 
The inclusion of Girard enables us to relate Eucharistic theology to a realm traditional 
theology rarely addresses in much depth: the world of human violence.  Girard’s analysis of the 
origins of violence and civilization reveal the Eucharist in a brand new light: as a gift which 
imparts a share in Jesus redemptive reversal of sacrifice and violence.  Just as Jesus, by enduring 
the cross for our sake, ‘loved to the end,’ so his gift of the Eucharist empowers us to imitate his 
complete self-giving, embodying love for others.  The Eucharist embodies the truth of grace; we 
in turn are called to embody sacramentally -- fully, consciously, actively -- the gift of loving 
desire we receive in this ‘most august sacrament.’   
 To work toward this relational account of the Eucharist, we turn to the sacramental 
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II.  Chauvet: A Liturgical Theologian 
 Born in 1941, Louis-Marie Chauvet was ordained a priest for the Diocese of Luçon, 
France in 1966.  He defended his first doctoral dissertation for the University of Paris I-Sorbonne 
in 1973 on Jean Calvin: critique theologique et pastorale des doctrines scolastique et tridentine 
du sacrament de la penitence [John Calvin: Theological and Pastoral Critique of Scholastic and 
Tridentine Doctrines on the Sacrament of Penance].  In 1974 Chauvet began teaching at the 
Institut Catholique of Paris, while also doing pastoral ministry.  He defended his second doctoral 
dissertation in 1986, which became Symbole et sacrement: une relecture sacramentelle de 
l’existence chrétienne [Symbol and Sacrament: A Sacramental Reinterpretation of Christian 
Existence].51  Chauvet was elected professor at the Paris Institut Superior de Liturgie in 1989, 
and retired from teaching in 2007.52   
Chauvet’s relatively few publications have had a great influence upon sacramental 
theology.  Aside from Symbol and Sacrament his only books are Les sacrements, Parole de Dieu 
au risqué du corps [The Sacraments: The Word of God at the Mercy of the Body]53 and Du 
Symbolique au Symbol: Essai sur les Sacrements.54  Chauvet’s other articles, book chapters, and 
public lectures are currently only available in French.   
While a more thorough discussion of the scholarly reception of Chauvet will come later, 
it may be noted briefly that his thought represents the first sustained effort in liturgical theology 
to reckon with both Heidegger’s critique of onto-theology and ‘the linguistic turn’ in philosophy 
                                               
51 Louis-Marie Chauvet, Symbol and Sacrament: A Sacramental Reinterpretation of Christian Existence, trans. 
Patrick Madigan and Madeleine Beaumont (Collegeville, MN: Liturgical Press, 1995).  Hereafter ‘SS.’ 
52 Cf. Philippe Bordeyne, “Louis-Marie Chauvet: A Short Biography,” trans. Michael S. Driscoll, in Sacraments: 
Revelation of the Humanity of God: Engaging the Fundamental Theology of Louis-Marie Chauvet, eds. Philippe 
Bordeyne and Bruce T. Morrill (Collegeville, MN: Liturgical Press, 2008), ix-xiv. 
53 Louis-Marie Chauvet, The Sacraments: The Word of God at the Mercy of the Body, trans. Madeleine Beaumont 
(Collegeville, MN: Liturgical Press, 2001).  Les sacrements, parole de Dieu au risqué du corps (Paris : Ouvrieres, 
1997).  Hereafter ‘Sacraments.’ 
54 Louis-Marie Chauvet, Du Symbolique au Symbol: Essai sur les Sacrements, Coll. Rites et symbols (Paris :Ed. du 
Cerf, 1979).   
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on their own terms.  While the quantity of Chauvet’s scholarly output was likely limited by his 
concurrent pastoral work, his clear concern for pastoral applicability is uncommon among 
philosophically-minded sacramental theologians.  The core of his contribution is found in 
Symbol and Sacrament, which, while revisited in a lecture given in 2007, remains a reliable 
expression of the paradigm shift he sought to accomplish.  It serves as a primary referent to 
which his other texts offer refinements or corollaries.   
Chauvet’s chosen task, begun in Symbol and Sacrament and sustained throughout his 
work, is bold, perhaps (to some) brash.  Chauvet was satisfied neither to ‘transpose’ traditional 
theology into postmodern terminology or categories, nor proceed in the traditional manner (from 
God to ontology to revelation to Christology to the sacraments).  Chauvet’s vision was still 
greater: he cast the primary elements of Christian identity -- Scripture, sacraments, and ethics -- 
as the foundation of theology; he sought to develop theology from Christians’ scriptural, 
sacramental, and ethical origins.  A full review of Chauvet’s sacramental theology and its 
implications is beyond the scope of this dissertation.  This chapter aims to provide the premises 
(2.1) and features (2.2, 2.3) of his sacramental and Eucharistic theology; it will also consider the 
scholarly reception of his work (2.4).  It culls what Chauvet’s thought contributes (directly or by 
implication) toward a relational Eucharistic theology.   
2.1.  Chauvet’s Relecture: A Foundational Theology of Sacramentality 
This section will present Chauvet’s objective, why he considers traditional sacramental 
theology to be problematic (2.1.1.), and the extensive set of presuppositions (philosophical, 
psychoanalytic, theological) undergirding his ‘symbolic’ approach to human subjectivity and 
sacramentality (2.1.2.).  Chauvet thus reframes the questions and approach for sacramental 
theology in light of ‘the linguistic turn’ in philosophy.   
38 
 
2.1.1.  Objective: A ‘Relecture’ 
Chauvet’s paradigm shift is suggested in the full title of his magnum opus, Symbole et 
Sacrement: Une relecture sacramentelle de l’existence chrétienne in 1987.  The French word 
relecture (translated for the English text as ‘reinterpretation’) can convey a wide range of 
meaning, from ‘rereading’ to ‘radical reinterpretation.’55   That ‘radical reinterpretation’ appears 
to be the intended meaning will come to light in the following pages.  The ontological category 
of ‘existence’ -- for centuries the literal ‘be-all-and-end-all’ metaphysical foundation for 
theology -- is itself reinterpreted in light of the sacraments.  A sort of subordination of ontology 
to sacramentality (and eventually, the symbolic) may even be suggested.   
Chauvet works toward a “foundational theology of sacramentality”56 which considers the 
sacraments “as symbolic figures allowing us entrance into, and empowerment to live out, the 
(arch-)sacramentality which is the very essence of Christian existence.”57 To change from 
beginning with ‘the seven sacraments’ (as Trent did) to the more fundamental categories of 
symbol and sacramentality opens vast horizons previously excluded from sacramental theology.  
This move awakens us to the uniquely incarnational and cosmic nature of the Christian faith; it 
also opens far broader possibilities for understanding the mediation of grace between God and 
human beings.   
It is hard to overstate the scope of change for which Chauvet calls.  While the fuller 
scholarly reception of Chauvet’s work will be explored later, Lieven Boeve describes part of its 
achievement thus:    
                                               
55 Cf. Lieven Boeve, “Theology in a Postmodern Culture and the Hermeneutical Project of Louis-Marie Chauvet,” in 
Sacraments: Revelation of the Humanity of God: Engaging the Fundamental Theology of Louis-Marie Chauvet, eds. 
Philippe Bordeyne and Bruce T. Morrill (Collegeville, MN: Liturgical Press, 2008), 5-6. 
56 SS, 1.   
57 SS, 2.  Emphasis in the original, unless otherwise noted.  
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Chauvet’s work has resulted in an attempt to reconstruct the fundamental framework of 
theology itself, with important consequences for the diverse theological disciplines.... 
Characteristic of this reconstruction is ... it brings together the basic elements of Christian 
existence -- faith and praxis, sacraments, church, Christ -- and not from a totalizing, 
systematizing perspective but, rather, an existential one.  Chauvet’s sacramental theology is 
indeed framed within a relecture of Christian existence, a hermeneutics of being a Christian in 
the contemporary, so-called postmodern context.58 
 
Chauvet seeks to build theology upon the lived, embodied historical existence of persons with a 
distinctly Christian identity, who have their identity (in part) by means of the sacraments.  In 
philosophical terms, he is addressing the sacraments and sacramentality from the standpoint of a 
Christian’s Dasein.  This ‘existential’ approach in Chauvet’s theology offers hope of the more 
compelling and relational Eucharistic theology we hope to establish.  This, rather than the 
metaphysical concepts of being or causality, will be the starting point for (ultimately) a narrative 
of the transformative divine and human action found in the Eucharist.   
For many the term (and/or language of) ‘symbol’ -- especially in reference to the 
Eucharist -- evokes a kind of intellectual disdain.  For these, any mention of a ‘symbolic 
understanding of the Eucharist’ deserves the same reply given by Flannery O’Connor (“Well, if 
it’s only a symbol, to hell with it”59), since such language appears to weaken belief in the Real 
Presence of Christ in the Eucharist, a fundamental Eucharistic doctrine.  For others, ‘symbol’ has 
more to do with subjective feelings than with intellect or objective reality, or suggests a kind of 
avatar for which plenty of substitutes are available.   
Chauvet’s understanding of symbol is far more substantial than such reactionary 
assessments would suggest.  With Chauvet’s thought firmly established within both a 
philosophically rigorous notion of language and a patristic notion of symbol (which embodies 
what is signified), it is important to allow Chauvet to explain what he means by symbol and 
                                               
58 Boeve, “Theology in a Postmodern Context,” 6.  Emphasis added.   
59 Flannery O’Connor, The Habit of Being: Letters Edited with an Introduction by Sally Fitzgerald (New York: 
Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 1979), 125. 
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presence -- and absence -- before judging out-of-hand that ‘symbolic’ terminology is insufficient 
for preserving the doctrine of the Real Presence in the Eucharist.    
2.1.2.  New Symbolic Terrain: Subjects of the Implicating ‘Language of the Cross’ 
 The ‘linguistic turn’ within 20th century philosophy required theology to reassess its own 
philosophical premises, its preambula fidei.  New awareness of the profound implications of 
language upon thought, relations, and representations of reality opened new horizons, for which 
theology needed to account to remain in dialogue with contemporary philosophy.  Awareness of 
humankind’s ‘always-already’ involvement with being, culture, and history changed the nature 
and content of epistemology and scientific knowledge.  All the while, great attention must be 
paid to theological method to avoid replicating the errors of onto-theology. 
 To respond to these exigencies, Chauvet proposes a multifaceted approach.  It aims to 
resolve the aforementioned dichotomies through a hermeneutical approach that focuses on the 
conditions and attitudes according to which humans live out their subjectivity.  While in one 
sense it places greater emphasis on the subject, it also requires (to borrow from our introduction) 
a ‘Copernican’ sort of ‘de-centering’ from our common view of the subject as an autonomous 
and independent individual.   
Having used Heidegger to deconstruct traditional ‘onto-theology,’ Chauvet reorients us 
with a diverse set of sources.  Borrowing from thinkers in philosophy (Heidegger), 
psychoanalysis (Lacan), and theology (Breton), we might consider Chauvet’s new approach as 
linguistic, parabolic-implicating, and ‘me-ontological.’  Furthermore, it attends closely to the 
nature of mediation and the role of the body as a mediation in relationships.  Chauvet thus 
delineates a ‘non-foundational’ theology: we enter upon “a change of terrain ... [for] the question 
here becomes inseparable from the mode of questioning, and the latter in its turn is constituted by 
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the questioning subject itself... it is a speaking way.”60  Chauvet embarks us on an ever-
unfinished process that both attends to Being’s withdrawal and implicates the questioner.   
2.1.3.1.  From Philosophy: The Inescapable Mediation of the Symbolic Order 
The ‘reality’ in which Chauvet is interested is not a ‘purely objective’ set of entities 
waiting to be discovered and observed.  In Chauvet’s perspective, we are not in ‘direct’ contact 
with ‘the real’:   
Reality is never present to us except in a mediated way, which is to say, constructed out of the 
symbolic network of the culture which fashions us.  This symbolic order designates the system 
of connections between the different elements and levels of a culture (economic, social, 
political, ideological -- ethics, philosophy, religion...), a system forming a coherent whole.61 
 
Human interaction with and arrangement of the world “allows the social group and individuals to 
orient themselves in space, find their place in time, and in general situate themselves in the world 
in a significant way -- in short, to find their identity in a world that makes ‘sense.’”62  So a 
certain reciprocal relationship is natural to the human condition, involving both ‘the symbolic 
network of culture’ and human beings themselves.  Like fish kept alive by being in water, human 
beings are always immersed in and participants of the symbolic order.   
2.1.3.1.1.  Theology from the Formation of Subjects 
In Chauvet’s perspective we need to take account of this ‘formation of subjects’ which 
takes place in the real human world, in both an objective and subjective sense.  Humans’ 
arrangement of the world in culture and language into a ‘symbolic order’ also fashions human 
beings themselves as subjects.   In observing and placing ‘realities’ in their context, we are 
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mutually shaped by the ‘world’ we construct.   “There is no emergence of subjects without the 
subjugation of each of them to this law, this cultural agreement which is the symbolic order.” 63    
Chauvet wants to keep both of these aspects in view: “What if, instead of being obstacles to 
truth, sensible mediations of language, body, history, desire were the very milieu within which 
human beings attain their truth and thus correspond to the Truth which calls them?”64  Since 
human beings do not ‘exist’ apart from mediation by language, culture, and desire, Chauvet 
wants to locate theology “at the heart of the lack [manque] which this mediation opens in every 
subject.” 65  Instead of trying to deny or avoid this “human inability to get totally outside of 
language, culture, and desire.... [we] should think about [this] before all else.”66  This is human 
beings’ ‘always-already’ immersion within ‘the symbolic order.’   
In this symbolic order, from which human beings are ‘born,’ language plays a most 
essential role.  Just as Chauvet relied on Heidegger for a critique of traditional sacramental 
theology, so Heidegger’s thought on language, being, and human being opens ‘terrain’ for his 
new, symbolic approach.  For Chauvet, language -- if anything -- constitutes what is traditionally 
considered ‘metaphysics.’  More importantly, the dynamics of language, rather than onto-
theology’s ‘being,’ co-constitute human being. 
It is important to note that by ‘language,’ Chauvet means something much richer than a 
particular set of grammatical rules, syntax, and vocabulary which merely express meanings and 
gets translated (for instance) from French into English.  It includes such a notion,   
but also ... ‘quasi-languages:’ ‘supra-language’ made up of gestures, mime, and all artistic 
endeavor; ‘infra-language’ of the archaic impulses of the unconscious, to the extent that they 
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are human only if they function ‘continually . . . toward and within language’ without which 
they would only be instinctual animal reflexes or still-born psychotic experience.67 
 
For Chauvet even “every thought is ‘always already language,’”68 having been shaped (at least in 
part) by a particular cultural context.   
Like the body, language is not an instrument but a mediation.... [Humans] do not possess it 
like an ‘attribute,’ even if of the utmost importance; they are possessed by it.  Thus, language 
does not arise to translate after the fact a human experience that preceded it; it is constitutive 
of any truly human experience, that is to say, significant experience.69  
Chauvet is discussing a far deeper phenomenon, constitutive not merely of an arbitrary form of 
expression but even of perception and expression themselves.   
2.1.3.1.2.  Interrelation of Language, Being, Humans 
That human beings’ origin is bound up with language is essential for Chauvet’s 
understanding: subjects are born from enculturated language, which itself reflects aspects of 
being.  The inherent ambivalence of being and language likewise have critical importance for 
Chauvet: being and language conceal even as they reveal.  Theology, therefore, needs to take 
account of a peculiar aspect of being’s ‘withdrawal’ or ‘erasure,’ as this finds important parallels 
in both language and the birth of human subjects as such.  Chauvet insists that theology must 
include Heidegger’s understanding of the interrelation of language, being, and human beings.   
2.1.3.1.3.   The Persistence of Withdrawal, Erasure, Absence 
In order to avoid repeating the mistakes of metaphysics or onto-theology, Chauvet draws 
upon Heidegger’s diagnosis of the ‘forgetfulness of Being.’  Heidegger says one must consider 
metaphysics’ confusion of being-as-activity with the-being-of-entities (which is illusory) as an 
event itself, as part of the history of the revelation of being.  This kind of consideration opens 
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thinking to the fuller truth of being, its ignored foundation: the withdrawal (or ‘erasure’) of 
being.70   
 Contrary to metaphysics’ worldview, ‘being’ cannot be thought of as completely 
immediate, unmediated, or transparent.  Whatever is held as ‘present’ to thinking inevitably 
conceals or withdraws some aspect of itself.  More important for Chauvet than pinning down 
something like ‘the nature of being’ (even as an activity) is the observation that a withdrawal 
always accompanies Being’s arrival; an absence always accompanies its presence.  Citing J.P. 
Resweber’s commentary on Heidegger, “Being never ceases to hide within a difference which 
constitutes it.”71  Similar to how analogies involve affirmations of similarity and negations of 
greater dissimilarity, full perception of Being entails affirmation of a revelation and 
acknowledgment of a withdrawal or withholding.  It is recognition of what remains unthought, 
unconscious, otherwise unacknowledged -- the aspect of Being that is “non-available, the non-
representable, the ‘Incalculable.’”72  The fact that Being withdraws as it reveals itself means that 
“its ‘revelation’ is marked by the very history of its ‘concealment.’.... [which] ‘belongs to the 
very essence of being.’” 73  This simultaneous withdrawal-that-occurs-within-arrival, or absence-
that-occurs-within-presence, is ‘erasure.’  Recognition of this erasure is required in order to 
‘overcome metaphysics,’ to perceive the workings of language, and to understand the birth of the 
human subject.   
2.1.3.1.4.  Distance and the Subject 
 As with being and language, so with human subjects: “It is specifically ‘beginning with 
this essence of the truth of Being [as erasure]’ that one must re-think the essence of humankind 
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as ‘ecstatic ex-sistence.’”74  As the subject orients the world into and according to such a cultural 
order, the subject for him- or herself is also formed.   
In order for the subject to reach and retain its status of subject, it must build reality into a 
‘world,’ ... a signifying whole in which every element ... is integrated into a system of 
knowledge (of the world and of society), gratitude (code of good manners, mythical and ritual 
code ruling relationships with deities and ancestors), and ethical behavior (values serving as 
norms of conduct)....  By these means, the universe and events form a coherent whole which is 
called ‘the symbolic order.’  Subjects can orient themselves by it because each thing can find 
in it its own signifying place.75   
 
For Chauvet, these three pillars -- not abstracted forms, causes, or analogies -- constitute the 
‘essentials’ of a human world.   
The context of this ‘reconfigured reality’ is fundamental for understanding the very high 
importance Chauvet places upon the notions of distance and absence amid relationships, 
particularly the relationship between the divine and the human.  In what follows, Chauvet reveals 
how human beings’ relationships unfold from their context of being embedded in particular 
culture, language, and history.   
2.1.3.1.5.  Being as ‘Given’: The Entry of Grace and ‘Mature Proximity to Absence’ 
  While Chauvet’s fuller discussion of ‘gift’ comes later on a sociological level, he 
introduces it philosophically in Heidegger’s discussion of the arrival of Being as a gift (and 
furthermore the poet’s role in bringing awareness of ‘the Sacred’76).  Amid this, in turn, Chauvet 
finds a philosophical opening for discussion of grace.  The arrival of Being, which occurs as an 
event, is “to be understood ... in the sense of a gift; for Being, according to the Letter on 
Humanism, is the gift of self in openness; more exactly, ‘it at once bestows and withholds 
itself.’77  “There is, in Heidegger, a discourse of grace.... For Being, without either measure of 
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calculation, without explanation or justification... is pure grace, pure gift.”78  Thus does Chauvet 
ground philosophically the entire question of grace in Heidegger’s discussion of being, language, 
and human being.   
 The configuration of the event of the arrival (and withdrawal) of Being as a gift naturally 
shapes the proper human response: “The ‘event’ (Ereignis) we must think about is precisely this 
‘appropriation’ (er-eignen) of what is freely given, which can come about only through an 
attitude of graciousness and ‘disappropriation’ (Ent-eignung): ‘To the appropriation-Ereignis as 
such belongs the disappropriation.’”79  One should note the importance Chauvet places on the 
proper attitude which appropriates, that (paradoxically) of graciousness and disappropriation, of 
giving once again.  Chauvet has at least as much concern for the attitude by which being (or a 
concept) is received as with the content of what is given.   
Gelassenheit turns out to be the proper beginning of appropriation (or reception) of a gift 
of ‘the Sacred.’  True to Heidegger’s pairing of paradoxical opposites in the arrival-withdrawal 
of being, Chauvet considers the “human mode of the appropriation of Being as play and grace is 
through the disappropriation, that is, the Gelassenheit.  Charged with attending to the 
‘revealableness’ of Being by carrying it into language, the poet, allowing the word to speak, is 
touched by grace.”80  Such a posture of Gelassenheit to the Sacred’s gift-which-withdraws 
appropriates this gift through an attitude of graciousness and (further) disappropriation.  To thus 
acknowledge and relate authentically with this absence -- without attempting refusal or control -- 
is to “remain in a mature proximity to the absence.”81  
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Honest encounter with this withdrawal, with this “absence is precisely the place from 
which humans can come to their truth by overcoming all the barriers of objectifying and 
calculating reason.  This task is burdensome.  Is there anything more difficult than to hold 
oneself in such a ‘mature proximity to the absence of the god,’ than to agree to this ‘presence of 
absence’?82  Human beings’ truth -- the ‘truth of their relationship to God’ of which Chauvet 
spoke earlier -- consists of this allowing, or receptivity, of the ‘presence-of-the-absence’ of the 
Sacred, of grace.   
2.1.3.1.8.  ‘Symbolic Efficacy’ 
In light of reconfiguring how being, language, human being, and human subjects all arise 
together, Chauvet can speak of “the efficacy of the symbol, an efficacy which touches reality 
itself.... this reality is the most real.”83  For “Not only is language efficacious but it is what is 
most efficacious.”84  We understand this symbolic efficacy more vividly from human experience 
than from syllogistic logic.  Chauvet states “the efficacy of the sacraments must be understood in 
the mode of the symbolic efficacy of the word,”85 which expresses a far richer notion of the 
formation of subjects than mechanical notions of causality.  Even more fundamentally than the 
notion of gift exchange or symbolic exchange, the workings of language provide the proper 
horizon for exploring the sacraments, for it touches upon the very formation of subjects, of 
persons as such.  “The word should ... be treated as ... the very archetype of what happens 
between subjects and within any subject.  It is in language that ... the subject, takes its origin.”86   
Such linguistically-based notions of the formation of subjects and symbolic efficacy will 
become -- at last -- the proper context in which to discuss grace.  For “grace is less a value-object 
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to be received than a symbolic receiving oneself: receiving oneself from God in Christ, through 
the work of the Spirit, as daughters and sons, as sisters and brothers.”87   
2.1.3.2.  From Psychoanalysis: The Truth of Desire 
 Chauvet borrows some elements of his approach from psychoanalysis, in an attempt to 
take greater account of the subject -- one’s desiring, thinking, willing, etc. -- in his or her 
interiority.  While acknowledging this field has its limitations as a science, it counteracts the 
short-sightedness of scientific thinking’s constant impulse to exclude what is so essential to 
human living.   
2.1.3.2.1.  Accounting for Desire: Accessing the Truth of Interiority 
 Linguistic philosophy is not the only field concerned with ‘overcoming metaphysics;’ the 
empirical sciences have represented another such attempt.  While metaphysics (at one extreme) 
claimed a totalizing notion of knowable truth, empiricism’s ‘hard sciences’ (at the other extreme) 
claimed there is no over-arching truth, but only truths knowable from empirical data.  Since the 
linguistic turn and awareness of observers’ ‘already-involved’ status (as in the Heisenberg 
Principle), it is impossible to deny a place for the human subject within any field of study.  How 
can one account for the (interior) truth of the subject?   
 Chauvet proposes inclusion of the approach of psychoanalysis which, while it “declares 
‘there is only partial truth,’” this necessarily implies philosophical discourse’s affirmation of an 
over-arching truth which is known partially.88  The therapeutic work of psychoanalysis, for 
instance, is never fully achieved as a finished product.  This, however, is not to be perceived as a 
shortcoming, but rather a paradigm for theological inquiry.  Thus a dialectical approach which 
accounts for human interiority and philosophy reflects more accurately the involvement of the 
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subject with the ‘external’ realities being addressed.89  This approach reflects more “the internal 
contradiction from which rises the human subject.”90  
2.1.3.2.2.  Disabusing the Ego: The ‘Test of Melancholy’ 
  An important reason desire must be accounted for is because we desire to know and 
possess so fully, so totally -- i.e., without any mediation -- that we delude ourselves into notions 
of ‘certainty’ and permanence that simply do not belong to the human condition.  So we must 
undergo what Lacan calls “the test of ‘melancholy,’ ... learning to consent ‘to find oneself alone 
in the ordeal of the real’.... [for] ‘the real is the impossible.’”91  We must consent to how, for 
now, ‘we see as through a glass, darkly’ (1 Cor. 13:12), only in an eschatological future can or 
does ‘the fully real’ become possible for us.   
[We] must accept the death of the illusion everything in us desperately wants to believe, that 
is, the illusion that we can somehow pull ourselves out of the necessary mediation of symbols, 
situate ourselves outside of discourse, and apprehend reality directly, without passing through 
cultural tradition or the history of our own desire — in short, that we can take our ‘That’s self-
evident,’ our ‘It goes without saying’ as reality.  It is precisely these judgments, seemingly so 
‘reasonable,’ that never cease to delude us.92 
 
The necessity of mediation thus carries the important admission that we do not (in this lifetime) 
ever have unmediated direct access to the Lord Jesus.  A degree of ‘melancholy’ ought to 
accompany Gelassenheit, of ‘mature proximity to the absence’ of God.  This melancholy is itself 
a proper measure of being in true relation to God: hence such matters of interiority as desire and 
feeling must be incorporated into theology of sacramental mediation.   
2.1.3.3.  From Theology: The Parabolic Me-Ontological ‘Word of the Cross’ 
We have seen how Chauvet considers traditional analogical language of causality to be 
problematic as a language for grace.  An implicit complaint of Chauvet is that the onto-
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theological approach, while perhaps correct as an approach that seeks ‘objectivity,’ neglects an 
essential aspect of human being: namely, relationships with other subjects, as lived from one’s 
subjectivity.  Hence traditional theological approaches yield a language too objective, too 
removed from human addressees who are created, called, commanded, and loved by God, from 
whom a response is also demanded.  Theological language must speak from the decisive ‘place’ 
of the subject: a place of relation.   
A better inclusion of the subjective human response is the critical step accomplished by 
the type of language Chauvet calls ‘parabolic.’  The ‘word of the cross’ operates by means of 
symbol, a chief feature of which is it implicates those it addresses.  Though Chauvet does not 
call it such, it is relational; therefore this implicating aspect (in particular) is why Chauvet’s 
thought is a proper foundation for the relational approach to the Eucharist we are exploring.   
2.1.3.3.1.  Parabolic (vs. Analogic): Implicating Language 
Chauvet borrows the notion of ‘parabolic’ language from Eberhard Jüngel, which not 
only expresses the divine address, call, and mission to and for human beings, but also -- and 
more importantly -- demands a response.  It implicates its human dialogue partner(s), rather than 
remaining ‘objective’ as does ontological or scientific language.   
So Chauvet looks to the power of language and symbol to implicate subjects: “[The] 
primordial task of Christian theology ... consists, as Jüngel suggests, in considering the gospel 
itself as a form of analogy ... a type of parabolic language whose distinctive characteristic is ‘to 
insert human beings, insofar as they are summoned, into the being about which they are 
speaking.’”93  This statement -- far more than ‘moving from the metaphysical to the symbolic’ -- 
captures the radical linguistic difference of Chauvet’s ‘epistemological terrain’ from Scholastic 
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onto-theology.  An ‘objective’ approach to theology, while well-intentioned, misses the point -- 
especially regarding sacramental mediations with God.   
Just as each kind of discourse has its own implicit rules, Chauvet likewise considers “this 
language, where the hearers find themselves engaged, as a peculiar kind of ‘language game’ 
(Wittgenstein): a ‘hermeneutical’ language which has its own type of coherence and cannot be 
‘translated’ either into causative or explanatory language, notably scientific language, or into 
metaphysical language.”94  Chauvet employs a different language, which inherently implicates 
its participants, in order to access a fuller and different kind of thinking, namely of a relational 
order.  As a hermeneutical approach, it is at least as much concerned with the interpreter as with 
the interpreted content.  Such implication of its hearers and readers -- with which the gospel is 
saturated -- is far closer to the human realities of grace and the sacraments than chains of 
causality.   
 Chauvet recognizes that conceptual truth alone is insufficient.  The purest conceptual 
theological truths can still become means toward human self-serving ends, and thereby become 
idols.  For Chauvet this danger is far greater than that of ‘inaccurate information’: 
The critical thrust for Christian theology does not consist in the apophatic purification of our 
concepts in order to express God but rather in the use that we make of these concepts, that is, 
in the attitude, idolatrous or not, they elicit from us.... [The] tradition has understood this point 
for a long time: the most sophisticated ideas may be corrupted into idols.95 
 
This brings to the fore once again the importance of one’s subjective involvement in the realities 
considered (in this case, sacramental mediation).  Truth in theology is not merely a matter of 
intellectual understanding: it concerns both the attitudinal response of the subject as well as 
recognition of other subjects as the mediated presence of God.  As we shall see, the fullest 
‘measure of truth’ regarding the sacraments for Chauvet will be found in what he calls ‘the 
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liturgy of the neighbor’: the subject’s daily recognition of God in one’s neighbor and a life of 
service that reflects such genuine acknowledgment.   
2.1.3.3.2.  Hermeneutics of Witness 
Given the role of language in the formation of subjects, theologians have a higher calling 
than mere intellectual interpretation of foundational texts.  Theologians, as disciples, are called 
“to give witness to that in which they know themselves to be already held.”96  All the more is the 
Christian faith, which professes the revelation of God in the humanity of Jesus Christ and the 
mediation of the Church, a matter of living out and embodying the truths professed.   
For such reasons, the fundamental question of the relation of philosophy to theology 
receives a nuanced answer from Chauvet.  The two fields are related, not so much by particular 
themes, but by a ‘homology’ between the philosopher’s relation to Being and the theologian’s 
relation to the Christian God.  The philosopher’s Gelassenheit in regard to Being is similar to the 
theologian’s listening for the summons of the Word of God.  Because of this homology, Chauvet 
argues, one “must reject a fundamental divorce” between philosophy and theology.97   
However, the hermeneutical theology in light of the linguistic turn that Chauvet proposes 
is more than a simple transposition of Gelassenheit from philosophy to theology.  True 
‘interpretation’ must run far deeper, to the point of witnessing with one’s life.  It is a matter of 
“producing ... new practices which foster the emergence of a new world.  Its truth is always to be 
made; it resides in a future constantly happening.”98  The work of hermeneutics is thus not a 
matter of recovering an author’s intention but of generating practices which accord with the 
world proposed by the text (in this case, the gospel).  Theology must yield ‘right practices’ which 
form subjects according to the revelation of God.   
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2.1.3.3.3.  The ‘Me-ontological’ Logos of the Cross 
 Christian language must begin from the cross, the second of Chauvet’s ‘axes’ of thought 
(the first was language).  It must do so “because it is in the One whom human beings reduced to 
less than nothing in his humanity that Paul was able to recognize para-doxically the indirect 
revelation (‘para’) of the glory (‘doxa’) of God: a ‘madness’ from which ‘the power of God’ 
breaks forth (1 Cor. 1).”99  The Christian logos of the cross -- the ‘wisdom of God’ -- is folly for 
both Greek philosophy (which seeks wisdom) and Jewish faith (which seeks signs); it runs 
completely opposite to human logic.  Furthermore -- and more demanding -- it directly 
implicates its hearers into its notions of God, selfhood, being, becoming, and body.   
 With reference to Stanislaus Breton’s interpretation of Philippians 2:5-11 in The Word of 
the Cross, Chauvet says that Paul elevates “the figure of the Doulos (‘slave’) to the dignity of an 
absolute,” thus rendering “‘the very idea of a divine SELF’ outmoded,” for a slave only has 
‘being’ in reference to another.100  The slave does not exist autonomously; he only ‘exists’ in 
relation to the master.  Furthermore, according to the culture of Paul’s time, those who were 
crucified were reduced to ‘nothing’ (me-on).  Since Paul’s passage begins ‘Let the same mind be 
in you that was in Christ Jesus...’ (Phil. 2:5), “‘true becoming’ is not to detach the divine kenosis 
from that which is carried out in us,” namely, an obedient emptying-of-self. 101  God revealed 
himself in the ‘nothingness’ of Christ crucified, of whom no one took account (cf. Is. 53:3). 
So this ‘word of the cross’ now finds expression in “our corporality ... [which] has the 
responsibility of becoming the very place for this message.... [wherein] we can take nothing 
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without recognizing ourselves as being taken.”102  Breton states, “God ... solicits from us this 
body of world and humanity, without which God cannot come among us in truth.  It is precisely 
because God is nothing of what is, that God must become.”103  This is the God who reveals 
Himself in the cross and through the mediation of the Church, which is ‘the Body of Christ.’  
This ‘language of the cross’ is God’s own prophetic word, which critiques, subverts, and re-
orients human ideas, values, and lives.  It both calls all into question and calls subjects to a new 
‘becoming’ which is mediated in and through their own bodies.  To this mediation in corporality, 
in the body, we now turn.   
2.1.3.4.  Mediation and Initiation: Passage Through ‘Death’ by ‘Consent to Corporality’ 
 This confluence of philosophy, psychoanalysis, and theology sets the stage for human 
subjects in the world.  We now examine the interaction of subjects with this world, one another, 
and the crises by which they develop -- either in greater freedom or illusion.   
2.1.3.4.1.  Becoming Subjects Amid the Laws of ‘Distances’ 
 The process of becoming a human subject is neither automatic nor painless.  Life’s “path 
of ongoing genesis”104 demands negotiation of life’s unpleasant and unconquerable conditions.   
This negotiation process takes place through an unending work of renunciation and ‘mourning’ 
idealized notions of both the self and life-as-we-wish.  We mourn the fact of our own death, but 
also our alienation from others and ‘the real’ (i.e., our dependence on mediation, the ‘law of 
symbolic deprivation’).  Recalling Lacan’s differentiation of the self that takes place through 
language, we must also mourn an alienation from oneself (the ‘law of difference’).105   
2.1.3.4.2.  Initiation: Death and Life 
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The process of dealing honestly with all of these forms of ‘distance’ -- the “truth of the 
subject” -- occurs through a process of initiation.106  In such initiation a subject ‘dies’ in some 
aspect of life in order to be ‘reborn’ to fuller life, living more closely according to truth.  The 
‘death’ we ourselves undergo demands the work of ‘mourning’: 
The truth of the psychic subject, always open to the question of Truth, takes place through 
mourning: mourning for the imaginary coincidence between the (I) of the enunciation and the 
‘I’ of the statement, mourning for the correspondence between the subject and the ideal Self, 
mourning for the hope of ever recovering original beatitude or (which is the same thing) of 
ever discovering the complete fullness of meaning.  It is precisely in the radical loss of this 
‘paradise’ and in the consent to the absence of the Thing that the possibility for the subject to 
cor-respond to the Truth emerges.107   
 
Chauvet’s notion of initiation involves a framework -- whether of life situations, or a tribal rite --
of crisis.  Living and maturing necessarily involves dealing with crises of grief, in which a 
privilege of youth must be lost in order to gain access to still-greater potentialities.  It involves 
decisions which embark the subject toward new horizons of life.   
2.1.3.4.3.  The ‘Necrotic Temptation’ 
 Christian disciples -- both in the Bible and in every age -- have an initiatory task of 
overcoming what Chauvet calls ‘necrotic temptation,’ the desire for unmediated access and/or 
possession of Christ’s presence in a tangible, guaranteed, and thoroughly objective form.  As an 
imaginary desire it is both natural (to desire the fullness of Christ’s presence) but illusory (it 
cannot be fulfilled and is not meant to be fulfilled).  It presents believers with a crisis which 
requires for its resolution ‘consent to the presence of the absence of God.’  Chauvet takes 
examples from Scripture (particularly Acts of the Apostles) to demonstrate both the temptation 
and the transition meant to occur in the disciples’ faith.   
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 Beginning with the Empty Tomb of Easter morning, the disciples must reckon with the 
mystery of Christ’s presence to them in new ways.  This new form of presence, however, is not 
merely an arbitrary and interchangeable difference; relating to this new presence demands a kind 
of grief and consent to a loss, of ‘immediate’ relation.   
 In scenes such as the empty tomb (Lk. 24:1-12), the journey to Emmaus (Lk. 24:13-35), 
and Philip’s ministry to the Ethiopian eunuch (Acts 8:26-40), various disciples must learn to 
consent to Christ’s absence.  At the empty tomb an angel informs the women at the tomb “Why 
do you search for the living among the dead?  He is not here, but has risen” (Lk. 24:5).  At 
Emmaus the disciples journeying to Emmaus encounter the risen Lord, but only recognize him 
upon his at the ‘breaking of the bread,’ whereupon he disappears (Lk. 24:31).  After the 
baptizing the Ethiopian eunuch, Philip is snatched away by the Spirit of the Lord (cf. Acts 8:39).  
In each scene (as well as depictions of the Ascension in Lk. 24:51 and Acts 1:10) an epiphany of 
the Lord is accompanied by a sudden absence. 
Even though Christ has conquered death in the resurrection and given hope of restoration 
of the body, there is nonetheless a ‘loss’ of immediate access to Christ.  While present in the 
Church through the Holy Spirit, he is no longer present in his own body.  This absence cannot be 
denied or minimized: it serves a most important purpose in the development of mature Christian 
subjects.  It becomes a critical ‘choice point’ at which a disciple can either remain lost in 
‘necrotic temptation’ or, through ‘mourning,’ consent to Christ’s absence and welcome Christ 
instead through the mediation of one’s neighbor.   
 The ‘necrotic temptation’ also plays itself out with regard to the Eucharist.  Traditional 
Eucharistic doctrine assures the faithful that “the whole Christ is truly, really, and substantially 
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contained” in the Eucharist.108  Such language admits no room for consideration of how Christ 
might be absent in any degree; indeed to raise that possibility often raises suspicion of heresy or 
outright denial of the Real Presence of Christ.  Refusal of any such admission of Christ’s being 
sacramentally present and thus in some degree absent, however, creates a stumbling block to 
growth in Christian subjectivity.  Though a sacramental mediation, the security of a guaranteed 
‘presence of Christ’ can become an end unto itself; the mature work of mourning the absence of 
Christ can find all-too-easy relief in the Eucharist.   
So quite against an onto-theological conception of ‘direct access’ to reality, Chauvet puts 
forward the truth of the need for mediation.  There is also recognition of the emotional toll that 
acknowledgment of this truth takes: the distance that persists is something to be mourned.  The 
emotional cost is no illusory or insignificant matter: it can be a major obstacle in the journey to 
relate to God, others, and self in truth.  Furthermore, the work of initiation is by no means a one-
time occurrence; it must be undergone again and again, as long as we live.  Chauvet calls for a 
mature honesty with oneself concerning our ‘not-yet’ relation to eschatological fullness.   
2.1.3.4.5.  Consent to Embodiment 
To Symbol and Sacrament I almost gave the title, On Mediation.  The entire project can 
indeed be summed up in the idea of the positive consent to corporality as mediation of the 
most spiritual relationship with God.109 
 
 Our natural desire for immediacy and the need for ‘mourning’ thus face a crisis in the 
absence of Christ.  The crisis is surmounted, the initiation finds resolution, in transitioning away 
                                               
108 “In the most blessed sacrament of the Eucharist ‘the body and blood, together with the soul and divinity, of our 
Lord Jesus Christ and, therefore, the whole Christ is truly, really, and substantially contained.’  ‘This presence is 
called 'real' - by which is not intended to exclude the other types of presence as if they could not be 'real' too, but 
because it is presence in the fullest sense: that is to say, it is a substantial presence by which Christ, God and man, 
makes himself wholly and entirely present.’”  Catechism of the Catholic Church, 1374.  Cf. Council of Trent (1551): 
DS 1651; Paul VI, Mysterium Fidei 39.  Accessed 12 December 2016 at 
http://www.vatican.va/archive/ccc_css/archive/catechism/p2s2c1a3.htm.  
109 My translation : “J’ai failli donner comme titre à Symbole et Sacrement: de la médiation.  Tout le projet en effet 
peut se résumer dans l’idée du consentement positif à la corporéité comme médiation du rapport le plus spirituel à 
Dieu.”  Louis-Marie Chauvet, ”Un relecture de Symbole et Sacrement,” in Quaestiones Liturgiques 88 (2007), 111. 
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from possessive desire for immediate access to Christ toward a kenotic desire to serve Christ in 
the bodies of one’s neighbors.   
 Consent to the truth of the subject, of the human condition, reaches its culmination in ‘the 
law of the body,’ of corporality.  In the body all the human being’s ‘worlds’ -- including 
encounter with the symbolic order -- coalesce.  For “The body is the primordial place of every 
symbolic joining of the ‘inside’ and the ‘outside’.... The body is the binding, the space in the 
middle where both identity and difference are symbolically connected under the authority of the 
Other.”110  The freedom of the subject, however, paradoxically expands as it accepts the natural 
limitations of the human condition rather than resists them.   
The I-body exists only as woven, inhabited, spoken by this triple body of culture, tradition, 
and nature.  This is what is implied by the concept of corporality: one’s own physical body 
certainly, but as the place where the triple body — social, ancestral, and cosmic — which 
makes up the subject is symbolically joined, in an original manner for each one of us 
according to the different forms of our desires. 111    
 
‘Bodies’ are thus the inescapable location, the Sitz im Leben of human interaction, not only with 
other human beings but also with God.   
 This is the way of kenosis, of obedience, of surrender.  In no way is this a mere 
‘spiritualizing’ of ethics: charity demands concrete expression in and for the bodies of one’s 
neighbors.  Mourning the immediate presence of the desired other must yield to desiring to serve 
the present other who -- too often -- is undesired, shunned.  This way is more demanding, more 
apostolic, in that consent to fuller truth -- not merely of the sacramental presence but also the 
absence of Christ -- sends the disciple to the wounded and alienated bodies in the world.   
2.2.  Relations Among Subjects: Symbolic Exchange  
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We have thus recounted Chauvet’s depiction of human subjects ‘as individuals;’ we now 
explore ways subjects relate with each other through the mediation of symbols, and most 
specifically through gifts.  Reconceiving the basic notion of mediation as inherent in language, 
being, and subjectivity (and not as a ‘necessary evil’) naturally reshapes the nature of relations 
between subjects.  This section will first examine how Chauvet understands symbols (2.2.1.), 
namely as means of recognizing other subjects as such.  Such recognition demonstrates what 
Chauvet calls the ‘symbolic efficacy of language,’ an important concept for his notion of 
sacramental efficacy (2.2.2.).  The nature of this efficacy, rooted in the nature of language and 
symbol, in turn shapes relations and alliances by means of ‘symbolic gift exchange’ (2.2.3.).   
Introduced by sociologist Marcel Mauss and developed by Jean Baudrillard, ‘symbolic 
exchange’ offers an analysis of relations between givers and recipients beyond purely utilitarian 
economics.112  It also relates subjects and objects to the realm of meaning and values, 
particularly that which cannot be measured or calculated.  Precisely because it articulates such 
meaning and values well, Chauvet will consider it an appropriate model for understanding both 
grace and the celebration of the Eucharist.   
2.2.1.  Functioning of the Symbol 
First, Chauvet’s notion of the symbol is necessary.  Typically the notion of ‘symbol’ is 
thought of as an instance of representation of ‘something else’ not tangibly present: whether that 
is reality, economic worth, or information.  Chauvet’s notion is different: “The primary function 
of the symbol is to join the persons who produce or receive it... and so to identify them as 
subjects in their relations with other subjects.  The symbol thus ties the cultural pact where all 
                                               
112 Marcel Mauss, Essai sur le don (1925); English edition: The Gift: The Form and Reason for Exchange in Archaic 
Societies, trans. by W.D. Halls, foreword by Mary Douglas (New York: W.W. Norton, 1990).  Jean Baudrillard, 
Symbolic Exchange and Death, trans. by Iain Hamilton Grant with an introduction by Mike Gane (London: SAGE, 
1993).  [French edition, 1976.]   
60 
 
mutual recognition occurs.”113  This is a critical difference from most common understandings of 
symbol (including the oft-quoted quip of Flannery O’Connor, mentioned in 2.1.1.1. above).  For 
Chauvet, a symbol thus functions as a revealer and agent: it reveals identities as subjects -- 
namely, their common subjectivity -- and enacts an alliance between subjects thereby.  Chauvet 
uses an example of visiting a foreign country and overhearing one’s native language spoken.  
Through the symbol of the overheard phrase, the hearer has an immediate relation and 
connection with the speaker that does not exist with others around them.  The hearer and speaker 
both share a common culture, perhaps momentarily relieving the alienation felt by being in a 
foreign country.  Generally speaking, symbols thus accomplish a mutual recognition of persons 
as members of a given culture, fulfilling a basic human social need above all else: “[H]uman 
beings speak, but only because the symbol has first made them human beings.”114  A shared 
understanding of a mediating symbol serves to refer, not to an otherwise-absent reality, but 
subjects to one another.  The symbol’s presence can, in a sense, bring about, manifest, and 
confirm the relation between the subjects.   
2.2.2.  The ‘Symbolic Efficacy’ of Language  
 Continuing to look at reality through the lens of language, Chauvet borrows the ideas of 
J.L. Austin and Emil Benveniste on language acts to describe ritual language in closer detail, and 
its impact upon relationships.115  As its own kind of language act, symbolic ritual language sets 
certain processes into motion.  While historical narrative is governed, for instance, by the third 
person and speaks of the past, the discourse of ritual language speaks in the first person to a 
second, in the present tense.  The current act of enunciation is the focus: it enacts a new ‘present’ 
                                               
113 SS, 120-121. 
114 J. Lacan, Ecrits, 276; cf. Chauvet, SS, 121.   
115 Cf. SS, 130-135.  Cf. J.L. Austin, How to Do Things with Words (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 
1962); E. Benveniste, Problemes de linguistique generale (Paris: Gallimard, 1966) 1: ch. 19, esp. 242-243.   
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each time.  This highlights an important point for liturgical discourse, as sacred texts -- with their 
direct address by and to God, and which recount events of God’s action in the world -- are 
‘brought to life’ again each time they are proclaimed in the assembly.   
 All language has both declarative and performative functions whereby, respectively, 
some information is provided and (more importantly) the relationship between subjects changes 
by the act of communication.116  Far more than providing mere information, language is always 
establishing or altering relationships between subjects, if simply through recognition of the other.  
Ordinary greetings or ‘small talk’ about the weather (or conversely, not responding to such) 
exemplify this reality well: rather little by way of ‘information’ is communicated, but the mutual 
recognition (or dismissal) of and by the other is the primary purpose.  Again this phenomenon is 
found repeatedly in liturgical texts (all of which God has certainly heard before).  Yet as the 
praying assembly makes supplication to God for protection, gives thanks, praises God, or 
confesses its sins, it does so to shape its relationship to God, not ‘provide information.’ 
 Furthermore, all language (according to Austin) has three dimensions to it.  A locutionary 
dimension concerns the simple physical speech act itself, the saying of something.  The 
illocutionary dimension accomplishes a change by speech within a particular context; it changes 
the relation between subjects.  The perlocutionary dimension “designates the effect of the 
language act ‘on the feelings, the thoughts, the behavior of the audience or the speaker or still 
other persons.’”117  The illocutionary dimension carries particular importance for liturgical rites, 
as this is what establishes relations between subjects.   
To relate briefly these ideas to sacramental theology: for Chauvet the formation and 
reinforcement of alliances among subjects -- effected by the language of symbols (verbal or 
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otherwise) -- becomes the refashioned model for speaking of efficacy. ‘Symbolic efficacy’ 
concerns the illocutionary dimension of language, broadly conceived and in all its Heideggerian 
aspects concerning the formation of subjects.  Symbolic efficacy concerns the establishment of 
“new relation of places between subjects, a relationship of filial and brotherly and sisterly 
alliance, that the sacramental ‘expression’ aims at instituting or restoring in faith.”118  According 
to this linguistic understanding, “‘grace’ designates not an object we receive, but rather a 
symbolic work of receiving oneself: a work of ‘perlaboration’ in the Spirit by which subjects 
receive themselves from God in Christ as sons and daughters, brothers and sisters.” 119  This 
reflects another way Chauvet seeks to move beyond popular notions of grace as a ‘thing’ or 
commodity toward an attitude by which one truly lives.   
2.2.3.  Exchange and Gift  
 Since the publication of Marcel Mauss’ Essai sur le don in 1925, philosophical discourse 
has explored the question (or ‘problem’) of the gift in a new light.  Do gifts create obligations 
toward donors?  Do return gifts (or gratitude) annul an original gift?  Such questions continue 
receiving attention among phenomenologists and postmodern thinkers.120  Since they call 
attention to the nature of relationships and graciousness, they are important for sacramental 
theology as well.  Chauvet offers one analysis of exchange, symbolic exchange, as “a model ... 
for understanding the distinctive way in which the subject comes to be in its relation with other 
                                               
118 SS, 140. 
119 SS, 140. 
120 For an overview of the complicated philosophical and theological question of the gift, including the perspectives 
of Jacques Derrida, John Milbank, and Jean-Luc Marion, see Robyn Horner, Rethinking God as Gift: Marion, 
Derrida, and the Limits of Phenomenology (New York: Fordham, 2001).  Key texts include Jacques Derrida, Given 
Time I: Counterfeit Money, trans. Peggy Kamuf (Chicago, IL: Chicago University Press, 1992); John Milbank, “Can 
a Gift Be Given?,” Modern Theology 11:1 (Jan. 1995), 119-161; Jean-Luc Marion, Being Given, Toward a 
Phenomenology of Givenness, trans. Jeffrey L. Kosky (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2002). 
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subjects.”121  As a form of exchange ‘outside the order of value,’ Chauvet considers it all the 
more a fitting way to discuss the gift of grace.   
2.2.3.1.  Market Exchange 
 Mauss studied the kinds of exchange among traditional societies in Canada, Alaska, 
Polynesia, and Melanesia; traces of these can be found in cultures throughout the world.  Two 
basic categories of exchange thus meet both the practical and social needs of human beings: 
market exchange (usually of material goods) and symbolic exchange (of what is ‘priceless’ or 
beyond what can be quantified).   
Market exchange “is binary: product X is exchanged for value Y”; direct reciprocity is 
expected between giver and recipient:122  
 
The giver ‘loses’ some possession by giving, the recipient ‘gains.’  Currencies, measures for 
quantities, and economic value facilitate exchange of all kinds of commodities.   
2.2.3.2.  Symbolic Exchange 
Symbolic exchange, however, operates differently.  Instead of a merely binary relation it 
“is structured in a ternary way.... Besides the gift and the return-gift, there is here the reception 
of the gift as gift and not as anything else.”123  Thus, though an ‘equal value’ cannot be given 
back to the giver, some form of recognition and return-gift are nonetheless obligated of the 
recipient.  Such ‘return’-generosity is therefore passed on to another, a third person, extending 
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122 Sacraments, 121. 
123 Sacraments, 122.  
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social ties beyond the original giver and recipient.  Instead of giving something of equal value 
back to the giver, an obligatory “return-gift [to a third person] is the mark of the reception.”124   
 
Whereas market exchange involves the ‘trade’ of goods that can be produced and 
consumed, symbolic exchange concerns a richer social reality which builds communities, which 
in turn give individual subjects a context in which to find their identity.  Symbolic exchange “has 
to do first with the desire to be recognized as a subject, not to lose face, not to fall from one’s 
social rank, and consequently to compete for prestige.”125  It entails exchange, not of limited 
material goods, but of recognition. 
[The] principle which rules [symbolic exchange] is one of super-abundance.  The true objects 
being exchanged are the subjects themselves.  By the intermediary of these [symbolic] objects, 
the subjects weave or reweave alliances, they recognize themselves as full members of the 
tribe, where they find their identity in showing themselves in their proper place, and in putting 
others in their ‘proper place.’126  
 
According to such a model, communal ‘wealth’ thus accumulates in the social and symbolic 
realms of respect, gratitude, and solidarity.  An opening for the notion of self-giving emerges 
here, since subjects are the ‘true objects being exchanged.’  Gifts mediate above all else 
alliances, not the mere transfer of commodities.  Not least of all, these alliances give birth to, 
precede, and contextualize the identities of individuals.  Chauvet upholds this hidden logic of a 
“fundamental system of ‘obligatory generosity’ and ‘mandatory gratuitousness,’ organized 
according to a process of gift--reception--return-gift .... [which] allows us to live as subjects in 
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all our relations in what they contain of the authentically human.”127  The logic and language of 
symbolic exchange, which bestows true recognition, gives birth to fully human subjects.   
2.2.3.3.  Baudrillard on Symbolic Exchange 
Chauvet refines his notion of symbolic exchange through Jean Baudrillard’s four ‘logics’ 
of the various purposes of exchange.128  The first three are varieties of Mauss’ market  
exchange: 1) the functional logic of utilitarian value (e.g., a car’s utility as a vehicle); 2) the 
economic logic of exchange value (the car’s cash value); 3) the differential logic of sign value 
(the status the car signifies), based on a social code of difference.  In marked contrast to sign-
value is the logic of ‘symbolic exchange’ based on non-value, what is beyond exchange value, or 
‘priceless.’   
Following Baudrillard further, gift exchange entails ambivalence, as a gift can signify 
either the presence or absence of the giver.  A gift likewise expresses to the recipient both 
relation to and ‘distance’ from the giver.  Thus, according to Chauvet a gift-object  
‘one lets go [of] as if it were a part of oneself,’ it becomes a signifier that ‘grounds both the 
presence of the one to the other and their absence from one another.  From this comes the 
ambivalence of all the elements of symbolic exchange ... as a medium of relation and distance, 
the gift is always a sign of love and aggression.... Thus, the structure of the exchange (cf. Levi-
Strauss) is never that of mere reciprocity.  These are not two simple terms, but two ambivalent 
terms which are exchanged, and the exchange establishes their relation as ambivalent.’  In 
contrast to the sign-object, which refers ‘only to the absence of the relation,’ the symbol-object 
(such as the gift) establishes the relation ‘in the absence.’129 
 
Several themes important to Chauvet reappear here: presence and absence, relation and distance, 
sign and symbol, exchange and reciprocity -- as well as ambivalence.  This ambivalence of all 
symbols will prove critical for when Chauvet (and later, Marion) addresses the many subtle 
                                               
127 SS, 103. 
128 Cf. SS, 103-105.  Cf. Jean Baudrillard, Pour une critique de l’economie politique du signe (Paris, Gallimard, 
1972) 61-63, 144-153.  English edition : For a Critique of the Political Economy of the Sign, trans. with an 
introduction by Charles Levin (St. Louis: Telos, 1981).  
129 SS, 103.   
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temptations to idolatry inherent in any devotion.  Each of the themes mentioned above will have 
their own ramifications when applied to sacramental and Eucharistic theology.  The complexities 
created by the ambivalence of so many features configure new possibilities for, place limits on, 
and change the contours of these relations.  The gift of self emerges from this structure as well 
which will help relations of grace be understood as self-giving (rather than cause-and-effect, 
productionist, of the gift of a commodity).   
 This element of ambivalence is very important to note, for it vastly expands the 
possibilities for exchanges and changes in meanings and relations among subjects, quite aside 
from any tangible objects exchanged.   
2.3.  Relations of Grace: Gift of Christian Identity and Sacraments as 
Symbolic Exchange 
With Chauvet’s linguistic, psychoanalytic, and theological approach, the operative 
question concerning sacraments changes.  Since properly Christian subjects come to be by 
reception of Baptism, Confirmation, and Eucharist, Christians are already-embedded within 
‘sacramentality’: their faith is itself “woven together out of sacraments.”130  Since there is no 
Christian subject without the sacraments, the basic question is no longer ‘why have sacraments?’  
Instead, Chauvet asks “What does it mean, then, to believe in Jesus Christ if such a belief is 
structured sacramentally?”131  Something in the nature of the sacraments is instructive for the 
nature of faith and Christian identity.   
 Chauvet proposes that the logic of symbolic exchange among human relationships is a 
fitting model for the relationship of grace between God and human beings.  Mauss and 
Baudrillard brought the ‘logic of the gift’ and of symbolic exchange to light on an 
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anthropological level; this section examines how Chauvet transposes them to discussion of grace 
and the sacraments.  It will first review his rationale for this transposition (2.3.1.).  Next it will 
discuss the church which precedes the Christian subject (2.3.2.), then the nature of the Christian 
identity it bestows.  The process for appropriating the faith, revealed in the scriptures, patterns 
the gift exchange in the Eucharistic liturgy (2.3.5.).  This section concludes by describing 
Chauvet’s ‘anti-sacrificial’ understanding of the Eucharist (2.3.6).   
2.3.1.  Symbolic Exchange in Relations of Grace 
Since symbolic exchange concerns an ‘economy’ beyond practical value, Chauvet finds it 
fitting to describe the nature of relationships in the realm of grace.  One of Chauvet’s chief 
criticisms of traditional sacramental theology is precisely its de facto commodification of grace 
which causal or ‘productionist’ language fosters.  Symbolic exchange, with its greater focus on 
subjects and alliances between them, “occurs in the order of non-value, hence its major interest 
to us in thinking through the gratuitous and gracious relation that is effected between humankind 
and God in the sacraments.”132  An overview of how Chauvet understands these concepts and the 
restoration of reciprocity which symbolic exchange accomplishes follows.    
2.3.1.1.  Graciousness and Gratuitousness 
 An appreciation of the gratuitous and gracious relation of God to human beings is of first 
importance for Chauvet: it sets the horizon upon which grace -- and then the sacraments -- are 
imagined.  As gratuitous, the divine initiative of grace always takes precedence: God was, in 
Christ, reconciling the world to Himself (cf. 2 Cor. 5:17).  Humans’ worship, repentance, 
petition, or service toward God (in liturgy and life) is always and only a response to God’s loving 
initiative.  Furthermore “Even the return-gift of our human response thus belongs to the 
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theologically Christian concept of ‘grace.’”133 This emphasis helps remove concerns that 
sacraments represent an attempt to ‘control’ or coerce God into action.   
As gracious, the gift God bestows cannot be stockpiled or calculated, nor is it parceled 
out (“God does not ration his Spirit”).  Traditional categories such the ‘accumulation of merit’ by 
reception of the sacraments in a state of grace betray the calculating -- and ultimately, coercive -- 
approach with which such language is concerned.  This ‘anti-quantitative’ notion also moves 
theology away from notions of ‘necessary’ or ‘sufficient’ grace.   
 Symbolic exchange helps us step out of quantitative notions of grace through its 
appreciation of how ultimately, subjects exchange themselves.  All the more in the gifts of the 
sacraments and Christian identity do we recognize “we are not at the origin of our own selves ... 
[and] we receive our selves from a gift that was there before us.”134 
2.3.1.2.  Restoring Divine-Human Reciprocity 
 Another concern of Chauvet’s which symbolic exchange helps correct is a proper sense 
of the divine-human cooperation, which preserves both divine initiative and a meaningful human 
response.  While human beings are not able to make a ‘direct’ return gift to God, God’s reception 
of human charity toward the poor, vulnerable, and in need (cf. Mt. 25:31-46) carries a meaning 
far beyond the ‘economic value’ of the gift.  to reception of human self-giving God Himself 
accepts humans’ self-giving -- which is ‘beyond value’ -- through the mediation of the poor of 
the world.  As God’s gift of self through Word and Spirit are received in an embodied way 
through the sacraments, humans receive this gift by extending a similar graciousness through  
loving service for others.  This both develops the original recipient as a Christian subject, and 
calls others into fuller subjectivity.   
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 This paradigm clarifies the nature and place of the human response, which also expands 
the notion of ‘liturgy’ beyond the time-frame of a mass.  The ‘public work’ of members of the 
church extends the liturgy into the life of the world.  For all these reasons Chauvet finds 
symbolic exchange a more helpful paradigm for speaking of a relation of grace between God and 
human subjects.  The formation of free, loving, and responsible human subjects reframes the 
purpose, concerns, and terminology of the sacraments.   
2.3.2.  The Church, Womb of Christian Subjects and Identity 
 Before speaking of God’s relation to individual human beings through the sacraments, 
the mediation of Christian identity (in all its elements) through the church must be recognized.  
God and the church always precede the individual’s coming-to-faith, for “In order to be 
Christian, one must belong to the church.  The church is primary.  The gospel is communitarian 
by its very nature.”135  The social nature of the church ‘precedes’ the individual believer, and is 
the necessary mediation for Christian identity.  Contrary to modern sensibilities, individual 
Christians do not first come to faith and ‘then’ constitute the church; as bearer of Scripture, the 
sacraments, and ethics, the church’s witness in word and deed arouses Christian faith in 
individuals.   
Christian identity is itself a gift, received from God through the mediation of the church: 
“Christian identity is not self-administered; to obtain it, one must receive baptism, and one does 
not baptize oneself.”136  This too has importance for the nature of Christian faith and living.  
Chauvet is not concerning himself with the question of salvation ‘outside’ the visible church 
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136 Sacraments, 20.  This process of coming to Christian faith merits its own analysis as a symbolic exchange of the 
gift of faith -- itself a gift of relation -- which is ‘returned’ by means of proclamation and witness to the world.  This 
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(which is possible), only with the fact that confession of Christian faith inherently entails 
membership in the church.   
2.3.3.  Content of the Gift: Elements of Christian Identity  
Chauvet’s concern with the formation of human and Christian subjects reframes 
theological discourse on Christian identity.  While sacraments are necessary for the Christian 
subject, alone they are insufficient: “the sacraments are only one element among others” which 
constitute Christian identity.  Faith, expressed even by reception of the sacraments, still has need 
for scripture and ethics, which are likewise mediated by the church.  Faith finds bodily 
expression through reception of the sacraments of initiation (Baptism, Eucharist, Confirmation).  
Furthermore, this embodied faith must be expressed in the course of one’s life through a 
Christian ethic toward other subjects.  These elements (scripture, sacraments and ethics) together 
correspond to the human elements of knowledge, gratitude, and action (or behavior).137   
 Chauvet’s understanding of each of these categories is rather broad.  The New Testament 
Scriptures are “the unfolding of the apostolic church’s confession of faith,” the category also 
includes theology and catechesis, which explicate these foundational texts.138  ‘Sacraments’ 
includes all forms of celebration and prayer (including postures and gestures associated with 
prayer), not merely the seven sacraments as traditionally defined by the Council of Trent.  
‘Ethics’ entails “all that pertains to action in the name of the gospel”: not merely interpersonal 
relationships but collective social problems that are beyond any single person’s choices.139   
The following diagrams express the relationship among Christ, the Church (represented 
by the dotted-line circle), and the elements of Christian identity.  Chauvet gives two versions: 
                                               
137 Cf. Sacraments, 31. 
138 Sacraments, 29.   
139 Sacraments, 31.   
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                         (1986 version)140 
                              (1997 version)141 
These diagrams bring together several of Chauvet’s emphases.  The person of Jesus Christ is the 
mediator of God’s gift of self, which elicits the faith of his community of disciples.  Faith finds 
its embodied expression (and reception) in the sacraments, chiefly Baptism and Eucharist.  The 
scriptures, as the written testimony of the earliest Christians, mediate Christian knowledge.  The 
sacraments mediate Christian gratitude, and Christian ethics mediate the action of the living 
ecclesial Body of Christ in the world.  Proclamation of the scriptures and ethical action are 
particularly oriented ‘toward the world,’ but the sacraments express their own witness by the 
church to the world.  Recalling still more of Chauvet’s themes, Baptism initiates the Christian by 
means of ‘dying.’  It is ‘performed’ on the individual’s body by means of elements of the 
                                               
140 SS, 172.   
141 Sacraments, 28.  The contrast in diagrams is interesting, yet Chauvet himself does not comment on their 
differences.  The 1986 diagram emphasizes the sacramental nature of Christ and of the Church, and is more 
explicitly trinitarian.  The 1997 diagram appears to place a stronger emphasis on faith and the sacraments as the 
foundation of Christian identity, from which are born scriptural testimony and ethical expression to the broader 
world.  In the absence of Chauvet’s own commentary, however, the importance (or lack thereof) of such differences 
is merely speculative.    
72 
 
‘cosmic body’ (water), incorporating the recipient into the social and cultural body of the church.  
The language of the scriptures gives birth to richer Christian subjectivity, informing believers’ 
lives of action on behalf of others.   
Each of the three main elements of Christian identity (scripture, sacraments, ethics) only 
acquire their full meaning in relation to the other two.  Furthermore, all three of these are 
bestowed to the church through the liturgy: 
[T]he church assembly attests ... that these Scriptures are the word of God for today and to the 
ethical life in which they demand to be embodied.... What makes ethical life a Christian reality 
is .... the ‘form’ which is given it by love understood as a response to God’s love, which came 
first (1 Cor. 13).  The liturgy is the place where this priority of the love of God freely 
bestowed is attested.... In the measure in which the ethical life of service to others is lived as a 
response to this primary gift, and therefore takes its source in the sacraments, in that same 
measure it finds its Christian identity.142  
 
Chauvet maintains a fundamental unity among the Christian assembly, scriptures, sacraments, 
and ethics: likewise among the liturgy and the gift of love God makes through the liturgy.  
Separation of any of these elements from the others distorts them: “[I]t would be absurd to think 
or say that one could be a Christian without any ethical concern for others; it would be equally 
absurd to think or say that one can be a Catholic ‘without going to Mass.’  Certainly only love 
matters.... But how could this love for others be lived as love for God if it were not rooted in the 
word and the Eucharist?” 143  The need for the sacraments is not ‘tacked onto’ ethics here in a sort 
of reverse order, neither is Christ ‘tacked onto’ the sacraments.  The gift of the creative and 
redemptive Incarnate Word gives birth to a ‘body of subjects’ which -- simply staying true to its 
origin -- expresses itself in actions of self-giving, becoming ever more like unto the source of its 
knowledge, gratitude, and ethics.   
                                               
142 Sacraments, 41.   
143 Sacraments, 42.   
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 While these elements of Christian identity are ‘discovered’ on an anthropological plane, 
they all have their origin in the gift of Jesus Christ.  This fact can be easily overlooked by those 
looking for a ‘descending, from above’ Christology and dissatisfied with Chauvet’s linguistic-
psychoanalytic premises.  Chauvet supplies an important corrective against any notion his is a 
‘merely exemplar’ soteriology: 
Jesus Christ ... is not simply an ‘example’ but the genuine ‘sacrament’ of God.  To present a 
Christ who would be first of all an example to imitate is to veer toward the path of moralism, a 
discouraging, even a fraudulent path since the 54 example to imitate is inimitable.  Christ must 
be announced primarily as the sacrament of God (and as a consequence he is to be ‘imitated’ 
in a way completely different from that promoted above).  As sacrament, that is to say, as the 
gratuitous gift of God and, more precisely, as Savior.  He is our ferryman to God’s shore.  We 
do not have to desperately run after him to join him: he himself comes toward us, as at 
Emmaus, and takes us in his boat to carry us to the other shore.  It is, before all else, this truth 
that the sacraments are witnessing to us: a pure gift from God deposited in our hands (The 
body of Christ—Amen).144 
 
Christ is to be imitated in a particularly sacramental way: by which Chauvet means, as gift.  
Christ comes to us as God’s ‘totally other’ gift; we are called and meant to ‘receive’ this gift by 
similarly ‘emptying ourselves’ (cf. Phil. 2:5-11) through ‘return-gift’ to other embodied persons 
in the world around us.   
2.3.4.  Process of Coming-to-Faith: Consent to Loss and Mediation 
The process by which the earliest disciples came to faith after the resurrection of Christ 
remains paradigmatic for contemporary believers: it is “an ecclesial pattern common to all 
Christians.”145  Three coming-to-faith narratives reveal this pattern whereby Christian faith 
comes about: the journey to Emmaus (Lk. 24:13-35), Philip’s baptism of the Ethiopian eunuch 
(Acts 8:26-40), and Saul’s conversion (Acts 9:1-20).  Chauvet describes a ‘symbolic exchange’ 
in a broader (‘Baudrillardian’) sense of changes of meaning: for religious symbols (such as 
                                               
144 Sacraments, 53-54. 
145 Sacraments, 20. 
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presence and absence) and the actions (ethics) of the subject.  We also see how Chauvet 
incorporates Heideggerian themes of language (in particular, interpretation), presence-absence, 
and arrival-withdrawal.   
2.3.4.1.  First Stage: Proclamation of Christ’s Death and Resurrection  
 In each narrative it is the ‘time of the church,’ when the ‘earthly’ Jesus no longer walks 
the earth.  Through a divine initiative, proclamation of Christ as risen is given (Christ 
interpreting the Scriptures, Philip explaining Isaiah to the eunuch, the risen Christ appearing to 
Saul).  By such interpretation of the scriptures or event, the necessity of the sufferings of the 
Christ before he entered his glory is attested.  Such ‘witnessing,’ however, is but part of the 
revelation. 
2.3.4.2.  Second Stage: Sacramental Gesture 
 Secondly, a sacramental gesture attests to and mediates the gift of divine grace still 
further.  In the three scenes selected, either a gesture of the ‘breaking of the bread’ (taking, 
blessing, breaking, giving) or baptism (by Philip, and Ananias) expresses concretely God’s 
gracious action.  (For Paul, the 2nd and 3rd stages are reversed.)  The love of God is embodied in 
a sacramental way, and chiefly through these forms of Baptism and Eucharist.   
2.3.4.3.  Third Stage: Eyes Open Upon an Absence   
 As the mediating action expresses God’s gracious love to the recipient(s), at the same 
time the original ‘form’ of the mediator disappears.  The stranger on the way to Emmaus 
vanishes, as does Philip from the Ethiopian eunuch.  After hearing the voice of the risen Christ, 
Paul opens his eyes “but could see nothing” (Acts 9:8).  Tangibly or concretely, an absence 
follows the gift.  The ‘giver’ of the gift disappears -- twice in the giving of the gift.   
2.3.4.4.  Fourth Stage: Return-Gift of Proclamation 
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 While absence of the giver to the recipient prevents the possibility of a direct return-gift, 
the obligation to a return-gift remains.  This new situation is meant to prompt the recipient to 
make a return-gift to a third subject, a new recipient who expands the reach of the gift.  The two 
disciples at Emmaus return to Jerusalem to tell what they saw, Philip proclaims the good news 
from Azotus to Caesarea, and Paul begins preaching Jesus as Lord at Damascus.  Proclamation 
of the Christian faith -- by word and embodied example -- expresses true reception of the gift of 
faith, through a return-gift given to others.   
2.3.4.5.  The Lesson: Accepting the Mediation of the Church  
The process of coming to faith thus requires both renunciation of ‘direct access’ to Christ 
and an assent to the incarnate mediation of the church.  Faith in the risen Jesus -- if it is to be 
faith, and neither direct knowledge nor access -- must accept the mediation of the Body of Christ, 
the church: “[Y]ou cannot arrive at the recognition of the risen Jesus unless you renounce 
seeing/touching/finding him by undeniable proofs.  Faith begins precisely with such a 
renunciation of the immediacy of the see/know and with the assent to the mediation of the 
church.”146  The church ‘substitutes’ as a sacramental body which witnesses by proclamation and 
deed to the gift it receives from God: “Living in God, the Lord Jesus has left his place on earth, 
as the story of the ascension shows (Acts 1:6-11).  From now on.... the church occupies this place 
symbolically, that is ... the church is not Christ, but his symbolic witness, which means that its 
original and constant raison d’etre is to direct everything back to him.”147   
The Church is not in any way extraneous to Christian faith: it is the body which mediates 
Christian faith to all.  “The passage to faith thus requires that one let go of the desire to see-
touch-find, to accept in its place the hearing of a word” -- which is supplied in part by the 
                                               
146 Sacraments, 25.   
147 Sacraments, 28. 
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‘visible word’ of the sacrament, celebrated by the liturgical assembly.148  So the church, as the 
ecclesial Body of Christ, takes up Jesus’ words and actions in the world, to be Christ’s presence 
in the world.  By its witness, the desire which all people have for immediate access to God is 
redirected by word and sacramental gift to become self-giving to and for one’s neighbor.  
Disciples are called to remember the Christ revealed by the scriptures and proclaimed in the 
memorial of the sacramental gesture, which bestows a gift and obligation to be returned through 
gift to others.  The setting in which this occurs is the liturgical assembly. 
2.3.5.  Liturgy of the Church 
As the ecclesial Body of Christ, the church stands as the mediation (or sacrament) of 
Christ’s continued action in the world.  “The gestures the church makes [in the eucharist], the 
words it pronounces are [Jesus’] gestures and his words.  In the fullest sense of the word [the 
church] is the ‘sacrament.’”149  The church most visibly takes on this role in its celebration of the 
liturgy.  As the assembly of the faithful “The liturgy is ... theological locus of first importance.  It 
shows us, not by mode of reasoning but by mode of symbolic action, that no one becomes 
Christian except by being taken into the common ‘womb’ of the church.”150  The church’s 
symbolic and sacramental celebration redirects attention and desire according to God’s loving 
word and will.   
While “every eucharistic assembly truly realizes the church of God,” such assemblies are 
not unrelated to other persons or communities, such as the bishop and the universal church.151  A 
                                               
148 SS, 162. 
149 Sacraments, 26.  
150 Sacraments, 33-34. 
151 Sacraments, 37.  The dignity of the liturgical assembly is also clearly affirmed in Church teaching: cf. Catechism 
of the Catholic Church, 1140, 1141, 1144, 1179; Sacrosanctum Concilium 7; Lumen Gentium , Paul VI, Encyclical 
Letter Mysterium Fidei, 35; General Instruction on the Roman Missal, 27.  Orthodox theologian Alexander 
Schmemann has also been influential in affirming the fundamental importance of the assembly; see Alexander 
Schmemann, The Eucharist: Sacrament of the Kingdom, trans. by Paul Kachur (Crestwood, NY: St. Vladimir’s 
Seminary, 1988).   
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eucharistic assembly must “be ‘lawful,’ that is ... that an ordained minister in communion with 
the bishop and therefore in communion with the other church communities presides.”152 
The following sections will examine the subjects, purpose, and actions of the eucharistic 
liturgy, with a view toward a ‘symbolic exchange’ analysis of the eucharistic prayer. 
2.3.5.1.  The Christian Subject in the Eucharist: The Ecclesial ‘We’ of the Assembly 
Even in the celebration of the Eucharist, the prayers the presider voices aloud are all 
spoken in the first person plural.  This linguistic detail has important implications for the 
celebration of the liturgy.  The social nature of the church as an assembly finds expression in the 
liturgy.  The priest does not speak in the first person singular to God ‘on behalf of’ the 
congregation: the assembly offers prayers to God.  This ‘we’ is important to note for our 
relational emphasis, to name properly the subjects involved.  The assembly, as a social entity, is 
the subject and recipient engaged in relation with God.     
2.3.5.2.  Liturgical Actions of Christ, Assembly, and Priest 
 Recognition of the assembly as a ‘subject’ in the liturgy clarifies the actions of the 
Eucharistic celebration, and the role of the priest in that celebration.  The celebration is, in part, 
an action of the assembly, gathered and celebrating in the name of the Triune God.  Christ 
presides and exercises his priesthood, and the assembly -- priest and congregation together -- 
celebrates.  “The priest who presides (for if all celebrate, one presides) manifests ‘sacramentally’ 
or ‘ministerially’ that it is Christ himself who presides and exercises his unique priesthood in the 
midst of the assembly and on its behalf; it is precisely because it is Christ who presides that all 
the members of his body act together with him, on the basis of faith and baptism.”153  Christ acts 
                                               
152 Sacraments, 37.  Cf. Lumen gentium, 26.   
153 Sacraments, 33. 
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as mediator; the priest as presider manifests Christ-as-priest among the assembly; the assembly 
acts together with Christ as His Body.   
The liturgy recalls and re-presents God’s gifts to the church, also giving hope of enjoying 
the fullness of the Kingdom of God in heaven.  This act of thanksgiving does not have its 
initiative in human action: it remains a response to the action of God across history:  
[To] give thanks to God in a Christian manner is not a ‘natural’ matter but demands a 
complete.... conversion in the strongest sense of the word .... [The] fulfillment of such a 
thanksgiving by human beings ... needs nothing less than the action of God (the Father and the 
Holy Spirit, co-operating subjects...) giving the Son to humankind under the triple dimension 
of time (past, present, and future).154   
 
The assembly is a participation in the Body of Christ, and it has an active role.  The 
assembly is not merely ‘acted upon’ by the priest who ‘acts on their behalf’: “this community 
acts; it acts as a body, as a constituted body, as body of Christ.”155  This is made especially clear 
in 1 Cor. 10:16-17, in which “the subject who blesses the cup and breaks the bread is the ‘we’ of 
the assembly.”156  This aspect reinforces an understanding of the assembly as acting fully and 
consciously in its Eucharistic celebration.   
2.3.5.3.  Eucharist as Memorial and Anticipation 
 For Chauvet the principal ‘shape’ or nature of the eucharistic action is a ‘twofold 
memorial’ -- of both the historical past and the eschatological future.  Chauvet himself refers to 
J.B. Metz’s notion of a ‘dangerous memory,’ which interrupts, subverts, and liberates from the 
dominant narrative set forth by the world’s oppressors.157  That the Eucharist is a memorial takes 
precedence over concerns of presence, transubstantiation, sacrifice, or meal.  The assembly 
                                               
154 Sacraments, 133.   
155 Sacraments, 33. 
156 1 Cor. 10:16-17: ‘The cup of blessing which we bless, is it not a sharing in the blood of Christ?  The bread that 
we break, is it not a sharing in the body of Christ?’  Sacraments, 33.   
157 Cf. Johann Baptist Metz, Faith in History and Society: Toward a Practical Fundamental Theology, trans. and ed. 
J. Matthew Ashley, with Study Guide (New York: Crossroad, 2011). 
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collectively recalls and celebrates the death and resurrection of Jesus, the ultimate gift of God, 
which culminated in God’s withdrawal at the Ascension and gift of the Holy Spirit at Pentecost.  
“[I]n the memorial the past is received as present (and even as a present)”: through the power of 
the risen Christ and the Holy Spirit, the paschal mystery of God’s self-gift is proclaimed, heard, 
and celebrated anew.158   
Most fundamentally the church’s thanksgiving is a memorial of the ‘Godself’ given to 
human beings in Jesus Christ.  This was originally revealed in the past (recalled through the 
scriptures and the liturgy), re-presented now in its celebration, but as a foretaste of the kingdom 
of heaven in its fullness.  As evidenced within the Eucharistic prayers themselves, the end of 
history does not occur with the institution narrative; an offering and petition for as-yet-unrealized 
eschatological fullness follow.   
The sacramental ‘presence’ of Christ ... can thus be understood only in relation to the twofold 
memorial which structures the whole of the Eucharistic Prayer: a memorial of the past in 
thanksgiving ... and a memorial of the future in supplication ....  This in no way minimizes the 
truth of the presence, but obliges us to place it, as C. Perrot puts it, at the midpoint of a ‘double 
distance between the yesterday of Golgotha and the future of the Parousia’: its connection to 
the Parousia keeps it from being reduced to a simple historical evocation of the cross which 
would equate the Christian meal with Greek funeral rites; its connection to Golgotha prevents 
it from remaining in the Jewish status of waiting; and the distance between the two crosses out 
its very truth of presence with the stroke of absence and prohibits us from conceiving it as a 
‘full’ presence in the Gnostic manner.159 
 
Here we see within the heart of the Eucharistic prayer itself the work of ‘mourning’ Chauvet 
associates with truly Christian faith.  In keeping with Chauvet’s cautionary concern with distance 
as a safeguard of truly reciprocal relationship, the lack of full immediacy must be recognized: the 
Eucharist remains a sacramental sign.  Acknowledgment of the petition is an important 
corrective, since it reminds us we still do not have full immediate presence vis-à-vis God.  There 
                                               
158 Sacraments, 56.  
159 SS, 391.  Cf. C. Perrot, “L’anamnèse néo-testamentaire,” Rev. Inst. Cath. Paris 2 (1982) 33-35.  
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is the truth of Christ’s presence, but we must not overlook the petition of longing for the fullness 
of God’s kingdom, still yet to come.  The Eucharist is a celebration and anticipation of the 
‘proleptic’ fulfillment of God’s self-giving, whose totality is yet to come.   
 Though celebrated daily throughout the world, the church celebrates its memorial of the 
Eucharist most fully on the Lord’s Day, Sunday, ‘the day after the sabbath’ upon which Christ 
rose from the dead.  “The Christian Sunday is the memorial-day of the paschal event.... [The 
Sunday assembly] is the ‘primary sacrament’ of the risen One.”160  Chauvet’s repeated insistence 
on the sacramental nature of the assembly is important to note: God is ‘already’ present 
sacramentally among the assembly, the baptized ecclesial Body of Christ.  This is an important 
corrective of common piety which considers only the consecrated bread and wine as (effectively) 
the only ‘presence’ of the Body of Christ, which only ‘appears’ at the consecration.      
2.3.5.4.  Symbolic Exchange in the Eucharistic Prayer 
We come to Chauvet’s application of symbolic gift exchange to the liturgy of the 
Eucharist.  Through close attention to its perlocutionary language of gift exchange, we discover 
aspects of this celebration that traditional sacramental theology underemphasizes or neglects 
altogether.  These relational aspects open new insights and questions concerning eucharistic 
theology and Christian discipleship.   
As mentioned earlier, Chauvet regards the word as “the very archetype of what happens 
between subjects and within any subject.”161  The words of the Eucharistic prayer, then, can be 
understood as intended to be transformative of both relationships with others and within oneself.   
The fact that there is a text [of the Eucharistic prayer] signifies that at the outset we are 
not competent to carry out such an action [of giving thanks].  In sum, it is not natural 
for us to render thanks to God in a Christian manner.  To carry out the Eucharist 
                                               
160 Sacraments, 35-36. 
161 SS, 266. 
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requires that the Church first gain this competence.  It is precisely the text that allows 
the ecclesial subject to gain this competence.  This text thus makes the assembly 
follow an itinerary which, by means of certain ‘transformations,’ has for its goal the 
assembly’s conversion. 162  
 
The intended transformation is spelled out by the narrative of the Eucharistic prayer: “it is not 
God but we ourselves who are changed by the Eucharistic prayer: all the transformations are 
expressed as the differentiated work of the God-in-three-persons.163   
The text of the Eucharistic prayer, with its symbolic efficacy of language (which bestows 
subjectivity) bestows the competence and Christian identity to give thanks to God in a Christian 
manner: namely, in a way which acknowledges the gratuitousness and obligation of the gifts God 
has given in Christ, which cannot be returned directly but must be returned via the body of Christ 
in the world.   
2.3.5.5.  Narrative Program(s) of the Eucharistic Prayer   
Chauvet traces this transformation by observing the process of symbolic exchange in the 
Eucharistic prayer.  He follows its ‘narrative program’: the standardized structure found in the 
Eucharistic prayers used by the universal church. 164  A narrative program “starts from a negative 
situation of lack... and stops when this lack is filled”; an ‘operating subject’ supplies an ‘object’ 
to a ‘receiving subject.’165   The narrative program “that sets the text of the Eucharistic prayer in 
motion” is announced in the initial dialogue (“Let us give thanks to the Lord our God”); it 
                                               
162 SS, 269.  Here, Chauvet overlooks the first three centuries of church history, during which time eucharistic 
prayers were often offered spontaneously, without a standardized text.  Cf. Paul F Bradshaw, Essays on Early 
Eastern Eucharistic Prayers (Collegeville, MN: Liturgical Press, 1997); Maxwell E. Johnson, editor, Issues in 
Eucharistic Praying in East and West: Essays in Liturgical and Theological Analysis (Collegeville, MN: Liturgical 
Press, 2011); Andrew McGowan, Ascetic Eucharists (New York: Oxford, 1999);  Paul F. Bradshaw and Maxwell E. 
Johnson, The Eucharistic Liturgies: Their Evolution and Interpretation (Collegeville, MN: Liturgical Press, 2012). 
163 SS, 269. 
164 Sacraments, cf. 130.   
165 Sacraments, 129-130.   
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concludes with the doxology and Great Amen.  This principal narrative / narrative program (NP) 
unfolds through a set of three narrative ‘sub-programs,’ described below. 166  
2.3.5.5.1.  NP 1: Preface and Sanctus 
 The assembly (the ecclesial ‘we’) gives thanks to God for the gifts of creation and His 
marvelous deeds in salvation history.  A feast day preface may commemorate a particular event 
or God’s grace in the exemplary life of one or more saints, but in any case the thanksgiving 
culminates in God’s gift of Jesus Christ.  Chauvet notes that the prayer has no other object than 
what is revealed in the scriptures, and it always culminates in paschal mystery of Christ.  
Recalling the second stage of the coming-to-faith process outlined above, the preface always 
recounts “the biblical past reread Christologically.”167  This implies that the Christian assembly 
is retracing the path of coming-to-faith in its liturgical celebration; the celebration is giving birth 
to Christian subjects.   
The assembly then joins the heavenly host as it celebrates God as the thrice-Holy One.168  
In sum, NP 1 presents “what God gives us, Jesus Christ as an historical (born of the Virgin Mary 
and crucified) glorious body.”169   
2.3.5.5.2. : NP 2:  First Epiclesis, Institution Narrative, Anamnesis 
 In the first epiclesis the assembly asks God to send the Holy Spirit upon the gifts of bread 
and wine, that they may (in the present) become the gift Jesus made of them (in the past) to his 
disciples “on the night he was betrayed, entering willingly into his Passion.”170  This is both a 
recollection of Jesus’ ultimate act of fidelity and a petition for re-present this gift among the 
                                               
166 Cf. Sacraments, 130-133.   
167 SS, 270. 
168 Given Chauvet’s strong emphasis on God’s transcendence, it is surprising this receives no mention.   
169 SS, 270.   
170 Eucharistic Prayer II. 
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assembly.  This petition is not ‘out of the blue’ but within a very particular (symbolic) context 
meant to enable reverent reception of the grace God intends for human beings.   
The prayer then recounts, in the presence of God and for the assembly, the institution 
narrative of the first gift of Jesus’ sacramental body and blood.  As mentioned already, it is a 
twofold memorial relating the present time to both the historical past and the future glory in 
heaven.  The text is a composite of the biblical accounts, and by quoting it two important 
transpositions, of time and subject, occur at once.  First, the speaking subject changes from the 
ecclesial ‘we’ petitioning God to citation by the priest of Jesus speaking in the first person ‘I’ to 
his disciples.  Second, there is a change from narration of the past (‘Jesus took... said the 
blessing, broke, gave’)  -- to the second person imperative, present tense -- (‘Take this, all of you 
... eat / drink’).   
Through the power of the Holy Spirit, this citation of the word of God in prayerful 
remembrance in a liturgical assembly of the baptized carries great significance.  The risen Lord 
addresses disciples in the here-and-now: “This story [of the institution narrative] by the Church 
about Jesus in the past functions in effect as the words of the Lord Jesus to the Church in the 
present,”171 as “a discourse of the Lord addressed to the church.”172  Understanding ‘to cite’ as 
“‘to call upon officially to appear (as before a court)’ ...‘to quote by way of example, authority, 
or proof,’” Chauvet writes of the Eucharistic Prayer’s change from communal prayer in the 
preface to Jesus’ address of his disciples: 
This sudden passage from a citation referring to a faraway past to its being used in the present, 
in the discourse of the Eucharistic Prayer, shows that by citing Jesus at the Last Supper, the 
church sees itself in fact cited by him, its Lord, cited to act....  This story is central for the 
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172 Sacraments, 133. 
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church; it is the effective norm of its actions.  Thus, the church ‘executes’ the story as... a 
discourse of the Lord obliging the church to obey.”173 
 
This discourse of the Lord -- itself a gift -- obliges the church today: the church “cannot ‘narrate’ 
Jesus as Christ and Lord without being itself taken in the present into what it narrates in the 
past.”174  The assembly receives the gift anew, with its obligation.  Jesus’ words conclude with 
the mandate ‘Do this in memory of me.’   
 While never contesting belief in Christ’s sacramental presence in the Eucharist, Chauvet 
emphasizes a particular interpretation of its meaning.  It should not surprise us that a 
Heideggerian notion of ‘ad-esse,’ of ‘being-for’ (with its concomitant notions of purpose, care, 
and relation) come to the fore.  The Eucharistic presence is not a ‘being,’ ‘present’ (concerning 
either location or giftedness) for its own sake; it is oriented toward the disciples for a saving 
purpose.   
[The] story of the institution ... places Christ’s coming-to-presence in this same dynamic of 
relation [as was time, toward past and future].  First at the level of the words quoted, the “take, 
eat, . . . drink ...” and, still more, the hyper (“for”) are essential to the significance of the 
action.  Hyper is neither a simple derivation nor an extrinsic purpose of an esse that would be 
sufficient unto itself.  The salvific relation it signifies ... indicates that we cannot be content 
here, under the pretext of ‘realism,’ to imagine the reality at issue as the simple esse of a 
subsistent entity; the relation must be conceived precisely as ‘presence,’ that is, as being-for, 
being-toward.  In other terms, the esse is constitutively ad-esse.  Moreover, the gestures of gift 
and sharing indicate the same thing.175  
 
All of this is meant to correct a tendency toward thinking of transubstantiated elements as the 
final goal (or res) of the sacrament; they are not.  Christ’s presence is the elements serves another 
purpose ‘beyond itself.’ 
 After the memorial acclamation and recollection of Jesus’ suffering, death, and 
resurrection, the anamnesis expresses the immediate offering to God of the sacramental Body 
                                               
173 Sacraments, 134.  (Translators’ note: “The definitions of ‘cite’ are taken from Webster’s Ninth New Collegiate 
Dictionary (Springfield, MA: Merriam-Webster, 1989).” 
174 Sacraments, 134-135. 
175 SS, 391-392. 
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and Blood by the assembly.  By the act of oblation, the gift is more fully received through an act 
of dispossession.   
2.3.5.5.3.  NP 3: Second Epiclesis, Eschatological Prayer 
 In a second petition for the Holy Spirit, the assembly prays for itself, “so that it may 
become what it has just received in NP 2; and what it has received will be ritually completed in 
Communion.”176  Having just received and offered the sacramental body of Christ, the assembly 
“seeks that it become more fully the ecclesial body of this same Christ,” i.e., what traditional 
sacramental theology designates as the res of the Eucharist: the unity of the Body of Christ.  
Such unity among the ecclesial Body of Christ is the ‘final goal’ of the Eucharistic celebration, 
not merely in the time frame of the liturgical assembly but in lives witnessing to Christ.  Lastly, 
in hope of enjoying eternal life with God, the assembly asks “participation by the ecclesia here 
assembled in the reign fully realized.”177  The doxology and Great Amen conclude the 
Eucharistic prayer as such.  
2.3.5.5.4.  Synthesis of Narrative Programs within Symbolic Exchange 
With the subjects (God and human beings), the Eucharist entails gifts (of bread/Body and 
wine/Blood), markers of identity (Scripture, Sacrament, Ethics), and different periods in history 
(past, present, future).  The diagram below presents how Chauvet brings together these various 
triads of the Christian symbolic world according to the logic of symbolic exchange:178  
                                               
176 SS, 271.   
177 SS, 271. 




The celebration is first a memorial of how God bestowed gifts (1.) of creation and 
redemption to human beings (2.) in salvation history, most notably in Jesus Christ.  This gift 
originally occurred in the past (1.b.c.d.), but as it is recalled now in the present, the power of the 
risen Lord and the Holy Spirit present these gifts anew (2.b.c.d.).  As finite creatures limited by 
time and space, human beings are unable to make a ‘full’ return-gift to God, either ‘directly 
back’ to God or ‘of equal value.’  Nonetheless, having recognized the gift of grace, the assembly 
remains obligated -- implicitly by the nature of symbolic exchange, or explicitly through 
scripture’s commandments -- to make a return-gift.  So, as in common symbolic exchange of 
gifts of ‘non-value’ or beyond value, return-gift is made to a wider circle of subjects, namely, 
other people of the world (3.b.c.).  Such acts of justice and charity are given in gratitude and to 
prepare for God’s eschatological future, the fullness of the kingdom of heaven (3.d.).   
 This symbolic exchange analysis reveals the dynamic continuity among the three 
elements of Christian identity, and their respective roles in the formation of Christian subjects.  
Through scripture (1.a.) the assembly recalls gifts of the past and present, celebrated 
sacramentally (2.a.), and then extended to an ever-wider circle of subjects through deeds of 
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service (3.a.).  The canon of scripture provides the foundational knowledge; sacraments are a 
celebration of gratitude; ethical lives give witness to inner transformation.   
2.3.6.  Christ’s Priesthood, Sacrifice, and Eucharist 
 Every eucharistic theology has an implicit soteriology; both, for Chauvet, are done a 
disservice by traditional ‘sacrificial’ concepts and terminology.  He acknowledges a need both to 
keep and refine the meaning of this terminology.   
2.3.6.1.  Sacrifice: Under Critique 
 The theological notion of ‘sacrifice’ has undergone extensive criticism in recent 
decades.179  While rooted in biblical texts (particularly the Letter to the Hebrews), many writers 
in both soteriology and Eucharistic theology have questioned the value of this traditional motif 
on theological and/or cultural grounds.180  Chapter IV of this dissertation will review the 
influential critique (and eventual rapprochement) of sacrifice by René Girard and those who 
have appropriated it into Christian theology.  Liberation and feminist theologians have likewise 
called attention to the potentially-oppressive aspects of this theme.  Other writers consider it 
essential to the nature of Christianity.181   
 Chauvet’s recasting of the Eucharist away from onto-theological ‘Real Presence’ toward 
an action of linguistic-symbolic gift exchange involves a reinterpretation of Eucharistic sacrifice 
as well.  Particularly since the language of sacrifice has embedded itself within church tradition, 
                                               
179 The criticism of satisfaction (or sacrificial) atonement theory is important for Eucharistic theology of sacrifice 
because Christ’s ‘sacrifice’ on the cross for the forgiveness of sins becomes the basis for Eucharistic and personal 
sacrifice.   
180 Theological critiques of sacrifice generally concern an idolatrous notion of God for whom violence is inherent in 
the divine nature.  Cf. Robert Daly, Sacrifice Unveiled: The True Meaning of Christian Sacrifice (New York: T & T 
Clark, 2009); S. Mark Heim, Saved from Sacrifice: A Theology of the Cross (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 2006); 
Stephan Finlan, Problems with Atonement: The Origins of, and Controversy about, the Atonement Doctrine 
(Collegeville, MN: Liturgical Press, 2006).   
181 Cf. Matthew Levering, Sacrifice and Community: Jewish Offering and Christian Eucharist (Malden, MA: 
Blackwell Publishing, 2005); Pope John Paul II, Ecclesia de Eucharistia: On the Eucharist in Its Relation to the 
Church, Encyclical Letter (17 April 2003). 
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questions concerning whether to keep or reject such language, and how to interpret it if kept, 
acquire particular importance. 
Chauvet first contrasts traditional sacrificial theology of atonement and the sacraments 
with a ‘non-sacrificial’ approach which would reject both the theology and terminology of 
sacrifice.  In Symbol and Sacrament, written in 1986, Chauvet associated such a stance with the 
thought of René Girard.182  Chauvet believed Girard mistakenly opposes ritual sacrifice and 
ethical concerns: either ritual sacrifice is effective (removing any need for ethical concern) or 
ethical (rendering ritual sacrifice superfluous), but not both.  Chauvet wants to introduce as a 
third option ‘anti-sacrifice’: a subversion of sacrificial theology away from ritual notions toward 
an ethical emphasis.   
2.3.6.2.  Understanding and Expressing Jesus’ Saving Sacrifice 
Chauvet proposes that “Jesus’ priesthood and sacrifice were exercised existentially, and 
not ritually.”183  As expressed in Philippians 2:5-11, by his kenosis Jesus “lived and ... died in 
reversing ... the paradigmatic sin of humankind.... [which] is to live its relation with God 
according to a pattern of force and competition, a pattern ... [of] the slave trying to seize ... the 
omnipotence of the master and to take the master’s place.”184  Jesus’ own posture of 
Gelassenheit expressed and accepted the distance proper to the human-divine relationship.  This 
humble ‘letting go’ culminated in Jesus’ surrender before God on the cross, “where he consents 
to taste humanity to its extreme limit, death experienced in the silence of a God who would not 
                                               
182 Cf. SS, 301-303.  Girard, in dialogue with Raymund Schwager S.J., eventually affirmed a qualified understanding 
of sacrifice, in which God allowed sinful humans to attempt ‘scapegoating’ Jesus, but exposed the lie of this 
mechanism through the events of the crucifixion and resurrection.  This arc in Girard’s thought will be reviewed in 
Chapter IV.  Cf. René Girard, The One by Whom Scandal Comes, trans. M.B. DeBevoise (East Lansing, MI: 
Michigan State University Press, 2014).  Also cf. Scott Cowdell, Chris Fleming, Joel Hodge, and Mathias 
Moosbrugger, eds., René Girard and Raymund Schwager: Correspondence 1974-1991, translated by Chris Fleming 
and Sheelah Treflé Hidden (Bloomsbury Academic: New York, 2016). 
183 SS, 299.   
184 SS, 299. 
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even intervene to spare the Just One this death.”185  For Chauvet this ‘word of the cross’ 
expresses and establishes the proper relation of human beings to God: “This ‘sacrificial’ letting-
be seems to us to open a way to express theologically the significance of the life and death of 
Jesus ‘for all humankind.’” 186  God neither demands nor is appeased by a traditionally-
understood ‘sacrifice’ of Jesus on behalf of sinners.   
2.3.6.3.  Jesus’ Gift in the Eucharist: From Ritual to Ethical/Existential ‘Sacrifice’ 
Thus Chauvet proposes ‘anti-sacrifice,’ which keeps sacrificial terminology but 
transposes their object from ritual to ethical sacrifice.187  According to such a model, worship is 
not expressed primarily in a ceremonial or ritual form but is “embodied in life itself through 
faith, hope, and charity.”188  By ‘anti-sacrificial’ Chauvet seeks “not the negation of the 
sacrificial ... but the task to convert all the sacrificial to the gospel in order to live it ... in a filial 
(and hence in a brotherly and sisterly) manner. ... [this] constitutes the premier place of our 
‘sacrifice.’”189  The truly ‘sacrificial’ element for Chauvet is precisely turning away from ritual 
sacrifice -- and all its tendencies toward self-serving idolatry -- toward active ‘service of Christ-
in-the-neighbor.  Ritual is not an ‘end in itself’ but serves to instill an existential, first-person 
readiness to act and live in memory of Jesus.   
Chauvet finds the foundation for this approach in the gospel according to John, wherein 
the evangelist substitutes the washing of the feet for the synoptic institution narrative.  
Employing the commentary of Xavier Léon-Dufour on John 13:15 (“I have set you an example, 
that you also should do as [kathos] I have done to you), Chauvet states: 
                                               
185 SS, 301. 
186 SS, 300. 
187 Cf. SS, 303-305.  
188 SS, 299.   
189 SS, 311. 
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‘The comparison with the anamnesis is inescapable: ... Do this in memory of me.’  For this 
Johannine kathos ‘is causal rather than merely exemplary ... as if Jesus said: ‘In acting this 
way, I give you power to act in the same way.’  This kathos, we would say, has the value of a 
sacramentum — that is to say, of a gift on the part of Christ — and not simply of an 
exemplum.... It is finally ‘Jesus himself who, through his disciples, fulfills the service which 
must characterize them.’  To wash one another’s feet is to live existentially the memory of 
Christ that the Eucharist makes us live ritually.190 
 
This is the way celebration of the Eucharist is ‘veri-fied.’  In a gift of giving, Jesus directs his 
disciples toward the mundane needs of neighbors.  This gift which redirects attention and action 
toward acts of mercy is the ‘anti-sacrifice:’ “the sacred work, the cult, the sacrifice that is 
pleasing to God, is the confession of faith lived in the agape of sharing in service to the poorest, 
of reconciliation, and of mercy.”191  In a deliberate move away from cult ritual which too often 
deteriorates into bourgeois self-indulgence, Christian ‘anti-sacrifice’ seeks the concrete relief of 
those in need as the ‘return-gift which recognizes and broadens the gift among other subjects. 
2.3.6.4.  Liturgy of the Eucharist: From Ritual Memory to Existential Memory 
The ritualized memorial of the liturgy of the Eucharist is thus meant to instill in disciples 
a living, existential memory of Jesus’ purpose, way of living, and kind of action.  Thus, “ritual 
memory of Jesus’ death and resurrection is not Christian unless it is veri-fied in an existential 
memory whose place is none other than the believers’ bodies.” 192  The liturgy of the Eucharist is 
neither an exercise in nostalgic memory nor a sacrificial appeasement of God, but a commission 
to live in the present as the ecclesial Body of Christ: “The ritual story at each Eucharist, retelling 
why Jesus handed over his life, sends all Christians back to their own responsibility to take 
charge of history in his name; and so they become his living memory in the world because he 
                                               
190 SS, 260-261.  Cf. X. Léon -Dufour, Sharing the Eucharistic Bread: The Witness of the New Testament, trans. 
Matthew J. O’Connell (New York: Paulist, 1987), 250.  There the translation reads “‘as’ (kathos) conveys the idea 
of origination rather than exemplarity.” 
191 SS, 260. 
192 SS, 260-261.   
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himself is ‘sacramentally’ engaged in the body of humanity they work at building for him.”193  
By recognizing 1) God’s gift to us, 2) His absence for a direct return-gift, and 3) His mediated 
presence among those in need, we are given the coordinates for ‘full, conscious, active 
participation’ in divine giving.   
Chauvet’s writings represent an attempt to re-present the philosophical premises of 
Christian sacramentality in light of the ‘linguistic turn’ of the 20th century and the awareness of 
the hermeneutical involvement of subjects with what they encounter.  This effort included a 
move ‘from the metaphysical to the symbolic,’ from a paradigm of causality to one of symbolic 
gift-exchange, and all while taking account of the revelation of the cross and the contributions of 
social sciences.   
2.4.  Critical Reception of Chauvet 
We now look to how Chauvet’s ‘gift’ has been received: this section will review the 
critical reception of Chauvet’s fundamental sacramental theology.  Scholarly recognition of the 
strengths and weaknesses of Chauvet’s proposal (particularly in comparison with traditional 
sacramental theology) will be examined.  Lastly, a last section will explore new directions for 
Chauvet’s thought regarding a relational approach to the Eucharist.   
2.4.1.  Critical Reception of Chauvet 
2.4.1.1.  Impact 
At the least, Chauvet has had a major impact reframing the basic questions, premises, and 
approach to the phenomenon of sacramentality in Christian faith and identity.  Chauvet’s Symbol 
and Sacrament has been hailed as “the most influential work in the field developing a 
postmodern approach to the theology of sacramentality,”194 a “provocative new archetype for 
                                               
193 SS, 261.   
194 David N. Power, Sacrament: The Language of God’s Giving (New York: Herder and Herder, 1999),  327. 
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sacramentology,”195 and a “herculean accomplishment.”196  As “the first radically different 
sacramental theology to come out of Europe since the existential-phenomenological 
transformation of neo-scholastic thinking wrought by Rahner and Schillebeeckx over thirty years 
ago,” Chauvet has “moved theology from being structured through premodern schemes onto the 
threshold of the postmodern context.”197  A large portion of the second Leuven Encounters in 
Systematic Theology conference (1999) was devoted to exploration of Chauvet’s thought.  The 
value of Chauvet’s contribution (in Symbol and Sacrament and elsewhere) is, of course, a matter 
of debate. 
2.4.1.2.  Favorable Reception: Strengths 
Several scholars look upon Chauvet’s contribution with appreciation.  Regis Duffy 
commends Symbol and Sacrament as an “innovative and foundational study in systematic 
theology” whose “orientation ... [is] ultimately pastoral.”198  Stijn Van den Bossche called it 
“certainly one of the most brilliant contributions to sacramentology since Vatican II.”199  Bruce 
Morrill praises Chauvet’s “success in articulating something of the tragic beauty of the paschal 
mystery: God’s revelation of salvation as the meeting of divine and human desire (the Spirit) in 
the human (bodily and historical, assured yet struggling, defeated but triumphant) person of 
Jesus.”200  
                                               
195 Megan Willis, “Language as the Sanctuary of Being: A Theological Exploration with Louis-Marie Chauvet,” 
Heythrop Journal 51 (2010), 872. 
196 Joseph Martos, “Symbol and Sacrament: A Sacramental Reinterpretation of Christian Existence,” Horizons, 23/2 
(Fall 1996): 345-346. 
197 Lieven Boeve, “Theology in a Postmodern Context and the Hermeneutical Project of Louis-Marie Chauvet,” in 
Sacraments, Revelation of the Humanity of God: Engaging the Fundamental Theology of Louis-Marie Chauvet, ed. 
Philippe Bordeyne and Bruce Morrill (Collegeville, MN: Liturgical Press, 2008), 6. 
198 Regis A. Duffy, "Symbol and sacrament: a sacramental reinterpretation of Christian existence." Theological 
Studies 57, no. 3 (September 1996): 551-552. ATLASerials, Religion Collection, EBSCOhost (accessed April 15, 
2017). 
199 Stijn Van den Bossche, “Introduction,” in Lieven Boeve and L. Leijssen, eds., Contemporary Sacramental 
Contours of a God Incarnate: Sacramental Presence in a Postmodern Context (Leuven: Leuven University Press, 
2001), 11. 
200 Bruce Morrill, “Building on Chauvet’s Work: An Overview,” in Bordeyne and Morrill, Sacraments, xxii-xxiii. 
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In particular, Chauvet’s interdisciplinary approach -- particularly inclusion of post-
‘linguistic turn’ philosophy and psychoanalysis -- earns high praise from many scholars.  John 
Baldovin calls Chauvet “one of the very best sacramental theologians writing today” whose 
writings are “remarkably balanced,” pointing to a third way between objectivist and subjectivist 
models for the sacraments.201  Glenn Ambrose finds Chauvet’s presentation “thought-provoking” 
and a “rich source of insights” in its synthesis of theology, philosophy, and the social sciences; 
since Chauvet is “accountable to the tradition ... for what it has done, and for what it has failed to 
do,” he “may serve as a bridge or a middle ground between traditional and more radical post-
metaphysical accounts of Christianity.” 202   
Chauvet’s insistence on ‘distance’ and ‘absence’ within relationship provides an 
important corrective to traditional theology’s overemphasis on divine presence.  David Power 
praises Chauvet for reviving a proper sense of divine transcendence in the sacraments and the 
Eucharist, radically expanding our awareness of ‘otherness’ as a mediation of divine presence.203   
While Chauvet is to be commended for relating sacramental theology more directly to ethics, 
Kenan Osborne says this contribution is “powerful, but it is only a beginning.”204   
Joseph C. Mudd’s Eucharist as Meaning: Critical Metaphysics and Contemporary 
Sacramental Theology gives both a thorough critique of Chauvet’s project and exposition of how 
Bernard Lonergan’s work achieves Chauvet’s goals more suitably.  Mudd commends Chauvet in 
that he  
builds on three critical insights from [Bernard Lonergan’s] thinking that are critical for any 
contemporary sacramental theology: (1) human knowledge of reality is contingent and always 
embedded in worlds mediated by and constituted by meaning; (2) theology is necessarily 
                                               
201 John Baldovin, Book Review of The Sacraments, Theological Studies, June, 2002, Vol.63(2), 419.   
202 Glenn P. Ambrose, The Theology of Louis-Marie Chauvet: Overcoming Onto-Theology with Sacramental 
Tradition (Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2012), 6. 
203 Cf. Power, Sacrament, 307-308.   
204 Kenan B. Osborne, Christian Sacraments in a Postmodern World: A Theology for the Third Millennium 
(Mahwah, N.J.: Paulist Press, 1999), 164. 
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hermeneutical, involving the theologian in a circle (or spiral) of questions, answers, and 
further questions; it is not to be a closed system; and, most crucially, (3) the presence of the 
divine in history is a presence as absence, a truth revealed paradigmatically on the cross, and 
the key to a eucharistic eschatology.205  
 
While Chauvet’s work “represents the most thoroughgoing criticism of metaphysical accounts of 
sacramental theology,”206 his main contributions are actually found in Lonergan’s thought.   
Chauvet’s “massive contribution to contemporary sacramental theology” has some problems that 
“call for clarifications and further development.”207 
2.4.1.3.  Criticisms: Weaknesses  
Regarding critiques of Chauvet, first, the “trenchant”208 critique by Bernard Blankenhorn 
of Chauvet was mentioned and evaluated above.209   
Mudd criticizes Chauvet’s two key methodological problems: his “misreading of 
Thomas’ theory of knowing” and an “empiricist understanding of causality that both prejudices 
Chauvet’s reading of Thomas on sacramental causality and influences his notion of the symbolic 
speech-act as ‘revealer/operator.’”210  First, Chauvet “imposes the problem of bridging subject 
and object on Thomas,” thereby imagining Thomas himself had an ‘instrumentalist’ notion of 
language which creates an idolatrous set of concepts about God.211  In doing so, Chauvet has 
misunderstood the nature of true judgments, which Mudd explains through the work of 
Lonergan.  Chauvet by contrast proposes a symbolic notion of language as the place of encounter 
with being, implicating the subject.  In doing so, however, he creates a false dichotomy between 
the metaphysical and the symbolic.   
                                               
205 Mudd, Eucharist as Meaning, 37. 
206 Ibid., 1. 
207 Ibid., 2. 
208 Mudd, Eucharist as Meaning, 33. 
209 In section in 2.1.2.1.3.  Bernard Blankenhorn, “Instrumental Causality in the Sacraments,” Nova et Vetera 4, no. 
2 (2006): 255-94.  Blankenhorn argues that since causal language is found in Scripture and soteriology, it is fitting 
for sacramental theology.   
210 Mudd, 2.  
211 Ibid., 15.  
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Mudd considers Chauvet’s replacement of ‘sacraments-as-causes’ with ‘sacraments-as-
revealer/operators’ merely cosmetic: citing Raymond Moloney, Mudd asks, “is this not efficient 
causality under another name?”212  Mudd notes that Chauvet’s Heideggerian premises need 
refinement in order to work in Christian theology.  While dismissing Thomistic causality for a 
Heideggerian notion of language and being, Chauvet has not clarified a doctrine of creation 
which might distinguish his thought from Heidegger’s atheism or taking being simply as a given 
without a creator.213  Since Chauvet understands any certain knowledge or judgments as 
examples of a domineering ‘rage to know’: the desire to know is inherently sinful, since it is 
always a subtle attempt at control.  Nonetheless, Chauvet himself declares several judgments: he 
thus risks contradicting his own warnings against creating a ‘logic of the Same.’  Furthermore, 
Mudd is critical of Chauvet’s attempt to transpose the traditional Eucharistic doctrine of the Real 
Presence into the Heideggerian category of ‘ad-esse.’214   
 While perhaps ‘ultimately pastoral’ in its orientation, a major (if not its chief) 
shortcoming of Chauvet’s proposal is its complexity, the corollary of its interdisciplinary nature.  
Ambrose acknowledges that Chauvet’s wide range of sources makes study of his thought “a 
daunting task,” as Aquinas, Heidegger or Lacan “are by themselves hard enough to grasp, and 
brought together they can be very disorientating.”215  Key elements of Chauvet’s paradigm (such 
as symbolic exchange, mourning, anti-sacrifice, and ethical obligation) are hidden or only 
suggested by the text of the Eucharistic prayer.  After all, “few have mourned consciously over 
the loss of an imaginary self-presence.... It would seem that the faithful would have to undergo a 
particular kind of psychoanalysis.... Then one may wonder about the risk of Eucharist becoming 
                                               
212 Ibid., 32.  Cf. Raymond Moloney, review, “Symbol and Sacrament,” Milltown Studies 38 (Autumn 1996): 148. 
213 Cf. Mudd, 117-120. 
214 Cf. Mudd, 183.   
215 Glenn P. Ambrose, The Theology of Louis-Marie Chauvet: Overcoming Onto-Theology with Sacramental 
Tradition (Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2012), 6.  Hereafter TLMC. 
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merely a ‘transitional object’ akin to a pacifier that helps us accept the presence of the absence of 
Jesus Christ.”216  Chauvet’s simpler claim that the liturgy “sends all Christians back to their own 
responsibility to take charge of history in his name” needs some pastoral elaboration to be 
brought to most people’s attention.217  Thus, even if correct and fruitful, Chauvet’s thought “will 
take some effort” to become understandable to popular piety.218   
While Chauvet embraces philosophy’s ‘linguistic turn,’ Daniel Pilario points out and 
cautions against Chauvet’s seeming naïveté regarding the ‘innocence’ of language. 219  Without 
some kind of critical filter, even gift-language can be manipulated toward political or coercive 
ends.  There is no realm of ‘purely economic’ or ‘purely symbolic’ exchange; they are inevitably 
intermingled.  Thus “Any framework, such as Chauvet’s, which posits a clear-cut distinction 
between the economic and the symbolic runs the risk of reading manipulative power into the 
divine all-gratuitous action ... (especially when this divine all-gratuitousness is mediated by such 
a precarious institution as the church).” 220  Vincent J. Miller poses a similar objection regarding 
a posture of Gelassenheit vis-à-vis God, who remains necessarily mediated through the symbols 
representing God: “In order for Gelassenheit to function here, one would have to assume that the 
symbolic mediation in human culture is as unsullied as God’s mystical presence in the soul. This 
is clearly not the case.”221 
Gerard Moore states that Chauvet’s “departure from metaphysics as a central point of 
sacramental theology.... has not been universally embraced”; furthermore, “Chauvet’s thinking 
                                               
216 Ambrose, TLMC, 81-82. 
217 Cf. Chauvet, SS, 261.   
218 Ambrose, TLMC ,192. 
219 Daniel Franklin Pilario, “‘Gift-Exchange’ in Sacramentology: A Critical Assessment from the Perspective of 
Pierre Bourdieu,” in Lieven Boeve and L. Leijssen, eds., Contemporary Sacramental Contours of a God Incarnate: 
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Power, 37. 
220 Daniel Franklin Pilario, “‘Gift-Exchange’ in Sacramentology,” 98. 
221 Vincent J. Miller, “An Abyss at the Heart of Mediation: Louis-Marie Chauvet’s Fundamental Theology of 
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on symbolic exchange has not been particularly convincing.”222  Sebastian Madathummuriyil 
questions whether Chauvet’s “fundamental assumption that every gift obligates a return-gift” can 
be reconciled with ‘gratuitousness’ and ‘graciousness’ as he intends.223   
2.4.1.4.  Chauvet’s Contributions to Sacramental Theology 
 Chauvet’s thought makes several contributions to sacramental theology: 1) developing an 
existential approach; which 2) makes personal recognition central to the sacraments; thereby 3) 
changing the basis of ‘efficacy.’  His work also: 4) accounts for philosophy’s ‘linguistic turn’; 5) 
employs the more accessible symbol of ‘gift’; 6) explores a non-sacrificial understanding of 
Eucharist; and 7) corrects idolatrous notions of the Eucharist.  Lastly, 8) his work accomplishes 
some of the liturgical reform for which Vatican II called. 
2.4.1.4.1.  Development of Existentialist/Personalist Approach to Sacraments 
 In advancing the work of Rahner and Schillebeeckx, Chauvet has provided an invaluable 
contribution to sacramental theology.224  He brings sacramental theology out of its traditionally 
metaphysical emphasis further into a personalist or relational mode.  Its benefits are simple, 
immediate, and profound.  Chauvet’s primary concern with Christian subjects (as such) provides 
the proper fulcrum to transpose Eucharistic theology to a relational approach.  To the extent 
metaphysical language of causality served the good of theological understanding, such language 
is badly outdated and pastorally ineffective.  Just as no one speaks of their loving relationships in 
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terms of metaphysical causality, so exclusive use of causality for sacramental theology and grace 
is woefully inadequate.   
Chauvet’s recognition of both God and humans as subjects already reframes discourse on 
grace, since God fundamentally relates to human beings as subjects, not merely passive 
recipients of an ‘objective’ commodity.  The heart of sacramental theology is recognition of 
persons, neither even exchange of gifts per se (even under nomenclature of merit, grace, etc.).  
Chauvet’s approach injects some much-needed vitality, personalism, and intersubjectivity into 
sacramental theology.  A greater importance on ethics naturally emerges which entails far more 
for Christian discipleship than simplistic notions of ‘not committing mortal sin.’  Chauvet moves 
sacramental -- and here, Eucharistic -- theology into a relational, personal set of categories, 
which I would consider the proper basis and conclusion of Eucharistic theology: how the 
Eucharist is meant to shape our relationships which, as Chauvet states, are the ‘womb’ of 
individual subjects and, in the Church, of Christian subjects.   
Chauvet’s recognition of the human being as subject creates genuine room for 
meaningful human freedom, action, and reciprocity.  Rather than ‘cooperating with causes’ in a 
pseudo-mechanical manner (with moral and prayer life separate and arbitrary in relation to the 
sacramental life), Chauvet’s subjects, endowed with gifts within the more-visibly-ecclesial 
context, act with responsibility and freedom.   
2.4.1.4.2.  Central Place of Personal Recognition 
 Regarding mission into the world, the ‘liturgy of the neighbor’ of which Chauvet speaks 
(borrowing Lévinas -- and itself deserving of greater development in liturgical study) is itself, 
first and foremost, a matter of discovery and recognition: recognizing the other ‘as such’; 
recognizing the other’s dignity; recognizing the other’s needs and desires -- all so that true 
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charity may be shown them.  Recognizing the stranger (cf. Mt. 25:31-46) and neighbor (cf. Rich 
man and Lazarus: Lk. 16:xx) in need overflows naturally from recognition of both the absence of 
the unmediated presence of God and the obligation for return-gift.  This unity of the 
sacramental/liturgical and ethical (or moral) life in Chauvet’s thought deserves greater attention. 
2.4.1.4.3.  Changing the Basis of ‘Sacramental Efficacy’ 
 Not least among the reasons Chauvet’s transposition to existential categories is important 
is the matter of sacramental efficacy.  What truly changes people, what changes people’s lives, 
has very little to do with ‘instrumental causes’ -- it has to do with knowing oneself as beloved.  
“God is love” (1 Jn. 4:16).  Neither abstract (i.e., metaphysical) nor practical truth but existential 
truth -- expressed and accepted personally: ‘God loves me, us’ -- this transforms lives.  This 
point is so obvious and yet so often omitted by traditional sacramental theology -- which speaks 
instead of merit, grace, and metaphysical participation.   
A sacramental language that speaks in personalist/existential terms does better justice to 
the realities they describe.  To appreciate the Eucharist, not as a ‘localized arrival’ of the divine 
presence, but more clearly as the gracious gift of Godself with an ethical mandate toward the 
broader human community, celebrates the love that ‘impels us’ (cf. 2 Cor. 5:14) to bring God’s 
love to the world, as best we are able.   
2.4.1.4.4.  Incorporation of ‘the Linguistic Turn’ into Sacramental Theology  
An incorporation of philosophy’s ‘linguistic turn’ into theology has been long overdue; 
Chauvet helps sacramental theology catch up to contemporary philosophy.  Chauvet’s 
incorporation of insights across various sciences contrasts favorably with anti-modernist 
approaches which dismiss critiques of onto-theology, causality, and sacrifice, all of which carry 
great importance for Eucharistic theology.  Analogues from psychoanalysis, sociology, or 
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linguistic philosophy neither weaken nor change the theological basis for the sacraments, but 
make them more intelligible for an educated laity to maintain a Christian worldview.   
2.4.1.4.5.  Gift Paradigm 
 The symbolic image of ‘gift’ fits Eucharistic theology very well.  This universal symbol 
is accessible to anyone (including children), and naturally associates sacraments with gratitude 
and appreciation.  On an academic level, the ethical and sacramental ‘lives’ stand in closer unity 
under the theme of gift than under separate discussions of causes, substances, transubstantiation, 
sacrifice, or merit.  Not least, a ‘gift’ model of the sacraments opens a way to sidestep the 
problematic language of ‘sacrifice’ which can distort understandings of the Eucharist, the 
meaning of Christ’s death, and inserts violence into intra-trinitarian relations.225   
 Also, the contrast between market and gift exchange provide a helpful paradigm that 
exposes a ‘bargaining’ or ‘contractual’ attitude we can have with God, wherein we expect a 
certain return on our ‘investment’ in ascetical practice, prayer, and discipleship.  Recognition of 
God as an ever-gracious giver of gifts -- rather than business partner -- expresses more faithfully 
a God ‘who is never outdone in generosity,’ who is loved rather than simply feared.   
2.4.1.4.6.  Exploration of Eucharistic Sacrifice in Light of Critique 
 Because of the central role of sacrifice in soteriology and Eucharistic theology, and the 
increasing critique of it in recent decades, every Eucharistic theology must deal with the theme 
of sacrifice.     At the least, the meaning of sacrifice is no longer self-evident or self-explanatory 
in a scientific age.  The more insistently Church teaching emphasizes the importance of sacrifice 
without defining or explaining it, the more evident the need for a new theological paradigm or 
                                               
225 Under the theme of gift, violence will still be accounted for, but later on, only under sinful human agency.   
101 
 
motif.226  Chauvet’s use of ‘gift’ as the primary analogue for grace and the sacraments provides 
this function, particularly as the notion of gift is thoroughly biblical and philosophically 
meaningful.   Certainly, the Church needs to speak of asceticism, renunciation, choice of ‘one 
thing necessary,’ and the imitation of Christ.  Equivocal use of ‘sacrifice’ for these -- as well as 
pagan and Jewish sacrifices, ‘spiritual sacrifices,’ and Christ’s self-offering on Calvary -- only 
obfuscates the intended reality.  A phenomenology of givenness -- as proposed by Jean-Luc 
Marion in our next chapter -- can help develop this theme, as well as remove the notion of 
violence from intra-Trinitarian relations.   
2.4.1.4.7.  Corrective Measures Against Idolatrous Notions of Eucharist 
 Chauvet’s thought unmasks some subtle tendencies toward idolatry that Eucharistic piety 
can have.  First, insistence on an ever-unfinished mode of questioning, a preference for symbols 
rather than concepts, and a posture of Gelassenheit provide safeguards (albeit, imperfect) against 
a ‘logic of the Same’ which effectively ‘comprehends’ the Eucharist, thereby ‘domesticates’ it, 
removing the morally scandalous claims God makes upon us through the Eucharist.    
Secondly, understanding the liturgy of the Eucharist as a celebratory action of grateful 
remembrance, leading to recognition of the gift’s Giver and His claims upon us, helps name and 
expose another idolatrous tendency, of Eucharistic adoration.  When celebrated as an instance of 
the divine presence and divorced from its moral claims upon us, the Eucharist becomes a mere 
product of what a wonder-working God can do, to the amazement of a crowd (audience of 
spectators?).227  Certainly, an evocation of wonder towards God is beneficial.  Yes, we affirm a 
change of substance in the bread and wine occurs: but how does such a fact effect any greater 
                                               
226 In its 61 paragraphs, the Encyclical Letter Ecclesia de eucharistia uses ‘sacrifice’ or ‘sacrificial’ 68 times; 16 
times in paragraph 12 alone.  It gives no definition for either term.   
227 This is a sort of ‘straw man’ depiction of traditional piety regarding the Eucharist, but reflects a simplified 
understanding common to many people’s experience.    
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unity among the faithful, the true res of the sacrament?  If understood, however, as recollection 
and recognition of the loving gift, Giver, and the claims the gift makes upon us, the celebration is 
reception of gift and task, to offer gratefully a ‘return-gift’ in the context of one’s own life.  Such 
an understanding leads more directly to changed values, lives, and actions: in a word, 
conversion.   
2.4.1.4.8.  Recapping Vatican II’s Liturgical Reform 
 Another credit to Chauvet’s project is how it advances points of liturgical reform 
(broadly conceived) called for by Sacrosanctum Concilium and Lumen Gentium.228  Among 
these are its clearer relation of the liturgy to apostolic work (through ‘anti-sacrifice’ and ‘liturgy 
of the neighbor’: cf. SC 9-10).  Chauvet’s theology ponders the mysteries of Christ’s resurrection 
and ascension, expressing more fully the entire paschal mystery and not simply Jesus’ death (SC 
5).  As the liturgical assembly is for Chauvet the womb of individual Christians, his thought 
clarifies the value of the presence of Christ in the assembly-as-such (SC 7).  While Chauvet did 
not take up linguistic philosophy in order to reflect the changes of Vatican II, certainly a basic 
understanding of linguistic philosophy makes the importance of the liturgy as dialogue (SC 11, 
14) and vernacular for liturgical language especially clear (SC 36, 54).  Likewise, an appreciation 
of the value of symbol for communication helps explain the uniqueness of the Precious Blood 
(SC 55).  Chauvet’s sacramental understanding of the Church vis-à-vis the world (LG 1, 9) helps 
express its sense of mission (LG 8, 48).  Not least of all, Chauvet’s existential approach to the 
sacraments lends emphasis to the universal call to holiness (LG 7,11,33).   
2.4.2.  Unexplored Possibilities/Corollaries 
                                               
228 These shifts are mentioned above in the Introduction, Section 1.1.2. 
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 As a ‘fundamental theology of sacramentality,’ Chauvet’s thought opens new 
possibilities for fruitful theological investigation.  Below are some of these possibilities, with 
greater/special emphasis on those pertaining to a relational approach to the Eucharist.  
2.4.2.1.  Birth of Christian Subjects and the Sacraments of Initiation 
 Especially as Chauvet’s thought concerns the formation of Christian subjects, an 
important expansion of this thought would concern the sacraments of initiation in greater detail, 
especially Baptism and Confirmation, but also the relation of these to the Eucharist.   
While Chauvet’s thought emphasizes the social nature of Christian subjectivity, how 
might it speak of sacramental character?  Even if the fruits of Baptism would not thrive for an 
isolated individual as they would among an active Christian community, how might the notion of 
sacramental character be transposed into Chauvet’s thought?  As a matter of subjectivity rather 
than ‘essence,’ in what sense is Baptism or Confirmation permanent, and in what sense does 
Christian subjectivity or identity never acquire a ‘fixed’ status before death?   
2.4.2.2.  The Purpose of Alliances: Recognition of Subjects 
One of Chauvet’s most valuable contributions is how he connects gift exchange with the 
formation of alliances and the recognition of subjects.  Full recognition of subjects as such -- of 
Jesus as Son of God, of one’s neighbor (cf. Mt. 25:31-46; Lk. Good Samaritan and 
Rich/Lazarus), of ‘the Body [of Christ]’ in one’s neighbor (cf. 1 Cor. 10) -- is a fundamental 
biblical and eucharistic theme which merits far greater emphasis.  Pastorally, it is especially 
important amid our postmodern culture (‘virtual reality’) of endemic alienation, 
disenfranchisement, and loneliness.  In the context of symbolic exchange, gift-giving introduces 
the full personhood of the other, for both giver and recipient.  Symbolic exchange might be 
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considered most fundamentally as a process of recognition: of giver, gift, and to whom return-
gift should be given.   
 Moreover, we learn that alliances among subjects are ‘kept alive’ by ongoing exchange, 
not a single acquisition of ‘membership’ or an accumulation of merit.  The living element of 
action within alliances (such as the Church) receives the greater emphasis it deserves, which also 
fosters a richer relation between the sacraments and ethics.   
2.4.2.3.  Recognition of Subjects and Liturgy of the Neighbor 
 Why is there not a Christian ‘liturgy of the neighbor,’ of encountering the other in 
charity?  Do not all ‘others’ deserve genuine and meaningful recognition, by way of 
acknowledgment and appreciation -- if simply symbolically, and in our imagination -- simply as 
a matter of justice?  Amid a totalizing consumerist ideology and culture that considers others as 
means to selfish ends, would not an actual ‘liturgy of the neighbor’ -- odd as that sounds -- 
provide a fundamentally important corrective?  Amid the contemporary ‘hyper-reality’ 
(Baudrillard) which apparently heightens feelings of anxiety, loneliness, and depression, would 
people not benefit from assembling in the ‘real world’ of face-to-face recognition and 
interaction?  Chauvet’s fundamental theology of sacramentality, with its implicit emphasis on 
interpersonal recognition, can help awaken the Church to the needs of others -- and ourselves -- 
through development of a concrete ‘liturgy of the neighbor’ according to scriptural warrant and 
the demands of justice.  Such a ritual would provide a stronger and clearer sense of mission and 
of connection between liturgy and life than what typically concludes the liturgy of the Eucharist 
(‘The mass is ended, go in peace’).   
2.4.2.4.  Embodied/Incarnate Nature of the Sacraments 
105 
 
While Chauvet touched upon the ‘mediation of the body’ in various forms (cosmic, 
social, physical), relatively little was said concerning the embodied nature of the sacraments 
themselves, and the embodied nature of the Eucharistic assembly.  What could it mean that the 
sacraments (and especially the Eucharist) are embodied -- or incarnate -- mediations?  Especially 
in light of the linguistic philosophy undergirding Chauvet’s fundamental theology of 
sacramentality, what kind of gift is given in the ‘embodied word’ of the Eucharist?   
2.4.2.5.  The Gift of Giving One’s Life   
The gift of the Eucharist is certainly most unique: study of its ‘nature’ (Christ’s Body and 
Blood, soul and divinity) has occupied theologians for millennia.  Such a traditional approach, 
concerned with metaphysical questions of ‘what the Eucharist is’ as an object, independent of 
subjective perceptions, beliefs, or even unbelief.  All this is a most important and worthwhile 
effort.  Too often overlooked, however, is the action symbolized (or ‘re-presented’) in the 
institution narrative, itself a fundamental element of the Eucharist and part of its ‘nature’ as gift.  
Our relational approach to the Eucharist proposed here calls attention to this aspect of the 
Eucharistic gift: the gift Jesus made ‘of giving’ per se, and ‘of giving one’s life.’   
Understandably, Chauvet’s model of symbolic gift exchange employs examples of 
‘ready-at-hand’ gifts.  We have also just mentioned (and suggested for further development) the 
gift of recognition that comes about from the exchange of gifts and formation of alliances.  Gifts 
are often given as precisely as expressions of love the giver has for the recipient.  They reveal 
love which may be otherwise hidden from recognition; one of the joys of life is such expression-
and-recognition of love.  We do not necessarily need the Eucharist to experience or discover this, 
but this aspect is certainly present in the Eucharist.  Something still deeper remains our aim.   
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In the Eucharist we are shown -- and given -- the gift of giving one’s life (“Having loved 
his own who were in the world, [Jesus] loved them to the end” -- Jn. 13:1b).  The Eucharist first 
celebrates and re-presents Jesus’ miraculous gift of His Body and Blood, Soul and Divinity.  Yet 
these gifts are given with a further mandate: “Do this in memory of me.”  On an ‘initial’ level of 
meaning, these words concern the gift of the ritual, which is celebrated in remembrance of 
Christ.   
On a deeper level, however, these words recalled and celebrated in the liturgy teach that 
we too -- especially as members of His ecclesial Body -- are called to ‘full conscious active 
participation’ in the mystery of loving, as deliberate agents and stewards of our lives.  We too are 
capable of imitating Jesus’ loving gift, ‘doing’ as Jesus ‘did’ in the giving of His Body and 
Blood.  We are made capable of and called to the ‘greater love’ (cf. Jn. 15) of even laying down 
one’s life for others.  We are enabled by Jesus’ own gift of Himself to us to likewise give of our 
own lives to those around us.   
We are not merely to receive an item Jesus gives his disciples, but to love with the very 
same love -- God’s love.  We are freed to give even of our own body and blood, in a 
metaphorical if not literal sense, as an expression of love in the world.  This is the gift ‘of giving 
one’s life,’ another gift we receive in the Eucharist.  If recognized and accepted as a personal 
call, our task in life becomes deciding to whom, for whom, how, when, and in what form that 
gift will be given.   
Furthermore, reception of the gift ‘of giving one’s life’ is proven (or ‘veri-fied’) over the 
course of one’s life, through gift of one’s life for others.  The exchange of our lives in mutual 
service as members of the Body of Christ is the verified ‘life blood’ of the Christian community.  
At each liturgy we hear this call, imagine this possibility of our own full participation in it.  If we 
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never think of it or hear it proposed to us personally, we will never imagine it, and hence 
unlikely live it.  So the liturgical manifestation of the ‘gift of giving one’s life’ is not accidental 
to its celebration: it demonstrates something essential to the call-within-the-gift: how self-gift 
calls for ‘concrete’ (or ‘phenomenal’) expression.   
2.4.2.6.  Jesus Changes the Symbols -- Therefore the Identities of Disciples 
 Given Chauvet’s understanding of how language and symbol shape identity, one aspect 
of the Eucharist left unexplored is the change in symbolic meaning Jesus effects for both the 
bread and wine, from being Passover symbols to referring to himself.  Since language and 
symbolic world shape identity -- especially in a context of initiation of subjects -- the fact that 
Jesus changed the meaning of the Passover symbols to refer to himself already reshapes the 
identity of his disciples.  While these dynamics are not work in the same precise way for 
contemporary Christian disciples, it still speaks to an aspect of initiation which is important for 
understanding Chauvet’s symbolic world.   
+ + + 
 The thought of Louis-Marie Chauvet has carved a foundation both philosophical 
(linguistic, interdisciplinary, existential) and theological (liturgical, scriptural, ethical) to 
conceive of the liturgy of the Eucharist according to a relational approach, through the theme of 
gift.  Our concern has been (and will continue to be) less ‘what’ the Eucharist ‘is’ metaphysically 
and more about how the Eucharist reveals and is meant to impact various relationships.  While 
Chauvet’s use of symbolic gift exchange opened a wealth of resources through which to 
understand these relationships and the subjects involved, this gift is able to ‘keep on giving,’ 
through the writings of Jean-Luc Marion on the phenomenology of givenness.  Our next chapter 
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surveys Marion’s thought for themes related to givenness and the Eucharist that will build on our 
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III.  Marion: A Thinker of ‘Givenness’ 
[T]he Eucharist and the confession of faith.... are only intelligible in terms of the gift. 
-- Jean-Luc Marion229 
 
I am exploring a relational model for understanding the Eucharist, how it is meant to 
transform our relationships.  Beginning with Chauvet, we have set this model within a liturgical 
theology aware of both the linguistic turn and the relations which symbolic gift exchange creates.  
More so than traditional sacramental theology, these notions of language and symbolic exchange 
describe fittingly the sacramental mediation of grace: the bestowal and strengthening of Christian 
identity by means of a divine gift -- in particular, the Eucharist.  To specify further the relational 
nature of the Eucharist we now turn to Jean-Luc Marion, whose thought is “Eucharistic in its 
very core.”230  As one who discusses both theological grace and postmodern philosophy, Marion 
is well qualified to assist appropriating Eucharistic doctrine into a contemporary idiom.  Some 
aspects of Marion’s thought -- whether theological or philosophical -- will be appropriated 
directly (Eucharistic hermeneutic; etc.) and others developed, either beyond Marion’s direct 
statements (‘trinitarian play,’ blessing, Institution Narrative, ‘anamorphosis’) or differing from 
his own ideas (to speak of relationships, development/pedagogy).  For this dissertation, Marion’s 
central contribution will be to use his insight into the recognition of giver, gift, and givee for the 
liturgical action of blessing, as the crucial initial step in full reception of the eucharistic gift and 
participation in eucharistic giving.   As much as Marion’s writings on the Eucharist offer 
                                               
229 Jean-Luc Marion, God Without Being: Hors-Texte, Second Edition, trans. Thomas A. Carlson with a foreword by 
David Tracy and a new preface by Jean-Luc Marion, Religion and Postmodernism (Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, 2012), xxvi.  Hereafter GWB.  
230 Philipp Wolfram Rosemann, “Postmodern Philosophy and J.-L. Marion’s Eucharistic Realism,” The Mystery of 
Faith: Reflections on the Encyclical Ecclesia de Eucharistia, eds. James McEvoy and Maurice Hogan, 231.  Cf. 
Sebastian Madathummuriyil, Sacrament as Gift: A Pneumatological and Phenomenal Approach, Studies in Liturgy 
XXV (Leuven: Peeters, 2012), 243. 
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contributions, so his observations concerning the encounter of God with human beings contribute 
immensely to the project at hand.   
 Jean-Luc Marion (b. 1946) earned degrees in philosophy from the Université Paris-
Sorbonne in 1974 (Doctorat du IIIe cycle) and 1980 (Doctorat d’Etat).231  Drawing upon an 
eclectic set of sources, Marion cites as “as close teachers Beaufret, Derrida, but also Althusser; 
as masters, Alquié and Lévinas, but also Gilson, Daniélou, and H.U. von Balthasar; and, as 
horizon, Nietzsche, Wittgenstein, and Heidegger.”232  Completing his studies shortly after 
Vatican II, he was in charge of the theological journal Résurrection from 1968 to 1973, and in 
1974 became co-editor of the Francophone version of Communio at the behest of Hans Urs von 
Balthasar.233  Marion had his dissertation Sur l’ontologie grise de Descartes published in 1975, 
the first of several books on Descartes; as a Cartesian scholar he received the Grand Prix de 
Philosophie de l’Académie Française in 1992.234   
Marion’s scholarly writing is prodigious in its volume, depth, and consistency.  Two of 
his prominent concerns are the phenomenological possibility of revelation and how theology 
might ‘overcome’ metaphysics.  The Idol and Distance: Five Studies engaged Heidegger, 
Nietzsche, Hölderlin, Dionysius the Areopagite, Lévinas, and Derrida.235  The 1982 publication 
                                               
231  Jean-Luc Marion, The Rigor of Things: Conversations with Dan Arbib, trans. Christina M. Gschwandtner, 
foreword by David Tracy (Bronx, New York: Fordham, 2017), 30.   Hereafter RT.  Cf. Biography on University of 
Chicago website, http://philosophy.uchicago.edu/faculty/marion.html, accessed May 11, 2018. 
232 Marion, GWB, xxi. 
233 Cf. Marion, RT, especially 20-29.  Marion says that while producing Résurrection, “we ‘stuffed’ ourselves with 
theology.... This is how I added to the philosophical training I had received ... an equally intense theological 
training,” 21. 
234 Jean-Luc Marion, Sur l’ontologie grise de Descartes (Paris:Vrin, 1975).  English edition forthcoming as Jean-
Luc Marion, Descartes’ Grey Ontology: Cartesian Science and Aristotelian Thought in the Regulae, trans. 
unspecified (    : St. Augustine’s Press, 2018).  Hereafter DGO.  Cf. Graham Ward, “Introducing Jean-Luc Marion,” 
New Blackfriars 76 No. 895 (July/August 1995), 318. 
235 Jean-Luc Marion, L’idole et la distance: cinq études (Paris: B. Grasset, 1977); The Idol and Distance: Five 
Studies, trans. Thomas A. Carlson, Perspectives in Continental Philosophy, ed. John D. Caputo (New York: 
Fordham University Press, 2001).  Hereafter ID. 
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of God Without Being: Hors-texte explored Heidegger’s critique of onto-theo-logy, 
hermeneutics, and Eucharistic theology.236   
 Considering his work a development of the phenomenology of Husserl, Heidegger, and 
Lévinas, Marion developed his ‘phenomenology of givenness’ in the trilogy Reduction and 
Givenness, Being Given: Toward a Phenomenology of Givenness, and In Excess: Studies of 
Saturated Phenomena.237  Meanwhile, he also sustained a dialogue on ‘the problem of the gift’ 
with Derrida.238  While not directly theological, Marion’s focus on the phenomenology of 
givenness and the ‘mere possibility’ of revelation is important for our project because it opens 
rich new perspectives through which the Eucharistic gift may be understood.   
Elected an immortel of the Académie Française in 2008, Marion is currently the Andrew 
Thomas Greeley and Grace McNichols Greeley Professor of Catholic Studies and Professor of 
the Philosophy of Religions and Theology, Professor in the Committee on Social Thought and 
the Department of Philosophy at the University of Chicago Divinity School, and Dominique 
Dubarle Chair of Philosophy and Theology at the Institut Catholique de Paris.  Marion’s writings 
include what has been traditionally divided into philosophy and theology, and this has generated 
plenty of controversy in philosophical circles.  While Marion claims repeatedly (if not 
vehemently) his ‘pure phenomenology’ of givenness remains within the rational limits of 
                                               
236 Jean-Luc Marion, Dieu sans l’être: hors-texte, Rev. ed. (Paris : Librairie Artheme Fayard, 1982); English edition 
GWB cited above. 
237 Jean-Luc Marion, Reduction and Givenness: Investigations of Husserl, Heidegger, and Phenomenology, trans. 
Thomas A. Carlson (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 1998).  Being Given: Toward a Phenomenology 
of Givenness, trans. Jeffrey L. Kosky (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2002).  Hereafter BG.  In Excess: 
Studies of Saturated Phenomena, trans. Robyn Horner and Vincent Berraud, Perspectives in Continental Philosophy, 
ed. John D. Caputo (New York: Fordham University Press, 2002).  Hereafter IE. 
238 Cf. “On the Gift: A Discussion between Jacques Derrida and Jean-Luc Marion, Moderated by Richard Kearney,” 
in John D. Caputo and Michael J. Scanlon, eds., God, the Gift, Postmodernism (Bloomington: Indiana University 
Press, 1999), 54-78.   
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philosophy, several critics disagree.  (Their critiques will be covered in section 3.3 below.)  
Briefly, they accuse Marion of ‘smuggling’ theological themes into philosophy.239   
Within our liturgical theology project such debates (while noted) are not as problematic.  
After surveying Marion’s writings on the Eucharist, Marion’s philosophical contributions are 
employed here to help describe in philosophical terms certain relational aspects of the Eucharist, 
without reducing the Eucharist to such terms.  In the spirit of ‘giving reason for one’s hope’ (cf. 
1 Pet. 3:15), Marion’s thought is included as a supplemental set of ideas to describe an 
underlying logic of the Eucharist.240  Marion’s philosophy thus provides a helpful addition to 
Chauvet’s ‘symbolic exchange’ (which also explains aspects of the Eucharist in relational terms).  
Admittedly, this reverses the direction of Marion’s philosophical efforts, but we aim toward a 
different (namely, theological) purpose.  Meanwhile, Marion’s own theological writings on the 
Eucharist will also protect against a reduction of the Eucharist to philosophy.  
Across his career Marion revisits and develops earlier themes several times.  It is beyond 
the scope of this dissertation to trace, for instance, the full development of ‘the saturated 
phenomenon’ through its Kantian, Husserlian, and Heideggerian categories into what becomes 
‘the erotic reduction,’ a transition into existential/interpersonal concerns and questions.  For 
brevity’s sake Marion’s later writings will be given precedence as representative of his 
developed thought.   
This chapter will begin with an overview of Marion’s writings on the Eucharist (‘the 
mystery of charity’), liturgy, and sacraments (3.1).  Marion’s ‘phenomenology of givenness’ 
                                               
239 Cf. Dominique Janicaud, Le tournant théologique de la phénoménologie française (Combas: Éditions de l’Éclat, 
1991).  In English: Dominique Janicaud, “The Theological Turn of French Phenomenology,” in Dominique 
Janicaud, et al., Phenomenology and the ‘Theological Turn’: The French Debate, trans. Bernard G. Prusak (Bronx, 
NY: Fordham, 2000), 16-103.  Hereafter P&TT. 
240 Cf. Jean-Luc Marion, “Faith and Reason,” in Believing in Order to See: On the Rationality of Revelation and the 
Irrationality of Some Believers, trans. Christina M. Gschwandtner, Perspectives in Continental Philosophy (Bronx, 
New York: Fordham, 2017), 3-12. 
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(3.2) offers concepts (saturated phenomena, idols/icons, and on the self) which can be adopted 
and developed to clarify dynamics of the Eucharistic gift.  After a review of Marion’s critical 
reception (3.3), I propose some developments of Marion’s thought (3.4) for incorporation into a 
relational Eucharistic theology.   
3.1.  Marion on the Eucharist 
 While The Idol and Distance (French edition 1977) included some theological 
investigation, God Without Being: Hors-Texte (1st French edition in 1982) contained Marion’s 
first extended treatment of Eucharistic theology.  His subsequent work on the phenomenology of 
givenness discussed matters potentially relating to the Eucharist (recasting the self as l’adonné, 
forgiveness, and sacrifice), but Marion left their fuller theological connections unexplored.  Only 
with more recent essays and discussions have some of Marion’s own understanding of these 
connections come to light.241   
 To summarize Marion on the Eucharist we begin with his basic principle for Eucharistic 
thought: the self-giving Incarnate Word sets the terms for any Eucharistic hermeneutic, which is 
exemplified by the Emmaus narrative (3.1.1).  Its impact upon the celebrating community, which 
exists and acts in unity with its bishop, follows (3.1.2).  Revelation teaches important lessons 
concerning proper reception of God’s gift by the community (3.1.3.), namely through acceptance 
of Christ’s loving mission, becoming Christ’s active agents in the world.  This also has 
                                               
241 Cf. Jean-Luc Marion, Believing in Order to See: On the Rationality of Revelation and the Irrationality of Some 
Believers, trans. by Christina M. Gschwandtner, Perspectives in Continental Philosophy, ed. by John D. Caputo 
(New York: Fordham University Press, 2017); in particular the essays “The Phenomenality of the Sacrament” (102-
115); “The Recognition of the Gift” (125-135); and “They Recognized Him and Became Invisible to Them” (136-
143).   
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corollaries for particular Eucharistic topics (real presence, transubstantiation).  Marion’s 
discussion of various theological themes (3.1.4.) conclude the section.242   
3.1.1.  God’s Eucharistic ‘Hermeneutic’  
For Marion the Eucharist, as ‘the mystery of charity,’ must be allowed to give itself and 
interpret itself ‘from the point of view of the Word.’243  To ‘think the Eucharist’ requires “a 
radical conceptual self-critique” because insufficient ideas lead to idolatry; thus close attention to 
hermeneutics is necessary.244  Marion demands that the gift of the Eucharist be allowed to 
interpret itself by giving itself: “A gift, and this one above all, does not require first that one 
explain it, but indeed that one receive it.”245  Recipients would learn ‘Eucharist’ by means of the 
giving and receiving more than by conceptual explanation.   
Discussion of the Eucharist must begin from God’s self-giving, which is kenotic self-
giving love; furthermore it must be examined phenomenologically as gift.  The way the Word-
made-flesh gives himself in the Eucharist, the interpretation that the Word gives it, and the 
moment the disciples ‘recognize’ Jesus: these are the principal starting points.  While 
hermeneutical concerns reflect Marion’s attention to linguistic philosophy and proper ‘language 
for divine things,’ Marion is most concerned with maintaining the primacy of ‘how the Eucharist 
interprets itself’ over (or even against) the confines of human capacity to interpret the Eucharist.  
                                               
242 While Marion also addresses theologically-related themes of sacrifice and forgiveness, his thoughts on these are 
best offered after an explanation of his phenomenology of givenness (3.2). 
243 Cf. Marion, GWB, 162. 
244 Marion, GWB, 163.  In an essay on ‘Christian Philosophy,’ Marion corrects the tendency within hermeneutics 
toward subject-centeredness with an emphasis on the properly heuristic aspect of revelation which draws the self 
‘outward’ toward God.   Cf. Jean-Luc Marion, “‘Christian Philosophy:’ Hermeneutic or Heuristic?,” in The Visible 
and the Revealed, trans. by Christina M. Gschwandtner and others (Bronx, NY: Fordham, 2008), 66-79.  Hereafter 
“‘Christian Philosophy.’” 
245 Ibid., 162. 
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The radical gift of the Eucharist must itself set the terms by which it is understood; both the gift 
and its proper interpretation are ‘from elsewhere.’246 
3.1.1.1.  ‘Hermeneutic’ of God’s Self-Giving 
As it is for Chauvet, the key scriptural text for Marion’s Eucharistic thought is the 
encounter between the Risen Jesus and two disciples journeying to Emmaus (Lk. 24:13-35).247  
The disciples fail initially to recognize the stranger who approaches them as the Risen Lord, but 
Christ “interpreted to them the things about himself in all the Scriptures” (Lk. 24:27).  This 
interpretation provides a gift, revealing the divine plan of the crucified Messiah which, though 
foretold by the Old Covenant, was unforeseeable and radically new.248  To use 
phenomenological terms, Marion says that Christ “delivers the proper significations and orders 
the intuitions according to the concepts missing up to this point.”249  Even so it is not until Christ 
performs the actions of taking bread, blessing and breaking it, and giving it to them that he “was 
recognized by them in the breaking of the bread” (Lk. 24:35, cf. v. 31); this gesture gives the 
disciples the sign that gives meaning to all the intuitions and clues that had previously seemed 
“scattered and absurd.”250  According to Marion a pattern of meaning emerges: from the text (the 
law, prophets, and psalms) to its hermeneutic (Jesus’ reinterpretation) to the community of 
                                               
246 Cf. Jean-Luc Marion, Givenness and Revelation, trans. Stephen E. Lewis (New York: Oxford University Press, 
2016), esp. 1-29.  Hereafter GR.  
247 Cf. Jean-Luc Marion, “They Recognized Him and He Became Invisible to Them,” in Believing in Order to See: 
On the Rationality of Revelation and the Irrationality of Some Believers, trans. by Christina M. Gschwandtner, 
Perspectives in Continental Philosophy, ed. by John D. Caputo (New York: Fordham University Press, 2017), 136-
143.  Hereafter the article “They Recognized Him,” the text BIOTS.  Also cf. Marion, GWB, 146-152. 
248 Cf. “‘Christian Philosophy,’” 71. 
249 Marion, “They Recognized Him,” 140. 
250 Ibid., 141.  Proposal of a ‘fourfold pattern’ found in the Institution Narratives and miraculous feeding stories as 
evidence of a ‘historical core’ to the celebration of the Eucharist was put forward in 1945 by Dom Gregory Dix, The 
Shape of the Liturgy, new edition with an introduction by Simon Jones (London: Bloomsbury, 2005); esp. 48-70.  
The presence of these actions within both the Emmaus narrative and Institution Narrative of the Liturgy of the 
Eucharist is the assertion being made here, as historical criticism has called Dix’s original thesis into question.  Paul 
F. Bradshaw, for one, contests Dix’s assertion, as it assumes all traditions arise from a single source when historical 
evidence indicates “New Testament Christianity was itself essentially pluriform in doctrine and practice.” Paul F. 




disciples, who recognize Jesus (as the one addressing them, and as risen from the dead), but this 
recognition emerges only with the gesture of the gift.   
The central moment is when “the Word interprets [the Eucharist] in person.... at the point 
where he proffers the unspeakable speech, absolutely filial to the Father -- ‘taking bread, he gave 
thanks . . .’ (Lk. 24:30).”251  This is an interpretation ‘of the Word by the Word’ because the 
Word “intervenes in person in the Eucharist (in person, because only then does he manifest and 
perform his filiation) to accomplish in this way the hermeneutic.  The Eucharist alone completes 
the hermeneutic; the hermeneutic culminates in the Eucharist.”252  Into the disciples’ ‘world’ of 
this-worldly hopes, disappointment, and sadness, intervenes and interrupts a person who 
embodies other-worldly gift.  This gift -- revealed both by Christ alone and as Christ himself -- is 
known only because it is revealed divinely; for the purposes of understanding it, it belongs to the 
realm of theology, neither philosophy (alone), nor history, nor some other field of knowledge.   
This re-orientation of the disciples’ frame of reference toward the gift-according-to-its-
own-terms is fundamental to Marion’s entire oeuvre.  In both his theological and philosophical 
writings, the gift -- not the recipient’s limits regarding intuition -- is the point of reference, the 
criterion, the new ‘center.’  A de-centering or de-subjectivization of the recipient occurs, 
changing the terms and nature of the encounter.   
Implied in Marion’s interpretation is the importance of recipients’ participation in the 
liturgical celebration for ‘proper understanding’ of the Eucharist: not only through direct 
observation of the gestures and hearing its words but accepting its personal address, witnessing 
the self-abandoning giving (the prophetic acts of breaking bread and giving it away) and the 
declaration accompanying the gift’s ‘manifestation.’  The manifold gift of person-interpretation-
                                               
251 Marion, GWB, 150. 
252 Marion, GWB, 150. 
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gesture gives itself to be received precisely on its own terms; proper interpretation concludes in 
the giving and sharing of Christ’s body and blood, the gift of his person.  The actions of the 
Eucharistic celebration -- of taking, blessing, breaking, sharing, and declaring what the Word 
says the gifts are -- completes the hermeneutic of the Word.   
3.1.1.2.  Giving of Kenotic Loving 
The total, other-worldly gift of God in Christ is the revelation ‘God is love’ (1 Jn. 4:8, 
16).  God’s loving gift of himself, particularly in Christ and through the Eucharist, expresses 
visibly the true nature of love: self-emptying kenosis.   
This gift of God’s love for the world is expressed first and foremost through the gift of 
the Son of God, Jesus Christ: “For God so loved the world that he gave his only Son, so that 
whoever believes in him might not perish but might have eternal life” (Jn. 3:16).253  The Son is 
the gift of the Father, to whom the Son constantly refers his person, mission, and teaching.254  
For Marion a variety of words for love are synonymous: charity, agape, eros;255 he explains 
these in terms of (self-)abandon and kenotic love.  Furthermore, the term ‘love’ may be used 
univocally of God and human beings,256 though there is the “infinite difference” that God “loves 
                                               
253 Cf. Marion, “The Recognition of the Gift,” 129.  This essay provides a summary of the logic of Christ as gift of 
the Father; 125-135. 
254 E.g., Jesus’ person (“the Father and I are one” -- Jn. 10:30); mission (“I have come not to do my own will but the 
will of him who sent me” -- Jn. 6:38); teaching (“my teaching is not mine but his who sent me” -- Jn. 7:16; “I have 
made known to you everything that I have heard from my Father” -- Jn. 15:15).  The Scriptures testify this gift 
extends and can be specified still further, in that disciples receive the love of God poured out into our hearts (cf. 
Rom. 5:5) through the Holy Spirit through faith; this is love which surpasses knowledge (cf. Eph. 3:18) and the 
peace that surpasses all understanding (cf. Phil. 4:7). 
255 Marion argues vehemently against Anders Nygren’s notion of a distinction between agape and eros.  Cf. Anders 
Nygren, Eros and Agape: The Christian Notion of Love and Its Transformations, trans. Philip S. Watson 
(Philadelphia: Westminster, 1953). Cf. Marion, RT, 117-118. Also Jean-Luc Marion, In the Self’s Place: The 
Approach of Saint Augustine, trans. Jeffrey L. Kosky, Cultural Memory in the Present, eds. Mieke Bal and Hent de 
Vries (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 2012), 272-273, 383-384.  Hereafter ISP.  Also Jean-Luc 
Marion, The Erotic Phenomenon, trans. Stephen E. Lewis (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2007), 4-5, 220-
221.  Hereafter EP.   
256 Marion cites Denys the Areopagite, who says that God “ ‘charms’ all beings at once by ‘goodness, charity, and 
desire, agathotēti kai agapēsei kai erōti,” since he loves “with a beautiful and good eros of all things, by the 
hyperbole of desiring goodness, erōtikē“: the good inspires and fosters agape (as also eros). Cf. Marion, GWB, 74.  
Cf. Denys, Divine Names, IV, 7.   
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infinitely better than we.”257  Such love brings about unity and communion, between both God 
and human beings and among human communities.  We receive both awareness of and the 
proper meaning of these terms from divine revelation first and alone -- though they may be 
developed by means of reason if their excessive meaning has been witnessed and received -- 
albeit not by intellection alone, but by means of imitating its self-abandon.   
This ‘excess’ of God’s love beyond our understanding is by no means a problem; for 
Marion it indicates further how God gives himself to be loved rather than merely known (as 
another kind of ‘object’ -- being thereby domesticated).258  It is much less important for us to 
understand merely rationally God’s self-gift of love than it is to accept it by a pure and simple 
gesture of love.  According to Marion, concern with conditions (such as Kant’s) by which 
phenomena (or God) may be recognized is ultimately idolatrous, since those conditions become 
the only realm within which God may appear or act.  For Marion, love “does not pretend to 
comprehend;” rather, it concerns itself primarily with neither comprehension nor even reception 
of love but “its own giving, giving where the giver strictly coincides with the gift, without any 
restriction, reservation, or mastery.  Thus love gives itself only in abandoning itself, ceaselessly 
transgressing the limits of its own gift, so as to be transplanted outside of itself.”259  For God as 
well as for humans, love is self-giving, which is received by becoming like the gift: becoming a 
lover oneself.   
 While predominantly characterized by self-abandoning giving, love induces an effect 
upon the will of recipients.  For Marion, love includes an Augustinian element of ‘being drawn,’ 
                                               
257 Marion, EP, 221.  
258 Cf. Marion, GR, 29.   
259 Marion, GWB, 48. 
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an attraction: “we are ‘drawn,’ swept along, pulled by the desire for pleasure when we love.”260  
Love is not one option among others for the will, but is itself the perfection of willing the true 
good.  The will does not act by its own autonomous or self-generating force, but rather ‘By 
loving, one is drawn.’261  God’s gift of love, when received by faith as a gift, as grace -- not by 
the intellect -- has the effect of “spreading ... this attraction into hearts (through the Holy Spirit);” 
this effect is “what is proper to God in loving and causing love.”262  God’s grace bestows not 
only God’s self but the gift of faith in Christ, which allows one to desire to love God.   
3.1.1.3.  Eucharist as Epitome and Paradigm of Gift 
 For Marion, “kenotic gift culminates par excellence in the Eucharist,”263 as the kenosis of 
the Word at the Incarnation finds a parallel in Jesus’ total gift of ‘abandonment’ in the gifts of his 
body and blood.  This total self-emptying self-gift, given the night before he died on behalf of 
and to his disciples, is the ultimate expression of love: “Greater love no one has than this, to lay 
down one’s life for one’s friends” (Jn. 15:13).  Christ’s self-gift not only expresses greater love 
for his friends than for his own self-preservation, but it fulfills his own teaching to “Love your 
enemies” (Mt. 5:44), transcending the realms of exchange and reciprocity into unconditional 
love.   
For Marion the Eucharist is not only the ultimate gift but the paradigm by which all gift-
giving is most properly understood; it reveals and epitomizes aspects of gift-giving that 
ordinarily escape notice.264  This Eucharistic paradigm is divinely revealed, yet opens 
                                               
260 Cf. Marion, GR, 40.  Cf. Augustine, Tractates on the Gospel of John, XXVI, 4, 11–27; 262.  A more thorough 
discussion of Marion’s notion of desire (taken from Augustine’s Confessions) will appear later in section 3.2, in a 
discussion of the encounter with love. 
261 Ibid.  Cf. Augustine, Tractates on the Gospel of John, 11– 27; 264 (modified by Marion).   
262 Ibid. 
263 Cf. Marion, “The Recognition of the Gift,” 126, 132. 
264 The Eucharist is “paradigm of any gift of alms, and accomplishes its logic.” Ibid., 133.   
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possibilities for reason to consider.265  Just as in the Eucharist Christ gives his body and blood in 
the object-forms of bread and wine (leaving Christ’s body and blood invisible), so the invisible 
nature of a gift-object as gift immediately disappears.266  Every gift, like the Eucharist, becomes 
a mere object, immediately losing any reference to either its givenness (contingency) or its giver 
(source).  The gift’s givenness and giver do not become predicates of the ‘item’ but become 
invisible; and yet recognition of these two aspects are precisely the requirements for recognition 
of the gift as such.267  The difficulty of properly recognizing any gift as such is compounded by 
the risk of its being forgotten or neglected by the recipient.  All these paradigmatic aspects of the 
gift, revealed most clearly in the Eucharist, reinforce the importance of Marion’s notion that 
revelation bestows or even imposes its own hermeneutic upon recipients.   
 To recognize any gift (including the Eucharist) as such -- that is, despite the invisibility 
of the gift’s contingency and transparency -- recourse to a “phenomenology of the invisible” 
must be had.268  It is not enough for a gift simply to appear: its giver (source) and its givenness 
(contingency) must be known for a gift-as-such to be received.  Proper recognition of the 
Eucharistic gift as such -- as from the Father and contingent -- is both critical for proper 
reception of the Eucharist and a fundamental way that Christ reveals the Father.  Thus in the 
Eucharist the respective “glory” of Father and Son “is shared and exchanged” by this “practice of 
the gift as such.”269  
                                               
265 The aforementioned article by Marion, “Christian Philosophy,” elaborates on this relation between revelation and 
the ‘natural’ order knowable by reason. One might also recall St. Anselm of Canterbury’s definition of theology as 
fides quaerens intellectum (‘faith seeking understanding’).   
266 Marion describes this phenomenal feature of gift-giving in “The Recognition of the Gift,” 125-127, and then 
relates it to the Eucharist in “a theological approach to the philosophical aporia of the gift” (127) in the rest of the 
essay (127-135).  Section 3.4 below will relate the importance of these phenomenological aspects of transparency 
and contingency to the Eucharist.   
267 Cf. Marion, “The Recognition of the Gift,” 129. 
268 Ibid., 127.  Marion also discusses contingency in a phenomenological context in BG, 125-139.   
269 Ibid., 131 and 130, respectively.  Discussion of the role of the Holy Spirit in this recognition process and sharing 
of glory will appear later.  
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The bestowal of the Eucharist is not simply of the (apparent) bread and wine: the 
Incarnate Word’s saying over each gift (‘This is my body/blood’) “overdetermines” them.270  
The Eucharist expresses the Paschal Mystery because it expresses Christ’s complete self-
abandonment: “the consecrated bread incarnates the perfectly abandoned gift of a ‘body given 
for [us]’ (Lk. 22:19).” 271  Through the visible gifts (of bread and wine), invisible gifts (of 
Christ’s body and blood) of the gift (namely, Christ and the Holy Spirit) of the ultimate giver 
(the Father) are all phenomenalized.  In the Eucharist therefore, the Triune involvement in 
givenness is made manifest:  
Recognizing the gift as such then means no longer seeing the thing in its stubborn opaqueness 
(this man born in Nazareth, this piece of bread, this cup of wine), but as it gives itself (Christ, 
his body, and his blood), from the point therefore from which the gift departs, as it happens, 
from the Father, because, in the end, in its transparency the Eucharistic gift gives the Father to 
see through the Son and in the Spirit.272   
 
The ‘material presence’ of Christ’s body and blood in the bread and wine are so minimal -- 
completely dependent on Christ’s words -- that the gift expresses par excellence Christ’s self-
emptying kenosis: it is a gift of self so complete that no ‘thing’ of Christ’s ‘self’ remains visibly 
and only the least possible ‘presence’ (in the host and wine) are visible.  This absence of visible 
body and blood is its very transparency, its referral back to Christ who is himself the gift of the 
‘ultimate’ giver, the Father.   
The Eucharist manifests God’s self-giving visibly, that a recipient might recognize 
transparently the gift’s ultimate origin (the Father) and its contingency.  Furthermore, the 
Eucharist expresses hope in the full coming of the Kingdom of God, the absolutely complete gift 
of God.  Marion does not dwell on the hylomorphic substance or accidents of the Eucharistic 
elements but on their referential character, their meaning as signs pointing toward the self-giving 
                                               
270 Ibid., 133.  
271 Marion, PC, 133. 
272 Marion, “Recognition of the Gift,” 134. 
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divine Giver.  Such attention as Marion pays to these relations of the Eucharist -- the trinitarian 
workings of its givenness, giver, and manifestation through the Son and Holy Spirit -- specify 
what this dissertation proposes in a ‘relational approach to the Eucharist.’  Connections between 
these referents and the event of giving which the Eucharist epitomizes offers a way to speak 
meaningfully of the Eucharist as ‘the source and summit of Christian living.’ 
Marion’s thought presents the Eucharist as God’s self-gift which can only be understood 
on its own terms: the message is the divine Word himself in a mystery of love that exceeds what 
any conceptual model can express.  Participation in the Eucharistic actions (‘receiving’ its 
meaning through observation of the taking, blessing, and giving) communicates the gift more 
aptly than concepts.  Reception of this gift (in its fullest sense) leads to a greater attraction to 
loving, to self-abandoning giving toward others.  The Eucharist is important certainly as the 
Body and Blood of Christ, but its referential character as referring to the Father (transparency) 
and as freely given (contingency) are vital for fuller appreciation of the Eucharistic gift.     
3.1.2.  The Celebrating Community  
 God gives the Eucharist as gift to the Church, which receives this gift by becoming like 
the gift itself.  The liturgical assembly must think, act, and be conformed according to the logic 
of God’s self-giving love, under the guidance of its bishop. 
This process of unveiling-leading-to-recognition continues amidst the present-day 
liturgical celebration of the Eucharist, which “unceasingly reproduces this hermeneutic site of 
theology.”273  The Liturgy of the Word’s proclamation of the Scriptures sets the terms.  Those 
terms are expressed again in the gestural actions and words of Christ by the priest in persona 
Christi, which offer -- rather, give -- the clearest possible interpretation.  The gift (which includes 
the interpretation) precedes the understanding, as it does in ‘the mystery of charity,’ which 
                                               
273 Marion, GWB, 152.   
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operates ‘without reason’ and does not confine itself to the limits of conceptual understanding.  
The invisible Word is made visible in the breaking of the bread through the gestures and voice of 
the priest, accomplishing in fullness the hermeneutic of what is being proclaimed.   
The given divine Word calls the community to communion and conformity with God.  
Interpretation does not ‘belong’ to the assembly, as either a product of its imagination or as if it 
were analyzing an object.  Rather, the assembly ‘interprets’ the Eucharist by an existential 
conformity: that is, “only to the strict degree that it lets itself be called together and assimilated, 
hence converted and interpreted by the Word, sacramentally and therefore actually acting in the 
community.”274  From its ‘posture’ of receptivity the assembly undergoes a ‘de-subjectivization:’ 
the community does not ‘take action’ so much as receive the Word by recognizing the Word’s 
action, made visible by the sacrament.  The assembly validates its reception of the Eucharistic 
gift -- its genuine recognition of the gift in its own integrity -- by conformity to it, by becoming 
more fully the visible and active ecclesial Body of Christ in ongoing world history.  Such a 
corporate, existential, and incarnate hermeneutic make significant contributions to ‘a true 
understanding of the Eucharist.’   
 A somewhat controversial assertion by Marion concerning interpretation of the Eucharist 
concerns the unique role of the bishop as theologian.  While a properly Eucharistic hermeneutic 
of the text is undertaken by the community, with the assistance of the theologian the liturgical 
service still has need of the ‘voice of the Word’ speaking from ‘the place of the Word.’  Since 
the bishop “alone finds himself invested by the persona Christi,” he alone is a theologian proper: 
If, first, theology as theology attempts the hermeneutic of the words in view, hence also, from 
the point of view of the Word, if the Eucharist offers the only correct hermeneutic site where 
the Word can be said in person in the blessing, if finally only the celebrant receives authority 
to go beyond the words as far as the Word, because he alone finds himself invested by the 
                                               
274 Marion, GWB, 152.  Emphasis added.  
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persona Christi, then one must conclude that only the bishop merits, in the full sense, the title 
of theologian.275 
 
In a 2001 interview with Richard Kearney, Marion clarified that he was putting forward the 
patristic tradition as the proper context for theology, wherein the ‘place’ for theology was the 
liturgy of the believing community. 276  Theology’s questions arose out of the pastoral needs of 
the church, and amid the liturgical celebration the bishop addressed those needs by interpreting 
the gospel.  The rise of universities split theological scholarship from communal pastoral 
concern, raising questions outside their proper context and no longer orienting people toward 
worship.   
Interpretation of the text by the community can occur, but after receiving the help of the 
theologian and “on condition that the community itself be interpreted by the Word and 
assimilated to the place where theological interpretation can be exercised, thanks to the liturgical 
service of the theologian par excellence, the bishop.”277  The community needs to recognize the 
‘priority of the text’ over itself, and that authoritative interpretation occurs within a liturgical-
pastoral context.  Also, the assembly’s relationship of union with the bishop is an essential aspect 
of a properly celebrated Eucharist.  Given Marion’s repeated concern to avoid a reduction of 
Eucharistic presence to “the immediate consciousness that the (community) consciousness has of 
it,”278 the bishop may be safeguarding (as in persona Christi representative) the gaze of ‘the 
Other’ who gazes at the community.  This of course does not prevent a set of potential abuses or 
errors originating in the bishop, but Marion seems to consider an identification of Eucharistic 
presence with (merely) the community’s consciousness the greater danger.   
                                               
275 Ibid. 
276 Cf. Richard Kearney, “A Dialogue with Jean-Luc Marion,” Philosophy Today 48:1 (2004), 15-16.  Hereafter 
“Dialogue.”  “I am thinking of the two Gregorys, Basil the Great, or John the Chrysostom.”   
277 Marion, GWB, 152. 
278 Ibid., 169-170, et al. 
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3.1.3.  Reception of the Gift: Transformation of the Community  
 I will now examine Marion’s writings relating recognition of the Eucharistic gift and the 
transformation of the community.279  This results in an existential notion of Christ’s ‘real 
presence’ in the ecclesial body of Christ which awaits its eschatological fullness from God.  The 
radical other-worldly gift of the Eucharist thus calls for transformation not merely of individuals 
but of their relationships with one another.  A note on the traditional doctrine of 
transubstantiation concludes this section.   
3.1.3.1.  Eucharist, Christ’s Disappearance, and Entry into ‘Trinitarian Play’ 
The gift of the Eucharist is not an end in itself: it is meant first to be recognized ‘as gift,’ 
as gift of love from the Father through the Son and Holy Spirit; it is also a way of reinforcing 
hope and faith in Christ as risen from the dead.  An oft-overlooked part of the Emmaus narrative 
is important in Marion’s ‘Eucharistic hermeneutic:’ Christ’s disappearance as he is recognized 
in the breaking of the bread (cf. Lk. 24:31).  Once the two disciples recognize Christ anew -- 
both Christ in the Eucharist, and Christ as Resurrected -- the visible human form of Christ 
disappears.  This disappearance becomes a call for the disciple to ‘become what one receives:’ a 
living member of the body of Christ, embodying and manifesting more fully in the world the 
ecclesial Body of Christ.  God entrusts the message of reconciliation to disciples (2 Cor. 5:19) to 
be his witnesses in the world (cf. Acts 1:8; Mt. 28:19; Mk. 16:15).   
The events of the paschal mystery (Christ’s suffering, death, resurrection, and ascension) 
and the Eucharist bestow a gift of love, but they also invite those who recognize these gifts ‘as 
such’ to become a similarly transparent and contingent gift of self in the present world, as Christ 
was.  What modernity calls ‘the death of God’ -- God’s withdrawal from the world, revealed 
                                               
279 To stay within what Marion writes on the Eucharist (and closely-related themes) this section will address only 
that topic here.  Marion’s writings on the broader topic of how the encounter of revelation with human beings leads 
to their transformation will be given below in section 3.2.   
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particularly in Christ’s death and ascension -- calls disciples forth into active roles as ‘the Body 
of Christ’ in the world, taking responsibility for others as Christ did.280  Disciples are called to 
‘step into’ Christ’s transparent and contingent ‘trinitarian role:’ “If Christ leaves, it is in order to 
free the trinitarian site for the disciples.”281  Such ‘disappearance’ by Christ “allows the disciples 
to become not servants but friends, not spectators but actors of the redemptive and revelatory 
action of Christ.  They themselves occupy the place, the role, and the charge of Christ.”282  As in 
the Ascension in Luke 24:50-53,283 the disciples take on Christ’s role as one who blesses.  
Marion notes that “Christ makes himself recognized -- as gift of presence -- ever since Easter by 
the sign of the blessing,” and “the highest presence of Christ lies in the Spirit’s action of making 
us, with him and in him, bless the Father.”284  An action of Christ taken up by his disciples 
becomes the true sign of his continuing presence among them. 
Full reception of the Eucharist, therefore, involves (in Marion’s terms) both recognizing 
the Eucharistic gift as such and stepping into the role of Christ (who is no longer visibly present 
in the world) as agents taking responsibility to love and bless -- recognizing the Father’s gifts -- 
as Christ did.  It involves existential acceptance of the call to become the living ecclesial body of 
Christ in the world: to live transparently as a Christ-like lover who abandons self.  By charitable 
action that refers to the Father transparently in one’s contingent life, a disciple becomes more 
                                               
280 “In light of revelation, the interactions within creation of the visible and invisible, advent and withdrawal -- in 
short the nature of event (Ereignis) -- turn out to be traces and hints of the kenotic self-donation taking place within 
the Trinity: “The Ereignis can therefore be understood in two ways, neither unifiable nor contradictory, nor 
competing: as such, the last word of Being, and as medium or analogon of the trinitarian play (the gift of creation 
referring back to and growing deeper in the original filiation).” Marion, ID, 247.  The perceived ‘absence’ or ‘death’ 
of God is revealed as the purposeful divine withdrawal (revealed in Christ’s Death, then again at his Ascension) 
which calls forth disciples to step into active roles as ‘the Body of Christ’ in the world, taking responsibility for 
others as Christ did. 
281 Jean-Luc Marion, Prolegomena to Charity, trans. Stephen Lewis (New York: Fordham University Press, 2002), 
142-143.  Hereafter PC. 
282 Ibid., 145.  Emphasis added. 
283 “[Christ] led them out as far as Bethany and, lifting up his hands, he blessed them.  While he was blessing them, 
he withdrew from them and was carried up into heaven.  And they worshiped him, and returned to Jerusalem with 
great joy, and they were continually in the temple blessing God.”   
284 Ibid., 133, 145. 
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fully a member of the Body of Christ acting as such.  “Thus, as much by the Eucharist as by the 
gift of the Spirit, the withdrawal of the Ascension makes the disciples come unto a perfect, 
though paradoxical presence in Christ.”285  This entrance into and living from Christ’s charitable, 
transparent, and contingent role, as one who continually recognizes the Father’s generosity, 
constitutes ‘trinitarian play.’   
To transpose Marion’s ideas into images from Scripture and tradition, the ‘real presence 
of Christ’ manifests itself most vividly in the disciple -- oneself a ‘member’ of the ecclesial Body 
of Christ -- who responds in love to the Word and the Holy Spirit, who blesses the Father as the 
Giver of every good gift (cf. James 1:17).  Such a disciple puts Christ’s words into action: “Go 
and do likewise” (Lk. 10:37); “Love one another as I have loved you” (Jn. 13:34); “Do this in 
memory of me” (Lk. 22:19; 1 Cor. 11:24, 25).  
3.1.3.2.  Recasting the Real Presence of Christ in the Eucharist 
Since questions concerning Christ’s ‘Real Presence’ in the Eucharist are central to the 
Eucharistic theology of the Roman Church, we must explore how Marion addresses them.  
Traditionally the Roman Church has upheld the ‘objective’ presence of the ‘Body and Blood, 
Soul and Divinity of Christ (i.e., such presence is not dependent upon the ‘subjective’ belief of 
witnesses).  Given Marion’s concerns to ‘overcome metaphysics’286 and develop a 
phenomenology of givenness, it should be no surprise that he transposes the doctrine of the real 
presence of Christ in the Eucharist according to a new interpretation.  Since, for Marion, 
givenness is the most fundamental phenomenological reality, the nature of the Eucharist as gift 
                                               
285 Ibid.  
286 Cf. Jean-Luc Marion, “Substance and Subsistence: Suaréz and the Treatise on Substantia in the Principles of 
Philosophy 1, §51-§54,” in On the Ego and on God: Further Cartesian Questions, trans. Christina M. Gschwandtner 
(New York: Fordham Univ. Press, 2007); also cf. Jean-Luc Marion, “Thomas Aquinas and Onto-theo-logy,” in 




reveals the real presence of Christ more effectively than language of ontology (such as Being, 
presence, substance). 
One difficulty of proclaiming the real presence of Christ in the Eucharist is that the 
eschatological fullness of this gift will only be known with the eschaton, the parousia at the end 
of time: so Marion first recasts the real presence of Christ according to the gift of time.  Fully 
exploiting the double meaning of ‘present’ as both ‘gift’ and ‘now,’ he changes discussion of 
Eucharistic presence from presence-as-ontological-Being to the-present-time-received-as-gift.  
We must “think presence starting from the gift that, theologically, constitutes presence in the 
present;” these changes have important implications for the Eucharist as the real presence of 
Christ and as memorial.287   
In the everyday notion of time (‘metaphysical temporality’) the past and future are 
imagined and measured as extensions from basic reference point of “the here and now by which 
consciousness assures itself ... of being.”288  The past apparently ‘fades away from presence’ and 
the future ‘is not yet’: our language concerning time thus implies corollaries concerning being 
and presence.  Moreover, in such a notion ‘memorial’ tries to preserve something gone by and 
lost to the past, and ‘hope’ seeks that something good come into the fullness of presence.  Time-
received-as-Eucharistic-gift, however, reverses a priority in metaphysics for the present over past 
and future.  According to Christian revelation the fullness of being (‘Parousia’) and of history 
come at the eschaton: therefore, the true reference point arrives ‘from the future.’   
The present of the Eucharistic gift is ... temporalized ... as memorial (temporalization starting 
from the past), then as eschatological announcement (temporalization starting from the future), 
and finally, and only finally, as dailyness and viaticum (temporalization starting from the 
present).... [This] implies that we will understand the Eucharistic presence less in the way of 
an available permanence than as a new sort of advent.289 
                                               
287 Marion, GWB, 171.  
288 Ibid., 170. 




According to this ‘Christic temporality,’ God’s total and final decision of love was established in 
our past, expressed in the gifts of the body and blood of Jesus Christ upon Calvary and in the 
Eucharist.  This definitive pledge of love nonetheless will find its fulfillment in the 
eschatological banquet, when Christ himself will again ‘drink the fruit of the vine’ (Lk. 22:18).   
 Marion’s notion of presence therefore shifts from a static ontological notion of being 
toward the event of God’s advent.  This reshapes our understanding of the Eucharist as 
memorial: it is not merely a nostalgic memorial but a reminder of the full advent of God to come, 
the ‘not yet’ orientation toward the fullness of the Kingdom.  “The memorial aims at the 
Parousia” more than simply the present moment, since the Eucharist is still only the 
sacramentally present body and blood of Christ.290  For Marion, the fundamental reality of the 
traditional doctrine of the real presence of Christ in the Eucharist is that it brings God’s 
eschatological self-gift into visibility, into the phenomenal world: God’s fullness is waiting to be 
received; it gazes at us, calling our ‘reality’ and selves into question.   
 This notion of real presence into categories of givenness (explained more fully in section 
3.2. below) is reinforced in more recent writings of Marion.  Marion speaks of real presence as 
interwoven with recognition of the Eucharistic gift as such, recognition of the Eucharist’s 
transparency and contingency.  Marion contrasts the ‘self-persistence’ or ‘opaqueness’ of an 
object (which makes no reference to a giver or its contingency) with the ‘transparency’ or ‘real 
presence’ of a gift, which reveal the gift’s nature.  Regarding the Eucharist this means “the 
minimal remnant of a presence that points to the bread and wine must fill, as abandoned gift, the 
role of the presence of the gift of the Son who has come in the flesh to manifest his dependence 
                                               
290 Marion, GWB, 173.  Emphasis added.   
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within givenness.”291  The invisible transparency and contingency of the Eucharistic gift -- that 
is, their relational, signifying or referential aspects -- is how phenomenology would express the 
insight of Christ’s real presence in the Eucharist.   
3.1.3.3.  The Gift of the Real Presence Amid Relationships 
The gift of the Eucharist is never given in pure isolation; furthermore it is meant to raise 
questions concerning all of one’s relationships: “When God provokes us by the gift that his 
Church names ‘the Real Presence,’ we are confronted by ... the difficulty indeed of our 
relationship to the infinite, but also ... the difficulty of our relationship with the other ... and 
therefore with ourselves.... It is a matter of entering into ‘the trinitarian play’ (le jeu 
trinitaire).”292  An existential notion of ‘trinitarian play’ which hopes and waits for the fullness 
of God has implications not merely for individuals’ relationships with God, but for all one’s 
relationships.  The radical advent of God’s presence into the world requires that we rethink our 
relationships: the gift of the Eucharist requires adopting a Eucharistic hermeneutic concerning 
our relationships.   By stating that the gift of the Eucharist’s Real Presence ‘provokes’ us and 
leads to ‘entering into the trinitarian play,’ Marion clearly indicates that the Eucharist is meant to 
impact all our relationships.  It calls into question all our relationships: with God, with others, 
and ‘therefore with ourselves.’  This point is simply raised here; the precise manner in which 
Marion’s paradigm explains how these relationships are transformed will be described below, 
                                               
291 Marion, “Recognition of the Gift,” 133. 
292 Jean-Luc Marion, « Splendeur de la contemplation eucharistique, » in Politique de la Mystique: hommage à Mgr 
Maxime Charles, eds. Jean-Luc Marion, Claire-Agnes Zirnheld, P.-M. Delfieux (Limoges: Editions Criterion, 1984), 
20, 25.  Originally published in Résurrection 31 (1969), 84-88.  Hereafter “Splendor.”  My translation.  Marion’s 
original text (omitted text is bracketed): « Lorsque Dieu provoque par le don de ce que son Eglise nomme ‘la 
présence réelle,’ nous sommes confrontés, sur [un cas d’autant plus particulier qu’il pousse chacun des termes à 
l’infini,] à la difficulté certes de notre rapport à l’infini, mais aussi et du même coup, à la difficulté de notre rapport 
avec l’autre, quel qu’il soit, et donc avec nous-mêmes….  Il s’agit donc d’entrer dans le jeu trinitaire. »  Marion’s 
neologism ‘the trinitarian play’ (or ‘game’ -- le jeu trinitaire) could be a ‘play’ on the postmodern notion of 
linguistic play (jeu) and its endless deferral of meaning among signs (différance).  Jacques Derrida had introduced 
his notion of linguistic play two years earlier in the 1967 publication of Writing and Difference.  Also, it might be 
noted that Marion was 23 years old when this article was first published.  
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with the help of Marion’s phenomenology of givenness (3.2.).  As will be shown, our 
relationships are transformed by our being called out of reciprocity into loving self-abandonment 
for the other.  Beginning with recognizing as gift all that one is and receives, and recognizing 
others as gifts made in the divine image, the Eucharist calls the disciple to imitate God’s loving 
initiative to love first with total abandon.   
3.1.3.4.  Doctrine of Transubstantiation 
 Marion’s recasting of Eucharistic presence, however, in no way eliminates the traditional 
doctrine of transubstantiation.293  Though this doctrine is subject to misinterpretation, it holds a 
critically important place for Marion.  Despite its onto-theological terminology of substance and 
accidents, for Marion the doctrine “alone offers the possibility of distance, since it strictly 
separates my consciousness from Him who summons it ... [and] my attention and my prayer.”294  
The priority of the Eucharistic gift’s ‘objective’ self-manifestation vis-à-vis the recipient 
“imposes” an “irreducible exteriority.... Only distance, in maintaining a distinct separation of 
terms (of persons), renders communion possible, and immediately mediates the relation.”295  The 
doctrine’s value is seen especially in the practice of Eucharistic adoration.  This form of prayer 
“is a labor ... of concentration, but one that is essentially desubjectivizing, where the I is erased 
before the one whom it observes speaking.”296  This ‘desubjectivization’ of the ego -- or, more 
particularly, its will -- prepares us well for a fuller understanding of the sense of mission that the 
celebration of the Eucharist is meant to impart.   
                                               
293 “The Council of Trent summarizes the Catholic faith by declaring: "Because Christ our Redeemer said that it was 
truly his body that he was offering under the species of bread, it has always been the conviction of the Church of 
God, and this holy Council now declares again, that by the consecration of the bread and wine there takes place a 
change of the whole substance of the bread into the substance of the body of Christ our Lord and of the whole 
substance of the wine into the substance of his blood. This change the holy Catholic Church has fittingly and 
properly called transubstantiation."  Catechism of the Catholic Church, par. 1376.  Cf. Council of Trent (1551): DS 
1642.  
294 Marion, GWB, 177. 
295 Ibid., 169.   
296 Marion, RT, 27. 
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3.1.4.  Related Theological Themes in Marion 
 Marion has written about other theological themes that, while not directly related by him 
to the Eucharist, will be employed in my own synthesis.  Marion’s theological writings on idols 
and icons proposes a kind of discourse concerning revelation of divine realities to human beings.  
His writings on the distance between the divine and the human provide an important context for 
a theological notion of gift.  The combination of icons (which reveal the invisible divine) and 
gifts (which are transparent and contingent) converge very well, as Marion demonstrates, with 
the traditional definition of sacrament.   
3.1.4.1.  Idols and Icons: Theological Use 
 Writing at the boundaries of theology and philosophy, Marion employs some terms in 
senses particular to his own thought.  Here we explore Marion’s motif of ‘idols and icons’ as he 
uses it for theological purposes, as a background for his understanding of sacraments.297  
 In God Without Being Marion speaks of idols and icons as two ways of experiencing or 
approaching the divine,298 but “in one case [i.e., idols] the approach is on our terms, in the other 
case it is on God’s terms.”299  As mediating phenomena, both idols and icons “no longer restrict 
their visibility to themselves”: they function as signs of the divine.... they are “two manners of 
being ... not two classes of beings.”300  At hand are “two modes of apprehension of the divine in 
visibility.”301   
                                               
297 Section 3.2 below will describe Marion’s phenomenological use of this motif, which is important for Marion’s 
paradigm of revelation.   
298 In GWB Marion described idols and icons as two ways of experiencing the divine (cf. GWB, 1-60; esp. 1-24), but 
in all subsequent works he describes them as types of saturated phenomena (cf. Marion, BG, 229-233; IE, 54-81, 
104-127).   
299 Christina M. Gschwandtner, Marion and Theology, Philosophy and Theology (New York: Bloomsbury T&T 
Clark, 2016), 33.  Hereafter MT. 
300 Marion, GWB, 8. 
301 Ibid., 9. 
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In this context, the term ‘idol’ for Marion does not carry a pejorative sense.  Idols express 
an authentic vision of the divine that proceeds from the human, rather than opening to the divine 
to receive what it gives.  Idols give a particular visible manifestation of what an artist has seen of 
the divine.  An idol functions as an “invisible mirror,”302 turning one’s gaze back upon oneself, 
manifesting some desirable aspect of the divine.  Its “manifestation and its material expression 
are almost entirely grounded in the viewer and function as a measure of his or her capacity and 
desires.”303  Idols carry appeal for us -- ‘dazzle’ us -- because they match so well with our ideals, 
hopes, and desires.  
Conversely, by gazing at an icon, the one gazing realizes he or she in fact is gazed upon 
by an invisible other.  More powerfully than any intention to understand or control the image 
presented by the icon, the one gazing is oneself called into question.  One’s own self or meaning 
-- not the icon’s -- is called into question: “the gaze of man is lost in the invisible gaze that 
visibly envisages him.”304  The icon displays itself visibly, yet by overwhelming the onlooker’s 
intention it signifies an invisible other as such; hence, they are unsettling in some degree.  The 
icon truly mediates the gaze of the invisible (i.e., the divine) upon the witness.  These two 
‘modes of apprehension’ are important for Marion as they set the stage for the relation of all that 
is visible in the world to the invisible: namely, God.   
Marion uses the icon motif theologically with scripture’s analogy for the role Christ plays 
visibly revealing the Father in heaven: Christ is the icon of the invisible God (hos estin eikōn tou 
theou tou aoratou; Col. 1:15).305  Christ’s visibility as the Incarnate Word refers -- reveals -- the 
invisible Father who would otherwise remain completely invisible, “and which does not allow 
                                               
302 Marion, GWB, 12; cf. 12-14. 
303 Gschwandtner, MT, 33.  
304 Marion, GWB, 19. 
305 Cf. Marion, GR, 61-88, 102-108.  Marion cites this verse and theme often in both his writings: ID, 8, 25-26; cf. 
BG 236-241; The Crossing of the Visible, 77, 84; “Phenomenality of the Sacrament,” 111-115. 
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itself to be seen or aimed at except through ... the icon.”306  The icon thus preserves the distance 
between the human and the divine, the transcendence of the invisible.  Christ’s iconic nature is 
expressed in John 14:6: ‘No one comes to the Father except through me.’   
Marion’s theological notion of icon is a helpful way to speak of hidden (or ‘invisible’) 
aspects the Eucharist, most importantly, emergence of awareness that one is in a sense looked at 
and encountered by a divine Other.  Though present, this Other remains unseen and therefore 
beyond one’s control or manipulation.  Since this Other is divine, the ‘unsettling’ effect is fully 
proper to the moment: we are removed from the illusion ‘full autonomy’ and ourselves called 
into question.  That the icon brings what is invisible into visibility -- while remaining invisible -- 
becomes central to Marion’s notion of a sacrament and of the Eucharist in particular.307  Marion 
himself discusses the risk of apparent idolatry regarding Eucharistic adoration, and John 
Baldovin has used Marion’s idol/icon motif to discuss liturgical reform.308 
Marion’s theological use of idols and icons marks an initial way to distinguish what 
meets or fits our expectations regarding the divine (idols) from what confronts us as truly from 
an Other (icons).  Similarly, Marion speaks of the sacraments as crossing the threshold between 
the divine invisible and visible phenomena.  
3.1.4.2.  Charity: Becoming the Gift 
 In The Idol and Distance Marion addresses several questions concerning how humans 
relate to an utterly transcendent God: what language is appropriate to the distance between the 
                                               
306 Ibid., 103.  Cf. Mt. 11:27b: “No one knows the Son except the Father, and no one knows the Father except the 
Son and anyone to whom the Son chooses to reveal him;” also Jn. 14:6: “I am the way, and the truth, and the life.  
No one comes to the Father except through me.” 
307 Jean-Luc Marion, “The Phenomenality of the Sacrament,” 102-115, and “Recognition of the Gift,” 125-135, in 
BIOTS. 
308 Cf. Marion, “Splendor.”  Cf. John F. Baldovin, “Idols and Icons: Reflections on the Current State of Liturgical 
Reform,” Worship 84 (2010) 386-402. 
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two?  Is anything communicated or given, and how? 309  With the help of St. Paul and Denys the 
Areopagite Marion states “Only love can claim to know Love;”310 therefore the language proper 
to relation with the divine cause/Αἰτία is praise instead of philosophical predication.311   
Similarly, the divine Goodness “gives itself -- not to be comprehended but to be received.”312  
The notion of gift predominates everything that transpires between God and human beings, so 
that humans grow in likeness to divine giving and goodness.   
A recipient of divine goodness “receives the gift only in order to give it, such that this 
gift, in the same gesture, regives the gift redundancy;” by doing this the recipients conform 
themselves to the event of giving and themselves participate in divine love and goodness.313  
Receiving and giving are therefore not two separate actions but one and the same: one “does not 
receive the gift as such except ... through repetition by giving himself” and thereby becomes a 
gift.314  Divine goodness and love therefore ‘take on a body’ in the recipient, for through acts of 
charity “the recipient donor becomes integrally and in person -- hypostatically -- a gift.”315  A 
person takes on the likeness of the divine giver.   
These texts provide important principles regarding relation between God and human 
beings which can inform interpretation of other passages (in Being Given and In Excess) in 
which Marion speaks phenomenologically of the obligations of a recipient.  With any gift, the 
recipient is not without responsibility: with the gift of becoming a ‘givee’ comes the gift of an 
“active capacity ... [which] must be put to work.... [and] work on itself in order to receive.”316  
While receptive, the recipient is not at liberty to be entirely passive or unobligated.  The work of 
                                               
309 Cf. Marion, ID, 139-195, 233-253. 
310 Marion, ID, 145. 
311 Cf. Ibid., 151-152.   
312 Ibid., 155.   
313 Ibid., 165.   
314 Ibid., 166.  
315 Ibid., 168.   
316 Marion, IE, 48. 
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the recipient to exercise its active capacities represents its full coming-to-birth, which does not 
occur all at once but must be ‘put to work’ with the reception of each gift.317  As both recipient 
of the gift and responsible for obeying its inherent call, the self refashioned in light of the gift is 
both “the sole master and servant of the given.”318  This dynamic will take on central importance 
for understanding ‘reception’ of the Eucharist, looking beyond the reception of the host to the 
embodiment of charity in one’s life.   
3.1.4.3.  Sacraments: Visible Signs of Invisible Grace 
 Marion’s writings on sacraments make frequent use of the terms used in the Council of 
Trent’s definition, albeit in his own way: “Indeed the holy Eucharist shares in common with the 
other sacraments that it is a sign of a holy thing and the visible form of an invisible grace.”319  
Marion’s notions of ‘visible’ and ‘invisible,’ however, carry meanings particular to his own 
thought, as will be shown.  Sacraments originate from Christianity’s basic assertion of the 
Incarnation, “the eternal involvement of the God of Jesus Christ in the process of self-
manifestation and self-showing.”320  For Marion a sacrament’s visible and invisible aspects 
function “as the two inseparable faces of a single phenomenon,” God’s self-giving.321  The 
Eucharist’s visible aspects would include the bread and wine, gestures (elevation, fraction, 
giving); its invisible aspects for Marion are not merely Christ’s Body and Blood but the gifts’ 
transparency (their reference to the Father) and contingency (given freely by God, in a particular 
time and place).  Sacraments are the means that accomplish the invisible divine’s self-
abandonment into visible phenomenality: a ‘phenomenality of abandon.’ 
                                               
317 Cf. Ibid. 
318 Marion, BG, 319. 
319 Marion, “The Phenomenality of the Sacrament,” in BIOTS, 102.  Cf. “Decree on the Eucharist,” Council of Trent, 
Session XII, c. 3, canon 3.   
320 Ibid., 112. 
321 Ibid., 103. 
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Bringing his notions of the visible and invisible together both the Incarnation and the 
phenomenon of the gift, Marion says a kenosis occurs in which “the invisible is translated, 
delivers itself up, and abandons itself to the visible to the point of appearing in it as the invisible 
that it remains.”322  The invisible God gives himself over, abandoning himself as a visible 
phenomenon, in the Incarnation, Eucharist, and his suffering and death; this alone provides the 
legitimacy of the sacraments.  The eschatological fullness of the gift of Christ pervades Marion’s 
logic for the sacraments: “God’s self-dispensation is at stake in the sacrament, not as merely one 
of its effects or even one of its gifts, but as Himself.  When God gives, he never gives less than 
himself.”323  The completeness and concreteness of God’s self-giving into phenomenal form 
underlies the notion of each sacrament; the fundamental event of each sacrament is this coming-
into-phenomenality (or coming-into-visibility).  Even the apparent lack of any visible reference 
to a divine giver (e.g., only a human being appears to administer the sacrament) becomes a 
feature of the divine self-abandoning love animating each sacramental gift.   
3.2.  Givenness and the Self: Saturated Phenomena and the Erotic Reduction 
 Having surveyed Marion’s direct writings on the Eucharist, this next section examines his 
phenomenological writings for their contribution toward the ‘relational Eucharistic theology’ I 
am proposing.  While Marion himself does not often relate his unique philosophical terms (of 
givenness, saturated phenomena, or l’adonné) to the Eucharist, such terms are ‘saturated’ with 
possibilities for Eucharistic theology.  While philosophical in nature, Marion’s studies on 
‘givenness’ contribute to Eucharistic theology in that God “comes to us in and as gift.”324  
Marion’s paradigm will help us express the Eucharist in terms that neither are metaphysical 
                                               
322 Marion, “The Phenomenality of the Sacrament,” 108. 
323 Ibid., 112. 
324 Marion, GWB, 3 (‘Envoi’). 
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(“love is not an object for metaphysics”325) nor simply repeating scriptural motifs.  Most 
importantly, Marion’s phenomenological approach opens a far richer notion of the self who 
encounters God; this refashioning of the self in light of the event (or advent) of givenness 
overcomes a variety of problematic dichotomies (subject-object, self and other) and provides a 
new paradigm for speaking of encounter.  His philosophical concepts offer a profound 
contribution to sacramental theology because they open a valuable way to describe the 
sacramental encounter between God and human beings -- accounting especially for the 
transformations in and of human beings that both the Eucharist is meant to instill and which 
Eucharistic theology strives to articulate.   
A phenomenological ‘reduction to givenness’ (3.2.1.) establishes the horizon by which 
Marion aims to ‘overcome’ onto-theology and metaphysics.  It also opens discussion of 
phenomena which ‘saturate’ or exceed the limits of perception and concepts (3.2.2.).  Such 
excess recasts the self as most fundamentally a recipient (l’adonné), overturning the modern 
notion of an autonomous subject who constitutes the phenomena (3.2.3.).   Marion’s deeper 
exploration into the ‘order of charity’ (Pascal) through an ‘erotic reduction’ reveals the dynamics 
of encounter between persons (3.2.4.); his exploration of the unique dynamics of the divine-
human encounter -- particularly concerning God’s truth and human desire -- comes through a 
close reading of Augustine’s Confessions (3.2.5.).  This analysis in turn opens discussion of 
desire, encounter with truth, and questions of ultimate concern, all of which I will use (in 3.4) to 
illumine what is at stake in reception of the Eucharist.   
3.2.1.  Phenomenological Reduction to Givenness 
                                               
325 Jean-Luc Marion, “On the Gift and Desire: An Interview with Jean-Luc Marion,” in Jason W. Alvis, Marion and 
Derrida on The Gift and Desire: Debating the Generosity of Things, Contributions To Phenomenology 85 
(Switzerland: Springer International Publishing, 2016), 256.  Hereafter “Gift and Desire,” MDGD. 
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 According to Marion most analyses of gift-giving or ‘the problem of the gift’ reduce 
matters to giver, gift, and recipient.  In the metaphysical point of view (e.g., Marcel Mauss’ 
sociological analysis of the gift) “givenness is articulated in terms of a giver, a gift given, and a 
givee, which are in principle connected by a reciprocal relation,” since a gift “demands ... 
restitution” from the recipient.326  Marion considers this reciprocity problematic however, since 
metaphysical causality prevails: the giver as efficient cause, gift as material and formal cause, for 
the good of giver and/or recipient as final cause.327  The gift remains caught up in an economy of 
exchange: not genuine gifts, but this-for-that.   
Marion’s phenomenological analysis of givenness -- “the given as such .... the pure 
given” -- goes deeper than this.328  In order to liberate or purify the gift from exchange and 
reciprocity, it is necessary to reduce matters to givenness: “thinking the gift as gift.... [by] 
bracketing the transcendence of the givee... giver, and ... of the transcendence of the object 
exchanged” -- the three standard elements in most examinations of the problem of the gift.329   
Beyond Husserl’s ‘transcendental reduction’ (to ‘objectness’) and Heidegger’s ‘existential 
reduction’ (to ‘beingness,’ Dasein), Marion proposes a third phenomenological reduction, to “the 
given as such” -- ‘givenness.’330  This triple bracketing (reduction, or epochē) of giver, gift, and 
recipient salvages the event of givenness from the realm of metaphysical causality and from 
‘Being,’ from objects or things.  “What shows itself first gives itself -- this is my one and only 
theme” -- this fundamental reality precedes concerns about objects, being, or subjects; Marion 
                                               
326 Marion, BG, 75. 
327 Cf. Ibid. 
328 Ibid., 2-3. 
329 Ibid., 84.    
330 Cf. Ibid., 2.  In The Erotic Phenomenon Marion calls Husserl’s reduction ‘epistemic,’ Heidegger’s ‘ontological,’ 
and replaces ‘reduction to givenness’ with ‘the erotic reduction’ to love.  Cf. EP, 21.   
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calls this ‘givenness.’331  His reduction to givenness examines the fundamental event-dynamism, 
not merely of gift-giving, but of all phenomena. 
 Marion’s threefold reduction reveals some fascinating aspects of the ‘event of givenness’ 
which, though commonly experienced, are rarely articulated so well.  Marion’s understanding of 
the true nature of a gift calls for our attention, even though Marion eventually brackets gifts 
altogether.  A central assertion by Marion is that “the gift does not consist in an object -- because 
it does not at all consist” as such; the true essence of a gift is quite distinct from the object that 
might express it.332  To clarify this Marion cites as an example the most ‘valuable’ gifts of 
friendship or marriage, in which the true gift transcends token-items given, such as wedding 
rings.  The profound gift of marriage between two people cannot be reduced to their exchange of 
rings; their gift, though expressed symbolically through the rings, ‘saturates with excess’ the 
rings they give each other.  Such an example reveals “what is truly at stake in the gift, much 
more precious and serious than the object that conventionally represents it”: the object is at the 
service of the ‘true gift’ (such as one’s word, friendship, or love) which remains invisible, 
‘unreal’ in that it is ‘outside of being.’333  The ‘true gift’ at stake -- typically over-identified with 
the ‘gift-item’ in sociology or metaphysics -- is outside of objectness or ‘being,’ but is revealed 
by the reduction to givenness.  The wedding ring, rather, “attests the gift that I became in 
receiving (that of) the Other precisely because in reality [the ring] is not equal to [the gift], but 
offers the symbolic index of the gift, without common measure with what is nevertheless shown 
in [the ring].” 334  This fact indicates how life’s ‘most important gifts’ cannot be reduced to items 
                                               
331 Marion, BG, 5.   
332 Ibid., 105. 
333 Ibid., 104. 
334 Ibid., 105.  Emphasis added.  Though Marion’s ‘triple bracketing’ of giver, gift, and givee in the ‘reduction to 
givenness’ grants only passing mention to the notion of self-gift mentioned here, it merits fuller attention in the 
‘relational Eucharistic theology’ I am proposing.  I will expound on this articulation of self-gift in the context of the 
Eucharist both in section 3.4 below and in chapter 5.    
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or objects; the invisible aspects of a visible gift are most essential to its nature as gift.  Gifts such 
as friendship, marriage, oneself, or one’s word, “give the most and most decisively give nothing 
-- no thing, no object; ... because what they give belongs neither to reality nor to objectness and 
can thus surpass all expectation, indeed fulfill a desire.” 335  The actual true gift is always 
invisible, outside of ‘being,’ manifested symbolically by the material gift.   
 The decisions of the giver and recipient concerning the gift also call for our attention.  
The giver has a privileged perspective regarding the gift: the giver’s gaze which regards an 
object as the object of a gift grants the object its ‘givability.’336  And yet, interestingly, Marion 
does not say the ‘givability’ arises from a decision by the giver to be gracious: rather, “The gift 
begins and, in fact, is achieved as soon as the giver imagines that he owes something -- a gift 
without thing -- to someone, therefore when he recognizes himself not only in the situation of a 
givee but also first as a debtor.”337  Givability emerges regarding an object -- visible or invisible -
- because the emerging giver recognizes himself as having already received; the giver recognizes 
both the potential gift as already-received and himself as a potential giver.  As for the lover the 
critical moment is the moment of decision to advance (to ‘love first’), so for the giver “the gift 
resides in the decision to give made by the potential giver, but [he] can decide only insofar as he 
yields to givability, that is to say, recognizes that an other gift already obliged him.”338  A giver 
realizes him-/herself as already a recipient, already-given-to, already-obliged.  The giver gives 
the gift without expectation of return or gratitude, and ‘abandons’ the gift, leaving ‘no strings 
attached.’ 
                                               
335 Marion, BG, 106.   
336 Cf. Ibid., 106-108. 




 Reception of a gift requires its own decision, and includes its own challenge.  First, 
acceptance of the gift requires acceptance of an obligation toward another person, whether in an 
expression of gratitude, a gift to the giver, or generosity toward others;339 a gift “always imposes 
an ordeal” whether or how to accept the gift.340  So Marion’s reduction to givenness brings the 
‘acceptability’ of a gift to light.  Reception requires “recognizing that one owes something -- (the 
gift) to something -- sometimes the giver.  To decide to receive a gift ... demands receiving at the 
same time as the gift the knowledge and the acknowledgment of a debt.  The gratuity of the gift 
is paid for with recognition -- of the gift and its very gratuity.”341  In order to receive, the  
recipient must admit “that the principle ‘I don’t owe anything to anyone' can, here at least, suffer 
an exception.”342  The illusion of a fully-autonomous self cannot remain in light of receiving a 
gift.  Apparent acceptance of the gift-item while refusing (or neglecting) the obligation is to 
refuse the gift.343   
3.2.2.  ‘Saturated Phenomena’ 
A major concern for Marion is to correct modern philosophy’s excessive focus on the 
subject.  The common modern notion of the autonomous subject developed out of the work of 
René Descartes (“I think, therefore I am”) and Immanuel Kant, whose critiques of reason and 
judgment reshaped Western thought according to the limits of human reason.  Marion overturns 
these notions, calling for radically different notions of the possibilities for divine revelation and 
the self.  His notion of givenness now includes phenomena that previously fell outside of Kantian 
                                               
339 Cf. Marion, BG, 108-113. 
340 Ibid., 111. 
341 Ibid., 112.  
342 Ibid., 108.  
343 Again Marion’s reduction to givenness calls only passing attention to the interaction between the givee and 
others, through the sense of obligation.  I call attention, however, to how this sense of obligation openly implies -- 
indeed, ‘takes as given’ -- relationship with others.  Marion eventually abandons language of obligation altogether.  
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rational limits (phenomena ‘saturated with intuition,’ “which I call paradoxes”), both restoring 
the possibility of divine revelation and prioritizing ‘what is given’ over the recipient.344 
 With the help of phenomenology, Marion takes on Kant’s categories of the understanding 
to demonstrate how phenomena saturated with intuition -- which overwhelm an observer’s 
intention -- are not irrational but rather transcend Kant’s criteria to excess in ‘saturated 
phenomena.’  Against Kant’s notion that only finite experiences can be considered real, Marion 
wants to examine phenomena that surpass Kant’s finite categories of human knowing.  Such 
saturated phenomena are “invisable according to quantity, unbearable according to quality, 
absolute according to relation, irregardable according to modality.”345  In each category the 
phenomenon cannot be reckoned with in the usual manner because of its excess of givenness.  
Such phenomena are paradoxes: their excess of intuition carries more rationality than the mind 
can bear: “In every case, recognizing the saturated phenomena comes down to thinking seriously 
‘aliquid quo majus cogitari nequit.’”346  Each category of Kant’s criteria (quantity, quality, 
relation, modality) thus has its paradoxical and excessive phenomenological counterpart.  These 
four corresponding kinds of saturated phenomena (event, idol, flesh, icon) cannot be grasped 
within rational limits and so demand a ‘hermeneutic’ that accords with what it gives -- just as the 
Eucharist is only understood this way.  This new category of ‘the saturated phenomenon’ creates 
room for experiences Kant would have considered unthinkable.   
                                               
344 Marion, BG, 4. 
345 Ibid., 199; cf. 199-221.  Translator Jeffrey L. Kosky writes: “Invisable, from viser, designates that which cannot 
be aimed at, meant, or intended.  Irregardable designates what cannot be looked at or gazed upon.’”  BG, 363, notes 
41 and 42.  Thomas A. Carlson, translator of God Without Being: Hors-texte, says the term invisable was coined by 
Marion.  Marion, GWB, 239n8. 
346 ‘Something than which a greater cannot be thought,’ a variation on Saint Anselm’s definition for God in his 
Proslogion.  Marion, The Visible and the Revealed, trans. Christina M. Gschwandtner and others (New York: 
Fordham, 2008), 48.  
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Idols and icons function here as phenomenological terms for paradoxical experiences of 
quantity and modality.347  Marion develops his notion of the icon still further in his later writings 
as he incorporates the work of Emmanuel Lévinas.348  The face functions in a particularly iconic 
way (phenomenologically) of its own.  Marion even considers each face a kind of icon: “[O]nly 
the icon shows us a face (in other words ... every face is given as an icon);” faces are “not 
[merely] to be seen, but to be venerated.”349  An ‘Other’ (otherwise inaccessible to us) both 
comes to manifestation for us through the face. 
The importance of this?  Modern philosophy’s incorrigible impasse of a subject-object 
dichotomy can be overcome; theology can speak of divine revelation without reducing or 
confining God’s gifts to human comprehension of concepts, language, or experience.  More 
importantly for the development of the relational Eucharistic theology this dissertation aims at, 
givenness, saturated phenomena, idols and icons (as phenomena) all re-open horizons that relate 
not only phenomena to a self, but the nature of an encounter between persons -- and all they can 
give and receive from one another.  These notions describe more accurately the impact of the 
divine gift -- i.e., the transformation of the self through changes in relation, existential questions, 
desire, and mission.   
3.2.3.  Critique of the Subject: Anamorphosis and L’adonné  
 Beginning with The Idol and Distance and continuing throughout Marion’s writings 
(especially the phenomenological works) is “a thoroughgoing critique of ... the modern 
metaphysics centered on the active, spontaneous subject who occupies modern philosophy from 
                                               
347 Examples include in BG, 206-209, 232-233; IE 104-127. 
348 Regarding Marion’s adoption of Lévinas’ notion of ‘the face of the Other,’ Cf. Robyn Horner, Rethinking God as 
Gift: Marion, Derrida, and the Limits of Phenomenology (Bronx, NY: Fordham, 2001), 80, 91, 139-140, 167. 
349 Marion, GWB, 19.   
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Descartes through Hegel and Nietzsche.”350  If modernity represented a philosophical ‘turn to the 
subject,’ Marion aims at a ‘(re)turn to the things themselves,’ particularly the saturated 
phenomenon, to let it set the conditions of the encounter.  This turn to the things themselves -- 
especially in the case of the saturated phenomenon -- has strong implications for a proper notion 
of the self.  The primacy of what the saturated phenomenon ‘gives itself as it shows itself’ over 
the self requires radically rethinking the self.   
Through what Marion calls ‘anamorphosis,’ the bestowal of the saturated phenomenon 
gives not only ‘its own gift’ but even gives the recipient the recipient’s own self, so that the 
recipient is most properly named l’adonné.351  L’adonné is “defined as he who receives and 
receives himself from the given.”352  As a saturating phenomenon gives its ‘call’ (its summons), 
the recipient necessarily has a passive stance: so the self, usually imagined according to the 
nominative case (I, ego) is reconstituted according to the dative case (me).  The recipient-self is 
‘always late’ as its constitution follows upon the event of the phenomenon’s appearance: “this 
self can be attested only inasmuch as the phenomenon first gives itself.”353  Therefore the ‘self’ 
does not exist as an autonomous subject, but is inverted by the call: it “is constituted and no 
longer constituting because it no longer has at its disposal any dominant point of view over the 
intuition that overwhelms it.... The I... becomes a me rather than an I.”354  Marion calls this 
                                               
350 Thomas A. Carlson, “Translator’s Introduction,” xii, in Marion, ID. 
351 Cf. Marion, IE, 44-53.  L’adonné is Marion’s chief term for this notion of the self-as-recipient.  In some instances 
Marion uses the term interloqué; cf. Cf. Marion, “The Saturated Phenomenon,” in The Visible and Revealed, 44, 46.  
In BG, 248-319; 322-323. (trans. Jeffrey L. Kosky) l’adonné is translated as ‘the gifted.’   
352 Marion, BG, 322. 
353 Ibid., 4.  
354 Marion, SP, 210-211, first emphasis added; cf. Marion, The Visible and the Revealed, trans. Christina M. 
Gschwandtner and others, Perspectives in Continental Philosophy, ed. John D. Caputo (Bronx, NY: Fordham, 2008), 
44.  In this reversal or inversion of subjectivity, Marion acknowledges a debt to Lévinas: “Such a reversal of 
intentionality and phenomenality, passing from the object which is visible and aimed at to the face which aims and 
is thus non-visible, radically alters the entire horizon of phenomenological analysis, as we have all indeed noticed.  
In that much, we have all become Lévinasians, and definitively.”  In Jeffrey Bloechl, ed., Face of the Other and the 
Trace of God: Essays on the Philosophy of Emmanuel Lévinas (New York: Fordham, 2000), 225.  Cf. Donald 
Wallenfang, Dialectical Anatomy of the Eucharist: An Étude in Phenomenology (Eugene, OR: Cascade, 2017), 77.  
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change from ego to witness ‘anamorphosis,’ which is “nothing less than a conversion.”355  The 
dative case now characterizes one’s identity rather than the nominative; the recipient discovers 
oneself an ‘interloqué,’ one passively ‘spoken to’ by the giving phenomenon.356   Because the 
self-recast-in-light-of-givenness, l’adonné, is always and only ‘constituted’ after a phenomenon 
gives itself, l’adonné is able to receive the paradox of the icon, of the face, of divine revelation. 
The paradoxical and saturated phenomenon can be received since it constitutes l’adonné who 
receives it.  
This change of case in the self is far more than a grammatical change: the “constituting 
subject is succeeded by the constituted witness,” who permits the gaze of the invisible upon 
oneself.357  As an example, Marion uses the Markan account of the rich young man (Mk. 10:17-
22): the man kneels before Christ, exposing himself to Christ’s gaze, and beseeches his 
goodness.  The “counter-gaze of [Christ]... constitutes ... its witness.... ‘Jesus gazed upon him 
and loved him’... instituting what [He] gazes upon.  The gaze recognizes, establishes, and 
individualizes ... this electing gaze does not objectify or reify since it ends up loving.”358  By 
receiving the counter-gaze which bestows an election, we enter upon the greatest possibility of 
‘encounter,’ love. 
3.2.4.  Encounter Between L’adonnés: The ‘Erotic Reduction’ 
Having recast the subject as l’adonné through the reduction to givenness, a related topic 
emerges: encounter between persons, between l’adonnés.  In what he calls the ‘radicalized’ form 
of the reduction to givenness, Marion examines the ‘erotic reduction:’ “an intrigue of one gifted 
                                                                                                                                                       
Hereafter DAE.  Nonetheless, Marion claims to proceed beyond Lévinas’ ethical reduction to the reduction to 
givenness. 
355 Cf. Marion, GR, 64-65.  For more on anamorphosis, cf. Marion, BG, 123-139. 
356 Cf. Marion, IE, 44-53. 
357 Marion, SP, 211.  The Christian as ‘witness’ who testifies: cf. Acts 1:8; Jn. 1:32-36; 19:35-36; 20:2, 30-31; 
21:24-25; 1 Jn. 1:1-4; et al. 
358 Marion, BG, 240-241. 
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with another gifted defines exactly the space of the erotic reduction.”359  We first examine 
Marion’s phenomenology of encounter between human beings, then his close reading of 
Augustine’s Confessions for a phenomenology of encounter between God and human beings 
(3.2.5.)   
Unlike the modern notion of an autonomous subject, Marion claims that with l’adonné 
(the gifted), “defined as he who receives and receives himself from the given,”360 the 
philosophical difficulties of ‘intersubjectivity’ are bypassed.  Just as the subject-object 
dichotomy is overcome through the phenomenology of givenness, so now genuine encounter is 
possible since l’adonné “can receive ... the paradox classified as icon, the face.... To receive the 
Other ... no obstacle stands between the Other and the gifted.”361  First, the Other is truly given 
‘as Other’ (what shows itself gives itself).  Second, the Other is truly received because, along 
with the gift of the Other, l’adonné’s genuine selfhood (as l’adonné) is received from the Other.  
Third, each face appears as an icon which paradoxically and absolutely saturates the category of 
relation with one another.  An encounter is no longer a matter of ‘intersubjectivity’ or 
‘interobjectivity’ but “intergivenness.... it is a case of one gifted giving itself to another 
gifted.”362  This ‘space’ of encounter is the realm of the ‘erotic reduction.’    
 This transition within philosophy beyond mere sense-data phenomena to experiences of 
encounter and love is critical: it crosses a threshold between the vanity of mere being or 
existence and the (potential) ecstatic joy of loving.  As Marion states, it restores love as a true 
philosophical concept, transcending ‘the order of reason’ to ‘the order of charity’s’ (Pascal) 
                                               
359 Marion, BG, xi (2012 Preface).  The erotic reduction “is not added to the third reduction (the given), nor is it 
confused with it; it radicalizes it by leading it to its utmost possibility.”  Christina Gschwandtner calls the erotic 
reduction “a reduction where everything but the desire for love is bracketed.”  Gschwandtner, MT, 90. 
360 Ibid., 322. 
361 Ibid. 
362 Ibid.  Emphasis added.  
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“erotic rationality.”363  Ultimately, only the lover -- who is l’adonné -- understands “love’s 
paradoxical logic;”364 therefore, “The lover is thus opposed to the cogitant.”365  Marion traces 
this phenomenal revelation of love and its paradoxical logic through a series of questions.  This 
section (3.2.4.) follows Marion’s ‘stages of development’ of love from the initial implicit desire 
for it to the decision to initiate love toward others.  In the process Marion captures in compelling 
form the greatest human concerns, which do not ask about mere existence but the essence of 
living life meaningfully.  This dissertation will later (3.4 below) employ these insights toward 
understanding the Eucharist as a ‘gift of desire.’  
3.2.4.1.  ‘What’s the Use?’: Experience of Vanity 
 Modernity, having been shaped by its notion of the self as an autonomous subject, has 
been misguided in its concern for pure certainty concerning being and existence.  In his 
Discourse on Method (1637) Descartes set out, by means of epistemological doubt, to arrive at 
absolute certainty of knowledge; his famous declaration ‘cogito ergo sum’ (‘I think, therefore I 
am’) assured the certainty of one’s existence.  In The Erotic Phenomenon, Marion wants to 
change the starting point of inquiry toward something more fundamental and important than 
existence.366  Certainty of one’s existence, asserts Marion, is insufficient for living, for such 
certainty is rendered meaningless by the mere question, ‘What’s the use?’367  So what if one is 
certain of one’s own existence: such certainty does not give life meaning, vitality, or joy against 
the waves of vanity and absurdity that we encounter.  Certainty of one’s existence only puts the 
self on par with mere objects: it gives no direction, purpose, or meaning to life which might 
                                               
363 Jean-Luc Marion, The Erotic Phenomenon, trans. Stephen E. Lewis (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
2007), 5.  Originally published as Le phénomène erotique, Éditions Grasset & Fasquelle, 2003.  Hereafter EP. 
364 Ibid., 69. 
365 Ibid., 28.  
366 While Marion has a discussion of vanity in chapter 4 of GWB, his use of existential questions in EP provides a 
more concise and more helpful presentation.  
367 Cf. Marion, EP, §2, 16-19. 
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withstand ennui, vanity, melancholy, or boredom.  Something more meaningful than 
metaphysical certainty of existence is demanded by human life against this nihilistic question, 
‘What’s the use?’   
3.2.4.2.  ‘Does anybody out there love me?’: Dependence on ‘From Elsewhere’ 
 In order to discover this meaningful certainty against vanity, “it is no longer a question of 
obtaining a certainty of being, but instead the response to another question—‘Does anybody love 
me?’”368  Unlike scientific paradigms which reduce phenomena to objects whose existence 
(whether personal or objective) can be verified, Marion’s question accomplishes an ‘erotic 
reduction’ (an intensified version of the reduction to givenness), which examines life and the 
world under the standard of love.  It requires a different sort of certainty, which Marion calls 
‘assurance’: “I must discover myself as a given (and gifted) phenomenon, assured as a given that 
is free from vanity.”369  Only assurance of oneself as loved, as a ‘given and gifted’ phenomenon, 
can overcome the threats of meaninglessness.   
 However, this love must also come “from elsewhere (d’ailleurs),” not oneself, as an 
event: “I am, not by being ... but insofar as I am loved.”370  Only such a “radical event” from 
‘outside the self’ which “determines originarily that which I am by that for whom (or for which) 
I am.... according to the advent from elsewhere.... [S]omeone wills me from elsewhere” rescues 
from vanity.371  We demand recognition by an other who recognizes me personally, and in such a 
way that we know it.  This demand, however, Marion considers misguided, as it is inevitably 
frustrated.  Marion says we must surrender the desire to be loved, and simply learn that loving 
others is the only ‘assurance of love’ readily available to us.   
                                               
368 Marion, EP, 21. 
369 Ibid., 22.  
370 Ibid., 23. 
371 Ibid., 24-25.    
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The attempt to claim or provide sufficient love of self by oneself is illusory: it requires 
more than one can give oneself.  “To the question ‘Does anyone love me?’ ... only the excess that 
surprises and surpasses would suffice.  Thus, to love myself, I would have to go beyond myself 
...  I would demand of myself an excess of myself over myself.  But who can add one cubit to his 
stature?”372  Assurance that is not ‘excessive’ -- in other words, beyond mere reciprocity or 
‘market exchange’ -- is no assurance at all.   
Upon looking inward for assurance, there arises recognition “I become a lack to myself.... 
I am neither the principle, nor at the origin, of myself.”373  A difficulty arises in that “love of self 
can indeed be proclaimed, but it cannot be performed.”374  Awareness of this insufficiency -- 
even denial of it through claims of self-love -- only arouses self-hatred.375  So the true nature of 
the self -- decentered, incapable of self-love, not autonomous -- is quite different from our 
common ‘experience of self.’  Marion’s notion of a non-egoic notion of self is hardly academic, 
however: it proves essential for escape from the conundrum of the need for love.   
3.2.4.3.  ‘Can I love first?’: Decision to Become a Lover 
 The illusion of the ego exacerbates the problem: for “the ego ... is completely ignorant of 
love’s paradoxical logic; it knows little about the lover within that it has not yet liberated; it only 
reads love as the expectation of and demand for an assurance at a reasonable price.”376  In other 
words, the ego is thoroughly trapped and enmeshed in reciprocal or market exchange logic: the 
ego expects, demands, and negotiates in the interest of self-preservation -- all of which tend to 
                                               
372 Marion, EP, 46.  
373 Ibid., 42.   
374 Ibid., 44.  Only by experiencing oneself as beloved (by another) and as lover can ‘I’ “thus legitimately love 
myself....  I love myself mediately, or rather I cease to hate myself through the other’s mediation, and not through 
myself.... Loving oneself henceforward signifies that insofar as I discover myself to be a lover, and thus lovable, I 
will be able to end up by loving even myself -- I will be able to end up pardoning even myself, last of all, which is 
akin to pardoning the lowliest of all those lovable, the one who is most difficult to love.” Ibid., 213.   
375 Cf. Ibid., 54.  
376 Ibid., 69.     
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become corrosive of loving relationship.  The true ‘self’ is not a single united entity, and the 
attempt to preserve the self (as it normally appears, as the ego) is vain.  The chief obstacle 
consists in reciprocity itself: the demand that one be sufficiently loved before ‘expending’ 
oneself in love, the demand for a calculated profit from the bargain.   
Trapped in reciprocal logic, “love ... remained prisoner to the iron law of reciprocity;”377 
the solution therefore lies beyond reciprocity.  It is in a realm of excess which “poses the 
question of love without, however, submitting it to the prior condition of reciprocity, and thus of 
justice; that is to say, one that does not presuppose that assurance happens first for me.”378  A 
liberation of love from reciprocity -- including the desire to be loved -- is necessary.  For Marion, 
genuine loving goes much farther than reciprocity: it involves an excess of love for the other, 
which paradoxically supplies the lover’s self with the simple assurance of loving.   
 Marion claims this event of liberation issues “from me deep within an elsewhere that is 
more inward to me than me myself, preceded or validated by no assurance at all.”379  Appearing 
quite suddenly, Marion does not describe more of this ‘elsewhere’ which is ‘within’ a person in 
The Erotic Phenomenon.380  We can only surmise something more of it from his later text In the 
Self’s Place: The Approach of Saint Augustine.381  For Augustine, melius quod interius -- ‘the 
better is the more interior.’382  Augustine also confesses of God that “you were more interior [to 
                                               
377 Marion, EP, 70. 
378 Ibid. 
379 Ibid., 70-71.  
380 The frequent allusions and affinity in The Erotic Phenomenon (published in French in 2003) -- without any 
mention of Augustine’s name -- to Augustinian thought was noted by scholars before Marion wrote In the Self’s 
Place in 2008.  Cf. Eoin Cassidy, “Le phénomène érotique : Augustinian Resonances in Marion’s Phenomenology 
of Love,” in Givenness and God: Questions of Jean-Luc Marion, eds. Eoin Cassidy and Ian Leask, Perspectives in 
Continental Philosophy (New York: Fordham, 2005), 201-219.  In his foreword to In the Self’s Place, Marion twice 
cites lectures on Augustine given in 2004 as the origin of the text.  Cf. Marion, ISP, xiii-xiv. 
381 Marion wrote EP in 2003, ISP in 2008. 
382 Cf. Confessions X, 6, 9, 14, 156; Marion, ISP, 97. 
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me] than what is most inward in me and higher than the most high in me.”383  Putting Marion’s 
(and Augustine’s) texts together in this way, it appears Marion describes what theology would 
call an interior moment of grace -- albeit reduced from whatever could have mediated its 
arising.384  Since The Erotic Phenomenon is written as a philosophical discussion of love, Marion 
is being careful to stay strictly within the limits of phenomenology, which can speak of 
givenness but not of grace in a theological sense, which posits a divine Giver and Gift.  Perhaps, 
having already been criticized for ‘smuggling in’ a divine giver in his previous 
phenomenological work, Marion omits any explicit reference to God here, though he does at the 
end of The Erotic Phenomenon.  Marion acknowledges God as the giver of love to all; any 
connection to God stirring the soul ‘from elsewhere’ toward loving is left implied.  While 
attribution of this moment to grace is not so problematic within a theological investigation (such 
as here), it exemplifies a philosophical problem raised by Marion’s critics.  Furthermore, by 
itself Marion’s assertion -- cryptic, mysterious, and working ‘ex machina’ even with the help of 
the Augustinian texts -- implies people are readily as keenly aware of their thoughts, desires, and 
questioning as Augustine.  Yet how many people in history have persevered as successfully as 
Augustine did in such pursuit of interior clarity and truth?   
According to Marion, love’s liberation from reciprocity -- a crucial step -- arises when 
one asks “‘Can I love first?’ ... which means, to behave like a lover who gives himself, rather 
than like one who is loved tit for tat.”385  While appearing from an ‘elsewhere’ that arises ‘from 
                                               
383 Marion, ISP, 97.  Cf. Confessions III, 6, 11, 13, 382.  Interestingly, Bret Saunders cites this Augustinian passage 
as used by Marion to denote distance. 
384 EP concludes with the realization that God is the first and last lover, whose revelation of Godself as love serves 
as the paradigm of ‘the lover’s advance.’  Cf. Marion, EP, 221-222. 
385 Marion, EP, 70-71.  Strangely, Marion neither accounts for nor mentions the possibility of an external mediation 
(e.g. by dialogue with others) of the question (‘Can I love first?’) which allows an escape from vanity and 
reciprocity.  By itself, Marion’s attribution of this question’s arising to an exclusively interior movement of grace 
can create problematic notions: either that one can (and ought to) discover it with enough introspection, or of a 
‘predestination’ of those able to ask it and those unable.  An exploration of how the witness of the Church can (and 
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within,’ the assurance a lover used to seek from others is provided by the lover’s own decision to 
love others -- “which is enough.  The lover finds an absolute assurance in love—not the 
assurance of being, nor of being loved, but that of loving.”386  The threshold of loving is the 
threshold of genuine ‘selfhood,’ genuine living: “I do not become myself when I simply think, 
doubt, or imagine, because others can think my thoughts ... ; nor do I become myself when I will, 
desire, or hope.... But I become myself definitively each time and for as long as I, as lover, can 
love first.”387  The previous demands -- to receive love first, and that my love be reciprocated -- 
are forsaken; concern for the beloved exceeds concern for oneself.   
The radically creative nature of love appears in light of the lover’s initiative: “in loving 
without reciprocity, the lover loves without reason;” just as war breaks out without good reason, 
“the lover.... declares his love ... without any reason.... The lover thus renders the beloved 
possible.”388  Marion calls this radical decision to love ‘the principle of insufficient reason,’ not 
because it lacks a rationale but because of “a failure of reason itself to give reasons for the 
initiative to love.”389  Reason, held captive by a logic of exchange and reciprocity, cannot 
conceive or imagine the paradoxical logic of charity which liberates the self.   
 Other stages follow in Marion’s account of the erotic phenomenon (oaths, the flesh, 
witness) culminating in yielding to God in an adieu: à Dieu.  Vowing one’s future and flesh for 
the good of the Other, a lover offers all one’s time and person in the vulnerable space of self-
abandoning love.  The final movement of yielding to God is an important one for expressing a 
decisive moment of self-abandoning love, especially as it clearly implies relation toward an 
Other.  Marion’s text concludes by acknowledging God as the first and perfect lover of all.   
                                                                                                                                                       
ought to) mediate the possibility for oneself of ‘initiating’ (actually, responding to God’s) love would be a helpful 
corrective.   
386 Marion, EP, 74. 
387 Ibid., 76.  
388 Ibid., 79, 85. 
389 Ibid., 79.  
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 In The Erotic Phenomenon Marion points out the self-awareness and decisions required 
to become a lover.  These stages are compelling both descriptively and prescriptively: they can 
guide people toward a mature approach to living and loving.  Certain features of the liturgy of 
the Eucharist can serve as catalysts for growth into this approach when understood in this light, 
shaping desires toward decision to become a lover.   
3.2.5.  Encounter of the Desire of L’adonné with God 
Marion admits he is “not so optimistic about desire as some are;” his comments on desire 
are sparse, even in a text on love such as The Erotic Phenomenon.390  Marion may also be 
suspicious of desire as an obstacle to ‘receiving what is given’ as it is, since desires can confine 
phenomena to the wishes or logic of the recipient and create idols (in the phenomenological 
sense).  Despite the limitations he sees in regarding desire and the minor role it plays in his 
thought, his commentary on desire (particularly in a close reading of Augustine’s Confessions) 
offers profound insight into the divine-human encounter.  While Marion does not directly relate 
desire to the Eucharist, this material will contribute significantly to the relational Eucharistic 
theology I am proposing. 
3.2.5.1.  Qualifying Desire 
To frame Marion’s analysis of desire properly, we first note four qualifications he places 
on desire.391  First, desire is more fundamental and more encompassing than even the ‘desire to 
know’ of which Aristotle speaks: “Desire is prior to the philosophical intention to know and has 
to be taken seriously as such.”392  The (mere) desire to know imposes a ‘logic of the Same,’ the 
will to power seeking to dominate by means of knowledge; thus Marion says that to discuss 
                                               
390 Kearney, “Dialogue,” 20.   
391 Cf. Alvis, MDGD, 79-96. 
392 Kearney, “Dialogue,” 20.   
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desire “we have to get rid of the horizon of Being” and look further.393  Desire, rather, must be 
re-thought according to the primacy of givenness (namely, love) over all else.  A second 
insufficient notion of desire is mere biological need: such desire is based on lack, destroyed by 
excess, and does not survive its fulfillment.  Third, Marion also finds desire problematic since it 
can unwittingly distort clear thought and provoke a refusal of phenomena ‘as they give 
themselves’ on their own terms.  For instance, humans’ desire for permanence is often projected 
onto God as a concept of God’s eternal and unchanging nature; desire can therefore lead to 
idolatrous notions.  Fourthly, desire is something far greater than what psychoanalysis deems it, 
an unconscious drive.  With these qualifications in mind, we proceed to Marion’s commentary 
on desire as it relates toward God. 
Positively, the desire of which Marion speaks in a specialized sense is a spiritual rather 
than biological desire.  Marion refers to Gregory of Nyssa’s On the Song of Songs for its proper 
articulation.  The desire operative here is a “non-biological, non-ontical desire, which is not 
based on lack... the more it is fulfilled, the more there is a rebirth of desire, without end.... [It] is 
nourished by excess, not destroyed by it.”394  Given scriptural warrant in Saint Paul (Phil. 3:12-
14), it is a constant spiritual ‘striving’ (epektasis) toward God.395  Rather than vanishing with its 
fulfillment, desire as epektasis is “an infinite movement from fulfillment to renewal of desire, in 
which the capacity for God is constantly enlarged or dilated according to the measureless 
                                               
393 Ibid. 
394 Cf. Ibid., 21.  “So there is a real equivocity about concepts like will, desire, and so on.  And that equivocity is 
further evidence that there really is some limitation to metaphysics.” 
395 Phil. 3:12-14: ‘Not that I have already obtained this [that is, resurrection from the dead] or am already perfect; 
but I press on to make it my own, because Christ Jesus has made me his own.  Brethren, I do not consider that I have 
made it my own; but one thing I do, forgetting what lies behind and straining forward [epekteinomenos] to what lies 
ahead, I press on toward the goal for the prize of the upward call of God in Christ Jesus.’  Cf. Stephen E. Lewis, 
“The Lover’s Capacity in Jean-Luc Marion’s The Erotic Phenomenon,” in Quaestiones Disputatae, ed. John R. 
White, 1:1 (Fall 2010), 239.  Hereafter “Lover’s Capacity.”  Marion also refers to epektasis in a discussion of the 
Eucharist’s temporal orientation toward the future in GWB, 173-176, 181. 
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measure of ‘He who comes.’”396  This desire is fulfilled in eternal beatitude, “where each 
fulfillment is a new arche, without end.”397  Eternal beatitude fulfills a desire, not for 
‘possession’ of an object or an Other, but for participation in living communion which 
nonetheless includes and maintains distance.   
3.2.5.2.  Desire for God: Gift of Being Drawn in Love  
Marion presents desire in light of revelation in Givenness and Revelation, beginning with 
Augustine’s gloss on John 6:44 (‘No one can come to me unless the Father who sent me draws 
him’).  Since divine revelation sets the context for discussion, desire serves a positive function, 
the desire for God.  Building on Augustine’s notion that “revelation itself is what draws” the soul 
to God (Ista attractio, ipsa est revelatio) and that God satisfies the hunger for righteousness (cf. 
Mt. 5:6), Marion concludes that “A desire, then, that is, a will, is indeed necessary if God is to 
fill it.”398  So desire is indicative of a certain lack, but only because divine excess keeps 
expanding l’adonné’s capacity for God.  Desire is operative in the experience of faith in God, in 
that the divine excess of love, goodness, and truth prompts a more eager desire and still-greater 
fulfillment.  
Marion characterizes desire and love for God as primarily passive experiences of ‘being 
drawn:’ quoting Augustine, “‘The soul is drawn [to God] also by love – trahitur animus et 
amore.’”399  The soul is drawn to God “very little through my will;” Marion says that “I am 
drawn ... instead and above all through the desire for my pleasure (‘parum est voluntate, etiam 
voluptate traheris’).”400  Therefore, Marion concludes, “Not only are we permitted (licet), but we 
                                               
396 Lewis, “Lover’s Capacity,” 239.  Emphasis added.  Cf. Jean-Luc Marion, “De quoi l’ego est-il capable?  
Divinisation et domination: capable/capax,” in Questions cartésiennes I: Méthode et métaphysique (Paris: Presses 
universitaires de France, 1991), 138.  Hereafter QCI.   Cf. Lewis, “Lover’s Capacity,” 239. 
397 Kearney, “Dialogue,” 21. 
398 Marion, GR, 39.  Cf. St. Augustine, Tractates 11-27, 264.   
399 Tractates 11-27, 262.  Translation modified by Marion. 
400 St. Augustine, Tractates 11-27, 262.  Emphasis added. 
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must (debemus) admit that we are ‘drawn,’ swept along, pulled by the desire for pleasure when 
we love.”401  The natural human desire for pleasure acts as a hook by which God draws people to 
Himself.  Here Marion’s understanding of love -- which dominates his notion of revelation, if not 
founds his phenomenology of givenness -- and human desire are linked. 
For Marion this link concerns “nothing less than the logic of love: ‘Amando trahitur— 
By loving, one is drawn.’”402  Again the self is not an autonomous subject exerting its will (to 
power) to ‘move toward God,’ but one who yields to the gift of being drawn.  More precisely, 
“the spreading of this attraction into hearts (through the Holy Spirit) must be understood as what 
is proper to God in loving and causing love.”403  This experience of ‘being drawn’ to God by 
love through the human desire for pleasure occurs at the prompting of the Holy Spirit (cf. Rom. 
5:5) which fills the will or desire. 
 The love and desire for God converge in the decision for faith -- itself a relation amid a 
certain distance from God, a situation of lack.  The autonomous subject never ‘generates’ its own 
movement toward God, but rather love, desire, and faith are received as gifts: “We will [belief in 
God] only when we love that which we desire; and in the case of God, we receive this desire 
(desire for pleasure) from God alone: ‘A person is drawn to Christ who is given the gift to 
believe in Christ. … Unless this power is given by God, it cannot arise from free choice, because 
it will not be free ... if the deliverer has not set it free.’”404  Thus desire, love, faith, the action of 
the Holy Spirit, and gift all intertwine: the believing self -- l’adonné -- has yielded to a gift of 
desire for God it has received from God.  The gift of divine revelation also allows the natural 
                                               
401 St. Augustine, Tractates 11-27, 262. 
Marion, Givenness and Revelation, 60. 
402 Marion, GR, 40.  Cf. Tractates 11-27, 264.  Translation modified by Marion. 
403 Ibid. 
404 Ibid., 41.  Emphasis added.   
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desire for God to know what it already loves and seeks, circumventing the need to perceive and 
know prior to loving.   
3.2.5.3.  Reading Augustine’s Confessions on Desire 
To observe the dynamics of desire within the erotic reduction, we turn to Marion’s 
reading of the Confessions of Saint Augustine of Hippo.  Marion analyzes the encounter of God, 
who is both the fulfillment of desire for the vita beata and the fullness of truth, with a human 
being who undergoes an ‘ordeal of the self.’  While desire remains a minor topic amid Marion’s 
oeuvre, I will employ this sustained treatment of it in In the Self’s Place as an important 
contribution toward a relational Eucharistic theology.405   
In his Confessions, Augustine sets out to answer the ‘great question’ he ‘became’ to 
himself (‘Factus eram mihi magna quaestio’).406  Intellect and memory prove insufficient to 
answer Augustine’s question, but study of desire offers a fuller self-understanding.  This section 
will explore the dynamics of desire Marion finds in Augustine’s Confessions in detail, as it 
radically challenges the common-sense notion of the self and (therefore) of how to live.   
 The fact of desire is self-evident; the question of its origin is not.  The modern/Cartesian 
(and Nietzschean) notion considers the egoic self as the origin of desire, but according to Marion 
this is quite false (as noted above).  Rather, Marion asserts, desire acts upon and within me, but 
not as ‘my own’ possession or accomplishment; it is known but not comprehended.407  The ‘self’ 
is passive in view of desire, which acts upon the self and is not under the domain of the self.  
Initiative per se belongs to the desire, not the self.  Arising from beyond the self, desire makes a 
profound claim on a person.  Extrinsic as desire’s origin and goal may be, it reveals something 
                                               
405 Cf. Jean-Luc Marion, In the Self’s Place: The Approach of Saint Augustine, trans. Jeffrey L. Kosky, Cultural 
Memory in the Present, eds. Mieke Bal and Hent de Vries (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2012), 44.  
Hereafter ISP. 
406 Cf. Augustine, Confessions, IV, 1,9,13,422.  Marion, ISP, 44.   
407 Cf. Marion, ISP, 83.  Girard will likewise attribute the origin of desire as arising ‘from outside’ the self, but as 
the result of imitation (‘mimesis’) of others’ desires. 
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crucial: desire “is something I receive and respond to in person, as such.  My desire—or more 
exactly, that to which I respond and commit myself—knows better who I am than my 
(intentional) thought ever will.”408  Desire -- and its claim on what I want, therefore on my life -- 
is received as a gift: it too manifests itself as a given, to l’adonné.  It orients me to my ipseity 
and calls for a response.  Against the modern/Cartesian notion of desire as the product of an ego 
or will, Marion recognizes desire is a gift from an ‘other.’   
 What do people desire most?  The vita beata: the happy life, blessed life.  All desire it, 
even if it is unattainable in this life.  This universal desire is primarily present to us in neither 
concepts nor intellection but in the “memoria.... The desire for the happy life ... inhabits us like 
the immemorial... in and through our desiring.”409  All have this inherent desire for the vita 
beata.  This requires we refashion our notion of the self: “the ego must now be recognized as 
[one] who originally desires ... more originally than as cogitans, it is put in play as amans, lover.  
And, for the lover, the question ... consists in deciding ... what [one] loves.”410  Love and desire 
are thereby related to one another.  The self is constituted according to this desiring:  
I am, certainly, but inasmuch as I love (and desire the vita beata).  The lover loves so radically 
that loving decides everything about himself and first of all his being.  Accordingly, to reach 
himself, he does not have to master an ousia ... but reach what he loves; and to know himself, 
he does not have to be preoccupied with knowing himself but with knowing (or at least 
identifying) what truly is decisive for himself—namely, what he loves in truth.411  
 
Loving, therefore, is the proper response to the immemorial gift of desire for the vita beata.  
What -- or rather, whom -- one loves is thus more decisive, more determinative of the self than 
either one’s being or what one thinks: “desire for the blessed life ... thus turns out to be the 
                                               
408 Ibid., 84.  Emphasis added.   
409 Ibid., 87. 
410 Ibid., 96.    
411 Marion, ISP, 96.   
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principle of the search, more radically than I myself.”412  Marion’s reading of the principle of 
desire in Augustine’s Confessions unveils a path for us to the true self to which neither scientific 
knowledge nor impersonal metaphysics offers access.  In so many words, ‘Where your treasure 
is, there your heart will be also’ (Mt. 6:21; Lk. 12:34).  
 Desire ‘possesses us’ more than we ‘possess’ or control desire; it also identifies us more 
than we identify what we desire, ‘locating’ part of the self elsewhere.  Furthermore, desire is not 
so much a substance as a lack, an absence of what (or whom) one desires.  The relation between 
desire and love is brought to light by Marion through desire’s lack:  
[N]othing belongs to me more than that which I desire, for that is what I lack; that 
which I lack defines me more intimately than everything that I possess .... And, more 
than anything, the lover only desires the one ... who decided him, the lover, to desire; 
for desire ... is born in the lover just this side of explanations and of justifications.... 
Born of the pure lack of the other, the lover’s desire affects him without his truly 
knowing why.... I become myself ... when I discover and finally admit the one that I 
desire; that one alone shows me my most secret center—that which I lacked and still 
lack....  My desire speaks me to myself.413  
 
Desire manifests something of my fuller, true self as l’adonné to myself.  It also implies a 
relation to an Other -- the Giver of the vita beata -- to which we must pay attention.414   
Desire arises when an object is located at a distance from me, and operates by virtue of 
lack (distance and absence).  It was precisely such lack, distance from, and absence of the ‘full’ 
self and the vita beata that prompted Augustine’s magna quaestio of the self.  The manifestation 
of an object or person as a good at some distance from me sparks desire.  Furthermore, we see 
how admitting what one desires -- confessing both the object of desire and my lack of it -- plays 
                                               
412 Ibid., 101.  
413 Marion, EP, 108. 
414 This technical sense of ‘relation’ that desire implies is not to be confused with the common notion of 
interpersonal relationship (such as a friendship).  Marion writes extensively about how lovers approach or 
encounter one another, but largely in a fleeting manner that needs constant maintenance (as a loving relationship 
would cease if one or the other people cease loving).  Further comment on the absence of relationship (beyond such 
fleeting moments) in Marion will come later in this chapter.  
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into awareness of one’s true self.  Contrary to what one might expect, I do not ‘acquire’ or come 
to possess ‘the rest of myself’ like any other object; instead, the self is radically challenged to 
become like the gift it receives, existentially.  As desire ‘speaks’ -- ‘calls’ -- to me (l’adonné), 
my proper response is a confession of its ‘taking possession’ of me through a kind of obedience 
to what gives itself: the gift of desire for the vita beata.  A response of loving (without seeking 
reciprocity) brings about and expresses a transformation according to ‘what gives itself,’ which 
was from the first a gift of love, from the one who loved us first, God.  The ego-driven and self-
asserting ‘I’ is distended, expanding into a true self that abides in loving rather than mere 
biological life.   
As desired yet not attained, the true self is at a distance from the egoic self, not as a 
spatial distance, but an ‘interior distance’: “The distance from the ego to the self’s place opens 
inside the self, not toward the exterior, for this interior alone opens onto what the lover loves.”415  
In one’s ‘interior,’ God, who is ‘more interior to me than my own self,’ appears (interior intimo 
meo -- Confessions, III, 6, 11, 13, 382).  Within this interior realm converge desire, the vita 
beata, God, the place of the self, and the distance between myself and that place: “If God 
occupies ... the place of the vita beata, therefore the place of my desire, then he ... reveals my 
final and originary place.... that becomes my self more interior to me than my private ego.... God 
appears as the place of self that I want and have to become.”416  For Marion this exposes the lie 
of the modern egoic/autonomous self; the ‘self’ is not (strictly speaking) one’s ‘own.’   
Instead, God is revealed as ‘the place of self,’ issuing a call by means of desire for this 
true self over one’s private ego.  ‘What I love’ elicits an existential call, raising a question of the 
self I am called to become.  Again, this call gives itself to me from a distance: “And thus I am 
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not from myself nor in myself because I am ... what I love.... The cogito, sum is carried away 
toward the interior intimo meo.417  In fact ... I happen upon and to myself: ‘Here [in memory, in 
the immemorial] I happen upon myself, and I am recalled [to myself].”418  The true self thus 
appears to me by means of desire as its own phenomenon, which ‘happens’ to its recipient, the 
gifted (l’adonné), the dative ‘me.’  The vita beata I desire above all else, the true self, ‘happens 
to me’ as the gift of God, arriving from a ‘distance.’  All this goes against the Cartesian notion of 
the self and changes the true nature of living: “I am not when and each time that I decide to be by 
deciding to think.  I am each time that, as lover and as gifted, I let the immemorial come over me, 
as a life that does not belong to me and ... inhabits me more intimately than myself.”419  Rather 
than ‘possessing certainty’ of oneself, the true self lives by loving without possessing, receiving 
its self and life as gifts.   
So together, anamorphosis and desire (especially as ‘lack’) ‘decenter’ the ‘location’ of 
the self: they reveal aspects of the self beyond one’s own powers or comprehension.  Receptivity 
and the influence of desire must qualify our notion of the self; they set the person toward a fuller 
truth.  The fulfillment the self seeks, however, can only occur through encounter with truth, 
which “has its own rigor and imposes its own demands.... [It] imposes a cost upon those who 
would receive and fulfill it.”420  The vita beata can be received only by one ready to accept truth 
on its own terms, namely, God’s terms.  For God is not only ‘Goodness’ beyond all thought and 
‘cause’ of the vita beata, but “‘highest and more inward truth’ (summa et interior veritas).”421 To 
attain the vita beata requires remaining in the presence of God’s truth and all it illuminates, by 
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418 Confessiones X, 8, 14, 14, 166.  Cf. Ibid.  
419 Ibid., 100.  Emphasis added.  Marion’s exploration of memoria by way of ‘the immemorial’ in Augustine is 
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confessing God’s transcendence and our own sinfulness.  However, we struggle to accept or 
enjoy the truth because it reveals our nature as creatures (not autonomous gods unto ourselves) 
and of our self-inflicted deformity: sin.  “The joining of beatitude and truth—which, in fact, 
demands nothing less than God—becomes the knot and the nut of desire” -- because beatitude 
cannot be separated from truth.422  The true goal of desire makes stern claims upon those who 
desire it. 
To desire vita beata without accepting its terms of confession of the truth (of God’s 
transcendence and one’s own sin) places the self in a conflicted condition, a state of self-
contradiction: “what truth puts into evidence is imposed with such power, that [one] who should 
receive it can also, sometimes or even most often, not be sufficient for it.”423  The 
phenomenology of this manifestation -- this advent -- of the vita beata paired with truth is 
described below.   
 What began as ‘aiming’ oneself toward the ‘incomprehensible’ God through prayer 
becomes a matter of receiving a scandalous truth along with the gift of the vita beata: If the 
happiness I desire will be not mere fantasy but true, not temporary but eternal, it will be possible 
only by abiding in the full truth of God.  However, the revelation of truth about ourselves, as 
creatures and as sinners, is difficult for the ego to bear.  The divine mysterium tremendum et 
fascinans not only attracts but repels -- an aspect often overlooked.  This unity of beatitude and 
truth (‘the knot and the nut of desire’) is hardly pure bliss for human beings to receive; it also 
scandalizes in that it calls ourselves into question, demands an account from us, demands a 
decision about oneself with no chance to avoid it.  Truth’s excess demands a person decide in 
only one of two possible ways: “either by the ordeal of bearing its excess ... finding himself 
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affected, modified, altered; or [conversely] by dodging this excess, at the price of a retreat before 
the evidence, of a retreat far from the true.”424  The gift of truth provokes and scandalizes by 
forcing a decision that has ultimate consequences for its recipient; the decision concerns one’s 
relation to the truth that is also beatitude.  This decision, however, necessarily concerns one’s 
entire self; for this reason it is also a decision about which one cannot remain indifferent.   
Divine truth thus provokes a crisis: it compels a person to decide toward love or hatred of 
truth; concurrently this decision inflicts a judgment upon oneself.  The alternatives are either 
(and only) acceptance of the truth or “rejection ... which does not lead to extinguishing or 
obfuscating [truth] ... but only to attempting not to see it ... attempting not to see oneself 
illuminated by it; ... hiding from oneself the fact that one cannot hide from it.”425  This is the 
threshold between scientific truth (knowledge ‘about’ things) and existential truth.  As a result, 
Marion notes, the “contrary of truth is not found simply in error or falsehood but in lying: 
wanting to keep, in addition to the true, the false, because one loves it as much as, indeed more 
than, the true.”426  Lying to oneself, by denying what the light of truth reveals about oneself, can 
even appear pleasing at first, since such denial provides temporarily relief for the wounded ego.  
Accepting the truth -- not merely about God, but of God and the self -- requires acceptance of the 
pain associated with being exposed by it: the pain experienced in the loss of lies one tells about 
and to oneself.  
 This is hardly a decision about mere evidence: it necessarily includes a decision by 
confession concerning oneself.  Refusal or acceptance of truth’s evidence entails a hatred or love 
of truth which changes the self; hence “Truth is no longer defined merely by the two values of 
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truth (the true and the false) but ultimately by the two effects (and two modes of attunement) 
produced in me by its evidence.”427  While perhaps a single encounter with truth becomes 
ultimately decisive for some people, for most such encounters and decisions concerning truth 
(and oneself) would occur across a personal history, even a lifetime.   
By refusal of the truth, recipients deceive themselves.  Piling up ‘objectively true’ 
evidence will do nothing to convince or change the recipient unless the recipient surrenders the 
egoic self and confesses the truth of God and the self.  The contrary of existential truth is found 
in lying to oneself, in “wanting to keep, in addition to the true, the false, because one loves it as 
much as, indeed more than, the true,”428 not simply in falsehood. 
 Before God’s saturating self-revelation -- particularly in Christ the Icon of the invisible 
God -- I discover at opposite ends: a) my true self in God’s truth, which is eternal life; and b) a 
false egoic self accused by the exposure of its sins and lies.  My decision boils down to bearing 
the truth or loving my false self: truth “obliges me to choose: either refuse the truth so as not to 
have to bear it and to remain what I now am, or accept it and make it incumbent on me to 
become other than what I now am.”429  
This existential decision for love and humility (or conversely, hatred and pride) before 
God also has epistemological consequences.  Truth is more readily knowable for the one who 
loves it, and hidden from one who hates it.  The one who loves the truth joins Augustine in his 
twofold confessio before God: confession of one’s own sins and confession of God’s praises.  
Those who hate the truth commit “the originary lie”: they want complete possession of the good 
for themselves and by themselves rather than by participation in God.430  The sin consists of 
                                               
427 Ibid., 110. 
428 Marion, ISP, 111-112. 
429 Marion, ISP, 119.  
430 Cf. Ibid., 122.  
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“appropriating [the beauty and truth of God] without receiving it, without having to pass through 
the reception of a gift.”431  As creatures distinct from God, our only participation in beauty, truth, 
goodness, or being is precisely by virtue of God -- they must be received as gifts, contingent as 
our own existence is: “the good evaporates precisely because it finds itself possessed, therefore 
finally lost.”432  The reality of the self as l’adonné -- gifted -- is fundamentally incompatible with 
an egoic self: this ordeal is resolved only by a decision between these two opposing realities.   
Unfortunately the will too often -- in fact, always -- proves insufficient to commit the self 
in deed to loving the good; one must ask God for the grace to do it.  The decision to love and do 
the truth “does not depend on [oneself], since it is about loving and loving must be received.  
Here a new principle intervenes: ‘Da quod jubes et jube quod vis’ (‘Grant what you command, 
and command what you will’).”433  Just as any participation in beauty and truth must be received 
as a gift and by participation in God’s beauty and truth, so God’s commands to love may only be 
fulfilled as gifts received from God: “I will not love because I will have decided; I will not 
decide, therefore, because I will have willed it but because I will receive it as a gift.”434  
Verification of this comes in times of temptation, when “the self learns if it loves what it 
received as a gift and if it loves this gift more than anything else.”435  In other words, reception 
of God’s gifts involves recognition of grace, its giver, and oneself as recipient -- who is in turn 
called to conform to this giving.  The very nature of this event, this phenomenon, as gift contains 
in turn the gift of the desire and freedom to conform to this gift -- that is, love -- ‘with all one’s 
heart, with all one’s soul, with all one’s strength, and all one’s mind’ (cf. Dt. 6:5): all one’s 
desire, life, even body and blood.   
                                               
431 Ibid., 123.  Emphases added. 
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Gradually, by way of receptivity and desire, the truth who alone fulfills our desire and 
selfhood comes to light.  This fulfillment comes with its own terms, namely confession of the 
truth about oneself and God.  Decisions about the gift of the vita beata, oneself, and relation to 
God all converge, as either receptivity or refusal of God’s gifts.  This dissertation will include 
this ‘ordeal of the self’ in its encounter with God as part of a fuller sense of what it means ‘to 
receive the Eucharist,’ as participants must recognize themselves as ‘not worthy that Christ 
should come under their roof’ and in need for the Lamb of God to take away sins.  Participants 
must reckon with receiving and communing with the Body and Blood of Christ, becoming more 
fully aware of living as a member of the ecclesial Body of Christ, and deciding to live according 
to either one’s own will or the call which declares ‘Do this in memory of me.’   
 By learning to see oneself from the point of view of God-who-is-love (by means of 
accepting the gift of His Word) one eventually -- in the end, according to Marion -- learns of 
oneself as loveable.  This is learned not for the sake of reinforcing one’s ego or self-image but in 
order to liberate the self from egoic self-concern.  “In fact, the real issue is to abandon [the egoic] 
point of view ... in order to see oneself as God alone sees us: as lovable, however deformed we 
might have let ourselves become.”436  The word of the God-who-is-love bestows the possibility 
for a person to love oneself, in a sort of interruption.  Proper love of self itself becomes a gift 
bestowed through the mediation of God and others: “I discover myself lovable through the 
other’s grace; ... because ... the other convinced me ... that I am worth it.  I love myself mediately, 
or rather I cease to hate myself through the other’s mediation.”437  While God loves us first, 
perfectly, and always, the mediation of others plays an essential role in opening the way to a 
                                               
436 Marion, ISP, 44. 
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proper (i.e., non-egoic) love for oneself.  The potential role of the human community and its 
capacity to mediate God’s love ought not be overlooked.   
Through Marion’s reading of Augustine, we learn that the encounter of the gift of God 
with our desire for beatitude includes revelation of our distance from God.  Both as creatures and 
as sinners, every encounter with the true God compels either confession of truth (our sins, and 
praise of God) or lying to ourselves and God (attempting to hide from truth).  Our self-
understanding is challenged as we discover the ‘place’ of the true self is in God, not in our egoic 
or autonomous selves.  This also challenges our relation to others, for whom we are suddenly 
responsible.  The divine gift awakens us to our distance from God, ourselves, and others -- but it 
also bestows precisely what traverses these distances: the gift of agapic love.   
3.3  Critical Reception of Marion’s Contributions 
 In the following sections I will first offer my own observations about Marion’s 
contributions to Eucharistic theology as well as offer some critiques.  Then following Marion’s 
impact, strengths, and weaknesses as noted by the scholarly community, I propose applications 
of Marion’s thought for Eucharistic theology. 
3.3.1.  Marion’s Eucharistic Theology 
3.3.1.1.  Contributions 
 Marion restores the place of God’s love -- for which metaphysics is insufficient to give 
account -- as the principle of Eucharistic theology.  The priority of love and goodness over onto-
theological categories of being, substance, and causality has important ramifications.  For 
theology in general and liturgical theology in particular, what the gospel reveals -- what ‘gives 
itself’ -- celebrates God’s steadfast love which “is better than life” (Ps. 63:3), not substantial 
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changes in objects, miraculous as those may be.  Marion’s thought re-reveals the God whose 
love exceeds reciprocity, whose pure grace goes beyond mere exchange to total kenotic self-gift.   
While exceeding reciprocity, God’s love still demands a response from the recipient, and 
indeed such a response concerns l’adonné’s very self much more than particular theological 
propositions.   Marion’s reduction of matters to life’s deepest concerns through the erotic 
reduction reminds us of the urgency for theology and philosophy to respond and speak to such 
concerns.   
Eucharistic theology in the West, particularly since medieval times, became increasingly 
preoccupied with the philosophical categories of substance, accident, presence, cause, and effect, 
all of which did little to enrich the nature of the mass as a liturgical celebration -- only begging 
the question Marion poses to all metaphysics: ‘What’s the point?’  Instead, just as real gifts 
transcend both materialism and metaphysics, the gift of the Eucharist is not to be over-identified 
with the items, the way a newlywed would be remiss to value a wedding ring more than the 
spouse making a self-gift.  Marion’s erotic reduction reaffirms the necessity of inquiry into the 
relationship of human desire(s) with the encounter with God.   
Marion’s discussions of the gift merit their own attention for Eucharistic theology, even 
though for phenomenological purposes he emphasizes the exclusion of any economical notion of 
gift with giver, gift, and givee.  His own notion of the Eucharist as a gift which must be received 
as such in its contingency and transparency is a very helpful step in this direction, yet there are 
still more fruitful corollaries to draw from his thought.  For one example, Marion’s discussions 
of gift restore a way to speak of the revelatory aspect of the liturgical celebration.  Without some 
kind of recognition of the Eucharist’s nature as contingent (as gift of free love) and transparent 
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(referring to the persons of the Trinity), the Eucharist gets reduced within the idolatrous limits of 
sense perception.   
 Marion’s interpretation of ‘trinitarian play’ displaces (in a quite creative way) any notion 
of disciples as merely passive recipients.  Rather, for disciples to have been given Christ’s 
‘trinitarian place’ to bless the Father and the world by their work animates a more active notion 
of discipleship of living as members of the ecclesial Body of Christ, a basic scriptural theme.  
Such disciples are both fully receptive and dependent before God and yet fully responsible and 
active in the world: this is a difficult balance rarely articulated in theology.  It corrects 
problematic notions of the Church as either a holy society serving itself or as mere agent of 
social change.   
3.3.1.2.  Critiques 
 Exploration of Marion’s thought with ‘relational Eucharistic theology’ in mind calls forth 
some aspects for further development.  First, the absence of discussion of relationship among 
persons (whether with God or one another), despite his analysis of encounters, represents a 
shortcoming in Marion’s thought.  Three other critiques of Marion’s thought will then be 
addressed: 1) its absence of preparation, catechesis, or practices; 2) the absence of active 
cooperation with the gift; and 3) the absence of commentary on the Institution Narrative. 
First, despite his detailed phenomenological descriptions of encounter between persons 
(or a person and God in In the Self’s Place), his limited discussion of sustained relationship 
becomes problematic.  While Marion writes at length concerning the emergence of l’adonné 
through the call of the other, and speaks briefly of the oath between committed lovers (or their 
‘crossing of gazes’), he does not speak of ongoing relationship(s) between selves, even between 
a married couple or God and a disciple.  Part of this difficulty is likely born from the 
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phenomenological method, which only speaks from the first person singular; even so it brackets 
an essential ingredient of life.  Marion’s erotic reduction concerns itself rigorously with present-
moment decisions to love, however without discussion of relationship.  This exclusion is 
somewhat strange, since l’adonné does not -- indeed, can not -- ‘exist’ in isolation: a l’adonné 
only comes to be within a horizon of relationship.  Also, while it is true that love in its purest 
expression transcends reciprocity and that (mere) reciprocal exchange can direct interactions 
toward selfish ends, total exclusion of reciprocal relations is unattainable (short of dying on 
behalf of another).  Reciprocal exchange includes positive aspects that can build up love (such as 
through shared duties) rather than corrode it.   
In his theological writing as well, Marion offers little discussion of relationship, even 
though all the theological principles Marion prizes most -- God is trinitarian and kenotic love, 
Christ as the Gift of the Father, the Eucharist as paradigm of all gift-giving -- pertain to 
relationships.   While he (rightly) upholds Christ’s death on the cross as a decisive revelation of 
distance within the Godhead, he typically speaks only of this distance.  However, Christ himself 
fostered enduring relationships with his call of the Twelve (cf. Mt. 10:1-4) and clearly addressed 
relationships in his teachings on topics such as prayer, forgiveness, and almsgiving (cf. Mt. 5-7).  
In The Idol and Distance Marion discusses the ‘distance’ necessary for relationship with God at 
some length, but without discussion of the Church or the sacraments.  Granted, Marion is 
restoring a sense of God’s transcendence and not doing theological ethics, moral theology, or 
ecclesiology: but the absence of discussion of relationship leaves a gap in his account.  While 
Marion himself refrains from such discussion, his thought offers plenty of potential insight for 
the topic.   
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 Without doubt the Christian faith upholds Christ as embodying the ideal of total, agapic, 
kenotic, self-giving love (cf. Phil. 2:6-11), and Marion does well to point out the inadequacy of 
love that expects reciprocal return of its gift.  While it is necessary ultimately to transcend 
reciprocal gift-exchange to accomplish the erotic reduction, a pedagogy of love can (and indeed 
can only) occur through relationships based on mutual exchange and reciprocity.  An education 
in duties toward others (or even oneself), for both individuals and society, is essential for 
establishing a just social order.  Reciprocal duties -- of the rich and poor, young and old, those in 
power and the alienated -- shape fundamental values, priorities, and even virtues.  While love 
which seeks return is imperfect, duty and reciprocal exchange have a proper pedagogical place 
toward a more perfect love, as a training in giving oneself and expressing love through practical 
means.   
So I will take Marion’s thought outside his own parameters (section 3.4 below) to explore 
its insight into relationships, for these are precisely the context for life’s most meaningful 
decisions and actions, especially those of the lover.  For example, the celebrated liturgy of the 
Eucharist -- the very paradigm of all gift-giving -- arises out of relationships God establishes.  
Not only do Creation or the Incarnation of the Word but the Trinity itself -- of which Marion 
speaks freely and eloquently -- presume relational contexts, entail relationship within the 
Godhead, and have profound implications for all relationships.  Relationships (either with God or 
other human beings), covenant, and community all provide contextual elements essential for 
living and understanding life.  The richness of love found in a friendship across decades -- 
whether in marriage, community, or individual friendships -- exceeds what any momentary 
experience can capture or express.  Loving entails desiring the good of the other and communion 
with the other.  To reduce all to matters of mere encounter while neglecting the quality of 
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ongoing relationships is to neglect the unique beauty of covenantal love and the value of fidelity.  
This becomes all the more important in the Eucharistic context since the words of Christ spoken 
over the wine concern ‘the new and everlasting covenant.’   
Such discussion of relationship is not antithetical to a phenomenology of encounter.  On 
the contrary -- and specifically concerning the Eucharist -- phenomenological thinker Emmanuel 
Falque upholds a place for enduring relationship, in the mutual ‘abiding’ (la manence) between 
Christ and the disciple is the very goal of Eucharistic communion (‘Those who eat my flesh and 
drink my blood abide in me, and I in them’ -- Jn. 6:56).438  The participant in communion 
becomes “fully incorporated into God.”439   Such relational aspects simply must be included for a 
full and accurate discussion of the Christian faith, the Church, its sacraments, and the Eucharist 
in particular.  Interestingly, Donald Wallenfang both employs Marion for his phenomenology 
and states that the Eucharist is “essentially a phenomenon between persons .... the pinnacle 
expression of Christ’s solidarity with all human persons.”440  According to Wallenfang the 
Eucharist “allows humanity to recognize the theological in Christ and in themselves -- a 
recognition that occurs through the course of the Eucharist as theological conversation between 
persons.”441  In Christ, God is not just giver but recipient as well.  The relationship of covenantal 
solidarity Christ establishes with human beings -- strengthened by communion -- can be 
accounted for within a Eucharistic theology informed by Marion’s phenomenology. 
                                               
438 Emmanuel Falque, “This is My Body: Contribution to a Philosophy of the Eucharist,” in Carnal Hermeneutics, 
Richard Kearney and Brian Treanor, eds. (Bronx, NY: Fordham, 2016), 292-294.  Hereafter “This is My Body.”  
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Second, while attention to the gift on its own terms is important to avoid reduction of the 
gift to idolatrous notions, the need for preparation, catechesis, and practices remains.  First, the 
requirement of Baptism before participation in the Eucharist speaks of a necessary preparation; 
the completion of initiation through Confirmation further indicates that the Eucharist is not to be 
considered an all-sufficient gift in isolation.  Education through catechesis is necessary as well.  
Although the Eucharist exceeds all that concepts could express about it, both the original biblical 
context and some conceptual analogies (gift, blessing, food) remain necessary to begin 
communicating its meaning.  Catechesis regarding God, Christ, and the Church is necessary for 
providing a meaningful context.  Without such context and understanding the Eucharist appears 
as a completely foreign language, communicating very little of ‘the mystery of charity’ or its 
logic.  A place for ascetical practices to facilitate reception of the gift (such as prayer, fasting, or 
almsgiving), that the word might bear fruit (cf. Mk. 4:1-20) must also be maintained.442  Most of 
all, repeated reception of the Eucharist (as possibility and fact) bespeaks the need for an ongoing 
process of learning how to receive this gift fully.   
 Third, Marion’s strong emphasis on l’adonné’s receptivity to the gift gradually neglects 
the need for decision and cooperative action to be transformed according to the gift and become 
a lover.  Most of all, the ‘trinitarian space’ opened up in his earliest theological writing remains 
underdeveloped.  Marion’s account of Christ’s Ascension, blessing, the call to ‘take Christ’s 
place’ in the world as the Body of Christ unites Christ’s Paschal Mystery with the call to 
discipleship in profound ways.  Amid Marion’s phenomenological concerns, this jeu trinitaire 
finds only a weak correlative in the lover who ‘decides to love without reason.’  The difficulty of 
qualifying the activity of a lover who is being transformed -- according to love’s will?  his own?  
                                               
442 Tasmin Jones cites this as a critique of Marion, proposing many more practices.  Cf. Tamsin Jones, A Genealogy 
of Marion’s Philosophy of Religion: Apparent Darkness, Philosophy of Religion, ed. Merold Westphal 
(Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 2011), 156-157.   
176 
 
who acts? -- complicates the issue, but the need to account for this activity remains.  The 
potential for the gift of another’s will, which nonetheless must be acted upon, may point toward a 
solution of this difficulty.   
Lastly, for all that Marion writes concerning the Eucharist, only rarely does he mention 
the words of Christ, ‘This is my body’/ ‘This is my blood.’  If perhaps such language is 
problematic for Marion’s attempt to bypass onto-theological language of being, it would 
nonetheless be all the more helpful for Marion to clarify how he interprets these words so central 
to the sacrament.  By comparison, he talks at far greater length about the Emmaus narrative as a 
‘hermeneutic’ paradigm and Christ’s disappearance than the actions of taking-blessing-breaking-
giving.  Matters of its origins in the Jewish Passover or its narrative context are omitted 
altogether, as are the  Eucharist as food, the new covenant, blood poured out for others, 
forgiveness, or the mandate to ‘Do this in memory of me.’  The several gifts that saturate these 
elements and Marion’s thought would mutually benefit each other from further exploration.  If 
the Eucharist is the paradigm of all gift-giving, exploration of this radical gift’s emergence from 
such historical, thematic, and dramatic/narrative elements would be all the more enriching.   
3.3.2.  Others’ Critiques 
I now look at how Marion’s ‘gifts’ have been received in the scholarly community: first, 
the impact of Marion’s thought for theology (Eucharist, sacraments) and philosophy 
(phenomenology of givenness).  Next, scholarly recognition of the strengths and weaknesses of 
Marion’s thought (particularly in comparison with traditional sacramental theology) follows.  In 
closing, some additional assessments are offered.  
3.3.2.1.  Impact 
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 The volume of significant conferences, books, articles, and dissertations dedicated to 
aspects of Marion’s thought attest that his influence is significant and continues to increase.  New 
Blackfriars devoted its July/August 1995 issue to Marion’s work.443  Major academic 
conferences involving Marion’s thought (and/or person) in 1997,444 1999,445 2003,446 2004,447 
and 2008,448 all of which became publications, reflect the intensified interest in the questions it 
raises.  Texts by Robyn Horner and Christina M. Gschwandtner have provided important 
syntheses and developments of Marion’s lengthy writings.449   
Proposals for sacramental theology built on Marion’s thought include Sebastian 
Madathummuriyil’s Sacrament as Gift: A Pneumatological and Phenomenological Approach 
and Donald Wallenfang’s Dialectical Anatomy of the Eucharist: An Étude in Phenomenology.450  
Madathummuriyil considers Marion’s phenomenology of pure gift to be the most fitting way to 
express God’s self-gift.  The true gift of God is of love, agape, which obligates not a returned 
gift but a response of agape.   A response of “living out the grace” in pure appreciation of the 
gift as such, rather than ‘obligatory return’ (i.e., equal exchange or reciprocity), ensures the 
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freedom of the recipient.451  Marion’s ‘iconic mode of presence,’ which can account for distance, 
absence, and withdrawal as well, creates a notion of presence not limited to either the (modern) 
subject or language.  Regarding the Eucharist, Marion’s categories allow for both the givenness 
of the gift and the radical otherness of God.   
Donald Wallenfang uses Marion’s phenomenology of gift to express the Eucharist as 
manifestation, as a gift constantly re-given in forgiveness through eternity.  In partnership with 
the thought of Ricoeur and Lévinas, Wallenfang proposes a ‘dialectical phenomenology’ of the 
Eucharist as manifestation and proclamation, in both prosaic and poetic discourse that include 
both phenomenology and metaphysics.452  Only by taking into account paradoxes (as in Marion) 
which maintain an “unresolved dialectic as the centrifugal force of truth” (as in Ricoeur) can 
Eucharistic theology avoid devolving into reductionistic accounts.453  The Eucharist “exhibits an 
intrinsic iconicity that must be explored through Marion’s illuminating hermeneutic of the 
saturated phenomenon.”454   
Crina Gschwandtner ranks Marion as “one of the most important living French 
philosophers” whose works are permeated with connections to theology.455  Leaving aside the 
scholarly debate regarding categorizing it as philosophy or theology, Gschwandtner proposes 
Marion’s work “can be read as advocating a lived theology – a spirituality that is also a theology, 
a theology that is grounded in prayer and spiritual practice.”456    
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179 
 
John Baldovin has applied Marion’s themes of idols, icons, and gift to liturgical reform, 
as a hermeneutic to discern attitudes toward the liturgy.457  An idolatrous notion of apostolic 
tradition preserves traditions for their own sake, at the loss of transparency; an iconic notion of 
liturgy preserves a sense of transparency, the glorification of God, and the sanctification of 
people.  Similarly, the nature of the eucharistic sacrifice needs to maintain a balanced dialectic of 
‘vertical’ and ‘horizontal’ aspects, recognizing Christ both in invisible glory and in one’s visible 
neighbor.  Concerning the role of the ordained priest, one cannot forget the common priesthood 
of all the Baptized.   
While Marion has not developed a systematic theology of the sacraments, Charles Lock 
notes that Marion’s thought is “intensely sacramental.”458  In particular, both his theological and 
phenomenological notions of the icon serve as prime examples of re-imagining a sacramental 
worldview, as opposed to a world of mere objects existing as entities unto themselves.  By the 
absence of systematized sacramental thought, Gschwandtner proposes that Marion is “instead 
calling us to do theology ... as the response to a call, as the unfolding of God’s self-manifestation 
... in the face of Christ.”459  This accomplishes a transfer from mere assent (intellectually or by 
belief) to theological concepts to an existentially lived response with one’s whole life.   
Like Madathummuriyil, Brian D. Robinette considers Marion’s thought very helpful for 
theology, applying Marion’s notion of saturated phenomenon to Christ’s resurrection (Grammars 
of Resurrection: A Christian Theology of Presence and Absence).460  The resurrection of Jesus 
Christ is an ‘im-possible Gift’: an unforeseeable fulfillment of creation and Israel’s history; 
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unbearable, transgressing binaries of presence/absence, body/spirit, historical/eschatological; 
unnamable, therefore requiring a pluralism of expression; and unconstitutable, reconstituting 
disciples as members in the ecclesial Body of Christ.461  Such excessive notions must be 
reckoned with in order to receive God’s self-giving as it has been revealed and to participate in 
the divine life into which we are called.   
 Marion’s Eucharistic thought does not receive as much attention as his phenomenological 
writings; his phenomenology of givenness receives the majority of scholarly attention.  Kevin 
Hart states that Marion can be considered the most important living phenomenologist, “certainly 
in France and perhaps also in the world.”462  For Gschwandtner, Marion’s notion of gift which 
implicates and makes claims on its recipient requires theology to account for an important 
existential element: “Conversion means not only to recognize and receive the gift of God but to 
love in the same kenotic fashion that refuses to pass on evil and instead is willing to absorb it by 
love.”463  In turn, Marion’s philosophical work opens an important space for discussion of 
theological topics within philosophy.464  Wallenfang attests that Marion has made a major 
advance in phenomenology, particularly with his notion of saturated phenomena.465  Marion has 
clearly garnered the attention of a variety of theologians and philosophers, and made an 
important impact in contemporary theology, including sacramental theology.   
3.3.2.2.  Strengths 
Lambert Leijssen celebrates Marion’s restoration of gift, which presents God’s self-
revelation in Jesus as the icon of the invisible (Col. 1:15) “as pure gift (don), to the abandonment 
(abandon) of his Son, for the forgiveness (pardon) of evil” returns to the fore of theological 
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reflection.466  This primacy of the gift is especially important for understanding the sacraments as 
God’s continual giving to human beings amid the trials of life.  Leijssen also notes that Marion’s 
notion of reception of the Eucharist involves a richer sense of the prayer of the entire assembly, 
which petitions God for the outpouring of the Holy Spirit upon both the gifts of bread and wine 
and the members of the assembly.467   
God’s self-giving manifest in the Eucharist calls for a response of witnessing to this 
giving by becoming in turn one who ‘loves first.’  Gschwandtner commends Marion’s synthesis 
of fields too often held separately by theology: spirituality, liturgy, reason, faith, speculation, and 
experience; at the same time she warns against use of Marion’s thought to construct a new 
metaphysical system, which would set idolatrous limitations on God all over again.  If Marion’s 
thought can be called a theology it is a theology of “experience of the divine in the crossing of 
gazes in prayer and in love, if we are willing to expose ourselves to it.”468  Marion’s thought does 
not impose again a system so much as witnesses to the experience of God, particularly in 
liturgical prayer.  Most of all, theology’s task is “to unfold the claim made upon us, the given of 
experience, most supremely the abundant givenness of the eucharistic gift of the broken body 
and shed blood.”469  The unfolding of this claim, manifest amid the self’s encounters -- in the 
liturgy with God, and with others in the church and the world -- is the intention behind inclusion 
of Marion’s thought in this dissertation.   
Thomas A. Carlson lauds Marion’s thought for how it liberates, not so much humans in a 
social sense but liberates “God from ... human sciences ... and metaphysics ... [which] culminate 
                                               
466 Lambert Leijssen, With the Silent Glimmer of God’s Spirit: A Postmodern Look at the Sacraments, trans. Marie 
Baird, foreword by George S. Worgul, Jr. (New York: Paulist, 2003), 78.  Hereafter SGGS. 
467 Cf. Leijssen, SGGS, 56-57. 
468 Cf. Gschwandtner, MT, 142. 
469 Ibid., 147. 
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in the nihilism of our time.”470  Marion’s critiques of the onto-theology found in so much 
Eucharistic theology (with its concerns of presence, form and matter, substance and accident) 
similarly liberate thinkers to receive the gift of the Eucharist ‘as it gives itself’: as God’s self-gift 
in Christ which calls its recipients to a proper response.  Similarly, Nathan Mitchell praises 
Marion’s thoroughgoing critique of philosophical and theological preoccupation with the subject.  
According to Mitchell the ‘S/self’ has become itself an idol; Marion is able to both name the 
problem and propose a solution through his notion of l’adonné. 471  Mitchell names a 
characteristic idolatry of our age which pervades not only philosophy but theology and popular 
culture as well.  Mitchell’s observation also reminds us that revival of awareness of conceptual 
idolatry across all variety of theological thought is itself an important corrective Marion offers.  
Against thinkers who might portray Marion as belonging among postmodern heretics (as he aims 
for a higher goal than merely saying ‘God exists’), Philipp W. Rosemann says Marion’s works 
“are both fully orthodox and take into consideration many of the concerns of postmodern 
philosophy.”472   
 Praise for Marion also comes by way of Orthodox Christianity.  Nikolaos Loudovikos  
says gratitude is owed to Marion’s “remarkable”473 God Without Being for bringing forth “the 
most essential and difficult Western theological problem.... [to] show how the 
Augustinian/Thomist God, or at least a certain long-living understanding of him, was, in a way, 
absent from creation.”474  Loudovikos also finds Marion’s notion of givenness compatible with 
the Orthodox idea of synergy, albeit with precautions to preserve the active thought and 
                                               
470 Thomas A. Carlson, “Blindness and the Decision to See: On Revelation and Reception in Jean-Luc Marion,” in 
Counter-Experiences: Reading Jean-Luc Marion, ed. Kevin Hart (South Bend, IN: Notre Dame, 2007), 153. 
471 Cf. Nathan Mitchell, Real Presence: The Work of Eucharist, New and expanded ed. (Chicago: Liturgy Training 
Publications, 2000), 108.  
472 Rosemann “Marion’s Eucharistic Realism,” 233. 
473 Nikolaos Loudovikos, A Eucharistic Ontology: Maximus the Confessor’s Eschatological Ontology of Being as 
Dialogical Reciprocity, trans. Elizabeth Theokritoff (Brookline, MA: Holy Cross Orthodox Press, 2010), 245n61. 
474 Ibid., 230. 
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cooperation of the human recipient(s).475  Loudovikos appears somewhat conciliatory in this 
assessment, as Marion practically never seems to attribute or preserve an active human role 
regarding cooperation with the divine.   
In sum, Marion’s re-examination of revelation on its own terms restores the simplest of 
notions -- gift -- as the single theme which underlies creation, common experience, and the 
special events of biblical revelation.  He restores revelation and the experience of it as viable 
possibilities for philosophical investigation, often through paradoxes which hold opposites 
together: invisible grace and phenomenality, receiving oneself with the gift, presence and 
distance.   These are genuinely valuable contributions by Marion which engage significant 
contemporary concerns and philosophy directly.  In particular, Marion’s work to restore the 
biblical motif of gift brings sacramental theology back to the fundamental reality of grace, which 
has been constrained to commodified or productionist categories for too long, as Chauvet noted.  
Marion’s themes of the primacy of love, divine transcendence, and givenness all restore essential 
fundamental aspects of our relationship to the divine.  As someone who appropriates a wealth of 
scriptural and traditional theology into contemporary postmodern thought, Marion is making an 
invaluable contribution to Catholic theology.   
3.3.2.3.  Weaknesses 
Direct critique of Marion’s Eucharistic theology is somewhat sparse in comparison with 
critique of his broader theological and phenomenological projects.  Gschwandtner questions 
Marion’s depiction of the Eucharist as always being a saturated phenomenon; simple experience 
of most liturgies would far more often note not rapturous beauty but ‘poor’ phenomena of 
inattention, misunderstanding, or indifference.476  Marion’s portrayal of the Eucharist as 
                                               
475 Ibid., 237. 
476 Cf. Gschwandtner, DG, 182; 170-192.    
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exclusively an overwhelming experience also neglects the varieties of experience possible due to 
different ecumenical traditions, settings, or styles of celebration.  As primary as the gift of the 
Eucharist remains, the quality of its reception remains in part shaped by the disposition of the 
recipient.  Gschwandtner also cites Marion’s lack of account for the communal and bodily -- if 
not visceral -- aspects of the celebration as gaps that call for closer examination.477  Wallenfang 
seeks to balance Marion’s phenomenology of manifestation with Ricoeur’s thought on 
proclamation; this in turn raises questions why Marion so strongly prefers Luke’s Emmaus story 
over the Last Supper narratives and the words Jesus gives with the bread and the wine.478  
Madathummuriyil likewise observes the need to balance Marion’s phenomenological account of 
the Eucharist with a proper pneumatology which accounts more explicitly for the role of the 
Holy Spirit in the Eucharistic celebration.479 
 The first edition of Dieu sans l’être: hors-texte in 1982 provoked “savage reviews, 
especially by French Dominicans” for including the thought of Thomas Aquinas under 
Heidegger’s critique of idolatrous ‘onto-theology.’480  While seemingly reluctant to admit any 
fault, by 1991 Marion changed his mind, dissociating Thomas Aquinas from any charges of 
‘onto-theology’ in which God is reciprocally effected by what He has caused.  In the preface to 
the English edition of God Without Being (1991), Marion clarified the distinction between 
Thomas’ (proper) subordination of esse to God and Heidegger’s univocity of Being with the 
divine.481  Marion’s new understanding was first explained at length at a conference in Toulouse 
in 1994, published in 1995, and included in the second English edition of God Without Being 
                                               
477 Cf. Gschwandtner, DG, 182-186. 
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480 Fergus Kerr, “Aquinas After Marion,” New Blackfriars 76 No. 895 (July/August 1995), 363.  Kerr does not 
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(2012).482  In the preface to this second edition Marion admitted that the original’s “bit of 
polemic... undoubtedly does merit being corrected and debated.  Indeed, my position has 
changed notably since 1982.”483   
Though Marion claims such is the case, his exoneration of Thomas raises several 
questions about Marion’s opinions of the neo-scholasticism to which Thomas gave such 
influential rise.  Is neo-scholastic theology ‘onto-theological’?  If so, how and when did it go 
astray from Thomas’ subordination of esse to God?  Is Marion’s ‘bit of polemic’ truly corrected 
by Marion himself?  If so, ought not there be more changes to God Without Being than an 
appendix chapter in the second edition? 
  The fundamental (and perhaps representative) critique of Marion’s phenomenological 
project came from Dominique Janicaud in 1991.484  Janicaud considers Marion representative of 
a second generation of phenomenologists who, following Lévinas, corrupted phenomenology by 
inserting (implicitly or explicitly) a biblical God into its horizon.485  Placement by Marion within 
phenomenology of an “opening [ouverture] to the invisible ... to a pure givenness [donation]” 
creates a “rupture with immanent phenomenality.”486  Concerning Marion’s proposed ‘inquiry 
into a ‘pure form of the call’’ in the form of givenness, Janicaud asks: “In what way does this 
                                               
482 Colloquium given June 3-4, 1994, at Institut Catholique de Toulouse.  Published as Jean-Luc Marion, “Saint 
Thomas d’Aquin et l’onto-théo-logie,” Revue Thomiste 95:1 (January 1995), 31-66.  English edition in Jean-Luc 
Marion, “Thomas and Onto-theo-logy,” in Mystics: Presence and Aporia, eds. Michael Kessler and Christian 
Sheppard (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2003), 38-74; also in chapter 8, “Thomas Aquinas and Onto-
theology,” of GWB, Second Edition (2012), 199-236.  This change is also in the newer French edition. 
483 Marion, “Preface to the Second Edition,” GWB, xxix-xxx. Marion says his polemic “concerns Heidegger first and 
also touches on Thomas Aquinas indirectly.... I am ready to maintain today the apparent paradox that Thomas 
Aquinas did not identify the question of God, nor that of his names, with Being, or at least with Being as 
metaphysics understands it within its ‘concept of Being.’”  Ibid. 
484 Dominique Janicaud, Le tournant théologique de la phénoménologie française (Combas: Éditions de l’Éclat, 
1991).  In English: Dominique Janicaud, “The Theological Turn of French Phenomenology,” in Dominique 
Janicaud, et al., Phenomenology and the ‘Theological Turn’: The French Debate, trans. Bernard G. Prusak (Bronx, 
NY: Fordham, 2000), 16-103.  Hereafter P&TT. 
485 Cf. Bernard G. Prusak, “Translator’s Introduction,” in P&TT, 3-4. 
486 Janicaud, P&TT, 17.   
186 
 
reduction ... remain phenomenological?”487  Marion’s proposal of a ‘post-metaphysical’ 
phenomenology-open-to-theology has “no respect for the phenomenological order.... [It resorts 
to] autosufficiency (pure givenness ‘gives itself’!) that restores metaphysica specialis -- and its 
favorite trick, autofoundation -- rather than giving it the boot.”488  These are clearly strong 
charges, especially against someone claiming to be as scrupulous concerning method as Marion 
does.  Despite Marion’s denials, according to Janicaud phenomenological neutrality in Marion 
has been abandoned.489   
Janicaud’s critique extends still further since he considers the errors of the ‘theological 
turn’ in phenomenology to be rooted in Lévinas, upon whom much of Marion’s thought depends.  
Janicaud accuses Lévinas (and implicitly Marion) of “a paradoxical and strategic blurring of the 
boundaries between the phenomenological and the theological.”   
Janicaud’s critique is convincing as it raises serious questions about Marion’s project as a 
‘pure phenomenology’ to which Marion appears to have failed in his response.  It is one matter 
to lay claim to saturating phenomena that meaningfully surpass the boundaries of Kant’s 
epistemology; it is quite another (at least, as a philosopher) to describe such phenomena as 
‘given,’ which so strongly implies a giver, the phenomenon as an intended (thereby personal) 
gift.  Thomas A. Carlson describes the relation of Marion’s theology and phenomenology well 
by saying they “inform one another more or otherwise than Marion himself might allow.”490  
Many of Marion’s examples of saturated phenomena are drawn from Christian texts, when quite 
‘natural’ experiences of ecstatic joy or dread of death pose themselves as qualified examples.  
Despite Marion’s strong claims to methodological purity, his phenomenology does not stand 
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satisfactorily on philosophical grounds alone.  His is clearly a ‘theistic phenomenology,’ which 
is to say, a phenomenology drawn from (Christian) theology, that too readily attributes an 
invisible gaze from behind the saturating icon.  This critique still does not disqualify Marion’s 
contributions toward this theological project of a relational Eucharistic theology, but it is duly 
noted.   
 In 1995 a special issue of New Blackfriars addressed Marion’s thought, particularly his 
God Without Being: Hors-Texte.491  There, John Milbank chides Marion’s attempt to uphold a 
radical divine gift which also correlates (by means of phenomenology) with philosophy: “Marion 
seeks to be both Barth and Heidegger at once.”492  In Milbank’s estimation Marion wants the 
best of both phenomenological and theological approaches, yet is in the end unfaithful to either.  
Marion’s arguments, says Milbank, presume “a priority of ethical intersubjectivity ... [which] 
cannot really be made phenomenologically evident, and still less manifest is the identity of the 
call as that of a caller.”493  Here again we see suspicions of ‘smuggling’ theological concerns into 
phenomenology, while claiming methodological purity.  Laurence Hemming hails Marion as one 
of the first theologians to take Heidegger’s critique of metaphysics as a whole seriously, but 
nonetheless considers Marion “insufficiently attentive to [its] complexity,” particularly 
concerning the ontological difference.494  Milbank and Hemming thus offer echoes of Janicaud’s 
critique, that Marion’s ‘phenomenology of givenness’ fundamentally theological.   
 Jacques Derrida had many reservations concerning Marion’s phenomenological 
methodology and conclusions.  In his text Given Time: I. Counterfeit Money, Derrida challenges 
the possibility of the gift, claiming that the gift nullifies itself (and certainly would not justify 
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itself), since it remains within the realm of reciprocity.495  According to Derrida, Marion’s 
assertion that the ‘pure call’ comes from ‘the Father’ (as opposed to mere ‘Being’) exposes a 
hidden Christian theology, as it attributes the call to a personally giving God.496  Derrida’s 
critique is similar to the criticism made by Milbank (that Marion ‘seeks to be Barth and 
Heidegger at once’), claiming to be ‘purely phenomenological’ but retaining theological 
premises.  In a famous debate with Marion on September 27, 1997 at Villanova University’s 
“Religion and Postmodernism” Conference, Derrida claimed that Marion’s “extraordinary 
extension of Gegebenheit’ ... only makes sense against a theological background,” as every 
experience of perception becomes an observation of givenness.497  As Bernard G. Prusak notes, 
Marion’s reply (which considered phenomenological purity secondary to concern for ‘the things 
that interest phenomenology’) “retracts his concession even while proffering it.”498  Both Derrida 
and Prusak observe how Marion’s interests undermine his phenomenological methodological 
purity.  That language of the ‘givenness’ of phenomena -- as opposed to their ‘appearing,’ 
perhaps -- inserts theological premises seems a possibility that many would admit, except Marion 
himself.  For philosophy this represents a weakness (if it inserts presumption of a giver), but for 
theology it leaves an important possibility open, and can thus even be considered a strength.  
Though the ‘purity’ of Marion’s phenomenological method remains debatable, suspicions 
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regarding insertion of a personally-giving God can become a strength when employed within 
theology, when everything in creation is a gift.     
Kathryn Tanner raises a concern that Marion unwittingly domesticates Revelation in “a 
tight conceptual system,” in effect substituting givenness as an all-encompassing principle for 
Heidegger’s Being.499  The phenomenological horizon of givenness thus risks becoming the new 
idolatrous mirror which reflects only what we desire to see (such as a divine Giver).  This word 
of caution (which echoes Milbank’s and Hemming’s criticisms cited above) is welcome: it 
reminds us how true reception of the call issuing forth from revelation both makes scandalous 
demands of us for action (not mere knowledge) and is only manifest in the recipient’s generous 
response.  The ‘priority of ethical intersubjectivity’ and the recipient’s responsibilities in the face 
of givenness -- which radically call the self into question -- deserve a far stronger emphasis than 
their proportion of Marion’s writings on these matters would suggest.  In particular regarding the 
Eucharist, theology must consistently recall that Jesus does not say ‘Know this in memory of 
me,’ but ‘Do this in memory of me’ -- namely, Jesus’ own self-giving which goes far beyond 
self-preservation.  Tanner’s criticism -- which should hardly be limited to Marion’s thought -- is 
a salutary reminder that the ethical demands of Christian discipleship toward other people must 
retain their priority over any conceptual understanding of the Eucharist. 
Some specifically theological criticisms of Marion concern the nature of faith.  Shane 
MacKinlay questions Marion’s interpretation of Emmaus as a paradigm for understanding faith 
and revelation.  In particular it neglects the “primary, existential sense of faith as personal trust in 
-- and commitment to -- a complex of meaningful relationships and significations in which a 
                                               
499 Cf. Kathryn Tanner, “Theology at the Limits of Phenomenology,” Counter-Experiences: Reading Jean-Luc 
Marion, ed. Kevin Hart (South Bend, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 2007), 204; cf. 201-213. 201-231.  
Hereafter “Theology at the Limits.” 
190 
 
person situates himself or herself.”500  Marion’s near-exclusive emphasis on the relation of the 
given to l’adonné (always in the singular) again overlooks, even neglects, the influence of 
relationships in communities.   
Jeffrey Bloechl argues that Marion neglects ‘the horizontal dimension’ of theology, the 
presence of the divine among what is immanent.501  This blind spot appears again in Marion’s 
arguments for the exclusivity of the bishop as theologian: Peter-Ben Smit points out the 
absurdity that any single human figure -- even a bishop -- could alone be an authoritative 
interpreter for a community, seemingly overlooking the common membership in which they all 
share.502  Similarly, John Baldovin points out how, with this exclusivity of the ordained 
priesthood, Marion risks “sanctioning a kind of idolatry” by neglecting the priesthood of the 
baptized.503   
3.4.  Proposals  
Several elements of Marion’s thought, both theological and phenomenological, make 
excellent contributions toward the relational Eucharistic theology this dissertation proposes.  
While Marion’s phenomenological project prioritizes ‘pure givenness’ which excludes even the 
giver, gift, and givee, my own use of Marion’s thought prioritizes his theological writings which 
relate God and human beings by means of the gift of Jesus Christ, the icon of the invisible God 
(Col. 1:15).  These proposals also read Marion’s analyses of encounters in light of revelation: 
even though these play a lesser role in Marion’s projects, they help account for encounters with 
Christ in the liturgy and others in the world, connecting ‘liturgy and life’ in the way Vatican II 
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documents (such as Sacrosanctum Concilium and Lumen Gentium) and papal teaching so 
strongly emphasize.  The contributions I propose also move outside some boundaries of 
Marion’s own explorations, to speak not merely of ‘encounters’ between persons but 
relationships.  In light of these ideas, the Eucharistic gift may be summed up as the God’s 
gracious and scandalous gift of desire, to seek to love even if it is not reciprocated. 
3.4.1.  Eucharist’s Context: Covenant Relationship and Obligation 
The theological reality of the relationship -- indeed, communion -- given by and with the 
Eucharist, and for which Christ gave himself on our behalf, calls for greater attention.  To recall 
Marion’s own Eucharistic ‘hermeneutic:’ we receive proper interpretation of the Eucharist by 
drawing upon the principles and logic (‘order of charity’) given by and in the Eucharist.  The 
Eucharist was and is revealed in the context of Christ’s self-giving to his disciples: each time it 
occurs, it does so in the context of and for the sake of a specific relationship, ‘the new and 
eternal covenant.’  Therefore, I examine the impact of Christ’s Eucharistic gift-giving within and 
upon relationships.   
Reception of the Eucharist ‘as it gives itself’ requires acknowledgment and acceptance of 
the covenantal-ecclesial context in which it is celebrated.  The Father’s initiative sent the gift of 
Christ to and for the world through the Holy Spirit, establishing and revealing in the events of the 
paschal mystery a ‘new and eternal covenant’ -- i.e., a relationship.  The establishment of this 
saving relationship was the purpose for which the gift of the Son was given (cf. Jn. 3:16; Rom. 
5:10-11; Heb. 8:6, 9:15-22); human beings enter into this covenant (most fundamentally) by 
faith, Baptism, and the gift of the Holy Spirit.  As Marion notes, the liturgy of the Eucharist 
celebrates and commemorates the self-gift of Christ, the icon of the invisible God, and proclaims 
the future eschatological fulfillment for which the Church hopes.  Having heard the scriptures 
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interpreted in the light of the Word, the assembly petitions God the Father by appealing to 
Christ’s gift of himself, proclaiming the death of the Lord until He comes again in glory (1 Cor. 
11:26).  The liturgy of the Eucharist celebrates and manifests this gracious gift once again so that 
its participants recognize and reaffirm their covenant relationship with God.  The ‘new and 
eternal covenant’ between God and human beings -- a relationship characterized by the love that 
is God (1 Jn. 4:8, 16) -- contextualizes both the celebration and theology of the Eucharist.   
 In addition to the relationship between God and human beings which established the 
covenantal relationship, the ecclesial context of the Eucharistic celebration must be 
acknowledged and accepted as another layer of its foundation.  Every celebration of the 
Eucharist acknowledges the participants’ communion -- even if partial -- with the angels and 
saints in glory and the universal church.  Participants likewise petition God on behalf of the 
Church, the world, and the dead in recognition of relationships which transcend space, time, and 
even death in eschatological faith and hope.  Not least of all, the community of the liturgical 
assembly ‘precedes’ the individual believer, both in terms of initiation into the Church and 
participation in the liturgical prayer.  Such fuller recognition of the ecclesial body (cf. 1 Cor. 
11:29) of Christ, to which members of the Church belong (1 Cor. 12:27), enables a richer sharing 
of the life and love one receives in the Eucharist.   
Proper recognition of all these contextual elements, invisible and visible, has important 
pastoral consequences.  It is essential to counter privatized piety which narrows the participants’ 
vision toward only one of these elements, whether ‘vertical’ (relating to God to the exclusion of 
all others) or ‘horizontal’ (relating to visible others without reference to God/Christ).  The liturgy 
of the Eucharist is not an escape from unpleasant realities but a fuller inauguration of the 
Kingdom of God, a thoroughly relational reality.  These points are emphasized to restore the 
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relational and communal contexts which common experience can appear to bypass, to the neglect 
of the obligations which accompany those relationships.  
3.4.2.  Receiving the Eucharist by Becoming Gift 
While reception of the Eucharist would appear a simple matter of taking, eating, and 
drinking, its full implications extend much farther.  Marion’s ideas, especially of receiving-by-
giving, help articulate this fuller meaning.  Marion’s ideas are particularly helpful for describing 
the way a communicant fully receives the Eucharistic gift ‘as it gives itself,’ ‘on its own terms.’  
We employ and develop Marion’s notions to explore the Eucharist in terms of anamorphosis, 
blessing, call to trinitarian play, and the decision to become a lover.   
3.4.2.1.  Recognition by Blessing 
Marion’s phenomenology of givenness and liturgical/Eucharistic theology can converge 
to demystify the prayer practice of blessing.  Thoroughly biblical in origin, blessing pervades 
both the Hebrew and Christian scriptures and is present throughout both Jewish and Christian 
liturgical practice.  One of Jesus’ chief actions in the miraculous feeding stories (Mt. 14:19; Mk. 
6:41; Lk. 9:16), the Institution Narrative of the Eucharist (Mt. 26:27; Mk. 14:23; Lk. 22:17,19; 1 
Cor. 11:24), and at Emmaus (Lk. 24:30) is to bless God, giving thanks -- εύχαρɩστεῑω.  
According to Marion, recognition of a gift ‘as such’ requires proper recognition of a gift’s 
contingency (that it is given freely), transparency (that it is a sign of a giver), givee (oneself), and 
giver (God).  Put another way, these are the relationships a gift concerns, proper recognition of 
which constitutes a way to understand blessing.  More practically, recognition of these truths -- 
particularly their relational context -- leads to gratitude, an important aspect in the genesis of 
charity in the recipient.     
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In the context of full reception of the Eucharistic gift, blessing entails recognition of the 
divine giver, of the divine gift of communion, and of the self (and others) as recipient-givee.  The 
recipient is called and enabled to do this by the grace of being l’adonné, when recognizing Christ 
as the divine giver, affirming by faith that the gifts are Christ’s Body and Blood, and oneself 
(and other recipients) as recipients.  Recognition of God as the giver is to recognize the invisible 
gaze and loving intention bringing about the gift in the present time and place.  By faith one 
recognizes or affirms the gifts as the body and blood of Jesus which draw the recipient into a 
closer communion in the new covenant.  Full recognition of the self-as-givee also means 
accepting the gifts of communion, covenant, and forgiveness as personally intended by God, not 
to the exclusion of others but as an expression of divine love for the recipient.   
One of Jesus’ chief actions in the miraculous feeding stories (Mt. 14:19; Mk. 6:41; Lk. 
9:16), the Institution Narrative of the Eucharist (Mt. 26:27; Mk. 14:23; Lk. 22:17,19; 1 Cor. 
11:24), and at Emmaus (Lk. 24:30) is to bless God, giving thanks -- εύχαρɩστεῑω.  In Jesus’ 
taking and saying the blessing over the gifts of bread and wine during the Institution Narrative, 
we observe how he recognized: a) the bread and wine as gifts; b) the Father who gave them to 
Jesus; and c) at least implicitly, himself as recipient of these gifts.  Understood in this way, 
blessing is not a magical act but an affirmation in faith central to proper reception of any gift, a 
recognition of the persons to which the signs refer, and the expressions of love therein.   
This clarified notion of blessing as proper recognition takes on still-greater importance in 
the context of understanding the role of the Church in the world.  As noted above504 Marion 
interprets Christ’s act of blessing in Luke 24:50-53 as important for understanding ‘the real 
presence’ of Christ among the ecclesial body of Christ, the Church.  The Church takes up 
Christ’s activity of blessing: continuing Christ’s work of revealing the Father, the gifts of Christ 
                                               
504 In section 3.1.3.1., ‘Eucharist, Christ’s Disappearance, and Entry into ‘Trinitarian Play.’ 
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and the Holy Spirit, and the world as the recipient of those gifts.  The ongoing activity of 
blessing by members of the Church serve as proclamation of God as giver of all gifts and giving, 
for the world to hear as an invitation to join in the life of blessing.  While Marion himself does 
not directly relate full recognition of the gift as such (its transparency and contingency) with the 
action of blessing, these actions illuminate each other richly.  The act of blessing is clarified well 
by Marion’s notion of gift-recognition.  It is to adopt ‘the Eucharistic hermeneutic’ or worldview 
that constantly interprets life in terms of givenness and the gift. 
Recognition of the gift ‘as such’ through blessing becomes essential to the celebration of 
the Eucharist, since “There is no presence of God among men, if men do not bless him and the 
one he has sent.... [God’s] blessing by men constitutes the condition for the possibility ... of 
Christ’s being recognized by them.”505  Christ’s presence does not depend on human blessing, 
but true recognition of Jesus as the Christ, as the Son of God, occurs only among those who 
acknowledge him as a gift of the Father: “The presence of Christ, and therefore also that of the 
Father, discloses itself by a gift: it can therefore be recognized only by a blessing.”506  In other 
words, grace is only truly recognized as such by grateful blessing by its recipients.  Conversely, 
thinking of grace as an ‘effect’ does not suffice to ‘recognize’ it truly -- much less its giver.   
Furthermore, upon Christ’s bodily ‘departure’ at the Ascension, the disciples “begin ... to 
accomplish in their own body that by which Christ received being the corporal gift of the 
presence of God: the blessing of the Father.  Having been spectators of the gift, they become for 
the first time the actors of the presence: received, incorporated into them (and above all them 
into it), given to all.”507  The act of blessing-recognition becomes a crucial hinge by which the 
                                               
505 Marion, PC, 129.  Emphasis added. 
506 Ibid. 
507 Ibid., 131.   
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recipient (‘spectator’) enters trinitarian play and becomes a giver, an active cooperator in the 
ecclesial Body of Christ.   
 The Eucharistic l’adonné sees others receiving the Eucharistic gifts and so by grace is 
called to ‘recognize the body of the Lord’ (cf. 1 Cor. 11:29) present in other members of the 
Church.  Sent forth by Jesus’ word ‘Do this in memory of me,’ the l’adonné is called to serve 
Christ present in the needy of the world (cf. Mt. 25:31-46).  Through the Eucharistic gifts -- 
which includes the command ‘Do this in memory of me’ -- l’adonné learns to recognize, bless, 
and serve the body of the Lord throughout the world.   
This gift leads to a new recognition of the self as well: by virtue of both the giver (God-
who-is-Love) and the gift (of communion with Christ), a givee properly recognizes oneself as 
such when recognizing oneself as beloved by God.  One’s true self ‘comes’ from and through the 
Eucharistic gifts of Christ’s kenosis, which bestow communion with God and vision to recognize 
our true relationships with others in the Church and the world.  Through Christ’s example, 
command, and spirit, recipients also receive the desire to initiate love, to ‘love first.’  By 
cooperative decision in the ‘obedience of faith’ (Rom. 1:5; 16:26) which works through love 
(Gal. 5:6; cf. Jam. 2:14-26), we fulfill the giving of what we have received: the gracious and 
scandalous gift of desire to love as Christ.   
 These gifts are gracious in that God’s love liberates a person from narcissistic self-
concern (‘Does anybody out there love me?’) toward the lover’s radical decision to initiate love 
(‘Can I love first?’).  They are scandalous since they reveal our own contingency, the location of 
the self in God and in others, and the truth that we are not ‘our own’ but belong to God (cf. Rom. 
14:7-8).  They are scandalous because they point to Christ as the way, the truth, and the life (Jn. 
14:6).   
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Christ’s Eucharistic gift also renews covenant obligations for its recipients.  Reception of 
these gifts makes of the recipient l’adonné: one who is ‘gifted’ and receives the gift by becoming 
a giver of kenotic love.  The gift is not ‘retained’ or ‘possessed’ like an object but shared 
precisely through dispossession of egoic self, even to the gift of one’s own body and blood for 
others.  This is the ‘loss of self’ which Jesus enjoins upon those who would follow him (cf. Mk. 
8:35).  We can either accept and love these truths or refuse and hate them, but the latter -- as 
Marion points out in In the Self’s Place -- is merely to lie to ourselves.   
3.4.2.3.  Jesus’ Command: Call to ‘Trinitarian Play’ 
 Full reception of the Eucharist involves accepting the gift on its own terms, in its entirety.  
With his injunction ‘Do this in memory of me,’ Jesus commands his disciples not simply repeat 
the ritual in memory of him but to give their own body and blood as Jesus has.  Jesus calls his 
disciples to love as he has just demonstrated: taking the initiative to love (loving ‘first’) and 
kenotically, without expectation or demand of return gift.  The gifts are given, not to be collected 
or merely consumed, but as a participatory point of entry into trinitarian play -- to ‘full, 
conscious, active participation’ in giving self, proving reception of the gift by giving from one’s 
own life.  Jesus’ command is another layer of the Eucharistic gift enabling disciples to know and 
live out their obligation, which is itself a grace of God.   
This full participation in giving self both begins immediately during the liturgy -- even if 
unnoticed by many -- but is also meant to extend beyond the time and setting of the liturgy.  Full 
participation in giving self involves three moments: the oblation by the community, the reception 
of communion, and living deliberately as a member of the ecclesial body of Christ in the world.  
After the anamnesis of the paschal mystery, each Roman Eucharistic prayer includes an oblation 
of the consecrated gifts, immediately offering the gifts back to God.  Even if this oblation 
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escapes the attention of many, it engages the community immediately in giving and receiving.  
More urgent than even communion or more prayers is this liturgical reflex to receive-by-giving-
away, to dispossess and share the gifts.  Those receiving communion present their bodies to God 
as a spiritual sacrifice (Rom. 12:1) in another participation in, another initial movement toward, 
full self-giving.  Lastly and most importantly, full reception of the Eucharist entails living out the 
mission to enter ‘trinitarian play’ by living deliberately as a member of the ecclesial body of 
Christ in the world, ready to ‘love first.’    
 Through the example and command of Jesus, the imagination is opened to the possibility 
of giving one’s ‘body and blood.’  Jesus’ gift in both the Eucharist and on the cross shows his 
disciples it is possible: one’s own body and blood become ‘givable,’ whether through martyrdom 
or the labor of one’s life.   
3.4.2.4.  Reception by Decision to Love: Acceptance of the Gift on Its Own Terms 
While Marion has a place for decision in the erotic reduction (namely, a person’s 
decision to become a lover), he thoroughly resists any notion of active cooperation with grace 
which might appear to attribute initiative or activity to the recipient.  By contrast, this 
dissertation emphasizes both the importance of the recipient’s decision to become a lover and 
repeated decisions to cooperate actively with the divine grace given.   
The mystery of cooperation with divine grace simply surpasses the limits of language: it 
demands of the human being both receptivity and active cooperation, an ‘active and cooperative 
receptivity.’  (Here, it can be helpful to recall Chauvet’s insight into the disparity between 
language and the real.)  The need to receive and accept grace does not absolve a recipient of 
responsibility for initiative, active cooperation, and perseverance; “what matters is faith working 
through charity” (Gal. . 
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Thus, mere consumption of the consecrated Eucharistic gifts still does not assure ‘full 
reception of the Eucharist’ or transformation of the recipient.  While the gifts are (‘of 
themselves’) gracious and scandalous expressions of God’s love and claim upon us, it is evident 
that not all who receive communion either live or understand the Eucharist according to these 
ideas -- much less offer their lives in martyrdom.  A deeper change remains necessary to speak of 
full reception of the Eucharistic gift.   
As Marion points out, true reception of any gift requires of the recipient becoming 
“integrally and in person -- hypostatically -- a gift.”508  It is not that a recipient first receives a 
gift and then gives it again; the recipient most fully receives the gift by giving again.  The real 
‘gift’ at stake is the act of giving: “The gift itself consists uniquely in the act of receiving/giving, 
and in no other ‘content.’”509  Marion shows us how fully receiving a gift goes far deeper than 
grateful reception of items, but entails entering existentially into giving-and-reception.   
So one ‘receives the Eucharist’ most fully by the decision to become a lover, becoming a 
giver of kenotic love.  This decision becomes possible through the gift of the Eucharist, through 
Christ proving his love for us while we were still sinners (Rom. 5:8).   This decision is 
furthermore only possible as a response to the gospel proclamation: it is not a summoning and 
assertion of will but is the deeper reception of the gift of God’s love, a cooperation with the 
movement of the divine will.  The liturgy of the Eucharist not only retells but re-presents -- ‘re-
gives’ -- Christ’s gift time and again; such repeated hearing of the call and reception of the gifts 
is necessary to overcome the dullness of the human heart, the ‘sloth of disobedience,’ and 
forgetfulness of God which resist participation in the paschal mystery of kenotic loving and 
living.  Through such a decision the recipient-giver also recognizes people in the world as icons 
                                               
508 Marion, ID, 168. 
509 Marion, ID, 170.   
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of the wounded Body of Christ to be fed, given drink, visited, cured, clothed, and welcomed (cf. 
Mt. 25:31-46). 
By decisions to give of one’s own life, one grows in strength as a living member of the 
ecclesial body of Christ.  Yet such radical decisions are only imaginable, made possible, and 
made desirable by Christ’s prior self-gift made present to us in the Eucharist.  This gift re-centers 
one’s life (anamorphosis), speaks of Christ’s loving self-gift to each of us (recognized in 
blessing), commands us to go and do likewise (‘Do this in memory of me’).  We either  accept 
the claim the giver makes upon us and love accordingly (‘becoming the gift’), or we refuse the 
claim, hate the truths it presents, and cut ourselves off from the loving that leads to the vita 
beata.   
3.4.3.  Liturgy of the Eucharist as Proclamation of Kenotic Love 
Marion’s analyses also offer a new way to appreciate the liturgy of the Eucharist as a 
proclamation of love.  The liturgical proclamation of incarnated love in the Eucharist -- by sign, 
word, and gesture -- testifies to God’s selfless loving.  This proclamation of divine love which 
transcends reciprocity announces ‘good news’ to the world.  The ‘distance’ between the self who 
despairs of love (‘Does anybody out there love me?’) and the self who loves (‘Can I love first?’) 
is traversed.   
Though Marion does not speak in terms of ‘relation to self’ or others, Christ’s love and 
gift of himself mediate between -- interfere with -- the self and its self-hatred.  An unselfish love 
is proclaimed through gifts in a personalist expression: ‘Take this all of you... given up for you.’  
Ritual recitation of the oath of Christ’s self-donating love corrects our notions of self, along with 
our attitudes and actions toward ourselves and others.  At the divine initiative -- as God always 
loved us first (1 Jn. 4:10) -- a gift of love is recalled and manifested as visible phenomena of 
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bread and wine, which at that moment made no demand for reciprocity: it simply forgives and 
liberates the recipient from the sinister trap of reciprocity in love.   
This revelatory moment is essential to ‘the mystery of faith’: the unilaterally proclaimed, 
manifested, and given gift of God’s love toward human beings -- ‘God was, in Christ, 
reconciling the world to himself’ (2 Cor. 5:17); ‘God proves his love for us in this, in that, while 
we were still sinners, Christ died for us’ (Rom. 5:8).  Recognition and acceptance of the 
Eucharistic gifts in this manner can empower a change from self-concern (‘Does anybody out 
there love me?’) to imagining initiatives of love for others (‘Can I love first?’).  Such a change in 
primary concern effects changes in one’s relationships with every other person.  Not only are 
other disciples proposed as people to be loved, but all: strangers, the needy (cf. Mt. 25:31-46; Lk. 
16:19-31), and enemies (cf. Mt. 5:43-48). 
Rather often in Eucharistic theology, the sacramental gifts are exalted to such a degree 
that the liturgical celebration and its import are lost.  Recognition of the liturgy of the Eucharist 
as a public proclamation of Christ’s gift in the present world is one way to express its value as an 
action and not simply as means to liturgical ‘products.’  This perspective sheds light on the 
kerygmatic and prophetic value of the liturgy that is, again, too often lost amid a deeply-
embedded ‘productionist’ mentality.  Furthermore, this moment takes place within a far broader 
proclamation that includes praise of God for creation and redemption, celebration of God’s 
kingdom among a particular community, and the missionary charge to extend Christ’s love in the 
present-day world.  In light of the importance of ‘givenness,’ the liturgical actions -- the 
‘breaking of the bread’ and the gestures which manifest the gifts to the assembly -- are essential 
to the proclamation of and witness to Christ’s love for the world.   
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Reception of the Eucharist entails ongoing recognition of and participation in the 
Eucharistic anamorphosis, communion, mission, and decisions, all of which culminate as a gift 
of desire to love first.  Christ’s command ‘Do this in memory of me,’ opens the possibility and 
offers the desire for us to make a gift of one’s own body and blood for others; we can recognize 
our own life -- our ‘body and blood’ -- as ‘givable.’  The body, blood, selfhood, and loving 
desire that constitute the more abundant life (Jn. 10:10) all come to us as gifts from another, 
namely, Jesus Christ.   
3.4.4.  Eucharist as God’s Gracious and Scandalous Gift of Desire 
The Eucharist ‘fully received’ is not just a gift of Christ’s body and blood but of his 
desire: the loving desire to give completely of oneself, kenotically, in a gift which verifies 
reception of Christ’s original gift.  The Eucharist is a gift of desire, in at least two senses: first as 
a gift expressing God’s loving desire to and for us (as a self-giving action directed toward 
communion), secondly as a bestowal of this desire to the recipient (recognized in the giving of 
one’s life).  To call the Eucharist a gift of desire emphasizes ‘full conscious active participation’ 
in the giving Christ enables, exemplifies, and inspires.  The gift of desire does not replace or 
exclude understanding the Eucharist as gifts of Christ’s body and blood, but without the recipient 
desiring to give oneself as Christ does, the Eucharistic gifts transform the self less fully, 
consciously, or actively.  Understanding the Eucharist as a gift of desire upholds a dynamic 
notion of ‘reception-by-giving.’  Insofar as eucharistic theology and practice seeks to foster 
‘fully, conscious, active participation’ in the divine mysteries, the desire and cooperative 
decision to ‘live eucharistically’ can and needs to be brought more fully into deliberate 
consciousness.   
3.4.4.1.  Eucharist Expressing God’s Loving Desire 
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The sacramental gift of Christ (the ‘saturated phenomenon par excellence’) in the 
Eucharist represents a ‘lover’s advance’ of the divine excess of goodness, truth, and love.  The 
Father who sent Christ to us as gift while we were still sinners (cf. Rom. 5:8) loved us first (cf. 1 
Jn. 4:19); this occurred originally in history in the person of Jesus Christ; this gift is given to us 
again sacramentally in each celebration of the Eucharist.   
In an excess of kenotic love which is agape and eros, Jesus’ words given in the 
Institution Narrative unveil the gifts’ significance: ‘this is my body, which will be given up for 
you’ and ‘this is the chalice of my blood: the blood of the new and eternal covenant, which will 
be poured out for you and for many for the forgiveness of sins.’  Since the gifts these words 
concern are given for the sake of a communion between the Giver and givee, to abide in love (cf. 
Jn. 15:9), these words first express Jesus’ loving desire for the redemption of sinners.  Jesus’ 
visible actions and gifts, with his audible word, express God’s love.  They concretely and 
definitively express God’s desire to give Godself to human beings. 
First in Christ (historically) and again (sacramentally) in each liturgy, words, gesture, 
food, and drink give this excess of charity in gifts able to be tasted, smelled, seen, touched, 
heard; they are even consumed and assimilated into the body.  In both the past (as an original 
event) and present (as the risen Christ speaks to the liturgical assembly) the words and gestures 
of Jesus recounted in the liturgy of the institution narrative express the ‘greater love’ Christ has 
for his disciples and the world.510  In perceivable words and deeds, the gifts express the 
superabundant loving desire God has for sinners, as Christ bestows the gifts of life even in view 
                                               
510 Cf. 1 Cor. 12:31b: Paul writes: ‘I will show you a still more excellent way,’ the way of charity (1 Cor. 13); cf. Jn. 
15:13: Jesus tells his disciples, ‘Greater love no one has than this, to lay down one’s life for one’s friends.’  
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of his imminent betrayal by his own disciples.511  It is not an abstract or remote love but is fully 
embodied and incarnate, surpassing even the desire in Jesus’ human will for self-preservation.   
Yet this gift-which-is-nourishment also includes a scandalous command: a call to live 
into trinitarian play: ‘Do this in memory of me.’  It is a scandalous command in that it demands 
of the recipient more than what any egoic desire would initiate or could put into action.  What 
Jesus commands is beyond what the egoic desire can imagine, desire, or will, since obedience to 
Jesus’ command is the undoing of the egoic self -- which is itself a critically important aspect of 
the gift.  As Marion noted concerning Augustine’s Confessions, truth scandalizes us because it 
“provokes a difference, and bars neutrality, for it always imposes a choice on the one who 
receives it and undergoes it.”512  Truth’s excess demands a person decide in only one of two 
possible ways: “either by the ordeal of bearing its excess ... finding himself affected, modified, 
altered; or [conversely] by dodging this excess, at the price of a retreat before the evidence, of a 
retreat far from the true.”513  The gift and the anamorphosis the Eucharist brings about (becoming 
l’adonné of the gift) nonetheless create the possibility that a recipient may be so changed as to 
obey the command, be transformed into a living and active member of the body of Christ, and a 
witness in one’s Sitz im Leben to God’s kenotic loving.  The Eucharist’s unity of beatitude and 
truth is hardly pure bliss for human beings to receive; it also scandalizes in that it calls ourselves 
into question, demands an account from us, demands a decision about oneself with no chance to 
avoid it.     
The Eucharistic gift ‘opens the self to itself’: it reveals one’s true selfhood as received 
from Christ, makes radical demands of us, and calls for changes in one’s ultimate concerns.  We 
                                               
511 Interestingly, all four scriptural accounts of the Institution Narrative (Mt 26:20-30; Mk. 14:22-26; Lk. 22:14-23; 
1 Cor. 11:23-26) associate the event with Jesus’ betrayal (‘On the night he was betrayed’ -- 1 Cor. 11:23). 
512 Marion, ISP, 108. 
513 Ibid., 109. 
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adopt these notions into a relational Eucharistic theology that speaks in categories of desire, 
selfhood, and relations.   
3.4.4.2.  Eucharist Bestowing God’s Loving Desire, To Be Lived 
Secondly, the Eucharist is a gift bestowing a share in God’s own loving desire, which is 
gracious, gratuitous (free, initiating).  By manifesting the divine excess of love to human beings, 
the Eucharist ‘re-presents’ anew the divine goodness, in the face of which l’adonné undergoes 
the ‘ordeal of the self’ described by Augustine (and recounted by Marion in In the Self’s Place): 
the egoic self is ‘undone,’ and the presence of divine goodness and truth, as the true place of the 
self, advances upon l’adonné in an ‘impossible’ gift of Christ’s body and blood, offered to be 
taken up in and by the flesh of the recipient and put into action.   
This is the ‘gift of desire’ in an ‘objective genitive’ sense, a gift which imparts and 
bestows God’s loving desire to us.  To love with God’s own loving -- with His loving and 
forgiving desire -- is our high calling.  It inspires loving beyond selfish benefit, to continue 
recognizing the need -- and in some degree, God-given capacity -- to imagine, discover, desire, 
initiate, and reveal agapic loving.  This gift of God’s own loving desire for us to take up and live 
from is a decisive moment in becoming Christian subjects; it provides what Marion describes in 
terms of ‘the erotic reduction’ (which excludes everything but the desire to love) and of 
‘something arising within me’ leading to a decision to become a lover.  The gift can be 
considered as a share in the ‘graciousness and gratuitousness’ of the divine giver, which is the 
freedom to love without prior reason (other than one’s own decision).  God’s free, loving, 
initiating, creative desire liberates the recipient to initiate love as the giver does; the desire and 
action -- not mere ‘items’ -- are meant to carry over to the recipient.   
206 
 
Insofar as the gift of the divine lover’s advance is recognized as such -- as a divine gift to 
oneself -- it arouses l’adonné’s gratitude and desire to give likewise of oneself.  Yet this desire is 
not definitively fulfilled in this lifetime: it is a gift of spiritual striving, epektasis, based not on 
lack but renewal of desire:  “the more it is fulfilled, the more there is a rebirth of desire, without 
end.... [It] is nourished by excess, not destroyed by it.”514  The recipient is radically challenged to 
become more fully like the gift it receives.   
Jesus’ words to his disciples are not ‘Watch this’ -- they are ‘Do this.’  What is the ‘this’ 
Jesus is showing them, that his disciples might in turn ‘do’?  They are to do what Jesus himself 
has just done, with their own gifts: disciples are to give their own ‘body and blood,’ their lives, 
their work, all their intention.  The gift is received by entering existentially into the giving Jesus 
has exemplified.  Jesus has just pledged the total and irrevocable gift of himself, giving his own 
body and blood, for the sake of the forgiveness of sins (taking an ultimate responsibility for 
every ‘other’).   
Therefore, doing what Jesus has just said he is doing, a disciple is to give of one’s self -- 
one’s ‘own’ body, one’s ‘own’ blood: gifts on loan as they really are -- as Jesus himself gives, 
unconditionally, for a purpose that glorifies God, in grateful memory of Jesus.  Jesus concretized 
and incarnated the gift of himself; we are called to do the same: “I give you a new 
commandment: Love one another as I have loved you” (Jn. 13:34).  One receives Jesus’ 
Eucharistic gifts most fully by fully giving in the same way again, with one’s own life: this 
reveals ‘full receipt’ of the gift, giving in kind.  Our greatest way to express gratitude is to 
become like him (insofar as we are able) by giving as he did.  The ‘most visible’ form this takes 
is in martyrdom, yet it can unfold in the course of anyone’s life.  Whether in marriage’s vocation 
                                               
514 Cf. Kearney, “Dialogue,” 21.  “So there is a real equivocity about concepts like will, desire, and so on.  And that 
equivocity is further evidence that there really is some limitation to metaphysics.” 
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to mutual and unreserved gift of ‘body and blood,’ or a priest’s or religious’ consecration, or any 
person’s existential decisions, all people have the opportunity to make of the fact and finality of 
death an opportunity for loving and definitive self-giving.  With Jesus’ gift of the Eucharist, we 
discover our own ‘body and blood’ as gifts both received and ‘givable,’ to and for others in 
charity, service, and witness. 
3.4.5.  Summary Assessment of Marion’s Gifts 
With the help of Marion’s attention to the dynamics of anamorphosis, recognition of the 
gift, trinitarian play, and the decision to become a lover, the richness of the Eucharistic gift 
becomes more evident.  In fully receiving the Eucharist -- loving as Jesus has loved, and doing 
so in memory of him -- disciples are called to give of themselves, as concretely as gifts of bread 
and wine, as nourishment for body and soul, out of love for other persons.  With the example of 
Jesus’ self-giving and the gift of the Eucharist, we can at least begin to imagine partaking of a 
share in God’s radical loving, even when it costs us everything.  Doing so means shedding 
idolatry at its source (namely, the illusory self) in a foretaste of the ‘more abundant’ eternal life 
Jesus came to give us (cf. Jn. 10:10).    
For liturgy to relate to life more clearly, some mediation between the two must become 
more evident.  This chapter has explored Marion’s thought as a mediation between the realms of 
liturgy and life, in particular by specifying the Eucharist’s gift of desire -- not as a gift to receive 
(only, or merely) but a gift to become and enact in one’s own self, flesh (‘body and blood’), life, 
and death.  Marion’s observations concerning dynamics of the encounter of God with human 
beings demand new notions of the self, impose obligations, and elicit our deepest desire for love.  
They contribute immensely to the project at hand.   
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As a theologian, Marion rewrites several topics -- revelation, language, theology, notions 
of the self -- from the primacy of God’s gift of love in Jesus Christ, the Incarnate Word.  In 
hindsight it becomes more ‘visible’ how Marion’s work has been concerned with the unique 
event of the Eucharist, which transgresses all boundaries of the sensible, of presence, causality, 
and relationship.  God’s gift of the Eucharist -- the gift of Godself (Christ’s Body and Blood; 
also of the Holy Spirit) -- sets up a relationship that maintains the dialectic of communion and 
distance which is so central to Marion’s thought.  The very natures of gift and of communion 
entail the distance which is necessarily part of the ‘mystery of charity’ that cannot be reduced to 
either complete union or separation.  The ‘word of the cross’ employs the so-called ‘death of 
God’ to unveil the mystery of charity; the gift of love celebrated by the liturgy of the Eucharist is 
part of our ‘Passover’ into our roles as disciples in the trinitarian play.   
The impact of the gift according to Marion’s phenomenology reshapes our notion of the 
subject; for our theological purposes it opens a way to describe the process of sanctification, of 
transformation into a more fully Christian subject.  First, as an inversion of subjectivity: no 
longer is a recipient an ‘ego,’ an autonomous agent who constitutes phenomena as objects.  
Rather, the givenness of the saturated phenomenon constitutes the recipient.  Next, an 
examination of the self’s desire calls the subject into question and reveals new aspects of the self.  
Our desire for the vita beata opens us to scandalous truth concerning the self, resulting in an 
ordeal for the self which reveals still more about the self and requires decision.  The impact of 
the divine gift is also reflected in the existential questions that concern various stages of 
experience.  All these aspects help describe for us how the divine gift in fact ‘opens the self’; 
thus they offer new ways to understand the relational impact of receiving the Eucharistic gift. 
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Marion’s phenomenological concepts help us understand how the divine gift interrupts the 
hidden ideologies of the ego (as self-sufficient), scientific knowledge (as all-encompassing of 
human concern), and market exchange (as characterizing all relationships) opens a new and far 
richer way to understand the importance of liturgy than a legalistic obligation to fulfill.   
Chauvet and Marion have common themes in their writings on the Eucharist: language of 
praise, sign, gift, blessing, presence, withdrawal/distance, abandoned flesh, the ‘word of the 
cross,’ personal recognition, Christ’s ‘existential’ (rather than ritual) sacrifice.  Self-giving is 
upheld as the height of true freedom, and expressed -- incarnated -- either in one’s own body or 
symbolically.  It is the gift by and of a person to and for persons, for the sake of a covenant 
relationship.  All of this helps us appreciate more fully the gift of the Eucharist from a relational 
perspective. 
That being said -- and while he protests firmly to the contrary -- Marion’s 
phenomenology is so often infused with Christian themes (love, idols, icons), examples (from 
Christian scriptures), and implied references (creation, grace) that its integration into theology is 
easily accomplished.  His phenomenology of givenness bears many characteristics of the fruit of 
theological reflection interrelating experience, creation, and grace.  Noel Dermot O’Donoghue 
summarizes the nature of Marion’s contribution well when he hails God Without Being as “above 
all .... [i]t is first and last a prayer,” for it is “at the heart of the giving and receiving that prayer 
arises ... the original mystery that issues into time from beyond time.”515  This statement applies 
fittingly to Marion’s entire oeuvre which, even as it benefits from corrections by philosophers 
and theologians alike, serves more as a single-minded witness to God’s giving than as either a 
philosophical treatise or an account of how God’s gifts are cooperatively received.  As such 
                                               
515 Neil Dermot O’Donoghue, “In the Beginning was the Gift... A marginal note on ‘God without Being,’” New 
Blackfriars 76 No. 895 (July/August 1995), 352; 351-353. 
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Marion’s phenomenological contributions -- anamorphosis, recognition of the gift, the nature of 
encounters -- are most welcome within this theological concern.  In a liturgical setting and in 
conjunction with other thinkers, concerns for the purity of phenomenological methodology 
recede in favor of a (reasonably) complete account of the liturgy of the Eucharist.   Marion’s 
phenomenological writings make invaluable contributions to our project of a relational 
Eucharistic theology, since they attend so carefully to human experience of and encounter with 
the divine.   
As with Chauvet, Marion’s writings on givenness reframe the reality of grace.  Every 
event, every ‘thing,’ every encounter is gift of grace.  From the totality of creation to the most 
fleeting perception of beauty, these did not have to be, but are occasion for recognition: most of 
all, recognition of encounter and relationship, and the joyful (if challenging) obligation to love.  
Yet, as recounted above, Marion’s account has its blind spots, one of which is the ‘horizontal’ or 
social aspect of faith.  Gifts can have a great influence on social relations -- not least when they 
are misinterpreted, leading to envy, accusation, and violence.  In order to both raise these issues 
and observe how Jesus’ gift offers redemption from the causes of violence, we now recruit our 




IV.  Girard: A Thinker of Desire 
 
4.1.  Overview of Girard’s Mimetic Theory    
4.1.1.  Seeds of Conflicts: Desire as Mimetic 
4.1.2.  Growth of Conflicts: Rivalry and Identity Crises 
4.1.3.  ‘Resolution’: The Scapegoat Mechanism 
4.1.3.1.  Murder of an Expendable Victim 
4.1.3.2.  Its Anthropological Purpose: Restoration of Unity 
4.1.3.3.  Its Religious Disguise: Sacrifice 
4.1.3.4.  Effects of Scapegoat Mechanism: A Deceitful ‘Peace’ 
4.1.4.  The Scandalous Cost of Forsaking Sacrificial Violence  
 
4.2.  Theological Applications of Mimetic Theory 
4.2.1.  The Satanic Nature of the Scapegoat Mechanism 
4.2.2.  Salvation Through Imitation of Christ 
4.2.3.  Jesus’ Subversion of Sacrifice: The ‘Original Liturgical Reform’ 
4.2.3.1.  First Stage: The Kingdom of God Challenges the World’s Order 
4.2.3.2.  Second Stage: The World’s Judgment on the Word 
4.2.3.3.  Third Stage: Christ’s Nonviolent Fidelity to His Mission Unto Death 
4.2.3.4.  Fourth Stage: Resurrection as the Father’s Judgment 
4.2.3.5.  Fifth Stage: Sending of the Holy Spirit 
4.2.3.6.  The Cause and Value of Jesus’ Death 
4.2.3.7.  Girard’s Refined Stance on Sacrifice 
4.2.3.8.  The Demands of Conversion and Discipleship 
4.2.4.  Worship in a Violent World: The Lamb of God Reconciles the World to God 
4.2.4.1.  Yom Kippur: Atonement Within the Jewish Liturgical Context 
4.2.4.2.  Jesus’ Saving Death as a Liturgical Atonement 
4.2.4.3.  The New Covenant Liturgy: The Last Supper    
4.2.4.4.  Eucharist/Mass 
4.2.4.5.  The Love Behind the Gift 
4.2.5.  Sacrifice Reappropriated 
4.2.5.1.  Reframing Creation and Sin 
4.2.5.2.  Recasting Redemption 
4.2.5.3.  Sacrifice According to Christ’s Image 
 
4.3.  Critical Reception of Girard’s Contribution 
4.3.1.  Girard’s Contributions 
4.3.1.1.  Clarifying Christ’s Unique Sacrifice 
4.3.1.2.  Restoring the Gospel Challenge of Nonviolence 
4.3.1.3.  Relating Desire and the Holy Spirit 
4.3.2.  Shortcomings 
4.3.2.1.  Weak Soteriology 
4.3.2.2.  Equivocation of All Archaic Sacrifice 
4.3.2.3.  Developments Needed 
4.3.3.  Others’ Critiques  
4.3.3.1.  Impact 
4.3.3.2.  Strengths 
4.3.3.3.  Critiques 
 
4.4.  Applying Mimetic Theory to the Liturgy of the Eucharist 
212 
 
4.4.1.  Liturgy of the Eucharist as a Gift of Desire 
4.4.1.1.  The Gift of Christ’s Loving Desire 
4.4.1.2.  The Gift of Christ’s Loving Desire in the Liturgy of the Eucharist  
4.4.2.  Ritual Reversal of the Origins of Violence 
4.4.3.  Gift of New Relations  
 
 
IV.  Thinker of Desire: René Girard 
 To refine our notion of the ‘gracious and scandalous gift of desire’ given in the Liturgy of 
the Eucharist, we now turn to the ‘mimetic theory’ of René Girard (1923-2015).  A literary 
scholar by training, Girard also explored ethnology, anthropology, and biblical studies; his 
theory has also been taken up in politics, economics, sociology, psychology, and theology.  Its 
adoption by several theologians (particularly Raymund Schwager) brought Girard’s mimetic 
theory into dialogue with theology.  We employ his insights here to highlight the scandalous and 
liberating impact of the Eucharist upon desire, identity, and relations.    
 Born on Christmas 1923 in Avignon, France, Girard obtained an undergraduate degree in 
Medieval History at École Nationale des Chartes in Paris in 1947, and obtained a doctorate in 
History from Indiana University in 1950.516  Girard’s initial book Mensonge romantique et vérité 
romanesque (1961; Deceit, Desire, and the Novel)517 and a work on Dostoevsky518 (1963) 
contrasted ‘the romantic lie’ with ‘novelistic truth,’ positing that desire is mediated to us by 
others.   While teaching at Johns Hopkins University, Girard was one of the organizers for the 
1966 conference that introduced French theory and structuralism to America.  Lucien Goldmann, 
                                               
516 “American Opinion of France, 1940-1943.”   
517 René Girard, Mensonge romantique et vérité Romanesque (Paris: Grasset, 1961).  English edition: René Girard, 
Deceit, Desire and the Novel: Self and Other in Literary Structure, trans. Yvonne Freccero (Baltimore: Johns 
Hopkins University Press, 1965). Hereafter DDN. 
518 René Girard, Critique dans un souterrain (Lausanne: Lausanne, L’Âge d’Homme,1976).  English edition: René 
Girard, Resurrection from the Underground: Feodor Dostoevsky, trans. James G. Williams, Studies in Violence, 
Mimesis, & Culture (East Lansing, MI: Michigan State University Press, 2012). 
213 
 
Roland Barthes, Jacques Lacan and Jacques Derrida all participated; “Girard quipped that he was 
‘bringing la peste to the United States.’”519   
In La Violence et le Sacré (1972; Violence and the Sacred),520 Girard -- against the 
anthropological, psychiatric, and structuralist theories of Frazer, Freud, Lévi-Strauss, Hubert and 
Mauss -- connected the notion of an originary murder with sacrificial mechanisms, which both 
hid and perpetuated violence within human culture.  The sacrificial system in fact created the 
social order (and sustained it), rather than vice versa.  This captured the interest of Raymund 
Schwager (1935-2004), Professor of Systematic Theology at Innsbruck, Austria.  In 1974 
Schwager began corresponding with Girard and proved both influential upon Girard and helpful 
for a wider acceptance of mimetic theory among theologians.   
After other brief teaching posts at Duke, Bryn Mawr, and SUNY-Buffalo, in 1981 Girard 
became the inaugural Andrew B. Hammond Professor in French Language, Literature and 
Civilization at Stanford in 1981.  Author of over 25 books, Girard’s texts Des choses cachées 
depuis la fondation du monde (1978; Things Hidden Since the Foundation of the World)521 and 
Je vois Satan tomber comme l'éclair (1999; I See Satan Fall Like Lightning)522 most directly 
relate his theory to biblical texts.  Recipient of six honorary degrees, in 2005 Girard was named 
an immortel of the Académie française. 
                                               
519 “Stanford professor and eminent French theorist René Girard, member of the Académie Française, dies at 91,” 
accessed on 30 November 2017 at https://news.stanford.edu/2015/11/04/rene-girard-obit-110415/.   
 
520 René Girard, La Violence et le Sacré (Paris: Grasset, 1972).  English edition: Violence and the Sacred, trans. 
Patrick Gregory (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1977).  Hereafter VS. 
521 René Girard, Des choses cachées depuis la fondation du monde (Paris: Grasset, 1978).  English edition: Things 
Hidden Since the Foundation of the World: Research undertaken in collaboration with Jean-Michel Oughourlian 
and G. Lefort, trans. Stephen Bann and Michael Metteer (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1987).  Hereafter TH. 
522 René Girard, Je vois Satan tomber comme l'éclair (Paris: Grasset, 1999).  English edition: René Girard, I See 
Satan Fall Like Lightning (Maryknoll, N.Y.: Orbis, 2001).  Hereafter ISSF. 
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Literary and ethnological studies led Girard to study the relation of sacrifice to religion, 
and therefore to Greek tragedy and the biblical texts, uncovering a contrast between what he calls 
the Christian ‘logos of the [evangelist] John’ and the worldly and violent ‘logos of Heraclitus.’523  
Girard’s mimetic theory ambitiously seeks to account for (no less than) the origins of religion 
and of all human culture; others have found it relevant for anthropology, psychology, sociology, 
politics, economics, literature, and more.  While such bold claims cause some to question the 
theory’s effectiveness across academic specialties, “Theology is less worried by Girard’s kind of 
multidisciplinary promiscuity, and in fact sees it as essential to its own task.”524  According to its 
proponents, mimetic theory offers theologians an overarching perspective traditionally provided 
by philosophy as the ‘handmaiden of theology.’   
Though Girard says “all of my books have been more or less explicit apologies of 
Christianity,”525 and contain several theological assertions, he does not claim to be a theologian.  
His mimetic theory is an anthropological insight drawn from novels and biblical texts.  Girard’s 
advocates consider this modesty admirable; critics find it disingenuous.  (This claim and its 
reception is analogous to Marion’s claim to ‘pure phenomenology.’)  Proponents find his work 
attractive since by way of literature, ethnology, and comparative religion, it affirms the unique 
revelation of Jesus Christ and the Gospels: “Girard’s impact on theology has been considerable, 
as theologians recognise in his work a new way of conceiving of the doctrine of the atonement, 
and in particular a fresh contribution to Christianity’s theological understanding of sacrifice.”526  
                                               
523 Cf. Girard, TH, 263-280. 
524 Michael Kirwan, Girard and Theology (New York: T&T Clark, 2009), 5.  Hereafter GT. 
525 René Girard, Battling to the End: Conversations with Benoit Chantre, trans. Mary Baker (East Lansing, MI: 
Michigan State University Press, Chicago Distribution, Kindle Edition), Kindle location 186.  Hereafter BE. 
526 Michael Kirwan, Discovering Girard: Religion Today (London: Darton Longman Todd, 2005), Kindle Edition, 
Kindle Locations 2313-2315.  Hereafter DG. 
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Girard’s creative approach can thus offer a new apologia for Christianity.527  Amid a secularized 
and pluralistic world, mimetic theory holds Jesus’ death as a critical moment in human history.   
With the help of Girard’s Christian interpreters (particularly Raymund Schwager, James 
Alison, and Robert Daly) we will explore the implications of mimetic theory for the Liturgy of 
the Eucharist.  Mimetic theory offers an anthropological rationale underlying Christ’s most 
gracious self-giving, which both reverses the genesis of violent sacrifice and bids his disciples to 
imitate what he has done for them (‘Do this in memory of me’); as such it more closely relates 
the ‘nature’ and ‘grace’ of Jesus’ action.  Just as our treatment of Marion in chapter 3 used his 
philosophical thought to help clarify theological matters (against the direction of Marion’s own 
movement), so here Girard’s mimetic theory is employed as a teaching tool for a relational 
theology of the Eucharist, but without reducing the Eucharist to elements of Girard’s mimetic 
theory.  After an overview of Girard’s mimetic theory (4.1) we explore some of his theological 
statements and the proposals for mimetic theory and theology (4.2.) of Raymund Schwager, 
James Alison, and Robert Daly.  Critical reception of Girard (4.3.) follows.  My proposals for 
further theological application of mimetic theory to the Eucharist (4.3) follow, particularly 
concerning matters of desire, identity, and relations.   
4.1.  Overview of Girard’s Mimetic Theory    
For Girard, “No single question has more of a future today than the question of man,”528 
and his mimetic theory aims to address this question (and its variations) simply and 
comprehensively.  Girard seeks to “take up an old problem [of the question of man]... and 
radically rethink it”529 through questioning human desire: How does desire arise?  What is 
                                               
527 See Grant Kaplan, René Girard, Unlikely Apologist: Mimetic Theory and Fundamental Theology (South Bend, 
IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 2016). 




desire’s role in the process of hominization?  What prompts human violence (the desire to kill)?  
How does desire shape human action and culture?  According to Girard, philosophy, psychology, 
and the life sciences have all missed the mark trying to answer these questions; they misguided 
inquiry into the origin of religion in particular.   
Girard’s mimetic theory begins with a look at the ‘mimetic’ origin and nature of desire, 
which generates a potent stew of rivalry, resentment, and conflict.  These conflicts easily escalate 
into communal identity crises which resolve through the deceitful ‘solution’ of the ‘single victim 
mechanism,’ more commonly known as ‘scapegoating.’  The Judeo-Christian scriptures 
gradually unveil this lie, culminating in a ‘subversion from within’ of the sacrificial system by 
Jesus.  Girard’s anthropological critique of sacrifice has important implications for theology, 
which will be explored after the following explanation. 
4.1.1.  Seeds of Conflicts: Desire as Mimetic 
The origins of desire, Girard reasons, are best explained by the human tendency toward 
imitation.  Against the grain of literature since the Romantic period and of philosophy since the 
Enlightenment, Girard debunks the notion of a purely ‘autonomous self’ who is the origin of his 
own desires.530  Under the heading of “Fundamental Anthropology” in Things Hidden Since the 
Foundation of the World, Girard cites Aristotle’s Poetics: “Man differs from the other animals in 
his greater aptitude for imitation.”531  The human inclination to imitate orients and shapes not 
only desires and actions of individuals but all human relationships, religion, and culture: “[All] 
human relations are absolutely reciprocal, the worst as well as the best[.]  What is that?  It’s 
imitation.”532  Girard often refers to this process of imitation by the term ‘mimesis.’533  This first 
                                               
530 Cf. Girard, DDN. 
531 Girard, TH,1.  Reference is to Aristotle’s Poetics, paragraph 4.  
532 René Girard, “Mimesis, Sacrifice, and the Bible,” in Ann W. Astell and Sandor Goodhart, eds., Sacrifice, 
Scripture, and Substitution: Readings in Ancient Judaism and Christianity (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre 
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insight -- deceptively simple -- will offer profound explanatory power regarding violent 
behavior, particularly its escalation, which otherwise appears most irrational.   
According to Girard this powerful impulse toward imitation/mimesis shapes all human 
activity: “there is nothing, or next to nothing, in human behavior that is not learned, and all 
learning is based on imitation.  If human beings suddenly stopped imitating, all forms of culture 
would vanish.”534  Imitation is more fundamental to human beings than even conscious desire or 
deliberate action.  Imitation shapes not only behavior but desire -- a critically important point.  
At first unconsciously but then with greater deliberation, human beings are driven to imitate one 
another’s desires.  We ‘learn’ and imitate not merely to desire but the desires for particular things 
themselves from other people.  Again, this insight into the unconsciously contagious and ever-
intensifying nature of desire becomes exceedingly important for explaining otherwise ‘irrational’ 
desires and behaviors, even as people become destructive of others or themselves.   
For Girard human desire is neither merely animal nor determined by conscious willing 
alone.  Desire is “grafted onto” biological needs and appetites (respiration, food, physical safety, 
procreation).  When a subject observes the desire of someone else (designated a ‘model’ or 
‘mediator’) for a particular object, the subject acquires the model’s desire for oneself.  Action 
taken by the model communicates or ‘mediates’ a particular desire and imparts a judgment of 
value.  Girard employs the image of a triangle to describe the relations among a subject, the 
model, and the object of desire:   
                                                                                                                                                       
Dame, 2011), 43.  Though not highlighted as such by Girard, the human desire to be imitated expands the 
implications of mimetic theory still further.   
533 “Rather than the exhausted word imitation, then, I chose to employ the Greek word mimesis.... The only 
advantage of the Greek word is that it makes the conflictual aspect of mimesis conceivable.... [whose] cause... is 
rivalry provoked by an object, the acquisitive mimesis which must always be our point of departure.”  Girard, TH, 
18.   




The desire of a model for an object (downward right arrow) communicates to the subject (upper 
left arrow, between model and subject) a similar desire for the given object (bottom arrow).  
When a given desired object is available in abundance, relations between the subject and model 
can remain benign: both can enjoy possession and enjoyment of the object, and the model is no 
obstacle.  Imitation of a model often progresses from mere appearance to belongings and actions; 
Girard calls this ‘external mediation.’    
This tendency toward imitation of models and their desires can be for good or ill; the 
result of envy receives so much emphasis in Girard that imitation of the good is often 
overlooked.  When imitation according to ‘external mediation’ occurs toward an abundant 
material good or a transcendent good (such as virtue), ‘good mimesis’ is operative.  According to 
Girard human beings never escape mimesis altogether, but mimesis can become occasion for 
moral good.   
An important element of this insight is the contagious nature of desire, which is often 
transferred without the conscious consent or decision of the recipient.  An object becomes 
attractive simply when a model is already attracted to it, and this desire intensifies (even 
unconsciously) as subject and model see each other attracted by it.  No prior deliberation or 
decision must precede the transfer of desire; in fact, the desire is transferred first and only 
subsequently subject to deliberation, which may not entirely extinguish the desire either.  
4.1.2.  Growth of Conflicts: Rivalry and Identity Crises 
What perhaps begins as admiration, however, can turn sour very quickly.  When the 
mutually desired object is (or becomes) a limited commodity -- actually or perceived as such -- 
219 
 
then the disciple and model begin competing against each other.  The disciple’s desire makes the 
model intensify his own desire and action, such that now the model is now imitator of the 
disciple.  The model is no longer the sole origin and owner of the desire, but among a pair of 
competitors who learn from each other how to acquire the object more successfully.  Such 
competition engenders joy at personal success and Schadenfreude at the other’s failures.  A 
person’s desire to imitate the model acquires such intensity that the subject has a ‘metaphysical 
desire’ to acquire the other’s very being -- desiring to become the model oneself, eliminate the 
other, and regain security.  This is ‘internal mediation’ of desire and the birth of rivalry.  
In such a rivalry, the subject strives to surpass the model, thereby imitating him; the 
model, conversely, becomes more like the subject as he likewise becomes a competitor who 
fends off another to possess the object for himself.  While “not sinful per se, it is ... a permanent 
occasion of sin.”535  Slights, whether perceived or real, become exaggerated; their mutual 
imitation becomes so overpowering it becomes more accurate to say the rivalry possesses them.  
Their interactions -- whether appearing to be courteous or openly violent -- get rationalized as 
serving justice.   
Such “exasperation of mimetic rivalry” Girard calls ‘scandal’ (Gk. skandalon), “a very 
common inability to walk away from mimetic rivalry which turns it into an addiction.... [such as] 
drugs, sex, power, and above all morbid competitiveness, professional, sexual, political, 
intellectual, and spiritual, especially spiritual.”536  Models become scandals (obstacles) to 
subjects as they prevent subjects from obtaining their desire.  The frustration of desire that 
subjects experience is likewise a ‘scandal’ which both attracts and aggravates the subject all the 
more.   
                                               
535 This statement exemplifies the kind of theological statements Girard makes from his anthropological analyses.  
René Girard, The Girard Reader, trans. James G. Williams (New York: Crossroad, 1996), 198.  Hereafter Reader. 
536 Girard, Reader, 198. 
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This mimetic process creates an ever-greater similarity between disciple and model and 
leads to an identity crisis, since all bases for differentiation disappear.  The end result is far from 
benign: “Each becomes the imitator of his own imitator and the model of his own model.... 
Violence is generated by this process; or rather violence is the process itself when two or more 
partners try to prevent one another from appropriating the object they all desire.”537  The impulse 
to imitate aggravates the fear of loss of identity or even life, which ‘justifies’ violence to secure 
superiority over the other.  Confusion over what makes oneself different from the other gives rise 
to panic and violence.   
Mimetic rivalries eventually draw their subjects and models into seemingly irresolvable 
conflict.  The object that subjects and models both desire becomes either unattainable, too scarce, 
or a stimulus for envy; this is especially the case with ‘metaphysical desire’ to ‘become the 
other’ for oneself and in fact eliminate the ‘actual other’ entirely.  The rivalry becomes 
obsessive, and yet they need each other as identifiable enemies who embody all that is 
detestable.   
To make matters worse, such conflicts and crises between persons compound one another 
into the social relations of larger groups.  Society becomes layered with mimetic rivalries, and 
communal identity crises arise.  Furthermore, the desires we assimilate for ourselves are already 
tainted with rivalry and violence: humankind thus becomes enmeshed in structures of political, 
economic, and social evil.  Against people’s expectations, the complete absence of 
differentiation leads not to unity but terror.  Each member of the community becomes a rival and 
the object of envy or blame of some other; competition breaks out as each defends their own 
innocence and is ready to accuse others of grave offenses.  Such a communal crisis (which 
                                               
537 Girard, Reader, 9.  Chapter is a reprint of René Girard, “Mimesis and Violence,” Berkshire Review 14 (1979), 9-
19.   
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Girard also calls a ‘mimetic crisis’) generates anxiety and aggression to a climactic point that 
demands resolution.  Society needs a cathartic outlet for its violence, some means of re-
establishing peace.  Societies can manage a degree of stability -- but at a steep price.   
4.1.3.  ‘Resolution’: The Scapegoat Mechanism 
The best-known feature of Girard’s mimetic theory is what he calls ‘the scapegoat 
mechanism.’  Borrowing the scriptural image of the scapegoat (Lev. 16:7-10, 20-22) upon whom 
the sins of the community are placed on the Day of Atonement, for Girard a scapegoat is any 
chosen victim whose expulsion and/or death unites the rest of the community, to resolve its 
crises of identity.  Upon such a victim a community discharges its violence, in a foolhardy 
attempt to be rid of the supposed contagion -- all the while perpetuating it. 
4.1.3.1.  Murder of an Expendable Victim 
Girard says the means by which all groups resolve these identity crises -- indeed, the very 
foundation for all human civilizations -- is no less than murder.  Murder both was committed (in 
the past, at humanity’s foundation) and is committed (in the present) against a single victim, in 
an all-against-one action.   
When no ‘reasonable’ basis for distinction is available, a process that appears random or 
acting as ‘divine chance’ is employed to select the victim.538  In truth however, the process is 
never random.  One way or another, society chooses precisely a victim whose death will incur no 
reprisal, no perpetuation of violence:  “All our sacrificial victims ... [have] one essential 
characteristic: ... [they] can be exposed to violence without fear of reprisal.... The considerable 
importance of this freedom from reprisal ... [means] that sacrifice is primarily an act of violence 
                                               
538 One might recall the ‘random’ selection of victims in The Lottery by Shirley Jackson or, more recently, The 
Hunger Games by Suzanne Collins. 
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without risk of vengeance.539  The powerless victim, deemed guilty, ‘substitutes’ as the collective 
guilt, contagion, or fault of the community.  “Sacrifice.... is a substitute for all the members of 
the community, offered up by the members themselves.  The sacrifice serves to protect the entire 
community from its own violence; it prompts the entire community to choose victims outside 
itself.”540  The innocent and defenseless victim, upon whom the community projects its guilt, 
personifies or embodies the evil to be expelled, often by being assigned a less-than-fully-human 
dignity, whether due to genetics, heresy, moral evil, supernatural forces, etc..   
4.1.3.2.  Its Anthropological Purpose: Restoration of Unity 
 While demonstrated most visibly in the context of religious sacrifice, Girard argues that 
the scapegoat mechanism arises from simply human causes and meets human needs.  The murder 
re-unifies the community by finding a victim that all its (other) members agree to exclude.  
Traditionally, the field of ethnology (in the works of Joseph de Maistre,541 Henri Hubert and 
Marcel Mauss542) described a sacrifice as a ritual in which an expendable innocent victim ‘pays 
for’ communal guilt with its life.  For Girard however “There is no question of ‘expiation.’  
Rather, society is seeking to deflect upon ... a ‘sacrificeable’ victim, the violence that would 
otherwise be vented on its own members, the people it most desires to protect.”543  The scapegoat 
mechanism provides a ‘safe’ and justifiable catharsis of violence upon an artificially ‘guilty’ 
victim who ‘deserves’ the punishment.  Moreover, while execution of the victim is perhaps 
                                               
539 Girard, Reader, 82. 
540 Ibid., 77. 
541 Cf. Joseph de Maistre, “Traite sur les sacrifices,” in Les Soirees de Saint-Petersbourg (Lyons, 1890); English 
trans.: Joseph de Maistre, “Elucidation on Sacrifices,” in St. Petersburg Dialogues, trans. Richard A. Lebrun 
(Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 1993).  Referred to in René Girard, Violence and the Sacred, trans. 
Patrick Gregory (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University, 1977), chapter 1. 
542 Cf. Henri Hubert and Marcel Mauss, Sacrifice: Its Nature and Function, trans. W.D. Halls (Chicago: University 
of Chicago Press, 1964).  Referred to in Girard’s Violence and the Sacred, chapter 1. 
543 Girard, Reader, 73. 
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shameful, the belief that execution of this victim will certainly produce peace becomes 
unassailable.  The peaceable end justifies the unseemly means. 
The murder re-unites the community by replacing the unfulfilled desire-for-acquisition 
with a desire-to-exclude -- which, without fail, is fulfilled.  “For the contagion that divides, 
fragments, and decomposes communities is substituted a collective contagion that gathers all 
those scandalized to act against a single victim who is promoted to the role of universal 
scandal.”544  All this occurs for purely anthropological reasons, even if it carries a magical or 
quasi-religious aura with it.  “Whereas mimetic appropriation is inevitably divisive, causing the 
contestants to fight..., mimetic antagonism is ultimately ... reunitive since it provides the 
antagonists with an object they can really share ... they can all rush against that victim in order 
to destroy it or drive it away.”545  Since acquisition cannot satisfy desire, violence becomes 
justifiable and most practical because it alone reunifies a community.  This action is regenerative 
for the community since, by the exclusion of the victim, the community renews and clarifies its 
sense of identity, if only by negation.   
4.1.3.3.  Its Religious Disguise: Sacrifice 
Since the guilt of its violent murder is difficult for a community to bear, the murder is 
given a holy disguise as ritual sacrifice.  Religious justifications such as sacrifice rationalize the 
‘need’ for exclusionary violence:  
[The] sacrificial process requires a certain degree of misunderstanding [méconnaissance].  The 
celebrants do not and must not comprehend the true role of the sacrificial act.  The theological 
basis of the sacrifice has a crucial role in fostering this misunderstanding.  It is the god who 
supposedly demands the victims; he alone in principle, who savors the smoke from the altars 
and requisitions the slaughtered flesh.546   
 
                                               
544 Girard, ISSF, 21. 
545 Ibid., 13.  Emphasis added. 
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Mythic sacrificial rituals accomplish this misunderstanding by hiding from the community its 
own violent origins.  Ironically, however, the community unconsciously affirms and perpetuates 
its continuity with those violent origins through its practice of sacrificial ritual.   
Ritual sacrifices thus both conceal and reveal how any community establishes its identity 
by murder.  Religious trappings of ritual, hierarchies, sacred realities and impurity all conspire to 
conceal and justify what is actually violence.  Under a religious or memorial pretext, an act of 
violence is the community’s foundation; furthermore, violent sacrifices re-establish communal 
security.  Thus, as Girard famously states, “Violence is the heart and secret soul of the sacred.”547  
Whether in a religious or secular context, the scapegoat mechanism manifests itself as a 
sacrifice: “Sacrifice is the resolution and conclusion of ritual because a collective murder or 
expulsion resolves the mimetic crisis that ritual mimics.  What kind of mechanism can this be? 
.... a scapegoat effect.”548  Such sacrificial pretexts are especially vivid when an identity crisis 
raises the question of ‘who are the true believers?’  An intolerable lack of difference or pecking 
order turns insignificant details into radical threats that require violent action.    
Sacrifices -- religious or secular -- always come with rationalizations to justify the 
violence they incur.  Girard, however, steadfastly upholds the innocence of all sacrificial victims: 
“Violence is frequently called irrational.  It has its reasons, however, and can marshal some 
rather convincing ones when the need arises.  Yet these reasons cannot be taken seriously, no 
matter how valid they may appear.”549  The supposed guilt of the victim is always a fiction, a 
fabricated lie.  Despite its rationalizations -- religious or otherwise -- the scapegoating process 
has no basis beyond preservation of power.   
                                               
547 Girard, VS, 31. 
548 Girard, Reader, 11. 
549 Girard, VS, 2.   
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 The scapegoat mechanism is virtually unstoppable: “When unappeased, violence seeks 
and always finds a surrogate victim.”550  The combination of the communal identity crisis, the 
failure to possess the desired object, and the aggression these instigate becomes too much for 
communities or institutions to withhold its violence any longer.  The community becomes a 
frenzied mob of all-against-one. 
4.1.3.4.  Effects of Scapegoat Mechanism: A Deceitful ‘Peace’ 
The scapegoat mechanism appears to achieve peace within the community: it resolves 
identity crises, restores unanimity, and cathartically removes aggression.  This peace, however, is 
due to a ‘double transference’ by the persecutors.  First the victim is deemed guilty of some 
offense, usually from a formulaic list of ‘worst possible’ crimes: infanticide, cannibalism, rape, 
witchcraft, and sodomy.551  Next, since the victim’s guilt unites the community, the victim is 
revered -- even deified -- for how it facilitated reconciliation.  All the while, violence is further 
justified and solidified within the life and history of the community.  The scapegoat mechanism 
“permits [a community] to escape their own violence, removes them from violence, and bestows 
on them all the institutions and beliefs that define their humanity.”552  Such peace, however, is 
fraudulent; its participants are only enmeshed all the more in violence and guilt.  
Even aside from the physical violence it inflicts, the scapegoat mechanism has several 
detrimental effects that might otherwise go unnoticed.  The mechanism justifies murder, whether 
of individuals or nations.  Scapegoating leads people to abdicate responsibility, blaming others 
for fabricated offenses and bestowing an impersonal state with authority to kill.  Any trait or 
                                               
550 Girard, VS, 2.  Emphasis added. 
551 Girard treats ‘persecution texts’ at length in The Scapegoat, trans. Yvonne Freccero (Baltimore, MD: Johns 
Hopkins University Press, 1986), chapters 1 and 2.  Hereafter Scapegoat. 
552 Girard, VS, 306. 
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category by which people can be differentiated from the rest becomes a potential means of 
scapegoating a powerless minority.    
Scapegoating also involves its participants in a twofold process of victimization: first 
one’s own person or group is deemed a victim (or, the potential victim of a threat), and then 
some other (whether within or outside the given community) is deemed a ‘guilty’ sacrificial 
victim fit for expulsion or death.  The first victimization does away with personal responsibility, 
the second does away with the bothersome ‘other.’   
4.1.4.  The Scandalous Cost of Forsaking Sacrificial Violence  
As simple and noble as the solution (withdrawing from scapegoating and violence) 
appears, it entails the greatest cost.  One who protests against sacrificial violence immediately 
stands out as an isolated prospective victim, upon whom violence could fall and receive no 
retribution.  To expose and refrain from scapegoating demands a total wager: Girard says “in 
order not to inflict violence, one must be prepared to submit to it.... I must resign myself to 
suffering if I am going to avoid becoming a persecutor myself.”553  There is no ‘neutral’ locus 
from which to live nonviolently; in a violent world, withdrawal from violence invites it upon 
oneself.  The ethical response demanded by nonviolence is costly to one’s ego, calling for what 
Scott Cowdell describes as “the self-sacrificial refusal of sacrificial violence.”554  This steep cost 
calls for a martyr’s courage and commitment.  Compounding this ethical challenge is that failure 
to question, call out, or interrupt the scapegoat mechanism complies with the status quo.  
Innocent or neutral bystanders are as mythical as the guilty victim: they do not exist.  Prophetic 
peacemakers, however, make convenient victims.  
                                               
553 René Girard, “Mimetic Violence and Sacrifice,” in The One By Whom Scandal Comes, trans. M.B. DeBevoise 
(East Lansing, MI: Western Michigan University Press, 2014), 71-72.  Hereafter TOBWSC. 
554 Scott Cowdell, René Girard and the Nonviolent God (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 2018), 
70.  Hereafter RGNG. 
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This extended analysis and critique of violence and sacrifice functions simply on an 
anthropological level, and operates with or without religious forms or justifications.  It exposes 
the deep-seated desire both to lie and to kill with which people comply without awareness.  It 
nonetheless carries strong implications for theology, particularly interpretation of Scripture, 
soteriology, and liturgy.     
4.2.  Theological Applications of Mimetic Theory 
 We now move from Girard’s anthropological analysis to theology, using statements by 
Girard and some ‘Girardian’ theologians.  First, the crossing of this boundary from anthropology 
into theology must simply be noted: Girard himself makes several theological claims even while 
admitting he is not a theologian.  Within the theological context of this dissertation, we 
deliberately seek to draw such theological conclusions, and so welcome such input from Girard 
and others.   
Mimetic theory contributes keen insights into interpretation of scripture for theology in 
general and soteriology in particular.  First, the Gospels unveil the satanic nature of the 
scapegoat mechanism (4.2.1.).  Next, various thinkers transpose the insights of mimetic theory 
into theology for a distinctively Girardian soteriology of atonement.  These constructive 
theological adaptations of Girard’s anthropology employ, quite interestingly, important elements 
from the Letter to the Hebrews, which Girard initially criticized vehemently.  Such elements 
include the unity of Jesus Christ as ‘priest in the order of Melchizedek’ and Victim; Jesus’ 
‘learning obedience through his sufferings’; and atonement as a liturgical action done at God’s 
gracious initiative, which purifies gift-giving of its sacrificial trappings.  Raymund Schwager 
interprets Jesus’ subjection to the scapegoat mechanism as its subversion rather than the epitome 
or embodiment of sacrifice (4.2.2.).  Within an explicitly liturgical context, James Alison notes 
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how the Letter to the Hebrews portrays Christ’s death as an act of self-giving to those being 
atoned, not as a sacrifice meant to appease a wrathful God whose justice must be upheld (4.2.3.).  
Robert Daly relates Christ’s unique act to broader systematic issues concerning the Trinity and 
liturgical celebration of the Eucharist (4.3.4.).   
4.2.1.  The Satanic Nature of the Scapegoat Mechanism 
While Girard calls the scapegoat mechanism “a purely human abomination,”555 its 
insidious nature transcends the limits of ‘anthropological’ terminology: scriptural testimony 
concerning Satan, the devil, expose its evil most effectively.  In turn, Girard’s analysis sheds 
light on the logic of these problematic passages, which occur more often than many people 
realize yet are often dismissed as mythological.  In conjunction with scripture’s testimony, 
mimetic theory describes the evil from which God offers redemption especially well.  
Summarizing Girard, James Williams says that though the scapegoat mechanism has 
anthropological causes, “this entire single victim process is [for Girard] the work of Satan.  
Indeed, it is Satan.”556  In scripture Satan is the accuser, the deceitful offerer of transcendence or 
‘salvation’, to become like God and take God’s place -- the ultimate metaphysical desire.  Satan 
is the false counterpart to the Holy Spirit, who is the Advocate and Spirit of Truth (cf. Jn. 14-16).  
In Girardian terms, Satan is first a ‘model’ who mediates desires (i.e., to disobey God, cf. Gen. 3) 
and thus seduces or tempts people into transgression.  He is also an ‘obstacle’ and adversary, the 
rival who prevents people from obtaining the true good they desire.557  As the principle of 
disorder Satan “diverts human beings from God for the sake of rivalistic models”558; as a 
                                               
555 René Girard, I See Satan Fall Like Lightning, trans. James G. Williams (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books, 2001), 
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556 James G. Williams, in Foreword to ISSF, Kindle Location 63-64.  The boundary between the anthropological and 
the theological appears, for Girard, irrelevant. 
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principle of order he incites communities to violence against a single innocent victim: “Satan is 
the violent contagion that persuades the entire community, which has become unanimous, that [a 
victim’s] guilt is real.”559 Less a mythical figure than a social phenomenon, Satan is neither an 
actual person nor a metaphysical substance: “The devil’s ‘quintessential being’ . . .  is the violent 
contagion that has no substance to it.  The devil . . .  has no being at all.  To clothe himself in the 
semblance of being, he must act as a parasite on God’s creatures.  He is totally mimetic, which 
amounts to saying nonexistent as an individual self.”560  Such an understanding recognizes 
scapegoating as ‘work of the devil’ without the cartoonish depictions of the devil in popular 
culture.   
In the Gospels, questions concerning Jesus’ authority lead to accusations that he works by 
the power of the devil; Jesus himself also spoke of and confronted the work of Satan in his public 
ministry (Mk. 3:23-26; Mt. 12:23-28).  According to Girard, use of the scapegoat mechanism is 
the attempt of Satan to drive out Satan: an evil threat is ‘driven out’ by violent and deceptive 
means, only to remain in a more deeply hidden form.  Satan is in fact divided against himself --  
quite purposefully -- in order to deceive.  Conversely, Jesus says “But if it is by the finger of God 
that I cast out demons, then the Kingdom of God is upon you” (Lk. 11:20).  Jesus’ withholding 
from the reciprocation of violence reveals the love of the Father and inaugurates a Kingdom, not 
of force and power, but of non-rivalrous desiring and living.   
Girard says the satanic nature of violence helps explain why Jesus calls those who want 
to kill him “children of the devil” (cf. Jn. 8:39-45).  Having nothing to do with anti-Semitic 
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demonization of Jews (according to Girard),561 such children of the devil are those “taken into 
the circle of rivalistic desire and who, unknowingly, become the playthings of mimetic 
violence.”562 All people (including Christians, historically and hypothetically) of any era or race 
who would expel a messenger of truth are ‘children of the devil,’ who “was a murderer from the 
beginning.... is a liar and the father of lies” (Jn. 8:44-45).   
As we have seen, Girard uses ‘scandal’ (Gk. skandalon -- ‘stumbling block’) to describe 
the ‘exasperation of mimetic rivalry,’ when communities “desperately, if unconsciously, seek the 
public substitutes upon whom to unburden themselves.”563  The burden is so great that truth 
becomes irrelevant: “In the Gospels, Satan’s power is his ability to make false accusations so 
convincing that they become the unassailable truth of entire communities.”564  Contagions of 
suspicion and accusation escalate quickly beyond the capacity to stop short of scapegoating.  The 
satanic nature of the scapegoat mechanism finds its supreme example when Caiaphas prophesied 
‘it is better for one man to die for the people, than for the whole nation to be destroyed’ (cf. Jn. 
11:49-53).565  Girard says “Caiaphas is the incarnation of politics at its best, not its worst.  No 
one has ever been a better politician. . . . Caiaphas is the perfect sacrificer who puts victims to 
death to save those who live.... every real cultural decision has a sacrificial character (decidere, 
remember, is to cut the victim’s throat).”566  Such logic continues within the cultural and political 
‘machinery’ that rules over human beings, from which the gospel liberates us.   
 Such observations are helpful for describing the evil dynamics of the scapegoat 
mechanism, the systemic violence -- an important element of ‘the sin of the world’ -- from which 
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Christ’s disciples are meant to withdraw.  Girard’s insights unveil the ‘logic’ of evil that 
otherwise appears as unpredictable and unreasonable madness.  The scapegoat mechanism 
deceives because it proposes resolution of identity crises by means of someone else’s death.   
4.2.2.  Salvation Through Imitation of Christ  
In truth however, “There is only one transcendence in the Gospels, the transcendence of 
divine love that triumphs over all manifestations of violence and the sacred by revealing their 
nothingness.”567  This transcendence -- salvation -- occurs through imitation of Christ, in at least 
two senses.   
Imitation of Christ first entails imitation of his nonviolence and obedience to his teaching. 
Just as important for proper relationship to God is imitation of Christ’s relationship of ‘distance’ 
from the Father, wherein he submits to the Father’s will and even experiences abandonment by 
the Father.  Even amid this abandonment, Christ remains faithful to the Father’s loving will and 
does not resort to self-protective violence.  This fidelity to loving reveals what a sanctified 
relationships is, as opposed to a reciprocal relationship which coerces God in his relationship to 
human beings.  Contrasting Christ’s ‘withdrawal relationship’ to the Father with the worldly 
reciprocity, Girard states: “The relationship [of Christ to the Father] sanctifies while reciprocity 
sacralizes by creating ties that are too strong.”568  For Girard the archaic sacrificial process 
‘sacralizes,’ creating a relationship of the divine toward the human which borders on contractual 
obligation, a false and idolatrous relationship.   
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The sanctifying relationship between Christ and the Father is part of what differentiates 
Christ from Satan, who also mediates ‘imitation of God,’ but in a perfectly rivalrous sense.569  
By contrast, Christ’s fidelity amid the abandonment by the Father reveals the transcendence of 
the Father and the extent to which we are called to love.  The revelation of such divine love, 
precisely amid the scapegoat mechanism in action, is the reason Jesus underwent the Passion, as 
we see next.   
4.2.3.  Jesus’ Subversion of Sacrifice: The ‘Original Liturgical Reform’ 
From a Girardian view, redemption is a matter of revelation: exposure of the scapegoat 
mechanism’s deception, cruelty, and vanity.  The wisdom of Christ crucified (cf. 1 Cor. 1:18-25) 
may appear to exemplify expiation by Jesus’ sacrificial death, but in fact it saves humanity by 
subversion of violent ritual sacrifice.  This interpretation, first proposed by Raymund Schwager 
and endorsed by Girard,570 has been expounded by several theologians since.571   
4.2.3.1.  First Stage: The Kingdom of God Challenges the World’s Order 
 With his proclamation of the Kingdom of God and offer of salvation in his deeds, 
teaching, and person, Jesus interrupted the sinful and violent world order operative since its 
foundation (cf. Mt. 13:35; 23:35).  By means of exorcisms, healings of ‘unclean’ outcasts and 
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Gentiles, and proclaiming the need to forgive even one’s enemies, Jesus inaugurated a kingdom 
‘not of this world’ (cf. Jn. 18:36) but according to the Holy Spirit.  This kingdom did not abide 
by the familiar stabilizing categories of Jew/Gentile, saint/sinner, clean/unclean, even when 
established by the law of Moses (‘it was said.... But I say to you,’ cf. Mt. 5:21-48) or ties of 
blood (‘Whoever does the will of God is my brother and sister and mother;’ Mk. 3:35).  This 
proclamation of radical mercy called existing religious institutions -- not least the sacrificial 
system -- into question.  Schwager notes that Jesus “proclaimed salvation precisely for sinners 
and outlaws.  In Qumran they awaited a liberation from sin through a stricter practice of the law, 
while Jesus showed how even the apparently just are still completely entangled in sin.”572  The 
self-righteous are exposed as such by their hostility to Jesus and his invitation of sinners into the 
Kingdom of God (cf. Mk. 3:6).   
Moreover, Jesus’ proclamation “broke with the religious thinking of Israel to the extent 
that with him salvation and repentance exchanged places, and he offered the sinner God’s 
forgiveness, irrespective of whether the sinner was willing to repent or unprepared to do so.”573  
Questions concerning Jesus’ authority and identity thus arose, provoking suspicion and hostility 
(cf. Mk. 2:1-3:30).  Thus, even while Jesus’ proclamation of the kingdom of God offered 
forgiveness for those who welcomed his message and person, it also (in Girardian terms) created 
many kinds of identity crises, predictably activating the scapegoat mechanism.   
4.2.3.2.  Second Stage: The World’s Judgment on the Word 
 The gospels depict Jesus facing opposition from very early in his ministry: from the 
scribes and Pharisees (Mk. 3:6), Satan (Mt. 4:1-10; Lk. 4:1-13), and Nazarenes (Lk. 4:16-30) to 
name a few.  As noted above, Caiaphas gave voice to the worldly logic (cf. Jn. 11:49-53) which 
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would expel the divine Word.  Historical-critical biblical scholarship poses Jesus’ provocative 
cleansing of the Temple (Mk. 11:15-18) as a ‘tipping point’: “[B]y his judgment sayings [Jesus] 
... triggered off a process which struck back at him ... : he became the victim of the sins of others, 
a scapegoat.”574  The Jewish and Roman authorities conspired to do away with Jesus’ message 
and person, activating an all-against-one scapegoating mechanism.   
The betrayal by Judas further exemplifies sacrificial logic: as ‘betrayer’ (paradidous: 
‘giver-over’) offering a substitute victim (Jesus) for a substitionary value (money) for sacrifice, 
pleasing the chief priests (Mk. 14:11).575  “Those who [put Jesus to death] want to silence, 
suppress, and expel the word, but they unwittingly confirm it because the Word talks about its 
own suppression and expulsion.”576  By seeking to arrest and execute Jesus, his opponents 
genuinely intend and attempt to get rid of a social contagion: they desire to sacrifice Jesus for the 
common good.   
4.2.3.3.  Third Stage: Christ’s Nonviolent Fidelity to His Mission Unto Death 
Though betrayed by his own disciple and subjected to violence by Jewish and Roman 
authorities, Jesus neither escaped this violence nor reciprocated it.  He confronts and undergoes 
the contagion of violence inflicted by his enemies in order to subvert it and expose it as a lie.  
According to the gospel accounts, Jesus was fully aware of both the hostility of his opponents 
and the violent death which awaited him in Jerusalem (cf. Mk. 8:31 et al.) yet remained faithful 
to his mission.   
While Jesus’ opponents, the crowds, and his disciples fall prey to mimetic rivalry and 
violence, Jesus alone withstands the mimetic crisis; he refrains from imitating or reciprocating 
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the violence others inflict on him.  This is a critical step, for at the moment the world expels him, 
Jesus’ self-restraint -- maintaining a ‘distance’ from inflicting violence -- allows him to retain 
full agency, subjectivity, and love (cf. Jn. 13:1), acting for his oppressors’ true good even though 
they inflict evil.  Girardian theologian Scott Cowdell coins the term ‘overaccepting’ to describe 
this redemptive intention of Christ amid both a sinful world and, in this instance, the evil 
perpetrated against him in his betrayal, arrest, and crucifixion.577  Neither despair, nor 
resignation, nor utter passivity in the face of evil, ‘overacceptance’ is a subversive use of others’ 
oppressive actions or a situation against its intended evil purpose.  Jesus “did not pay back the 
lying judgment and violent attack with the same coin, but he turned around the intensified evil 
and gave it back as love redoubled.”578  Overcoming even his own spontaneous will to self-
preservation, Jesus surrenders to the will of the Father (cf. Mk. 14:32-42), who will eventually 
raise him from the dead.579   
Jesus’ unique response amid this all-against-one effort proves decisive for the salvation 
of sinners, as he transforms death into a means of salvation from sin.  Jesus created a unique 
solidarity between himself and not only other victims but also their persecutors. Jesus’ love unto 
death thus opens for all, through the Holy Spirit, the opportunity to repent and choose the same 
kind of self-giving kenotic love.  With reference to Maximus the Confessor, Schwager proposes 
that “Christ on the cross altered the ‘use of death’ .... [meaning] that death, which was brought by 
God after the fall into the garden of Eden as punishment against human nature, was transformed 
by the crucified one into a means of salvation from sin.”580  Jesus accomplishes “the 
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transformation of passivity through his surrender.... Suffering which is affirmed becomes a new 
form of activity” -- a self-emptying and loving identification with sinners.581   
As Jesus is being put to death on the cross he nonetheless intercedes for his executioners: 
‘Father, forgive them; for they do not know what they are doing’ (Lk. 23:34), even though they 
commit evil.  Amid his own apparent weakness and passivity, Jesus’ petition reveals both his 
own innocence and redoubled love for his executioners, who “were more victims [of the 
contagion of violence] than agents;”582 since they do not comprehend what they do they “are 
victims of their own crime.”583  By accepting the place of the victim (‘Here I am’ -- cf. Heb. 
10:7), refusing to retaliate, and asking the Father for the forgiveness of his persecutors, Jesus 
identifies with sinners, albeit in a very specific way.  Schwager states: “It is precisely as victim 
that he intercedes for his enemies, and he identifies himself with them insofar as they are harmed 
by evil.”584  While in solidarity with sinners as victims, Jesus himself remains obedient to the 
Father’s loving will, himself never condoning evil, and thereby innocent and able to redeem.585   
Though Jesus dies a representative redeeming death for sinners, the need for individual 
conversion nonetheless remains.  Each person retains responsibility for conversion.  “As a 
responsible doer of sin each one is an enemy of Christ, and as victim of evil each one is within 
the domain for his redeeming power.”586  The ‘word of the cross’ (1 Cor. 1:18), judging the 
thoughts and intentions of the heart (cf. Heb. 4:12), offers the possibility of redemption.  Jesus’ 
nonviolent intercession for his executioners shows he is “nearer to that desire of his enemies that 
want something good for themselves than they are to themselves.... [He] protects the life of his 
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enemies.  So the free act of the non-violent one is more in accord with the actual will to life of 
the violent than the latter in their ostensible freedom.”587  The ‘active passivity’ of Jesus’ loving 
act achieves true solidarity with his enemies (who are unwitting victims), a solidarity deeper than 
what they themselves desire or can achieve by their own violent action.   
While appearing to exemplify self-sacrifice, the violence in Jesus’ crucifixion is directly 
willed by neither the Father nor Jesus.  The violence originates from those who rejected Jesus, 
but “God Himself reuses the scapegoat mechanism, at his own expense, in order to subvert it.”588  
The self-giving Jesus demonstrates symbolically in the Eucharist and embodies on the cross 
becomes the source of true unity, even between Jesus and sinners, in the new covenant to which 
he draws all people: “And I, when I am lifted up from the earth, will draw all people to myself” 
(Jn. 12:32).   
The cross becomes the revelation of truth concerning the innocence of victims, the deceit 
of scapegoating, and human complicity with scapegoating.  Its revelation of these truths enables 
repentance and decision for what achieves true unity: forgiveness, self-giving, non-violence, 
recognition of others’ fully human dignity.   
The final ‘word’ from the cross is not mere solidarity but Jesus’ giving-over of his spirit 
upon death.589  Particularly in Luke 23:46, “Suffering here is understood unambiguously as 
surrendering and handing over the Spirit to the Father.... [which] means at the same time the 
fulfillment of the mission.”590  Death’s finality was ‘used’ by Jesus, transformed into a perfect 
gift of self to the Father on behalf of sinners-as-victims: “The act of dying, the fulfillment of the 
                                               
587 Schwager, Banished From Eden, 110. 
588 René Girard, “Mimetic Violence and Sacrifice,” in TOBWSC, 43. 
589 Jesus “breathed his last” (Mk. 15:37, Mt. 27:50); “Then Jesus, crying out with a loud voice, said, ‘Father, into 
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590 Schwager, JITDOS, 188.  Lk. 23:46: “Then Jesus, crying out with a loud voice, said, ‘Father, into your hands I 
commend my spirit.’  Having said this, he breathed his last.” 
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mission, and the handing over of the Spirit to the Father consequently come together in the one 
event described by the letter to the Hebrews as the sacrifice of Christ.”591  With Jesus’ humble 
and obedient submission to this unjust situation “the loving Yes of Jesus replaces and 
encompasses the lacking or ambiguous Yes of” the first Adam and Eve, creating the opportunity 
of a new humanity.592   
In sum, Jesus’ manner of death on the cross was “the conversion and transformation of 
evil action in love.  [Jesus] turned the radical delivering of himself to his enemies, as he 
experienced this in being executed, into a radical surrender to his Father.”593  Having 
completely undergone the world’s judgment upon him, Jesus entrusts himself to the Father, the 
True Judge (cf. 1 Pet. 2:23).   
4.2.3.4.  Fourth Stage: Resurrection as the Father’s Judgment 
While the nations raged against the Lord’s Anointed (cf. Acts 4:25-26; Ps. 2:1-2), 
crucifying him, nonetheless the Father raised him up (Acts 2:23-24, 32, 36).  The resurrection 
vindicated Jesus’ person, life, and teaching, such that every knee should bend and every tongue 
confess Jesus Christ as Lord (cf. Phil. 2:6-11).  Furthermore, Jesus’ return from the dead did not 
entail vengeful retribution toward either his enemies or his disciples but proclamations of peace 
(cf. Lk. 24:36; Jn. 20:19, 26).  Thus, through the events of the paschal mystery the single victim 
mechanism was “reversed like a glove, exposed, placed in the open, stripped naked, and 
dismantled.” 594  With Jesus’ forgiveness and commissioning of the apostles, proclamation of the 
gospel invitation into the Kingdom of God was renewed, transcending reciprocity and 
retribution.   
                                               
591 Schwager, JITDOS, 188. 
592 Schwager, Banished From Eden, 110. 
593 Schwager, JITDOS, 189. 
594 Girard, ISSF, 151. 
239 
 
4.2.3.5.  Fifth Stage: Sending of the Holy Spirit 
 With the gift of the Holy Spirit upon the disciples at Pentecost, the disciples are 
transformed from a timid band into bold missionaries of the crucified Messiah.  Previous 
differences in religion, culture, economic status, and gender (cf. Gal. 3:27) were put aside as the 
community gathered and united (Acts 2:46) by the Holy Spirit so as to have “one heart and one 
soul” (Acts 4:32).  Instead of creating unity through a common enemy upon whom violence was 
inflicted, unity was sought through reconciliation (cf. 2 Cor. 5:18-19).    
 From the standpoint of mimetic theory, the gift of the Holy Spirit creates the possibility 
of ‘good mimesis’ -- imitation of Christ’s self-giving, which is the gift of liberation: “For 
freedom Christ has set us free” (Gal. 5:1).  Fully able to be shared, the Holy Spirit is not rationed 
out by God (cf. Jn. 3:32) but available to all through faith.    
4.2.3.6.  The Cause and Value of Jesus’ Death 
 If the events of Jesus’ paschal mystery unfolded as Schwager claims, a host of questions 
arise: for what reason did Jesus die upon the cross?  Was Christ’s death ‘necessary’?  Did the 
Father ‘will’ the death of His Son, ‘handing him over’ to death, or did the Son ‘offer himself’ to 
the Father on our behalf?  As important as these questions have been for systematic theology and 
soteriology, Girard dismisses them since they turn attention away from the more important 
matter of where true guilt lies:   
Medieval and modern theories of redemption all look in the direction of God for the causes of 
the Crucifixion: God's honor, God's justice, even God's anger, must be satisfied.  These 
theories don't succeed because they don't seriously look in the direction where the answer must 
lie: sinful humanity, human relations, mimetic contagion, which is the same thing as Satan.  
They speak much of original sin, but they fail to make the idea concrete.  That is why they 
give an impression of being arbitrary and unjust to human beings, even if they are 
theologically sound.595 
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According to Girard and Schwager, Jesus’ death is never directly willed by Jesus himself or the 
Father: rather “It is absolute fidelity to the principle defined in his own preaching that condemns 
Jesus.  There is no other cause for his death than the love of one’s neighbor lived to the very end, 
with an infinitely intelligent grasp of the constraints it imposes.  ‘Greater love has no man than 
this, that a man lay down his life for his friends’ (Jn. 15:13).”596  In the Garden of Gethsemane, 
“When Jesus says: ‘your will be done and not mine,’ it is really a question of dying.  But it is not 
a question of showing obedience to an incomprehensible demand for sacrifice.  Jesus has to die 
because continuing to live would mean a compromise with violence.”597  Even when Paul writes 
that God made Christ ‘to be sin’ (2 Cor. 5:19-21) he speaks “neither of an anger of God toward 
his Son nor of a destruction of sin through him.... [Paul] characterizes reconciliation rather as not 
taking sin into account.”598  In no way was God the cause of Jesus’ death: “Men killed Jesus 
because they were not capable of becoming reconciled without killing;”599 God’s mercy and 
power at work in Jesus turned it to a saving purpose.   Christ’s death was not ‘necessary’ in any 
sense that absolves human beings of their guilt and violence.   
 Conversely, the purpose which Jesus’ death came to serve was instead the complete 
reversal of the origins of violence and sacrifice.  God initiated a true reconciliation of the world 
to himself through Christ (2 Cor. 5:18), culminating in the gift of the Holy Spirit which reunites 
human beings to God and to one another.  Jesus accomplished this reconciliation through three 
decisive moments: through the Eucharist (preliminarily), and (at his death) with his forgiveness 
of his executioners, and the completion of his mission through the handing-over his spirit to the 
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Father.600  The events of Christ’s paschal mystery interrupts history’s dominant narrative of the 
guilty victim who deserves punishment; his solidarity with sinners opens a way of forgiveness, 
repentance, and conversion.   
4.2.3.7.  Girard’s Refined Stance on Sacrifice 
 Girard originally condemned sacrifice altogether, most forcefully in Violence and the 
Sacred601 and Things Hidden Since the Foundation of the World.602  This rejection of sacrifice 
led to widespread suspicion by theologians, including Hans Urs von Balthasar, for whom 
Christ’s kenotic self-sacrifice to the Father was central to soteriology.603  Through collaboration 
with Schwager, however, Girard eventually affirmed a very precise notion of sacrifice and 
retracted his purely anti-sacrificial stance.604  Jesus’ way, demonstrated by his life and taught in 
his proclamation, reveals the way to be done with rivalries and (archaic) sacrifice: such 
renunciation of rivalries and sacrificial measures becomes the true ‘sacrifice’ of Christ.605   
 In Christ’s death the world, in accord with Caiaphas’ sacrificial logic (Jn. 12:32), 
intended to expel the Word by sacrificing Christ in a crucifixion, scapegoating him as a 
dangerous contagion and restoring peace.  God, however, made use of this travesty to expose the 
lie of the mechanism, revealing Christ’s innocence through the resurrection and the inefficacy of 
archaic sacrifice:   
This is the essential theme, repeated time and time again, of Jesus’ preaching: reconciliation 
with God can take place unreservedly and with no sacrificial intermediary through the rules 
of the kingdom.  This reconciliation allows God to reveal himself as he is, for the first time 
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in human history.  Thus mankind no longer has to base harmonious relationships on bloody 
sacrifices, ridiculous fables of a violent deity, and the whole range of mythological cultural 
formations.606   
 
The archaic kind of sacrifice (which Girard always criticized) which justifies and directs 
violence against a third victim (it is “unable to escape violence without inflicting violence on 
others”) is nullified.  Through the very same set of historical events, however, true Christian 
‘sacrifice’ proves to be “renunciation of all egoistic claiming, even to life if needed, in order not 
to kill.”607  The same term has its own history of different meanings in their different contexts.  
Girard finds life-giving sacrifice exemplified not only in Christ but in the story of two prostitutes 
contending over a child before Solomon (1 Kings 3:16-28).  The woman who ‘sacrifices’ 
possession of the child out of compassion for its life, offering a sacrifice that refuses to do 
violence to another.   
 Life-giving sacrifice therefore has no recourse to violence toward others: it renounces 
one’s own desires to kill, lie, steal, or merely satisfy oneself or members of one’s own 
community to the exclusion of others.  ‘Sacrificial’ theology, liturgy, piety, ascesis, or action 
must be examined and purified of the archaic-sacrificial elements which often disguise violence, 
whether to others or oneself.  As it requires specification of the direct good intended or achieved 
by a ‘sacrificial’ action, and refusing to allow such a good to justify violent means, mimetic 
theory provides an important safeguard against unwittingly masochistic or sadistic forms of piety 
or ascesis.   
Girard sees in the violent and sacrificial elements of Judaism as prefiguring the gospels’ 
refusal of violence; there is both continuity and a sharp distinction between the two.608  
Hamerton-Kelly describes the paschal mystery as “a dialectical overcoming of sacrifice, which 
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supersedes it while leaving it intact.”609  While humanity (and some elements of Christian 
theology) thought it was sacrificing Christ for the sake of its own good in the crucifixion, God 
was, through Christ, leading humanity on an exodus out of sacrificial violence.   
4.2.3.8.  The Demands of Conversion and Discipleship 
The revelation and liberation Christ inaugurate, however, demand a cooperative response 
by disciples.  “The Gospels, of course, are interested not in the intellectual operation they enable, 
but in the ethical change that they can possibly, but not necessarily, trigger.”610  The paschal 
mystery reveals the Triune God “whose demand is for nonviolence rather than sacrifice.”611  
Through the existential changes brought about by repentance, Baptism, and adoption by the 
Spirit, disciples are grafted onto/into Jesus’ body, becoming the new creation, the new humanity.  
Disciples receive participation in this new life, as members of the ecclesial body of Christ, 
through Christ’s gifts of his body, blood, and spirit.  In light of mimetic theory, conversion 
includes: a) recognizing the innocence of Christ; b) recognizing one’s complicity with the same 
systems of violence that condemned Jesus; and c) withdrawing from involvement in personal and 
social violence.  Such living is radically insecure by worldly standards: “the Kingdom of God ... 
does not represent for men an unmitigated blessing.... It brings men face to face with their 
hardest task in history,”612 namely, to convert away from mimetic rivalry and violence.  
Conversion is difficult because the nonviolent refusal of retribution “looks like total impotence 
to those who live under the regime of violence.”613  One soon finds how withdrawal from the 
world’s violence risks inviting the same resistance Jesus encountered: “one can renounce 
sacrifice in one sense—sacrifice of another, violence against another—only by assuming the risk 
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of sacrifice in another sense—the sacrifice of Christ, who died for all who were dear to him.”614  
These demands, particularly amid a world saturated with violence, are indeed very great.   
If conversion entails turning away from violence, toward what does it turn?  Girard 
responds, “mimetic desire per se is not to be done away with, but it is to be fulfilled -- 
transformed, ‘converted’”615; following what the New Testament points out as “a more positive 
way of uniting human beings based on non-rivalrous striving towards God.... [D]iscipleship does 
not produce conflict.”616  Imitation continues for disciples, but a deliberate imitation of Jesus and 
of the Father: “[What] Jesus advocates is mimetic desire.  Imitate me, and imitate the Father 
through me.... Jesus seems to say that the only way to avoid violence is to imitate me, and imitate 
the Father.”617  Furthermore, as Kirwan describes, Girard understands conversion “entails both a 
turning away from oneself, but also ... a withdrawal from the baneful influence of others.... [It is] 
victory over a self-centeredness which is other-centered.”618  Imitation of -- or obedience to -- 
Jesus, the Father, and the Holy Spirit is what liberates from the deceitful and violent tendencies 
we too often imitate.   
 As suggested before at the anthropological level, such discipleship under Christ is most 
demanding, since it calls for imitation of Christ’s total fidelity unto death: “disciples are bound to 
share Christ’s fate, becoming scapegoats and victims themselves, becoming martyrs.... They die 
for the truth, as a repetition of the Cross.”619  As much as the paschal mystery provides 
forgiveness of sins, in no way does Christ’s death ‘substitute’ for the disciple’s death; direct 
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participation in Christ’s sufferings -- in one’s own flesh -- becomes all the more likely as a 
prophetic witness against scapegoating. 
This Girardian reinterpretation of the paschal mystery and the demands it makes upon 
discipleship put an end to the notion of Jesus’ death as a sacrifice demanded by either the Father 
or divine justice (or honor, etc.).  It removes violence from within the Godhead and places it 
firmly within the realm of the sinful human refusal of grace.  Most practically, it reveals the true 
innocence of victims, who are no longer to be sacrificed outright for the sake of a common good.   
4.2.4.  Worship in a Violent World: The Lamb of God Reconciles the World to God 
 Beginning with the writings of Saint Paul, the Church interpreted the meaning of the 
events of the paschal mystery to speak of the atonement or reconciliation achieved by Christ.  
Across the centuries the Church generated summary notions for atonement, for example ransom 
(cf. Mk. 10:45), recapitulation (Irenaeus, 3rd cent.), or satisfaction theory (Anselm, 12th cent.), 
which has proven very influential.  These theoretical lenses shape preaching, imagination, and 
piety in important ways.   
James Alison, however, proposes that with atonement theory, the nature of atonement as 
event is too often lost.  Instead, liturgy more accurately presents the paschal mystery to the 
faithful, for “the whole purpose of a liturgy is that it is something that people undergo as 
something is done for, towards, or at them;”620 it is meant to be transformative.  Furthermore, 
appreciation of the liturgical context of Jesus’ actions as he approached his own death is essential 
for understanding the radical meaning of the paschal mystery.  By recognizing the parallels and 
differences of Jesus’ action with what we know of the Yom Kippur (Day of Atonement) 
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sacrifice, the radically loving and transformative nature of Jesus’ action are properly restored to 
prominence.   
4.2.4.1.  Yom Kippur: Atonement Within the Jewish Liturgical Context 
 According to scholarly reconstructions of the Jewish First Temple atonement sacrifices 
(cf. Lev. 16), the liturgy enacted a reconciliation between heaven and earth.621  First, a high 
priest offered a bull or calf in sacrifice in expiation for his own sins (cf. Heb. 5:3, 7:27).  He then 
put on a seamless white robe and phylacteries bearing the name of the Lord; he thus became the 
angel of the Lord, one of whose names was ‘son of God.’  Of the priest was sung ‘Blessed is he 
who comes in the name of the Lord’ (Ps. 118:26); only he could enter the Holy of Holies.  He 
brought two goats or lambs, chosen by lot, one to be offered in sacrifice to the Lord (the ‘lamb of 
God’), the other, representing Azazel (the devil), upon whom the sins of the people would be 
placed, to be driven out into the wilderness.  With the blood of the sacrificed lamb of God, the 
high priest sprinkled the mercy seat in the Holy of Holies, symbolic of the dwelling place of God 
outside created time and space.  Then putting on a robe of the same material as the veil over the 
Holy of Holies, the high priest emerged to sprinkle the rest of the Temple and the people, setting 
them free from their sins.  “This action symbolized the Lord coming forth to purify the creation 
human beings had made impure: God was taking the initiative, and the people were the 
beneficiaries.”622   As a result, earth was reunited with heaven.   
Most importantly, this Jewish sacrificial context understood the Lord as coming forth 
(from his realm ‘beyond creation’) on his own gracious initiative in order to purify and restore 
creation -- and not as an angry deity demanding appeasement by sacrifice.  James Alison 
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summarizes this redemptive action as “God overcomes our violence by substituting himself for 
the victim of our typical sacrifices.”623  Precisely within the liturgical realm, wherein heaven and 
earth are meant to coincide, God is depicted as taking corrective initiative on behalf of the 
people.   
4.2.4.2.  Jesus’ Saving Death as a Liturgical Atonement 
The loving initiative of God becomes even clearer in light of the paschal mystery of 
Christ.  According to Alison, the Letter to the Hebrews (which portrays Jesus’ saving death as 
the fulfillment of the Yom Kippur liturgy) shows how “God overcomes our violence by 
substituting himself for the victim of our typical sacrifices.  This opens us up to be able to enjoy 
the fullness of creation as if death were not.”624  This inversion of the archaic notion of sacrifice 
(in which humans try to ‘appease’ God by sacrifice) proves vital for a proper understanding of 
the events of the Last Supper and the paschal mystery, which shape the liturgy of the Eucharist.   
 Unlike the former high priests who first offered sacrifice for their own sins and then 
sprinkled the blood of sacrificial animals, “when Christ came as a high priest ... he entered once 
for all into the Holy Place, not with the blood of goats and calves, but with his own blood, thus 
obtaining eternal redemption” (Heb. 9:11-12).  In the language of mimetic theory, Christ put 
himself in the place of the sacrificial victim.  Thus through the paschal mystery “we have 
redemption through [Christ’s] blood” (Eph. 1:7): despite humanity’s violent refusal, God gives 
his life to us.  God thereby “has made known to us the mystery of his will, according to [God’s] 
good pleasure that he set forth in Christ” (Eph. 1:8-9).  In Christ the “fullness of God” dwelt, and 
“through him God was pleased to reconcile to himself all things, whether on earth or in heaven, 
by making peace through the blood of his cross” (Col. 1:20).   
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According to Alison, Jesus’ nonviolence leading up to his death (as well as after the 
resurrection) shows that God is “entirely without vengeance, entirely without substitutionary 
tricks.... [Jesus] was giving himself entirely without ambivalence and ambiguity for us, towards 
us, in order to set us ‘free from our sins’ -- ‘our sins’ being our way of being bound up with each 
other in death, vengeance, violence and what is commonly called ‘wrath.’”625  Jesus never sought 
out or desired a self-sacrifice (as shown above by Schwager), but remained faithful to his own 
message unto death in hopes of converting his opponents away from violence and sin.  Jesus was 
giving himself for the sake of communion with those he desired to save -- namely, his executors.  
By posing liturgy as the paschal mystery’s proper context, Alison restores the primacy of 
reconciliation and communion as the proper goal of the atonement, rather than regarding a 
sacrificial action (immolation of a victim) as either a necessary means or end of the atonement.   
4.2.4.3.  The New Covenant Liturgy: The Last Supper    
 The properly liturgical context for the paschal mystery is likewise essential for proper 
understanding of the synoptic gospels’ depiction of the institution of the Eucharist at the Last 
Supper.  The institution narrative of the Last Supper reveals still further how Jesus was acting to 
unveil and undo the usual sacrificial logic and its scapegoating.   
According to anthropological study and mimetic theory, the most primitive forms of 
sacrifice were human sacrifices; gradually animals were sacrificed in their place.  Sacrificial gifts 
became still more symbolic, as grain, bread, or wine; sacrifices both hid violence and 
perpetuated it.  Amid the context of the Jewish Passover, Alison argues that Jesus’ actions and 
words at the Last Supper exposed this fact: 
Jesus ... was substituting himself for a series of substitutions.... Jesus takes exactly the inverse 
route [of sacrifice]; and he explains to us that he is going in the inverse route.... [He] 
substituted a human being back into the centre of the sacrificial system as the priest, thus 
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showing what the sacrificial system was really about, and so bringing it to an end.  He was the 
Great High Priest giving portions of himself as Lamb to his fellow priests.626 
 
Jesus thereby enacted “an exact inversion of the sacrificial system: he goes backwards and 
occupies the space [of the victim] so as to make it clear that [sacrifice] is simply murder.  And it 
needn’t be.”627  Jesus’ self-giving aims at both communion and an exposure of sacrificial 
violence so such sacrifices might be brought to an end.  His disciples, similarly, are to put an end 
to the victimization of others, and are through Christ to “continually offer a sacrifice of praise to 
God” (Heb. 13:15).  Alison’s analysis reveals the existential step involved for Jesus to expose the 
innocence of victims, commit himself in self-gift, and put an end to sacrificial violence.   
In the celebration of the liturgy of the Eucharist, the body of Christ is presented and 
proclaimed as ‘the Lamb of God who takes away the sins of the world.’  Christ is presented as 
‘the forgiving victim’: the risen and victorious Lamb of God is presented in a gesture of 
reconciliation which permits metanoia, for recognition of violent desire within oneself and 
conversion to and imitation of this loving initiative of Christ.628   
4.2.4.4.  Eucharist/Mass 
 In light of this analysis, certain aspects the liturgy of the Eucharist take on heightened 
importance, emphasizing a ‘full, conscious, active participation’ in the love Jesus demonstrated.  
The celebration is not a means of ‘obtaining’ God’s presence through a kind of local proximity 
of substances “but rather, our obedience to Jesus’ instruction to invoke him, to do this in memory 
of him, so that we find ourselves transported into participation in the ‘heavenly banquet.’” 629  It 
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celebrates Christ the Lamb of God, “the high priest emerging out of the Holy of Holies, giving us 
his body and blood, as our way into being a living priesthood.”630  The Sanctus acclaims the 
advent of the Holy One to the assembly in a reunification of heaven and earth.  The one ‘who 
comes in the name of the Lord’ is pronounced blessed and petitioned to grant salvation 
(‘Hosanna in the highest!’).  Alison says we are “being turned into the new Temple by receiving 
the body and blood of the victim, who is already victorious.... We are called out of ourselves into 
it.  We are being called ‘through the veil’ into participation,”631 into being grasped and impelled 
by the love of Christ (cf. Phil. 3:12; 2 Cor. 5:14) to decide to give of one’s own life, even in the 
same way as Christ.   
4.2.4.5.  The Love Behind the Gift 
Not least among the obstacles to receiving God’s gifts are the limits of our own language 
and imagination, to which Alison calls attention.  Even St. Paul had great difficulty expressing 
the love God shows in Christ; our Eucharistic participation in the paschal mystery -- with the 
body and blood of Christ visible only as bread and wine -- likewise defies not only expression 
but understanding and appreciation.  Alison’s reflects upon the need for contemplative 
recognition of God’s loving and generous desire that we might live it in our own lives:  
What we are given [by the forgiving victim] is a sign of something that has happened and been 
given to us.  What is difficult for us is ... to imagine the love that is behind that.  Why on earth 
should someone bother to do that for us? ... ‘What then shall we say to this?  If God is for us, 
who is against us?  He who did not spare his own Son but gave him up for us all, will he not 
also give us all things with him?’  St. Paul is struggling to find language about the divine 
generosity.  That is the really difficult thing for us to imagine.  We can imagine retaliation, we 
can imagine protection; but we find it awfully difficult to imagine someone we despised, and 
were awfully glad not to be like -- whom we would rather cast out so as to keep ourselves 
going -- we find it awfully difficult to imagine that person generously irrupting into our midst 
so as to set us free to enable something quite new to open up for us.  But being empowered to 
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imagine all that generosity is what atonement is all about; and that is what we are asked to live 
liturgically as Christians.632 
 
Alison’s reflection is very important, for it first specifies the love, the ‘divine generosity’ which 
must be understood as the primary motivation behind God’s reconciliation of the world to 
himself through Christ.  Without adequate reflection upon the love which motivated the divine 
action and transcended reciprocation of human violence -- by both initiating reconciliation of the 
world to God and raising Jesus from the dead -- Christ’s death becomes merely the Father’s 
imitation of human violence, a retaliation depicted as an outpouring of divine punishment upon 
sin, even if also upon the Son of God.  This approach locates violence within the Godhead 
producing an idolatrous understanding of the God of Jesus Christ.  Reflection upon and 
recognition of the loving desire which motivated Jesus’ final actions is critical for both fuller 
appreciation of the gift and fuller recognition of the desire into which we are called to participate 
if our reception of the gift is to reach its fullest. 
The Eucharistic gifts (in particular) express this divine loving initiative in their own 
unique way, as they express Jesus’ intention -- his desire -- in advance of his own death.  They 
reveal and call us to accept God’s own loving desire ‘as it is given:’ as an expression of love and 
as a desire by which to live.  They are gifts that call us ‘out of ourselves’ and ‘into participation’ 
in God’s loving, which transcends reciprocity or the desire for return-gift, making a radical claim 
on our lives, our sense of self, our body and blood.  The gift is both gracious and scandalous, 
calling us to risk everything we consider our own, but which in fact always ‘belongs’ to God.   
 Alison’s Girardian reinterpretation of Jesus’ actions according to the Letter to the 
Hebrews accentuates Judaism’s and Paul’s basic insight into God’s saving initiative at work, 
completely reversing the archaic notion of sacrifice criticized by Girard, which so often is ours: 
                                               
632 Alison, “God’s Self-Substitution,” 179. 
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that God needed (or needs) to be ‘appeased’ by sacrifice.  This fundamental and critically 
important insight into the self-giving love that underlies the act of redemption both aligns with 
the prophetic critique of sacrifice and does away with sacrifice-as-appeasement.   
4.2.5.  Sacrifice Reappropriated 
Another theologian appropriating Girard’s insights is Robert Daly.  In Sacrifice Unveiled 
Daly incorporates Girard’s mimetic theory into the categories of systematic theology: creation, 
the fall, redemption, and trinitarian theology.  Also, through research on sacrifice, editing the 
works of Edward Kilmartin, and encountering the thought of Girard, he came to a new 
understanding of the properly Christian notion of sacrifice rooted in Christ’s unique self-
giving.633  In the process Daly recasts sacrifice in thoroughly relational terms that unveil the core 
truth, beauty, and purpose of sacrifice, in terms that are directly applicable to celebration of the 
Eucharist.634   
4.2.5.1.  Reframing Creation and Sin 
While Girard himself usually stays within anthropological categories that do not discuss 
sin, Girardian theologians appropriate insights of mimetic theory to frame the origin of sin in 
terms of desire rather than as pride or disobedience.  God the Creator and Giver of all we are and 
have (Gen. 1-2) created human beings in God’s image and likeness (1:26) as the culmination of 
God’s creative work; and God saw all that he had made and “indeed, it was very good” (Gen. 
1:31).  Daly recognizes the relationship humans have (as creatures) with the divine Giver shapes 
the nature and obligations of human beings: “God can give everything to human beings except 
                                               
633 Robert Daly, Christian Sacrifice: The Judaeo-Christian Background before Origen, Studies in Christian 
Antiquity, 18 (Washington D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 1978); Robert Daly, The Origins of the 
Christian Doctrine of Sacrifice (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1978).  Cf. Edward J. Kilmartin, The Eucharist in the 
West: History and Theology, ed. Robert Daly (Collegeville, MN: Liturgical Press, 1998).  Hereafter EW. 
634 Robert Daly, Sacrifice Unveiled: The True Meaning of Christian Sacrifice (New York: T&T Clark, 2009).  
Hereafter SU.   
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that they don’t owe.  We are receivers of gifts.”635  As creatures we exist and live only within a 
relationship of obligation to God.   
Within this context, sin is the refusal of what one is, with the desire to be someone else 
(or have something) else.  The serpent tempts Eve first with acquisitive desire for the one thing 
she is not permitted (the fruit of the tree of knowledge of good and evil -- cf. Gen. 2:16-17; 3:1), 
then with metaphysical desire (‘you will be like God’ -- Gen. 3:5).  Even more than pride, then, 
Daly says “Original sin, therefore, is the sin of non-receptivity,”636 of not accepting what God 
gives (including our very selves).  Instead of accepting our condition as dependent creatures, we 
remain caught in incessant desires, both to have more and become autonomous and powerful 
over others.  Violence, along with all kind of justifications of it, serves the egotistical desire of 
individuals and (particularly) communities.   
The Hebrew Scriptures repeatedly address desire as a fundamental human problem.  
Desire runs amok when Cain slays Abel out of envious desire (cf. Gen. 4:1-16), an early instance 
of scapegoating, unleashing cycles of escalating violence.  The Torah’s injunctions and prophets’ 
warnings against idolatry safeguard the primacy of right relationship to God above all other 
desires (cf. Dt. 6:4-6).  The Ten Commandments explicitly forbid coveting (Ex. 20:17) as well as 
murder, adultery, theft, and lying -- in other words, the fruit of violent, lustful, greedy, and 
deceptive desires.    
4.2.5.2.  Recasting Redemption 
Girardian analysis tends very strongly to redemption as a replacement of desire: sinful 
mimetic desires (acquisitive and conflictive mimesis) are replaced with imitation of the virtues 
and devotion of a model, but without the ‘metaphysical’ desire to become (that is, replace) the 
                                               
635 Daly, SU, 209-210.  Daly’s statement affirms theologically something very similar to what Marion expresses 
phenomenologically through his notion of the human as most fundamentally recipient, ‘gifted,’ l’adonné.  
636 Daly, SU, 209-210.  Emphasis added. 
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model.  For disciples of Christ, such ‘good mimesis’ is either of the Father or of Jesus.  In the 
synoptics Jesus directly addresses sinful desires of the heart as the root of evils (cf. Mk. 7:21-23; 
also Mt. 5:28, 6:23), and promises the vision of God for the pure of heart (Mt. 5:8).  Similarly, 
the Johannine writings repeatedly depict a stark contrast between ‘the will of the Father’ (or ‘the 
one who sent’ Jesus) and desires that are ‘of the world.’637  All the while, the primacy of Christ 
remains unassailable: “You have one teacher, and you are all brothers” (Mt. 23:8).   
Jesus Christ embodies the good by both refusing to imitate satanic desire (Mt. 4:1-11; Lk. 
4:1-13) and praying that the Father’s will be done (Mk. 14:36).  Jesus teaches imitation of the 
Father’s graciousness (Mt. 5:43-48) or mercy (Lk. 6:36), and prayer that the Father’s will be 
done (Mt. 6:10).  In the Johannine gospel he exhorts his disciples to imitation of his service (Jn. 
13:34) and love (Jn. 15:9-12).  Paul likewise attests to how Christ is the perfect image of God (2 
Cor. 4:4; cf. Heb. 1:3), the icon of the invisible God (Col. 1:15); he is therefore the ideal model 
whose ‘mind’ we are called to ‘put on’ (cf. Phil. 2:2-11).  For these reasons, Daly says, 
redemption amounts to “imitating the desire of Jesus”638 (receptive and transformative mimesis).  
The desire of Jesus is recounted in scripture as the desire to do the will of his Father: “I have 
come not to do my own will but the will of the one who sent me” (Jn. 6:38).  Importantly, this 
replacement of desire occurs precisely through the dynamics of gift-giving: in Christ, Daly says, 
we are presented with “the gift/offer of transformative mimesis,”639 an other-worldly gift from 
someone not bound by violent mimetic desire.   
Daly leaves the dynamics of this radical and salvific gift unspecified, but clearly names 
God as its source.  Furthermore, the saving gift is love, not Christ’s suffering per se:  “Although 
                                               
637 E.g., 1 Jn. 2:16-17: “all that is in the world -- the desire of the flesh, the desire of the eyes, the pride in riches -- 
comes not from the Father but from the world.  And the world and its desire are passing away, but those who do the 
will of God live forever.” 
638 Daly, SU, 220. 
639 Daly, SU, 220. 
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we have in fact been ‘redeemed by the blood of Christ,’ as the traditional Christian formulation 
puts it, it was not, in the most precise sense, the suffering of Christ that saved us.  Rather, what 
saved us is the love with which he suffered.” 640  Daly specifies the love which both motivated 
Christ’s action and extended forgiveness to sinners is what redeems, not the immolation of 
Christ’s body per se as a discharge of divine violence which restores a balance of honor.   
In traditional theological terms, the Girardian model of redemption tends toward an 
‘exemplar’ soteriology of moral influence, rather than redemption by an ontological or 
metaphysical change in human beings.641  Christ is a supreme moral example who ultimately 
inspires people toward repentance and right action; he changes the will of people rather than 
their being.  This is considered a great weakness in Girardian theology according to many 
theologians, as will be discussed below in the scholarly reception of Girard’s thought. 
4.2.5.3.  Sacrifice According to Christ’s Image 
 Given the Girardian critique of Christ’s sacrifice, questions arise concerning the nature of 
sacrifice within a Eucharistic context: In what does Eucharistic sacrifice consist?  What does it 
accomplish, and how?  Church tradition and official teaching from the Council of Trent have 
understood the Eucharist so firmly as sacrificial that these questions cannot be ignored.  For his 
answers Daly turns to the thought of Edward J. Kilmartin, who arrived at a notion of sacrifice 
very conducive to the use of mimetic theory in theology.642  Very importantly for this 
dissertation, Daly answers questions on sacrifice -- Christ’s and Eucharistic -- with relational 
terms and categories.   
                                               
640 Daly, SU, 237; cf. 106. 
641 For an overview of traditional models of soteriology, cf. Gustav Aulen, Christus Victor: An Historical Study of 
the Three Main Types of the Idea of Atonement, trans. A.G. Hebert (New York: Macmillan, 1969). 
642 Cf. Kilmartin, EW, particularly 339-385.   
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Kilmartin (like Alison) noted that Christian sacrifice differs from world religions’ 
sacrifices through the divine initiative: atonement begins with God reconciling the world to 
himself (cf. 2 Cor. 5:17), not with offending humans offering appeasement sacrifices.  Christian 
sacrifice is thoroughly trinitarian in its origins, culminating in humans’ participation by charity in 
relationship with the triune God.  Christian sacrifice is first of all “the self-offering of the Father 
in the gift of his Son, and in the second place the unique response of the Son in his humanity to 
the Father, and in the third place, the self-offering of believers in union with Christ by which 
they share in his covenant relationship with the Father.”643  Gift therefore is the principle of 
sacrifice, and its origin is of critical importance: not in an offender’s need to appease, but in the 
offended God’s reconciling gift of the Son in the Incarnation (cf. Jn. 3:16).  Furthermore, God is 
not only the principle of sacrifice (as Giver) but the gift given.  God’s loving self-gift reveals 
how no thing or other person substitutes as the gift; much less are victims essential to sacrifice.   
Secondly, Christ the Son embodies the ‘return-self-giving’ to which human beings are 
called, remaining faithful to love of the Father and of other human beings to the end (cf. Jn. 
13:1).  His gift of self without self-preservation or reciprocation of violence simply offers the 
love than which there is no greater (cf. Jn. 15:13), it does not inherently involve death or 
destruction.  The will of the Father to which Jesus is obedient (cf. Mk. 14:36) does not ‘demand’ 
self-sacrifice per se; it ‘demands’ loving, to which humanity responded by torturing and 
executing Jesus. 
Thirdly, Christian sacrifice derives not from individual actions but from relationship: 
covenant relationship with the triune God by virtue of Baptism.  Baptism enables the Christian’s 
share in the priesthood of Christ, and so becomes capable of the same kind of loving or 
‘sacrifices.’  Christian sacrifice by disciples likewise primarily concerns self-offering, not objects 
                                               
643 Kilmartin, EW, 381-382. 
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or items.644  Moreover, Daly says Christian sacrifice “totally excludes that sacrifice can mean 
something is done to something or, even worse, that something is done to someone.  It sees 
sacrifice as a totally personal -- indeed the person-constituting event par excellence -- 
interpersonal event.”645   
The Eucharistic sacrifice similarly requires a certain reinterpretation in light of revelation 
of the scapegoat mechanism operative in archaic notions of sacrifice.  Traditionally the 
consecration of the bread and wine into the Body and Blood of Christ (transubstantiation) is 
understood analogously as an immolation.  Immolation, however, is no longer an essential 
element of the religious offering or transformation taking place.  What is most essential is the 
self-giving enabled or taking place through the symbolic reception and giving of gifts.  The 
offering of Christ’s Body and Blood to the Father in the Eucharistic liturgy does not change 
God’s mind or appease His anger; the change is among the assembly, to become more fully the 
ecclesial Body of Christ, animated by one heart and one mind.646  The change of the bread and 
wine into the Body and Blood of Christ is at the service of a more important change: that the 
liturgical assembly may become more fully the Body of Christ.647 
Girard’s anthropological insights provide a clarification of several aspects of community 
life, including their hidden consequences.  We may imagine gift-giving always results in pure 
gratitude and more peaceful community relations, but can rather stir up jealousy and envy.  To 
give a desire to be imitated and/or obeyed is to sow a seed of either rivalry (in the gift of an 
object, or if stirring up competition) or -- in the case of imitation of the good -- aspiration for a 
transcendent good which truly unites a community.   
                                               
644 Cf. Daly, SU, 5. 
645 Daly, SU, 21; cf. 228-229. 
646 Cf. Daly, SU, 21. 
647 Cf. Daly, SU, 20. 
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4.3.  Critical Reception of Girard’s Contribution 
 In the following I offer my own observations about Girard’s mimetic theory and its use in 
theology.  Then after Girard’s impact, strengths, and weaknesses as noted by the scholarly community, I 
propose applications of Girardian thought to Eucharistic theology. 
4.3.1.  Girard’s Contributions 
4.3.1.1.  Clarifying Christ’s Unique Sacrifice 
 Girard’s critique of sacrifice, which distinguishes Christ’s ‘sacrifice’ from all others, 
even anthropologically, is a major contribution.  The Church values and upholds sacrifice 
without explaining it sufficiently; as a result archaic notions of sacrifice get superimposed upon 
Christ’s Paschal Mystery which are then transposed into Christian theology and piety.  Even with 
2,000 years of the Church’s theological reflection, Christian sacrifices -- Christ’s, the Church’s, 
and those of individual believers -- have had no official definition or magisterial teaching.  
Sacrifice-related terms (e.g., sacrifice, offer/offering, oblation, etc.) are essential enough to be 
included in each of the Roman Church’s Eucharistic Prayers, yet magisterial teaching uses terms 
equivocally for Christ’s Paschal Mystery, Temple sacrifices, the Eucharistic sacrifice of the 
Church, and penitential practices offered by the faithful.  This unwittingly undoes the exposure 
of the scapegoat mechanism and baptizes it under a Christian guise.  Too often the necessity for 
sacrifice is simply repeated without explanation of either its functioning or its purpose; this is 
unhelpful in a postmodern age when the rationale of sacrifice makes less and less sense.   
 Girard, with the help of Schwager, Alison, and Daly, clarifies the salutary core of 
Christian sacrifice: not what is sacrificed but the existential, personal self-giving loving (and 
often, reconciling) initiative toward the violent/offending other, even at the risk of one’s own 
life.  Christ’s ‘sacrifice’ is shown to be a matter of forgiveness (cf. Lk. 23:34), of loving and 
reconciling initiative, self-giving for the good of the other.  This is the obedience to the divine 
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loving and merciful will that is ‘better than sacrifice’ (cf. Pss. 40:6-8, 51:16-17).  Instead of 
misrecognizing and eliminating others as threats and victims to be sacrificed, it recognizes and 
eliminates violence within oneself as the true threat.  Particularly with the help of Daly, 
trinitarian self-giving becomes the proper foundation and principle for a correctly Christian 
notion of sacrifice.  Incorporation of mimetic theory by these systematic theologians also 
corrects problematic depictions of intra-trinitarian relations which portray violence within the 
Godhead, e.g., for the sake of ‘appeasement’ of the Father by a discharge of wrath upon the Son.   
 Sacrifice is an important concept, but it is not the proper starting point for either 
Eucharistic theology or piety: only God’s loving self-gift, which initiates the new covenant 
relationship in which Christians live, provides the proper context for discussion of sacrifice.  
Acts of religious sacrifice, when isolated from the love which is meant to animate them, soon 
devolve into substitute obligation-fillers that presume love but do not foster resentment instead.   
4.3.1.2.  Restoring the Gospel Challenge of Nonviolence  
 Amid a culture immersed in scapegoating, ceaseless competition, and images of violence 
(even as entertainment), mimetic theory fulfills a prophetic task of exposing how deeply our 
logic is rooted in rivalrous desire and violence.  Its connection between violence and Satan is a 
helpful hermeneutic for scriptural texts on Satan, demonic possession, and exorcisms.  Its 
exposure of violence as satanic revives the gospel’s teachings on nonviolence, which are often 
too challenging and thus suppressed or dismissed as idealistic.   
 Girard’s interdisciplinary approach -- even as it offends academic methodology -- reveals 
important connections between the scriptures, anthropology, and ‘real life;’ thus it helps 
concretize and specify the work of conversion.  It helps bring theology into more meaningful 
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dialogue with lived experience, including how speaking or acting against systemic violence 
usually results in persecution of the messenger, since it challenges the status quo so forcefully.   
4.3.1.3.  Relating Desire and the Holy Spirit 
 Language of desire and of gift opens a clearer and more prominent place for the Holy 
Spirit in sanctification.  Girard’s anthropological insights, together with Schwager’s 
considerations in systematic theology, create fertile ground to explore how desire -- be it 
charitable or envious -- operates among a community.   
 For several possible reasons -- the Enlightenment’s association of subjective matters with 
what is unscientific or unreal, theology’s traditional emphasis on metaphysics, suspicion of 
desire as concupiscence, the commodification of grace as an entity, or others -- theology has 
neglected meaningful discussion of desire in either systematic or liturgical theology.  Girard’s 
concern with questions of human desire and the relational dynamics his analyses expose provide 
an important correction for theology to relate life-and-death issues with Christian reflection on 
charitable desire, a fruit of the Holy Spirit (cf. Gal. 5:22-23).  In particular, through theological 
use of mimetic theory, pneumatology can be brought more concretely into discussion of 
soteriology and ecclesiology. 
4.3.2.  Shortcomings 
4.3.2.1.  Weak Soteriology 
 The chief problem for Christian theology that incorporates the insights of mimetic theory 
is its relatively weak soteriology.  It accounts for merely a ‘moral influence’ soteriology, which 
makes conversion dependent upon the subjective disposition and committed action of the 
converted.  (Furthermore, the vast difference between cognitive awareness of the sacrificial 
mechanism and a sustained moral conversion which does not resort to sacrificial action is all too 
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often overlooked.)  Since mimetic theory’s question centered upon the workings of imitation and 
desire, its answer remains limited within matters of imitation and desire: which is plenty, but still 
not the sum total of the problems of the human condition.  Desire is also an ephemeral and 
transitory thing, a very weak hinge for salvation.  While Schwager intends a soteriology more 
substantial than psychological or subjective, it remains insufficient for explaining how salvation 
would occur for those with defective knowledge or willpower (children, those who never 
encountered the gospel, etc.).   
 ‘Ontological’ or metaphysical soteriologies have the merit of proposing how all can be 
saved (by virtue of God’s action), but these often take inadequate account of human freedom and 
responsibility in response to the process of sanctification.  Metaphysical soteriological models 
fail badly to account for the struggle of lifelong conversion and sanctification; they have very 
little to say concerning the ongoing responsibility and labor of conversion.  They tend toward a 
morality animated by fear of punishment and hope for reward rather than becoming Christian 
lovers.  So neither metaphysical (‘Christus Victor,’ satisfaction) soteriologies nor those of 
Schwager and Daly (moral influence, imitation) are alone sufficient; both are needed for a 
properly full account of conversion, sanctification, and redemption.  Metaphysical models 
uphold divine initiative and action properly, and moral influence models uphold the 
responsibility for some kind of cooperation with inspirations of the Holy Spirit in one’s thoughts, 
decisions, actions, and lives.  Moral influence models remain necessary (along with metaphysical 
models) to explain, direct, and sustain the individual’s attention and intention toward the good.648   
4.3.2.2.  Categorizing All Archaic Sacrifices as Murderous 
                                               
648 David Turnbloom has written on the value of exemplary soteriology within a Thomistic approach.  Cf. David 
Farina Turnbloom, Speaking with Aquinas: A Conversation about Grace, Virtue, and the Eucharist, Kindle Edition 
(Collegeville, MN: Liturgical Press, 2017). 
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 In his early work Girard considers all archaic sacrifices, even thank-offerings, to have 
sprung from an original murder.649  Girard’s rejection of all archaic sacrifice is a stumbling block 
to wider acceptance of mimetic theory, particularly as contemporary notions of sacrifice extend 
far beyond either acts of slaughter or even religious contexts.   
 Secular ‘sacrifices’ (such as for self-discipline) are necessary for progress in human 
flourishing (education, physical development, etc.).  There is still need in the Christian life for 
decision, ascesis, perseverance (e.g., Rom. 12:1-2; Heb. 12:1-12; Rev. 2:1-3:22).  Decisions cut 
away all possibilities but one; the merchant in search of pearls sells all he has to obtain one pearl 
of great price (Mt. 13:45-46).   It therefore remains to distinguish: a) Christ’s self-gift from 
archaic sacrifice; b) participation in the Eucharistic sacrifice by the laity; and c) wise ascetical 
commitment from notions of sacrifice which thwart authentic human flourishing.   
4.3.2.3.  Developments Needed 
 Since it was only toward the end of his life that Girard made a positive assessment of 
Christ’s death as a (particular kind of) sacrifice, it is left to interpreters of Girard to integrate this 
change into the rest of Girard’s work.  The fuller anthropological and theological implications of 
this change, which could integrate that were previously rejected, need articulation for a broad 
audience.   
 Also in need of development is a much fuller notion of good mimesis, of the imitation of 
Christ (or, for that matter, any model of the good) in anthropological terms.  (This is not to create 
two kinds of mimesis, for as Girardians note, there is simply one mimesis dynamic, tending 
toward either good or ill.650)  Devotional works which exhort imitation of Christ have existed for 
                                               
649 Cf. Girard, THFFW, 1-83, 105-125.  Unwittingly, Girard thereby imitates the Church, which relates many 
notions of sacrifice to Christ’s self-gift, as long as something is invoked as such.   
650 Cf. Sandor Goodhart, “Criticism, Critique, and Crisis in Assessing the Work of René Girard,” Bulletin for the 
Study of Religion, 45:3-4 (2016), 6-15; esp. 11-12. 
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centuries, but these (including Thomas à Kempis’ The Imitation of Christ) typically presume an 
archaic notion of Christ’s sacrifice and foster a notion of imitation that romanticizes suffering as 
a good since it can draw us to Christ.  As important as Girard’s exposure of sacrificial logic was, 
it needs to be complemented by a positive proposal of the solution: based on good redemptive 
mimesis of Christ, not an archaic notion of Christ’s sacrifice or depictions of romanticized 
suffering.  If the workings of imitation and desire are as complex as Girard proposes, the 
anthropological workings of charitable desire and its transmission need further clarification.   
4.3.3.  Others’ Critiques 
4.3.3.1.  Impact 
  Dubbed by fellow immortel and Stanford professor Michel Serres “the new Darwin of the 
human sciences,” Girard’s thought has garnered attention worldwide in a wide variety of 
fields.651  In 1983 the symposium Colloque René Girard in Cerisy-la-Salle, France, studied his 
thought from an interdisciplinary perspective.652  The International Association of Scholars of 
Mimetic Theory, since 1990, have sponsored an annual Colloquium on Violence and Religion653 
and published the journal Contagion: Journal of Violence, Mimesis, and Culture; Michigan State 
University Press publishes the Studies in Violence, Mimesis & Culture Series.  The University of 
Innsbruck, where Raymund Schwager taught, holds a database of worldwide publications related 
to mimetic theory.654  Michael Kirwan summarizes the scope of Girard’s impact:  
René Girard has completely modified the landscape of the social sciences. 
Ethnology, history of religion, philosophy, psychoanalysis, psychology and literary 
criticism are explicitly mobilised in this enterprise.  Theology, economics and 
                                               
651 Cynthia L. Haven, Evolution of Desire: A Life of René Girard, Studies in Violence, Mimesis & Culture, ed. 
William A. Johnsen (East Lansing, MI: Michigan State University Press, 2018), 226.  Hereafter ED.  Cf. Michel 
Serres, Atlas (Paris: Julliard, 1994), 219-220.   
652 Proceedings were published: Paul Dumouchel, ed., Violence and Truth: On the Work of René Girard (London: 
Althone, 1988). 
653 Accessible at https://violenceandreligion.com. 
654 Accessible at https://www.uibk.ac.at/theol/cover/mimdok/. 
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political sciences, history and sociology – in short, all the social sciences, and those 
that used to be called moral sciences – are influenced by it.655 
 
Girard’s impact within theology is suggested already in the writings of Schwager, Alison, and 
Daly above; several other theologians can be added.656 
  Billionaire investor Peter Thiel, a student of Girard’s, was an early major investor in 
Facebook precisely because he saw how social media would function according to mimetic 
theory. 657  Thiel’s foundation is a major donor of The Imitatio Foundation which supports the 
Colloquium on Violence and Religion.658  Lonergan scholar Robert M. Doran, S.J., is producing 
a systematic theology which incorporates the insights of Girard’s mimetic theory.659  Upon his 
death obituaries appeared in more than 15 countries, including such publications as Le Monde, 
The New York Times, and The Economist.660   
4.3.3.2.  Strengths 
  As one might expect from such an impact, praise for Girard’s work is effusive.  For 
James G. Williams it offers “the basis of a new Christian humanism,”661 and for Gil Bailie “the 
most sweeping and significant intellectual breakthrough of the modern age.”662  Daly considers it 
“one of the great intellectual achievements of the late twentieth century -- a comprehensive 
                                               
655 Michael Kirwan, Discovering Girard, Religion Today (London: Darton Longman Todd, 2010), Kindle Locations 
117-121.   Hereafter DG. 
656 Note 55 above has already mentioned James G. Williams, Gil Bailie, Stephen Finlan, S. Mark Heim, Erin Lothes-
Biviano; in addition the Lonerganian scholar Robert Doran, Wolfgang Palaver, Scott Cowdell, Joel Hodge, Mathias 
Moosbrugger, and still others. 
657 Quentin Hardy, “René Girard, French Theorist of the Social Sciences, Dies at 91,” The New York Times, 
November 10, 2015.  Accessed on January 31, 2019 at https://www.nytimes.com/2015/11/11/arts/international/rene-
girard-french-theorist-of-the-social-sciences-dies-at-91.html. Hereafter “Girard Dies at 91.” 
658 Accessible at https://violenceandreligion.com. 
659 Cf. Robert M. Doran, S.J., “A New Project in Systematic Theology,” Theological Studies 76 (2015) 243-259.  
Doran notes he will also employ Robert Daly’s Sacrifice Unveiled.  Also cf. Robert M. Doran, S.J., “The Nonviolent 
Cross: Lonergan and Girard on Redemption," Theological Studies 71 (2010) 46-61.   
660 Cf. Erik Buys, “In Memoriam: RIP René Girard (1923-2015),” Mimetic Margins, November 8, 2015.  Accessed 
on January 31, 2019 at https://mimeticmargins.com/tag/rip-rene-girard/.  Links to these obituaries can be found here. 
661 Williams, BVS, 6.  
662 Bailie, VU, 4.   
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vision of the ... processes of sin and redemption.”663  Among the strengths of mimetic theory is 
its explanatory power in a wide variety of academic disciplines as well as popular culture.   
Some of the strengths (4.3.1.) and weaknesses (4.3.2.) of mimetic theory for theology are 
noted above.  Additionally, mimetic theory offers a way to understand why the crucifixion of 
Christ took place without ascribing the origin of violence to the Godhead.  Whether writers agree 
or disagree with Girard (and/or his theological interpreters), his concerns and questions have 
shifted the theological landscape to deal with matters of violence in the Bible and in society and 
how disciples ought to respond.     
4.3.3.3.  Critiques  
  By no means, however, does Girard’s thought escape scholarly criticism.  Girard “has 
been accused of everything from being too religious to being too secular; he is apparently too 
Protestant, too masculinist, too pessimistic, too hopeful, too modern, too premodern, and too 
postmodern.”664  His methodology and interdisciplinary ‘grand-narrative’ approach come under 
suspicion as well.  Rather few address Girard’s theological statements, implicit or otherwise.  
Most notable among Girard’s theological critics was Hans Urs von Balthasar.665   
  For Balthasar, several problems in Girard’s thought stem from a lack of metaphysics.  
Balthasar considers Girard’s soteriology exclusively psychological, an insufficient and unreliable 
change in human beings: salvation derives not so much from the tragic death of Christ as in its 
                                               
663 Quoted on the back cover of Girard, Reader. 
664 Jacob Sherman, “Metaphysics and the Redemption of Sacrifice: On René Girard and Charles Williams,” 
Heythrop Journal LI (2010), 50. [45-59.]  Hereafter “Metaphysics.” 
665 Cf. Hans Urs von Balthasar, Theo-Drama: Theological Dramatic Theory, Volume IV: The Action, trans. Graham 
Harrison (San Francisco, Ignatius Press, 1994), 297-314.  Hereafter TD:IV.  Balthasar published the original German 
text in 1980. It includes a critique of Schwager, which could not have taken account of Schwager’s later publication 
JITDOS in 1999.  On June 27, 1979, Schwager wrote Girard that Balthasar had decided to give Girard a “place of 
honor” in his forthcoming book.  Given the critique Balthasar published, his remark to Schwager may have been 
meant ironically.  RGRSC, 75. 
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effect in others.666  It only changed things on an anthropological or social level, the cross 
“concerns only men’s attitude to the Crucified, as if God’s attitude to him did not exist”667 -- but 
changed nothing in the divine-human relationship.  Similarly, the fact that the world burdens 
Jesus with the sin of the world (instead of the Father) attributes too much redemptive initiative to 
human beings.668  The theological end result, according to Balthasar, is that Girard’s non-
metaphysical revelation of Christ is remarkably similar to Karl Barth’s completely other-worldly 
revelation.669  Similarly, John Milbank goes so far as to place Girard in continuity with the 
positivist social science tradition, unwittingly reinscribing pagan sacrificial logic as 
‘scientific.’670  Mark I. Wallace thinks Girard’s claim -- especially in the post-Derridean era -- 
that the gospels are uniquely revelatory risks becoming a postmodern biblicism.671  One sees 
from these critiques how Girard gets interpreted as modernist and nearly fundamentalist at the 
same time.  
For Balthasar, the categories of the ‘Old Covenant’ -- sacrifice, expiation, punishment, 
wrath -- provide both an important continuity with God’s covenant with Israel.672  Therefore it is 
problematic when Girard’s Jesus “takes their meaning ..., uncovers [sacrifice], completes it and 
radically reverses it.”673  Also Girard’s view also entails “the complete purification of the image 
of God from all traits of violence.  Violence is forbidden to man because the heavenly Father 
does not employ it; his kingdom will be a kingdom of love, not of ritual institutions and 
                                               
666 Cf. Balthasar, TD:IV, 300. 
667 Balthasar, TD:IV, 312. 
668 Cf. Balthasar, TD:IV, 314. 
669 Cf. Balthasar, TD: IV, 308-309. 
670 Cf. John Milbank, “Stories of Sacrifice,” Modern Theology 12:1 (1996), 54 [27-56.], and John Milbank, 
Theology and Social Theory: Beyond Secular Reason, 2nd ed. (Malden, MA: Blackwell Pub., 2006), 397.   
671 Mark I. Wallace, “Postmodern Biblicism: The Challenge of René Girard for Contemporary Theology,” Modern 
Theology 5:4 (July 1989), 311 [309-325]. 
672 Cf. Balthasar, TD:IV, 307-308. 
673 Balthasar, TD:IV, 298. 
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interdicts.”674  For Balthasar, such a revision is too sharp a break between the old and new 
covenants. 
Demythologizing violence out of the Old Testament notion of God will not do for 
Balthasar, who maintains the demands justice makes on God to punish and for sinners to be 
punished.  Balthasar complains Girard’s Father is ‘power-less’ and ‘does not ask’ for a sacrifice 
on the part of the Son,675 and similarly, Schwager’s God “forgives without requiring anything in 
return, without requiring satisfaction.”676  In response Balthasar asks, “Why the Cross, if God 
forgives in any case? .... either [God] wills to burden [the Servant] with sins, or [God] allows 
it.”677  In sum, Balthasar does not see much value in the critique of sacred violence.  He writes 
poetically of the unity of divine omnipotence, apparent powerlessness, and the gift, made visible 
by Christ on the cross.678  Yet according to this logic, Girard’s non-retaliatory God, who makes 
unlimited self-gift without threatening violence, presents itself as more ‘powerful.’  The 
Girardian Christ does away with categories of retribution and exchange, and instead opens the 
way of a God who is free to forgive.  The cross of Christ remains necessary nonetheless, to 
demonstrate back to humanity the violence of its scapegoat mechanism, and to prompt 
repentance, confession, and conversion at seeing the fruits of its work.   
It is unfortunate that Balthasar’s critique, written in 1980, came before both Girard’s 
agreement with Schwager on a revised notion of sacrifice (in 1991, published in 1996) and 
Schwager’s publication of Jesus in the Drama of Salvation (1999).  Girard’s revised stance on 
sacrifice (section 4.2.3.7. above) answers Balthasar’s criticism by redoubling the original point: 
“Christ became a scapegoat [in the eyes of the world] in order to desacralize those who came 
                                               
674 Balthasar, TD:IV, 306. 
675 Cf. Balthasar, TD:IV, 309-310. 
676 Cf. Schwager, Must There Be Scapegoats?, 211.  Quoted in Balthasar, TD:IV, 311. 
677 Balthasar, TD:IV, 312. 
678 Cf. Balthasar, TD:IV, 325-332. 
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before him and to prevent those who come after him from being sacralized.... [This corrects] the 
colossal but inevitable error of holding God responsible for purely human violence.... God is 
love.”679  For Girard, Christ saves not through an archaic sense of sacrifice but from such a sense.   
This stance of both distinction and continuity between archaic and Christian sacrifice, however, 
Jacob Sherman finds “profoundly ambivalent,” as Girard does not succeed at clarifying how this 
would be possible.680  
Despite Girard’s retractions and corrections, the perception among scholars persists that 
Girard’s view proposes an inherently violent ontology.  In 1996 John Milbank noted that culture, 
violence, and sacrality are all “co-terminous” for Girard, who pins violence on “intersubjective” 
desire, which means desire has an “ineluctably poisoned character.”681  For all Girard points out 
concerning the workings of violent desire, his proposal for what constitutes the kingdom of God 
or ‘good’ desire remains insufficient.682  Agreeing with Milbank, Hans Boersma adds that for 
Girard the love of God (or of Christ on the cross) does not redeem human beings so much as so 
much as simply expose and reject violence.683  Girard, Boersma asserts, shares Derrida’s 
“preoccupation with violence,” neglecting the positive message the gospel proclaims.684  
Girard’s lack of a doctrine of creation which could account for an ontology of hospitality is 
problematic as well; Boersma also questions whether desire can never arise from objects 
(without imitation of someone else).685   
                                               
679 Girard, “Mimetic Theory and Theology,” in TOBWSC, 44. 
680 Sherman, “Metaphysics,” 52-53. 
681 John Milbank, “Stories of Sacrifice,” Modern Theology 12:1 (January 1996), 42. [27-56.]  Cf. John Milbank, 
Theology and Social Theory: Beyond Secular Reason (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1990). 
682 Cf. John Milbank, Theology and Social Theory: Beyond Secular Reason (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1990), 395-
402. 
683 Cf. Hans Boersma, Violence, Hospitality, and the Cross: Reappropriating the Atonement Tradition (Grand 
Rapids, MI: Baker Academic, 2004), 141-142. [133-153]  Hereafter VHC. 
684 Boersma, VHC, 145.  
685 Cf. Boersma, VHC, 144-145, 149-150. 
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The perception of an inherently violent ontology also applies to Girard’s notion of desire.  
While Girard clarified in a 1993 interview that desire is not inherently evil,686 his interlocutor 
Rebecca Adams noted in a subsequent article Girard’s mimetic theory still lacks a clear account 
of how good (or ‘creative’) desire precedes violent mimesis.687  Furthermore, the gulf between 
God’s non-violent loving desire and the world’s violent mimesis raises questions as to how 
God’s desire could be imitated by human beings.  Similarly, for Sarah Coakley (in 2009) 
mimetic theory “positively bristles with theoretical problems .... in its insistent evocation of a 
primary violence deeply encoded in the roots of human nature.”688  Girard’s reluctance to 
employ metaphysics may keep matters on a practical or anthropological level, but it also hinders 
deeper exploration and expansion of his theory.  The scholarly community is clearly demanding 
a fuller metaphysical exposition of mimetic theory, while a ‘Girardian’ might respond that such 
exploration is a further delay or evasion of the conversion demanded by the insights of mimetic 
theory.689   
For other critics Girard’s theory resembles a Gnosticism of ‘those who know’ the ‘real’ 
meaning of Christ’s gospel.690  Similarly, Fergus Kerr notes mimetic theory cannot become 
divorced from the gospel narratives, or else it “might ... easily become one more abstract 
                                               
686 Cf. Rebecca Adams, “Violence, Difference, and Sacrifice: A Conversation with René Girard,” Religion and 
Literature 25:2 (1993), 9-33.  Excerpt reprinted as “The Goodness of Mimetic Desire,” in René Girard, The Girard 
Reader, ed. James G. Williams (New York: Crossroad, 1996), 62-65.  For another statement by Girard on ‘good’ 
mimesis, cf. “A Return to Imitation,” in René Girard, When These Things Begin: A Conversation with Miguel 
Treguer, trans. Trevor Cribben Merrill (East Lansing, MI: Michigan State University Press, 2014), 43-48. 
687 Cf. Rebecca Adams, “Loving Mimesis and Girard’s ‘Scapegoat of the Text’: A Creative Reassessment of 
Mimetic Desire,” in Violence Renounced: René Girard, Biblical Studies and Peacemaking, ed. Willard M. Swartley 
(Telford PA: Pandora Press, 2000). 
688 Sarah Coakley, “Sacrifice Regained: Reconsidering the Rationality of Christian Belief,” An Inaugural lecture by 
the Norris-Hulse Professor of Divinity given in the University of Cambridge, 13 October 2009 (Cambridge, UK: 
University of Cambridge Press, 2012), 12.  Hereafter “Sacrifice Regained.”  For an argument that Coakley has 
misread Girard, cf. Chelsea Jordan King, “Girard Reclaimed: Finding Common Ground between Sarah Coakley and 
René Girard on Sacrifice,” Contagion: Journal of Violence, Mimesis, and Culture, 23:1 (Spring 2016), 63-74. 
689 In light of Girard’s theory, his own corrections, and others’ critiques, it is interesting that no commentary is given 
on either Genesis 8:21 (God declares ‘the inclination of the human heart is evil from youth’) or Mark 7:21 (Jesus 
says ‘For it is from within, from the human heart, that evil intentions come’). 
690 Cf. Douglas Hedley, Sacrifice Imagined: Violence, Atonement and the Sacred, Kindle Edition (New York: 
Continuum, 2011) Kindle Locations 2493-2494. 
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theological theorem.”691  Boersma questions how Girard can claim Christianity both failed to 
heed its own message of nonviolence and can be responsible for producing Western democracy’s 
concern for victims, justice, and rights.692 
Girard’s eccentric interdisciplinary methodology is causa honoris for some693 and leaves 
others crying foul.694  As a literary critic exploring ethnology turned biblical scholar and semi-
theologian, Girard is (according to one colleague at Stanford) “ruthlessly undisciplined.  He’s 
still not forgiven.”695  Hypotheses such as Girard’s concerning the origins of culture are simply 
unverifiable scientifically.  Mimetic theory’s contributions within theology, however, concerning 
the uniqueness of Christ’s sacrifice, nonviolence as essential to Christ’s teaching, and opening a 
greater role for discussion of the Holy Spirit, outweigh concerns about academic methodology 
and scope.   
4.4.  Applying Mimetic Theory to the Liturgy of the Eucharist  
Mimetic theory within theology that is dramatic (Schwager), liturgical (Alison), and 
relational (Daly) highlights the nature of Christ’s unique sacrifice which scripture tells us both 
put an end to sacrifice (cf. Heb. 9:26) and established a new covenant (cf. Lk. 22:20; Heb. 
10:12,14).696  Christ thus founded a new community, the Church, which bases itself on imitation 
of Christ’s desire which, through his example, commands, and gift of the Holy Spirit, he sought 
to give to his disciples.   
4.4.1.  Liturgy of the Eucharist as a Gift of Desire  
                                               
691 Fergus Kerr, “Rescuing Girard’s Argument?,” Modern Theology 8:4 (October 1992), 398. [385-399] 
692 “Girard cannot have his cake and eat it, too.”  Cf. Boersma, VHC, 148-149. 
693 “[Girard’s] effort was probably naïve on a methodological level, but courageous and full of potential on a 
theoretical one.”  Pierpaolo Antonello and Joao Cezar de Castro Rocha, “Introduction,” in Girard, EC, 6.  
694 For a detailed narrative of the critical reception of Girard’s writings in France until 1978, see Benoît Chantre, 
“René Girard in France,” trans. Willam A. Johnsen, Contagion 23 (2016), 13-62.    
695 Quotation of Robert Pogue Harrison in Haven, ED, 2.   
696 Heb. 9:26b: “[Christ] has appeared once for all at the end of the age to remove sin by the sacrifice of himself.”  
Heb. 10:12,14: “But when Christ had offered for all time a single sacrifice for sins, ‘he sat down at the right hand of 
God.... For by a single offering [Christ] has perfected for all time those who are sanctified.” 
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In light of mimetic theory and its appropriation by theologians, the liturgy of the 
Eucharist can be appreciated anew, in ways that illuminate both the theory and the liturgy.  With 
an eye toward Daly’s notion of Christ offering us ‘the gift of transformative mimesis,’ the 
following proposes the liturgy of the Eucharist as precisely the ritual space and time in which 
this gift is celebrated, given, and received.   
4.4.1.1.  The Gift of Christ’s Loving Desire 
The liturgy of the Eucharist originates from Christ’s paschal mystery, and so we begin 
there.  With the cross, Christ’s loving fidelity exposed the deceit of scapegoating, the innocence 
of victims, and the violence embedded in all levels of society.  Christ’s resurrection, ascension, 
and gift of the Holy Spirit at Pentecost revealed God’s forgiveness of human beings, even while 
we were still sinners (Rom. 5:8).  Christ’s Paschal Mystery revealed both the gift of forgiveness 
and the truth of the world’s complicity with violence and sin.  These call for responses of 
confession of that complicity, and conversion through acceptance of God’s gift and living 
according to Christ’s desire.   
This conversion demands both deliverance from violent mimetic desire and the gift of 
‘good desire’ -- which humans cannot provide for themselves.  Insofar as mimesis of rivalry is 
the root of evil, there is need of a gift of good desire through a model-mediator to be imitated.  
Christ provides these gifts.  He serves as a proper model for relationship to the Father through his 
deference to the will of the Father (cf. Jn. 6:38), most dramatically in humble acceptance of the 
abandonment by the Father upon the cross.  He does not enter into rivalry with his disciples but 
calls them “friends, because I have made known to you everything that I have heard from my 
Father” (Jn. 15:14-15).  With the Father he sends the gift of the Holy Spirit (cf. Lk. 23:46; Jn. 
16:7-16; 20:21-23; Acts 2:1-4, 33) which liberates (2 Cor. 3:17), writing the new covenant (cf. 
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Lk. 22:20) on human hearts (cf. Jer. 31:31-33; Ezek. 37:14).  Through these actions Jesus is 
presented to us as the forgiving victim (Alison) whose grace precedes and creates the possibility 
of repentance and deeper conversion.697  Through the gift of faith, as Robert Hamerton-Kelly 
notes, the result is that  
Christ lives in me because I imitate him in the sense of his desire becoming my 
desire (1 Cor. 2:16b), and my desire becoming his, in the sense that ‘he loved me 
and gave himself for me’ (cf. Gal. 2:20).  Thus I love myself in Christ and as Christ 
loves me.  Christ lives in me and I live in him because we share the same desire, and 
thus acquisitive and conflictual desire becomes generous and consensual desire.698 
 
These gifts of covenant relationship, gift of the Holy Spirit, and communion with Christ are 
mediated to human beings through the sacraments of the Church.   
4.4.2.2.  The Gift of Christ’s Loving Desire in the Liturgy of the Eucharist 
The Eucharist most clearly specifies the gift of God’s love which is meant to constitute 
members of the Church, bringing about a communion not only of ‘body and blood’ but of will 
and desire.  Most directly in the institution narrative, yet more broadly from the liturgy of the 
Eucharist as a whole, God’s gracious and scandalous gift of desire is offered to its participants.   
Without use of the term ‘desire,’ the gift of God’s desire nonetheless finds most direct 
verbal expression in the Institution Narrative.  Citing the words attributed to Jesus to in a 
proclamation of his loving fidelity-unto-death (cf. 1 Cor. 11:23-26), the liturgy celebrates Jesus’ 
prophetic sign and expression of the self-giving he will fulfill upon the cross.   
This ‘gift of desire’ is by no means to be confined to the Institution Narrative, as if the 
items of the consecrated host and wine ‘contain’ or delineate the desire being given.  Rather, 
several aspects of the liturgy offer and foster adoption of God’s loving desire for oneself.  The 
prayers of the community (collect, prayer over the gifts, closing prayer) petition God for a closer 
                                               
697 Cf. Schwager, JITDOS, 56. 
698 Hamerton-Kelly, SV, 117. 
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union of will.  The liturgy’s rites (e.g., penitential), prayers (Gloria, Our Father), and Creed all 
shape attention and intention toward unified recognition of God’s truth and desire.  In particular, 
the Our Father (‘Thy will be done’) requests that God bestow his loving desire to become active 
in one’s own person and life.  The prayer before the sign of peace (along with the sign itself) 
acknowledges the peace Christ came to give and seeks to establish among us.   
In public celebration of “the riches of his grace which he lavished upon us ... [making] 
known to us the mystery of his will” (Eph. 1:7-9), the liturgy of the Eucharist re-presents and 
receives ritually the expression of Christ’s gift which, when received as such, delivers from self-
protective, egotistical, violent desire.  Through this understanding of the liturgy as a gift of God’s 
desire, the ‘love behind the gift’ (Alison) re-emerges to the foreground, both as a gracious gift 
and as a scandalous gift that impels us to look to God for our desire and to speak and act with 
love amid a violent world.   
The Eucharistic gift expresses and bestows God’s love to us.  Its gift of desire (in an 
objective sense) emphasizes the existential transformation this gift enables and demands of us 
(‘Do this in memory of me’); this transformation occurs -- even if ephemerally -- by living 
according to the loving desire the gift manifests.  This is full, conscious, active participation in 
the liturgy of the Eucharist: union not just of body and soul but also conscious human desire with 
God’s loving desire; such unity is precisely the res of the sacrament, without which full, 
conscious, active participation does not take place.   
 As Marion noted, Christ’s radical -- indeed ‘impossible’ -- gift of his body and blood 
reveals the ‘givability’ of one’s life.  No less is Jesus’ loving desire ‘givable’ -- and receivable; 
such a decision and desire needs to be present for the gift of one’s body and blood to occur in 
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charity.699  In light of seeing this possibility opened up by Jesus’ gift -- and the commandment to 
do so embedded within the institution narrative itself -- the full possibility and mandate for the 
recipient to imitate this self-giving emerge.  Christ’s gift makes the giving of our own lives in 
charity both possible and demanded of us: “Love one another as I have loved you .... “Greater 
love no one has than this, to lay down one’s life for one’s friends” (Jn. 13:34; 15:13).   
For pastoral reasons, the Eucharist needs to be understood as a personal gift of love much 
more and far more than a dramatic spectacle of miraculous transubstantiation of items on an 
altar.  Transubstantiation occurs, but it happens for the sake of recognition and acceptance of 
love which transform the recipient, not just ‘metaphysically’ or ‘ontologically,’ but to desire to 
become a living embodiment of Christ’s loving desire amid one’s own historical situation.   
Desire is not a secondary matter; it animates and characterizes actions as loving.  
Theological use of mimetic theory offers a way to address questions of desire within the 
relationship of Christ to his disciples.  Through such full, conscious, active participation in the 
liturgy of the Eucharist we are enabled to acknowledge, as Saint Paul did, “It is no longer I who 
live but it is Christ who lives in me.  And the life I now live in the flesh I live by faith in the Son 
of God, who loved me and gave himself for me” (Gal. 2:20-21).   
4.4.2.   Ritual Reversal of the Origins of Violence  
From a Girardian perspective, Christ’s deeds in the paschal mystery and the words of the  
institution narrative of the Eucharist are a perfect reversal and correction of the origins of 
violence.  Several aspects which constitute the scapegoat mechanism are reversed by Christ; each 
liturgy of the Eucharist implicitly celebrates this reversal.  Since the ‘ingredients’ of a radical 
decision to love against the tide of violence are demonstrated and celebrated in the liturgy of the 
Eucharist, it functions as the antithesis of archaic sacrifice.   
                                               
699 1 Cor. 13:3: “... and if I hand over my body so that I may boast, but do not have love, I gain nothing.” 
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 In the following tables, the first column lists the elements constituting the scapegoat 
mechanism, the way of the world.  The second column lists the elements as reversed by Christ in 
the Paschal Mystery (and/or Institution Narrative), reversing the origins of violence.  The third 
column presents these elements in the symbolic memorial which re-presents and preserves this 
revelation, in the liturgy of the Eucharist.  The fourth column presents ways participants in the 
liturgy are meant to bring Christ’s loving desire and action ‘beyond the liturgy’ into the world.  
Considered as a reversal of the origins of violence, the liturgy of the Eucharist celebrates an 
instituted (and embodied) memorial of the divine loving initiative, meant to redeem humanity 
from its sinful and violent foundations.   
 
First Stage: Dynamics of Desire Amid a Community 
Scapegoating Jesus: Paschal Mystery Eucharistic Liturgy Lives/Acts of Loving 
Acquisitive desire runs 
amok 
Divine self-giving desire, 
saving initiative from God.  
Proclamation of Kingdom 
of God  
Gift of God’s gracious and 
scandalous desire proclaimed 
and given  
Accepting and 
embodying God’s 
loving desire, beyond 
the liturgy into the 
world 
Mutual imitation creates 
communal identity crisis 
Jesus’ identity integrity (by 
blessing) and gift;  
Gift of communion into body 
of Christ 
Recognize givability 
of one’s life 
Competition, rivalries 
between subjects and models 
Nonrivalrous mediation of 
the Father’s will; petition to 
Father for forgiveness of 
the other 
Nonrivalrous gift of desire: 
given and available to all 
Recognize brethren/ 
icons /others 
Rivalrous desire becomes 
murderous, imitated by all 
against one 
Loving desire of one 
‘against’ (or in the face of) 
all  
Expression of God’s loving 
desire for and to recipient 
To give oneself in the 
chaotic violent world 
Against the pattern of acquisitive desire which gives birth to rivalry and aggression, Jesus, secure 
in his identity as Son and living according to the will of the Father, maintains a loving and 
forgiving initiative, even when the world turns against him.  The liturgy of the Eucharist re-
presents this Word of the Father liturgically, particularly as expressed in the words of the 
institution narrative and the gift of Christ’s body and blood for communion.  This offers Christ’s 
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desire to participants, who are themselves members of the ecclesial body of Christ and called to 
initiate loving as Christ did.   
Second Stage: Relation to the Other 
Scapegoating Jesus: Paschal Mystery Eucharistic Liturgy Lives/Acts of Loving 
Projects violent/evil desire 
onto a single victim; 
unwittingly spreads violent 
desire among community 
Recognizes other as victim 
of violent mimetic desire; 
‘Sacrifices’ desire to 
reciprocate/initiate violence 
 
Expresses God’s loving 
desire for disciples and 
world: “My peace I give to 
you” 
Called to live 
according to Christ’s 
loving desire 
The victim is deemed 
subhuman; other is 
condemned as threat; must 
get rid of victim to free 
ourselves of contagion 
Christ recognized the 
violent other as victim of 
mimetic desire; forgives the 
other; enters willingly into 
place of victim 
The participant is forgiven 
into repentance/freedom  to 
love 
Called to recognize 
violent others as 
victims of mimetic 
desire, as icon of the 
invisible Christ 
Communal unity through 
violent expulsion/murder of 
victim 
Covenant unity through 
self-gift and new covenant 
of forgiveness 
Covenant unity through 
communion in the new 
covenant of forgiveness 
Sent to imitate Jesus’ 
self-giving desire in 
action  
Selection of an other as 
victim; false accusation; 
renunciation of victim 
Entering role of victim; 
renunciation of violent 
reciprocation; other as one 
to be loved/forgiven 
Participating in new 
covenant by receiving gift of 
forgiveness and forgiving in 
turn (Our Father) 
Entering ‘trinitarian 
play’ 
Misrecognition of other as 
threat; inflicts violence  
Recognition of violent 
other as the true victim of 
mimetic violence; offers 
forgiveness 
Recognition of Christ the 
Victim as the Lamb of God 
Recognition of others 
as icons of Christ, 
especially the poor, 
ill, oppressed, etc. 
Seeks escape from 
violence/aggression by 
inflicting violence on victim 
Christ refuses to 
reciprocate/escape 
violence; delivers self to his 
enemies in love  
Re-presents Christ’s action: 
“On the night he was 
betrayed...”, offering 
covenant of forgiveness 
Called to nonviolence 
 
Instead of projecting aggression onto an innocent victim, Jesus recognizes the violent other’s 
victimhood to mimetic desire and petitions the Father for their forgiveness.  Instead of subjecting 
another to violence, Jesus enters the ‘place’ of the victim himself.  Without reciprocating or 
escaping the violence as it closes in him, he turns his imminent death into a gift of his body, 
blood, and loving desire to and for his disciples.  This bestows participation in the new covenant, 
which is offered to people through the sacraments of the Church.  The liturgy of the Eucharist in 
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particular is the ritual expression of Christ’s radical loving desire, calling contemporary disciples 
to a similarly radical decision to love in their lives, beyond the bounds of the liturgy.   
Third Stage: Ritual Actions and Their Effects 
Scapegoating Jesus: Paschal Mystery Eucharistic Liturgy Lives/Acts of Loving 
Take / curse / break / silence 
the victim, to preserve a 
limited resource; celebration 
of a feast 
Take / bless / break / give / 
speak the gift, giving away 
an abundant resource (love 
which redeems) through 
gifts of bread and wine 
Re-presentation of Jesus’ 
actions: take / bless / break / 
give / speak, giving away an 
abundant resource (love 
which redeems) through 
Eucharistic gifts 
To take/bless/break/ 
give/ speak in one’s 




Makes violent desire 
contagious: ‘gift’ of violent 
desire among the 
community; commemorated 
by sacrifices 
“Do this in memory of 
me”: commands disciples 
to imitation; commandment 
to love “as I have loved 
you”  
Gift of Holy Spirit; new 
covenant of forgiveness; ‘Do 
this in memory of me’ 
Accept the 
claim/call/demand 
the covenant makes 
on our lives 
Scapegoating Jesus: Paschal Mystery Eucharistic Liturgy Lives/Acts of Loving 
Violent process constitutes 
participants as murderers or 
complicit 
Jesus reveals his identity as 
Son of God, initiating love 
amid a world turned violent 
Strengthens recipients as 
living members of ecclesial 
body of Christ (Baptism 
constitutes them as such) 
Loving action 
constitutes self as 
lover in ‘trinitarian 
play’ 
 
In the context of the liturgy of the Eucharist, Christ’s solemn actions in the institution narrative 
constitute an exodus from violence, in a radically opposite manner from the scapegoat process.  
Christ’s gift is not merely the objects of the consecrated bread and wine but the gift of loving 
desire, which has its source in God and is (in principle) infinitely abundant and sharable.  Jesus’ 
forgiving gift brings about the new covenant, a community built on forgiveness rather than 
scapegoating; this fortifies its recipients as members of the body of Christ.  Beyond the time and 
place of the liturgy, recipients are called to enter Jesus’ ‘trinitarian place,’ embodying the loving 
action of Christ in the contemporary world.  They do so in memory of Christ’s gift (‘Do this in 






Nature of the Action 
Scapegoating Jesus: Paschal Mystery Eucharistic Liturgy Lives/Acts of Loving 
Act of religious 
appeasement, initiated by 
guilty party (humans) 
God reconciling the world 
to himself, by taking the 
place of the victim to 
forgive the guilty 
Full, conscious, active 
participation in liturgy to 
receive the gift 
Full, conscious, 
active living as 
member of ecclesial 
body of Christ 
Ritual hides but perpetuates 
violence, which is justified 
as sacred 
Paschal Mystery exposed 
the violent scapegoating 
process; subversion of the 
archaic sacred 
Liturgy of Eucharist  
re-presents Jesus’ subversion 
of sacrifice 
Called to speak and 
live prophetically to 
end scapegoating, in 
memory of Christ’s 
gift (‘Do this in 
memory of me’) 
Christ’s Paschal Mystery exposed what archaic sacrifice sought to hide, subverting the violent 
process and called disciples to live according to the same loving initiative.   
The characteristics of Christian sacrifice emerge in light of this reversal.  It is two parts 
confession, one part decision, and its final part action.   There is confession of sin, made possible 
by Christ’s offer of forgiveness, which forgives as it indicts; it is also a confession of faith, of 
surrender, self-gift and self-entrustment to God, clearing a space by which to receive the desire 
of God as one’s own will.   
4.3.3.  Gift of New Relations 
God’s superabundant giving -- expressed most intensely in the Last Supper narratives and 
the Paschal Mystery -- is his reconciling action imparts new relationships to the persons of the 
Godhead and of the world.   
 In Girard’s analyses, earthly models mediate desires to subjects: first ‘their own’ (which 
are in fact borrowed from others), then too often a rivalrous desire, springing from competition 
between model and subject.  Model and subject become obstacles to each other, giving birth to 
rivalrous and ‘metaphysical’ desire to become the other.  By contrast, Jesus mediates a proper 
relationship between human beings and the Father (cf. 1 Tim. 2:5; Jn. 14:6) and the desire to 
fulfill the Father’s will.  His filial distance from the Father, manifest most fully on the cross, 
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models the distance and obedience to which we are called as human beings.  Christ’s moral 
example can be desired as an ideal but is never imitated to a point of creating rivalry with the 
model.  These relational aspects maintain a proper communion-and-distance between the 
subjects.  Rivalry among disciples offends against the humility Christ exemplified and taught.   
 Since Christ gives his blood as ‘the blood of the new and eternal covenant, which will be 
poured out for the forgiveness of sins,’ Christ founds an utterly new kind of community rooted in 
forgiveness rather than violence.  Membership is not for the elite but the contrite and humble of 
heart.  Its members continue Christ’s prophetic work of exposing the scapegoat mechanism, 
again in an inversion of the goal of archaic sacrifice.  
With the help of Girard’s analyses of desire amid a community, the dynamics for the 
foundation of a community emerge with greater clarity.  By incorporating mimetic theory into an 
understanding of liturgy and Jesus’ call to discipleship, Jesus’ institution of the new covenant is 
given shape through a phenomenology of a ‘gift of desire.’  Gift and commandment are joined 
together so that reception and regiving are more clearly revealed (as Marion noted) as one and 
the same reality.  This is not to reduce the gift(s) or liturgy to mere psychological phenomena or 
philosophical terms, but to offer a paradigm by which these essential elements of Christian life 
are kept (at least partially) intelligible. It helps relational Eucharistic theology attend to the 
persons, actions, and gifts in the relationships between God and human beings, as well as among 
human beings themselves, particularly in the foundations and principles of community life.   
Having collected the major insights of Chauvet, Marion, and Girard for a relational 
approach to the Eucharist, the next section proposes a synthesis that brings the meaning of ‘full, 




V.  Synthesis: Liturgy of the Eucharist as God’s Gracious and Scandalous Gift
 of Desire  
 
5.1.  An Approach to Desire  
5.1.1.  A Notion of Desire 
5.1.2.  Divine Desire 
5.1.3.  ‘Gift of Desire’ 
5.1.4.  God’s Loving Desire: ‘Gracious and Scandalous’ 
 
5.2.  Celebrating the Eucharistic Giving: Remembering the Gift of God’s Desire 
5.2.1.  Contextual Elements of the Liturgical Assembly 
5.2.1.1.  Language, Word, Call 
5.2.1.2.  Desire 
5.2.1.3.  Assembling as the People of God 
5.2.1.4.  Sacred Space: In the World, Not of It 
5.2.1.5.  Sacred Time: Anamnetic, Present, Eschatological 
5.2.2.  Introductory Rites 
5.2.3.  Liturgy of the Word 
5.2.4.  Liturgy of the Eucharist (Proper) 
 5.2.4.1.  Beginnings 
 5.2.4.2.  Preface Sanctus, Epiclesis 
 5.2.4.3.  Institution Narrative 
 5.2.4.3.1.  Christ Reconfigures Himself as Embodied Gift 
 5.2.4.3.2.  ‘Do This in Memory of Me:’ Repeat the Gift of Self-Giving 
 5.2.4.3.3.  God’s Gracious and Scandalous Gift of Desire: Provoking ‘Crisis’ 
 5.2.4.3.4.  Resolution: Reconfiguration by Blessing, Overaccepting, Thanksgiving 
 5.2.4.4.  Memorial Acclamation, Anamnesis, Oblation 
 5.2.4.5.  Second Epiclesis & Eschatological Prayer 
 5.2.4.6.  Our Father & Sign of Peace 
 5.2.4.7.  Fraction Rite / Lamb of God 
 5.2.4.8.  Rite of Communion: ‘Le Jeu Trinitaire’ 
 5.2.4.9.  Closing Prayer and Dismissal 
 
5.3.  Liturgy of the Eucharist: Exchange Redeemed  
 5.3.1.  Gift of Desire 
  5.3.1.1.  Expression of God’s Desire for Us  
  5.3.1.2.  Gift of a Desire for Us to Embody for Others  
 5.3.2.  Gift of New Relations 
  5.3.2.1.  New Relations to Particular Subjects  
          5.3.3.2.  New Ways of Relating 
 5.3.3.  Gift of Identity: ‘Become What You Are’ 
 
5.4.  The Liturgy as a Whole 
 5.4.1.  Participation in the Paschal Mystery of Christ 




V.  Synthesis: Liturgy of the Eucharist as God’s Gracious and Scandalous Gift
 of Desire 
In this chapter I propose a relational account of the liturgy of the Eucharist which 
synthesizes and applies the insights of Chauvet, Marion, and Girard.  I interpret the Eucharistic 
liturgy and participants’ role in it through the root metaphor of gift, in particular as a gift of 
desire, which impacts participants’ desires, relationships, and identities.  While traditionally 
sacramental theology has emphasized a more metaphysical question of ‘what is it?,’ I will be 
focusing on -- without discarding metaphysical ontology altogether -- the liturgy’s structure as a 
dynamic event of being encountered by God’s giving of the divine gift.  My emphasis is on the 
giving of the desire, which occurs as an event, and reception of the gift through particular 
responses.   
While catechesis rightly and most often proposes the profound goodness of the 
Eucharistic gift, there is ‘more to the story.’  Like the gospel itself, the liturgy of the Eucharist 
also confronts and provokes us with unsettling truths of the true nature of living, selfhood, desire, 
and proper relationships with others.  For this reason I consider this Eucharistic gift of desire as 
‘gracious and scandalous’: a gift that implies great challenges to our sense of self, the source of 
the good, and how to live our lives.  Rather than omit these challenges to our commonsense 
notions of selfhood, the good, and living -- or consider the chief challenge a matter of the 
metaphysics of Christ’s Body and Blood contained by the accidents of the bread and wine -- I 
call attention to these challenges to our sense of self, the good, and living.  These challenges can 
precisely become the means by which the Eucharist transforms our identity, desire, and 
relationships.  This close reading of the event of the liturgy -- a sort of lectio divina of the 
liturgy’s phenomena of encounter, dialogue, giving, and receiving -- offers an interpretation of 
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the liturgy of the Eucharist which both nourishes and challenges participants intellectually, 
morally, and existentially.   
The chief question of this relational approach to the Eucharist is “what is going on 
relationally in the Eucharistic celebration?”  How does or ought this event impact recipients’ 
relationships?  How does this impact take shape: what knowledge, faith, decisions, and actions 
does the liturgy elicit or require?  To explain the relational impact of the liturgy upon participants 
more fully, the following questions will be kept in mind:  
-- How might the Eucharist impact our desire, relations, identity? (5.3.) 
-- How does or ought the liturgy of the Eucharist concern relationships between 
the participants and others? (5.3.2.) 
-- Does an understanding of the Eucharist as a gift of desire communicate any 
unique kind of participation in the Paschal Mystery of Christ?  (5.4.1.) 
-- What specifically does the Church celebrate in its liturgy of the Eucharist?  
(5.4.2.) 
The questions are vitally important, and the answers are not obvious.  To answer these questions, 
this approach pays close attention to the liturgy’s encounters and dialogues between God, the 
assembly, and members of the assembly with each other.  It borrows the methodologies of the 
respective thinkers of the previous chapters: it is hermeneutical (concerned with texts’ narrative 
programs), phenomenological (attending to givenness, revealed in and through phenomena 
manifested and proclaimed), and speculative (accepting an implicit metaphysics).  The insights 
of Chauvet, Marion, and Girard specify how the Eucharist challenges selfhood, desire, and 
relationships.  This consideration of the Eucharist as ‘God’s gracious and scandalous gift of 
desire’ fosters the kind of ‘full, conscious, active participation’ for which Sacrosanctum 
Concilium sought to renew the liturgy.  It seeks to arouse a lively sense, not merely of ‘the love 
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behind the gift’ (Alison), but of ‘the Lover behind the giving’ and the call to live and love from 
the radical graced loving desire we receive in the Eucharist.   
 After outlining an approach to desire (5.1) suitable to the analysis described above, 
analysis of the liturgy of the Eucharist itself (5.2) follows.  A synthesis of the insights of 
Chauvet, Marion, and Girard will facilitate exploring the Eucharist as God’s gracious and 
scandalous gift of desire (5.3) and its impact upon participants’ desire, relationships, and 
selfhood.  Summary notions on the liturgy of the Eucharist as a whole (5.4) conclude the chapter. 
5.1.  An Approach to Desire 
 Desire deserves a more prominent place in theology.  An approach to discussion of 
desire, particularly through questions of ultimate concern and encounters (5.1.1.), takes a step in 
this direction.  The mystery of divine desire (5.1.2.) is revealed in Christ as grace.  Mimetic 
theory helps make the notion of a ‘gift of desire’ (5.1.3.) more intelligible, which is especially 
helpful for theological motifs such as the imitation of Christ, obedience to the Father’s will, and 
the gift of the Holy Spirit.  God’s gift of loving desire, however gracious it is, is also scandalous 
and challenging to the ego (5.1.4.).   
5.1.1.  Initial Notions 
 For several reasons desire -- even loving desire -- holds an awkward place in theology.  
Ephemeral, mysterious, by appearances altruistic one moment and driven by ulterior motives the 
next, desire is difficult to specify simply as an anthropological phenomenon.  The fact desire can 
be (itself) either evil or good, ‘of the flesh’ or ‘according to the spirit’ (cf. Gal. 5:16-26) 
complicates further how theology should address desire.  Theology’s conceptualization of divine 
matters (such as grace or forgiveness) as entities through metaphysical abstraction -- i.e., as 
opposed to the more dynamic and eventual nature of liturgical action -- reveals a questionable 
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approach toward matters vital to living.  Despite these (and other) difficulties, desire can and 
ought to play a stronger role, revitalizing theology without devolving into purely romantic, 
voluntarist, or nominalist categories.   
Like the basic theological terms ‘grace’ and ‘love,’ desire is understood more accurately 
when evoked rather than defined.  In Augustine’s Confessions, upon the death of a friend, desire 
manifested itself in the form of a question (‘factus eram mihi magna quaestio’ -- ‘I became a 
great question to myself’700).  Augustine desired to know himself amid a time of crisis.  
Questions of ultimate concern, I propose, offer a most direct path toward the nature of desire, 
particularly as an existential and interpersonal reality, rather than as an object-entity.  Desire is a 
matter of relation of a self to something of value and/or concern: it never ‘simply’ concerns the 
object, it also pertains to the self.   
Augustine’s classic statement ‘You have made us for yourself, O Lord, and our hearts are 
restless until they rest in You’ (Conf. I.1.1.) evokes important truths of the Christian faith.  
Desire comes to rest only ‘in’ God: only the divine persons bring a person’s desire to fulfillment.  
Desire is thus necessarily interpersonal, and it is inherently dynamic and ceaseless outside of 
God’s fulfillment of it.  Desires for lesser things, even if fulfilled, do not remain satisfied for 
long.  Gregory of Nyssa’s notion of desire for God as ‘epektatic’ (cf. Phil. 3:14) suggests that 
even in beatitude there will be constant renewal of desire such that (as Stephen Lewis put it) “the 
capacity for God is constantly enlarged or dilated according to the measureless measure of ‘He 
who comes.’”701  The status of desire in heaven, however, is soon reaches the limits of our 
imagination and reasoning.  We do not know whether or how God ultimately fulfills or sustains 
                                               
700 Confessions, IV, 4, 9, 13. 
701 Lewis, “Lover’s Capacity,” 239.  Cf. Marion, QCI, 138.  
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desire for Him; for the moment we simply acknowledge God as the origin and goal of loving 
desire, of desire for vita beata.   
We return to questions to keep the meaning of desire more accessible.  Marion’s The 
Erotic Phenomenon expresses the ultimate desires of the human heart in his series of concise 
questions: What’s the use?  Does anybody love me?  Can I love first?  As desire (according to 
Marion) is “the mode of thought of he who becomes a lover,”702 this series of questions traces 
the path of one who is becoming a lover.  This is very helpful for the relational approach to the 
Eucharist at hand, as ‘becoming a lover’ is a most concise and relatable way to speak of 
becoming more fully a member of the ecclesial body of Christ, which is the res of the Eucharist 
(in traditional theological terms).  The transformation of desire involved in becoming a lover 
marks a way to speak in anthropological and existential terms of sanctification.   
Due to the inevitably gradual and mysterious process in which persons reveal themselves 
to one another, encounters are both rife with questions (at least implicitly) and closely related to 
desire.  Encounters are the starting points and means of renewal for every interpersonal 
relationship; they are thus central to the desire between lovers.  Any true encounter with God is a 
mysterious discovery process, in which questions arise of their own accord, not only concerning 
God but the human being.  Encounters both arouse desire (for closer union) and satisfy it (by 
being in the other’s company).  Relationships even lose their life when encounters are too 
infrequent; only reunion encounters revive them.   
Remaining within a theological context, the nature of desire can be understood in 
correlation to grace.  At the anthropological level human desire originates in a lack (usually only 
implicit) of awareness, understanding, appropriation, or re-giving of grace as gift, the self as 
                                               
702 Marion, ISP, 101.  Emphasis added.  It should be noted how, according to this notion of desire, the charitable 
person (saint) knows more fully the nature of desire than the mere ‘knower.’ 
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givee, and God as Giver.  Initially experienced as longing, want, or hunger, full recognition and 
acceptance of grace transforms desire from a matter of acquisition and protection to courageous 
self-giving which is vulnerable (and at peace with its lack) for the sake of loving.  It becomes 
desire to embody loving ‘at all costs,’ of which the psalmist suggests when praising God that His 
“steadfast love is better than life” (Ps. 63:3).   
5.1.2.  Divine Desire 
God’s loving desire -- including loving desire for human beings -- ever precedes and 
surpasses human desire for God.  First, the divine Son is eternally begotten of the Father’s loving 
desire; the love between the Father and the Son is itself the Holy Spirit.  The desire of God is 
central to the Christian revelation that God not merely ‘has’ love or ‘is loving’ but is love (1 Jn. 
4:8,16).  The plan of salvation entails the revelation of God’s loving desire, the revelation of 
grace.  “God, who is rich in mercy, out of the great love with which he loved us even when we 
were dead through our trespasses, made us alive together with Christ -- by grace you have been 
saved” (Eph. 2:4-5).  Grace is God’s desire, and God’s desire is grace, “the eternal purpose that 
[God] has carried out in Christ Jesus our Lord” (Eph. 3:11).  To omit or neglect God’s loving 
desire as the context for creation, salvation history, and eschatology -- not to mention liturgy -- is 
neglect a fundamental tenet of revelation.  This is important lest we imagine human desire must 
somehow bridge a chasm between earth and heaven: neither human desire nor capacity makes 
salvation possible, only God’s grace does (cf. Mk. 10:27).   
5.1.3.  ‘Gift of Desire’ 
Traditional theology and mimetic theory already converge on several points concerning 
humans’ nature and behavior as imitators.  Christians consider human beings to be created in the 
image and likeness of God (cf. Gen. 1:26-27), created to conform to -- imitate -- Christ the image 
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of God (2 Cor. 4:4) by putting on the mind of Christ (Phil. 2:5-11).  As regards both their being 
(according to theology) and their desires (according to mimetic theory), human beings are 
imitators.  To desire and act according to the Holy Spirit (Gal. 5:16-26) and do the will of the 
Father (Jn. 6:38) who is love (1 Jn. 4:8,16) is the fundamental, never-finished task of every 
Christian.  Imitation of Christ is a central task and feature of discipleship.   
In particular, mimetic theory helps our discourse by revealing how desires are transferred 
-- often unknowingly -- between persons.  Desires are highly contagious, and can be imitated 
consciously or unconsciously.  This (empirical) fact gets us past the philosophically thorny 
problem of a ‘gift of desire.’  Human beings are already ‘wired’ to imitate -- i.e., receive -- the 
desires of others.  Therefore, particularly when being given intentionally for imitation, desire can 
be given as a gift -- and received as such.   
Encounters thus take on a central role in the intentional giving and receiving of desire.  A 
model’s desire for something of value -- particularly non-material values, like virtue -- proves 
very influential, for good or ill.  Desires are in fact given and received all the time, even when 
never specified as such.  So when Christ both exhorts and exemplifies fidelity to the Father’s 
loving will, this is itself a ‘giving’ of desire, namely, the desire to give of oneself out of love for 
others; the question however remains: is this gift received? 
5.1.4.  God’s Loving Desire: ‘Gracious and Scandalous’ 
The nature of loving desire is at the heart of the gospel revelation, as demonstrated and 
commanded by Christ and taught by the writers of the New Testament.  This loving desire, 
scripture tells, us motivated the Father’s sending of His only Son (Jn. 3:16) that all might have 
eternal life.  It was proven (Rom. 5:8) in Christ’s fidelity to the Father unto death for sinners, to 
reconcile the world to God (2 Cor. 5:19).   
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God is love, but Christ’s gift of love is not merely a superabundance of comfort and 
pleasure for an individual person.  To share in God’s love by receiving and giving it entails many 
things the ego finds abhorrent: receiving love as a gift, becoming a servant of others (Phil. 2:1-
11), loving one’s enemies (Mt. 5:44-45), forgiving others (Mt. 6:14), obeying God’s will rather 
than one’s own (Jn. 6:38).  As comforting as the notion of loving desire may seem at first, the 
Christian revelation of love in Jesus Christ shows true charity is far more challenging -- even to 
receive -- than first imagined.  Vis-à-vis God it seeks to receive all that God gives and give 
freely of oneself for God’s sake, including to or for others.  Vis-à-vis others it is a forgiving and 
reconciling desire.   
As a celebration of Christ’s gift of love, the liturgy of the Eucharist is therefore 
scandalous: it confronts us with unsettling hints of the true nature of living, selfhood, desire, and 
proper relationships with others.  By reception of the Eucharist one is provoked toward 
reinforcing either a selfhood driven by ego (seeking to preserve autonomy as a self) or a selfhood 
understood as radically gifted: l’adonné; this is the ‘ordeal of truth’ from Marion’s commentary 
on Augustine’s Confessions.703   To receive the Eucharist is implicitly to accept bodiliness 
(expressed as ‘Body of Christ’) and life (expressed as ‘Blood of Christ’) as gifts from God to be 
stewarded wisely, and therefore not matters for one’s private possession.  The disciple is called 
to deny oneself and do the (loving) will of the Father; this entails initiating loving beyond 
reciprocity and giving one’s own body and blood to and for others in memory of Christ.  For 
these and other reasons the Eucharistic gift of desire is ‘gracious and scandalous’: a gift that 
implies great challenges to our sense of self, the source of the good, and how to live our lives.  
The Eucharist gift reveals the true demands of loving (both receiving it and giving it), which are 
                                               




scandalous to one’s ego.  Reception of this gift is proven (verified) when lived out in one’s own 
life: martyrdom in its most dramatic form, humble service through the work of one’s life, 
particularly as spouse and/or parent.   
5.2.  Celebrating the Eucharistic Giving 
Throughout the liturgy of the Eucharist, the processes of gift-giving, confession, and 
imitation -- brought to new light by Chauvet, Marion, and Girard -- emerge to draw participants 
into an existentially new set of relationships: this is the often-slow, sometimes-radical work of 
sanctification.  The liturgy is a structured dialogic encounter that trains the assembly in receiving 
and giving.  Gifts and persons must be recognized by blessing and thanksgiving.  If one yields to 
God’s gift as it gives itself, one can ‘be grasped by’ the loving desire expressed there and decide 
to imitate Christ’s graciousness in the world, even as doing so is scandalous to one’s ego.   One 
thus steps into ‘trinitarian play’ to return-give by loving one’s neighbor.   
God’s gracious gift of the Eucharist scandalizes recipients with the challenge of an 
identity crisis: who am I if I am receiving Christ’s body and blood?  Who am I, given that I 
commune with the body and blood of Christ, the Son of the living God?  Whose will shall 
predominate in me: my egoic will, or the gift of loving desire available to me through Christ’s 
gift of the Holy Spirit?  The liturgy of the Eucharist is the deliberate sacramental reproduction of 
a transformative ‘identity crisis’ that comes about from encounter with God’s gracious and 
scandalous self-gift: a crisis resolved not by archaic sacrifice but the Christian ‘sacrifice’ of 
being reconstituted as ‘gifted’ by God’s loving desire to step existentially into the ‘Christic role’ 
of embodying self-giving desire in the particularity of one’s lived situation.   
In light of the insights of Chauvet, Marion, and Girard, this analysis examines the liturgy 
of the Eucharist as an encounter with God who desires to express and bestow His own gracious 
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and scandalous desire.  Contextual elements of the liturgical setting (5.2.1.) serve important roles 
to establish a sacred setting for participants to be transformed by God.  The Introductory Rites 
(5.2.2.) are appreciated anew when examined relationally.  The Liturgy of the Word (5.2.3.) 
draws participants toward existential encounter with God through narrative, to which the 
assembly responds with the Liturgy of the Eucharist proper (5.2.4.).   
5.2.1.  Contextual Elements of the Liturgical Assembly  
5.2.1.1.  Language, Word, Call 
The liturgy is structured very precisely by its symbolic/sacramental language which, 
recalling Chauvet, is a more precise model for speaking sacramental efficacy.704  The liturgy’s 
language is not simply declarative but performative, whereby the relationship between subjects 
changes by the act of communication, an ‘illocutionary’ effect.705  Its language establishes or 
alters relationships between subjects, if simply through recognition of the other (which is a 
primary purpose of the liturgy).  Dialogues, between members of the assembly as well as the 
assembly and God, yield encounters through which gifts are given and received.   The prayer 
texts are informative, not for God but for human beings: precise scripted responses for 
participants to speak and appropriate for themselves.  As the praying assembly makes its prayer 
to shape its own dispositions and relationship to God, “a relationship of filial and brotherly and 
sisterly alliance, that the sacramental ‘expression’ aims at instituting or restoring in faith.”706  
Through this process, as Chauvet noted, members of the assembly receive themselves from God 
in Christ.707  Language is also determinative in that the call of God has gathered the assembly, 
even if people appear to gather for other reasons.   
                                               
704 Cf. chapter 2 above, 2.2.2. ‘Symbolic Efficacy’ of Language. 
705 Cf. Chauvet, SS, 131. 
706 SS, 140. 
707 Cf. SS, 140. 
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Within the liturgy, language has two chief roles: relating the narrative of salvation 
history, symbolically manifesting the actions and teachings of God (liturgy of the Word), and 
expressing the assembly’s work of recognition, blessing, and thanksgiving, that the assembly 
‘might become what it receives’ (liturgy of the Eucharist).   
Within a cosmic context, the liturgy occurs in the linguistic context of the eternal Word 
spoken by the Father, his Son Jesus Christ (cf. Jn. 1:1, 14).  The liturgy of the Eucharist, itself 
the ‘source and summit of the Christian life,’ finds its source and summit in the Word of God.  
The Word brought forth creation (Gen. 1:3; Jn. 1:1), which in turn proclaims the glory of God 
(Ps. 19:1-4).  This logos undergirds and orders creation and the process of redemption.  Within 
such a cosmic context of dialogue (dia-logos), confession of truth takes on its proper potential, 
particularly regarding the formation of Christian subjects. 
5.2.1.2.  Desire  
The liturgy of the Eucharist therefore originates and occurs amid the cosmic context of 
God’s loving desire (described above in 5.1.2.).  God’s will to create and redeem through the 
Incarnate Word and Holy Spirit are the ultimate origin of the world, salvation history, the 
Church, and development of the liturgy itself.  The liturgy occurs precisely to celebrate and 
fulfill this loving desire, grace, by participating fully, actively, consciously in reception of God’s 
gifts and preparing to give them again in one’s own life.  This desire is especially expressed 
within the Institution Narrative itself: “Do this in memory of me” (cf. 1 Cor. 11:24-25; Lk. 
22:19).   
5.2.1.3.  Assembling as the People of God   
 Gathered by the desire-call of God, the assembly forms part of the People of God: a 
public and corporate sacramental sign of God’s present and active work in the world.  The 
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assembly gathers because its members recognize themselves, at least implicitly, as recipients of 
God’s gifts: l’adonnés.  Assembly as a community is an embrace of Christian embodiment, a 
notion at the heart of Christian identity as the ecclesial Body of Christ.  The assembly does not 
exist for itself but is in Christ ‘like a sacrament’ (Lumen Gentium 1), a sign for its own members 
and the broader world, directed beyond itself to God.  Its members take on a variety of roles and 
ministries (sacristan, custodian, musicians, singers, servers, lectors, Eucharistic ministers) to 
cooperate with an ordained priest who is celebrant by virtue of his unity with the local bishop.  
The assembly’s prayers for the pope, local bishop, the rest of the world, and the deceased express 
an all-encompassing unity and hope.  Through all these forms of service -- inherently referential 
toward a greater purpose -- the assembly lives out its symbolic and iconic role before the world.   
The liturgical assembly, however, is not limited to visible persons: all are gathered by and 
in the presence of the persons of the Trinity.  The assembly will join the Communion of Saints 
and the heavenly host of angels by its praises of God in the Sanctus.  The assembly’s petitions 
for the faithful departed ‘and all who have died’ shape the assembly in a universal intention and 
outreach.   
5.2.1.4.  Sacred Space: In the World, Not of It 
The sacred liturgical space orders creation and labor toward the worship of God in its 
structures of stone, brick, wood, and other materials, along with its use of bread and wine (the 
‘work of human hands’), candles, and water.  The craftsmanship -- simple or ornate -- of the 
vessels, tabernacle, statues, vestments, and furniture offers more ways this consecrated 
microcosm interrupts mere undifferentiated or utilitarian space.   
The liturgical space needs to be a sufficient ‘break’ from profane space without an 
imagined identification with the sacred, which is idolization.  Symbols visual (crucifix, altar, 
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vestments, etc.), audible (proclamation, song, etc.), tangible (sign of peace) and involving taste 
(consecrated bread, wine) permeate the space and the liturgy.  To enter into and participate in 
this sacred space is to be placed into a different -- i.e., sacred -- context.   
With its seating and sanctuary, liturgical space is ordered toward the altar, which is also 
(in some capacity) a table.  This subtle blending of altar and table is suggestive of the nature of 
the event being celebrated, as Christ’s atonement and reconciliation do not occur through 
(archaic) blood sacrifice but through the dynamics of a meal.  In the setting of a meal, the 
synoptic gospels tell us, Jesus gave his body and blood in the form of bread and wine; the gospel 
of John has the same setting for Jesus’ washing of the feet and giving of the new commandment 
(cf. Jn. 13:34).  The liturgy is a ritual remembrance of the Eucharistic gift in the historical past, 
reception of the gift in the sacred present, and a foretaste of the heavenly wedding banquet of the 
Lamb (cf. Rev. 21:22-22:5).  This liturgical space marks off an interruption of the world’s logic 
of market exchange.  Reconciliation and forgiveness -- not just between an individual attendee 
and God, but between all people as well -- are meant to be operative, rather than retributive 
justice or market exchange.   
For Christian ‘sacrifice’ involves neither immolation nor anything ‘done to’ something or 
someone else (Daly), but a first-person existential decision by disciples to love one another as 
Christ has done and commanded, a decision verified in charitable action but never ‘done with’ or 
‘finished.’  Archaic sacrifice was ‘finished’ by Christ on the cross, commemorated in the 
crucifix; but Christian sacrificing is an ‘unfinishable’ activity (not an entity) which cannot be 
made into a permanent state of being or living.  It entails constant renewal of loving decision.     
5.2.1.5.  Sacred Time: Anamnetic, Present, Eschatological 
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 The sacred time of the liturgy occurs in its own cosmic context, between creation (which 
the liturgy brings toward fulfillment) and the Parousia (of which the liturgy is a foretaste).  It is 
an act of remembrance (anamnesis) of the death of the Lord (past) in anticipation of when the 
risen Christ comes again in glory (future).  The liturgy is commemoration, meal, and pledge of 
future glory; the Kingdom of God has come but not in its complete fullness.  As noted in 
Chauvet’s account of the Eucharist, the ritualized memory of the liturgy elicits a living 
existential memory -- i.e., a Spirit-guided desire -- among the ecclesial Body of Christ, the 
church.708  In this sacred time the gifts of God will be presented again to the faithful, not merely 
that the assembly may cognitively remember these events from history but more importantly be 
re-membered by the gifts, that they may be built up as the ecclesial Body of Christ, living and 
active in history and in the world.   
5.2.2.  Introductory Rites  
 After an opening hymn or entrance antiphon, the liturgy is rooted in recognition of the 
relational context of (quite simply) everything.  The invocation by the priest (‘In the Name of the 
Father...’ etc.) and gesture (sign of the cross) by all is an acknowledgment and recognition that 
everything -- particularly what is done in this particular sacred time and place -- is from, 
sustained by, and directed toward the Triune God.  This invocation re-establishes Christians in 
their Baptism.  Finding its source from God and oriented to the glory of God, the liturgy is an 
expression of and training in acknowledgment, recognition, receiving, and giving.  Through the 
liturgical action the assembly (at least implicitly) acknowledges God as ‘source and summit’ and 
participates in receiving his gifts in order that God may be glorified in all things (1 Pet. 4:11), not 
                                               
708 Section 2.3.6.4. (Jesus’ Gift in the Eucharist: From Ritual to Ethical/Existential ‘Sacrifice’).  Also section 





least in the participants themselves.  Through speech, song, gesture, movement, and silence the 
assembly is engaged in a communication, in receptivity and response, but for the purpose of 
directing thoughts, intentions, desires, actions, and lives toward the Triune God.   
 The assembly’s response of ‘Amen’ is repeated throughout the liturgy, shaping 
participants in assent to and imitation of God’s fidelity (‘emet) and love.  As minimal as such 
responses are, such active and public reception of the liturgy’s stated intentions are essential 
beginnings of a more fully appropriated response to God’s gifts and intentions for our lives.  The 
greeting and response (The Lord be with you -- And with your spirit) express both recognition of 
others and an intention that God be with the other.  Such dialogue and benevolence throughout 
the liturgy are simple yet necessary steps toward reconciling.   
 The liturgical encounter with and recognition of the Triune God who is truth (cf. Jn. 14:6) 
requires confession of sin to abide in His presence.  The Penitential Rite acknowledges such 
humble truth, that the assembly may abide in truth and love it rather than reject and hate it.709  
Acknowledgment of personal sins, individual and communal, prepares participants for 
celebrating the sacred mysteries.710   
Except during Lent, the Gloria echoes the song of the angelic host at the birth of Jesus, 
the reconciliation of those in heaven (‘in the highest’) and on earth (‘people of good will’).  Its 
words instill in the participant confession of praise of God: We praise you, we bless you, we 
adore you, we glorify you, we give you thanks for your great glory.  This praise of Jesus as the 
‘Lamb of God, you take away the sin of the world’ is programmatic of the liturgy, which is a 
sacramental encounter with Lamb now risen and enthroned, yet coming to us (as the priest 
emerging from the Holy of Holies, but with his own blood: Alison) with forgiving grace.   
                                               
709 Cf. Marion, ISP, 56-144. 




 With ‘Let us pray,’ the priest invokes the Father ‘through our Lord Jesus Christ your Son, 
who lives and reigns with you and the Holy Spirit, one God, forever and ever.’  Once again the 
assembly consents by saying ‘Amen,’ adopting the prayer’s intention as their own in a sign of 
unity.   
5.2.3.  Liturgy of the Word 
 The Liturgy of the Word recounts events and teachings from divine revelation.  This re-
reading of scripture “is an integral part of Scripture; access to meaning is constitutive of 
meaning, and reception belongs to revelation itself.”711  The primary task for the assembly is to 
listen, but they also participate by their responses (‘Thanks be to God,’ ‘Praise to you, Lord Jesus 
Christ’).  In particular the responsorial psalm engages the participation of the assembly, eliciting 
sung prayer of petition or praise.  The gospel reveals ‘the word of the cross’ of Christ who 
fulfills the law and the prophets (cf. Mt. 5:17).  The homily interprets the readings for the 
contemporary context.   
The assembly recognizes in Scripture “the exemplar of its identity,”712 itself a gift to 
which the assembly responds by celebrating the sacrament, which in turn establishes the 
foundation for ethics, the imitation of Christ.  Receiving the gift of the word of the cross in the 
Scriptures, the sacrament will celebrate what is to be carried out in the ethics of everyday life.  
Together these elements (Scripture, sacrament, ethics) constitute the three fundamental elements 
of Christian identity (Chauvet).   
To the word of the cross the assembly responds by professing the Creed, an initial step in 
‘the obedience of faith’ which receives God’s promises as a grace (or gift -- cf. Rom. 1:16, 4:16).  
The Creed also reaffirms people in relation to the divine persons and the Church.  The Universal 
                                               
711 Chauvet, SS, 209. 
712 Chauvet, SS, 210. 
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Prayer (‘Prayers of the Faithful’) expresses petitions -- desires -- to God shaped by the teachings 
of Scripture.  They are professed that they might impress themselves still further on the minds of 
the faithful as they ask God to fulfill them.   
The liturgy of the Word finds its fuller interpretation through both sacrament and ethics: 
“The sacraments allow us to see what is said in the letter of the Scriptures, to live what is said ... 
[becoming] a command to make what is said real in everyday life.”713  The knowledge bestowed 
by the Word (Scripture) is celebrated as a gift (sacrament), generating the gratitude that 
motivates embodying charity in the world (ethics).714  The liturgy of the Eucharist is a deeper 
training in receptivity of divine gifts, preparing the way for the re-giving which brings 
receptivity to fulfillment.   
5.2.4.  Liturgy of the Eucharist (Proper) 
The liturgy of the Eucharist is a public work of worship by which the assembly might 
become more fully the ecclesial Body of Christ.  The liturgy is a grateful remembrance -- 
thanksgiving -- for the absolute and committed self-gift of Christ for the sake of forgiveness of a 
world of sinners.  It commemorates Christ’s past gift of his body and blood, given in history; yet 
by its confession of Christ as Risen Lord and petition to the Father in the Holy Spirit, it is also 
graced with the same gift in the present.  The liturgical assembly receives these gracious gifts 
without the opportunity for a (visibly) direct ‘return-gift,’ and so extends the ‘giving it receives’ 
by sharing it and living it out themselves in the contemporary world.   
From a relational point of view, the liturgy of the Eucharist ‘works’ through its 
communications: prayers to God, proclamations or exhortations, symbolic gestures among the 
assembly.  The liturgy is permeated by ‘exchanges:’ dialogue with verbal acknowledgments 
                                               
713 Chauvet, SS, 226-227. 
714 Cf. Chauvet, Sacraments, 31. 
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(among the assembly, and the assembly with God), offering and reception, expression and 
acceptance, petition-and-reception.  These actions of exchange aim to change first and foremost 
not any objects but rather the persons involved.  The liturgy is an encounter with divine grace 
which transcends ‘market exchange’ to become a gracious recognition of persons: divine and 
human, visible and invisible, living and dead, present and absent.  Each of these exchanges 
shapes the relationships between the persons involved, building a purer manifestation of the 
ecclesial Body of Christ in the world.   
Through the liturgy’s address of God and remembrance (anamnesis) of God’s deeds, 
exhortations, and proclamation of the Church’s future hope, members of the assembly receive 
the gifts of God, most especially through holy communion.  These gifts and instruction are given 
for the sake of the transformation of the members, more particularly of their desires, their selves, 
relationships, and actions.  The liturgy orders people’s attention, desire, and intention toward 
God.  Through such ordering, the liturgy disposes its members to receive God’s transformative 
desire that they might live by it themselves.   
5.2.4.1.  Beginnings 
With the Preparation of the Altar and the Offertory, the focus of the assembly’s attention 
and action shifts from the lectern to the altar.  The offertory is a ritual presentation of the bread 
and wine by the faithful to the priest -- itself a symbolic gift-giving and exchange.  In what is 
already a response to God’s many gifts, the faithful present a token representation of ‘the work 
of human hands’ in thanksgiving to God.   
The blessings of bread715 and wine716 by the priest (and sometimes the assembly) 
liturgically recognize the divine Giver, the gift, and the assembly as the ‘givee’ -- fundamental 
                                               
715 “Blessed are you, Lord God of all creation, for through your goodness we have received the bread we offer you: 
fruit of the earth and work of human hands, it will become for us the bread of life. // Blessed be God forever.” 
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elements which will repeat and intensify throughout the liturgy.  Thanking and acknowledging 
God as Creator for the humble and tangible gifts of mere bread and wine is itself preparation for 
the assembly’s petition for, reception, and adoration of the Eucharistic gifts forthcoming.  This 
reception-through-blessing is an essential step in redemptive action, namely the thanksgiving 
which the Eucharistic preface so often proclaims as ‘our duty and our salvation.’ 
The priest’s prayer upon adding water to the wine priest pours wine717 reveals how 
reception of this gift and blessing of the divine Giver aims at sharing in Christ’s divinity, not the 
mere transformation of substances on the altar.  The priest’s petition after the blessings718 show 
the liturgy aims at the self-giving by the assembly to God.  The assembly’s sacrifice is not merely 
the Body and Blood of Christ on the altar but the persons of the assembly themselves (cf. Rom. 
12:2).  In the prayer with the washing719 the priest confesses the need for purification from sin, 
which he cannot provide for himself; he asks for this as for a gift.   
The Introductory Dialogue720 elicits mutual recognition, expression of good will, and 
joyful offering of self to God.  To the gift of the Word just proclaimed and given to them as 
givee, the assembly responds with thanksgiving -- eucharistia -- to the Giver.  This response, 
which expresses awareness that thanksgiving constitutes right relationship with God, is a 
microcosm of the liturgy’s training in recognition.   
5.2.4.2.   Preface, Sanctus, Epiclesis 
                                                                                                                                                       
716 “Blessed are you, Lord God of all creation, for through your goodness we have received the wine we offer you: 
fruit of the vine and work of human hands, it will become our spiritual drink. // Blessed be God forever.” 
717 ‘By the mystery of this water and wine may we come to share in the divinity of Christ who humbled himself to 
share in our humanity.’   
718 ‘With humble spirit and contrite heart may we be accepted by you, O Lord, and may our sacrifice in your sight 
this day be pleasing to you, Lord God.’   
719 ‘Wash me, O Lord, from my iniquity and cleanse me from my sin.’ 
720 ‘The Lord be with you.’  ‘And with your spirit.’ // ‘Lift up your hearts.’ ‘We lift them up to the Lord.’ // ‘Let us 
give thanks to the Lord our God.’ ‘It is right and just.’ 
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The Preface and Sanctus constitute the first narrative program (NP 1 -- Chauvet) of the 
Eucharistic Prayer.  It thanks God the Father for the gifts of creation and redemption, in 
particular through the gift of Jesus Christ in history.  The texts of the prefaces are as varied as the 
feasts, people, and events they celebrate, yet a standard opening in nearly all prefaces721 indicates 
that thanksgiving to God is a ‘categorical imperative’ of Christians.  It is not merely the duty of 
believers but of the nature of salvation to give thanks to God, a conscious activity directed 
toward a person.  The importance of the assembly’s ‘full, conscious, active participation’ in this 
work comes to the fore; it is hardly an extraneous action from which Christians may dispense 
themselves.   
The Preface confesses God’s sovereignty as Creator and celebrates His advent as 
Redeemer, expressing and reinforcing right relationship with God.  It is a ‘hallowing’ of God’s 
Name in the language of praise, the only language proper for speaking about and to God 
(Marion).  At the conclusion the assembly joins heaven’s angels and saints in praising God, an 
initial step of doing God’s will on earth as it is in heaven.   
Joining heaven’s praises of God as the Thrice-Holy (cf. Is. 6:3, Rev. 4:8), the assembly 
takes up the prophetic task of acknowledging God’s authority over heaven and earth.  The 
Thrice-Holy God is totally transcendent ‘Other’ who, because ‘distant,’ is able to be a true Giver.   
In the acclamation ‘Blessed is he who comes in the name of the Lord’ (cf. Ps. 118:26) the 
assembly anticipates in praise (if unwittingly) the advent of God; it anticipates and glorifies the 
divine Lover’s ‘advance.’   
                                               
721 “It is truly right and just, our duty and salvation, always and everywhere to give you thanks, Lord God, heavenly 
king, almighty and eternal God....”  Exceptions are the Easter prefaces, Preface of the Blessed Virgin Mary II, and 
Common Preface VI.  Cf. Eph: 5:20: “giving thanks to God the Father at all times and for everything in the name of 
our Lord Jesus Christ.” 
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The assembly kneels, embodying or ‘confessing’ bodily a posture of humility as it 
petitions God the Father to send the gift of the Holy Spirit upon the gifts of bread and wine, that 
it may receive again the gifts of Jesus’ sacramental body and blood to fulfill Jesus’ command to 
‘Do this in memory of me.’  With this petition for the Holy Spirit, the Father gives the gift of 
Christ in the present, no longer simply in the past; the Church joins Christ’s priestly intercession 
in heaven.722  Transformation of (merely) the bread and wine, however, is for the sake of 
transformation of the assembly into a more unified ecclesial body of Christ (a communio), an 
intention specified in the post-institution narrative epiclesis.   
5.2.4.3.  Institution Narrative723  
The Institution Narrative recounts the gestures, actions, and words of Jesus in a critical 
moment of interpreting the meaning of his own death.  With this narrative, the ‘fulcrum’ of the 
liturgy, the ‘radically other’ gift of Christ’s ‘word of the cross’ makes its advent, manifesting 
Christ’s consecration of himself in self-giving love.  The liturgy’s recollection of the works and 
desire of God culminates in the Institution Narrative, which reveals God’s gift of His desire for 
communion with the human race.  The rest of the liturgy is the assembly’s thanksgiving 
response, in which it seeks to be conformed to God’s loving desire, first within the liturgy but no 
less to conform all of life to it.   
5.2.4.3.1.  Christ Reconfigures Himself as Embodied Gift 
With slight variations the eucharistic prayers speak of Christ taking bread, giving thanks 
or saying a blessing, breaking the bread, and giving it to his disciples.  In the English translation 
                                               
722 Cf. Boris Bobrinskoy, “Le Saint Esprit dans la Liturgie,” Studia Liturgica 1 (1962), 47-49, 52.  Cf. John H. 
McKenna, The Eucharistic Epiclesis: A Detailed History from the Patristic to the Modern Era, Second Edition 
(Chicago: Liturgy Training Publications, 2009), 181.  Hereafter EE.   
723 The 2011 Editio Typica English translation reads: (over the bread): ‘Take this, all of you, and eat of it, for this is 
my body, which will be given up for you.’  Over the chalice: ‘Take this, all of you, and drink from it, for this is the 
chalice of my blood, the blood of the new and eternal covenant, which will be poured out for you and for many for 
the forgiveness of sins.  Do this in memory of me.’ 
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of the Roman Missal each of them narrate Christ’s words in the precise wording: ‘Take this, all 
of you, and eat of it: for this is my body, which will be given up for you.’  After the priest’s 
elevation of the host and genuflection, the prayer tells of Christ similarly taking the chalice of 
wine, giving thanks or saying a blessing, and giving it to his disciples with the words: ‘Take this, 
all of you, and drink from it: for this is the chalice of my blood, the blood of the new and eternal 
covenant, which will be poured out for you and for many for the forgiveness of sins.’724  The 
narrative is structured by a pattern: Christ takes each gift, gives thanks (i.e., to the Father for the 
gift) or says a blessing, reconfigures it (e.g., by breaking the bread or assigning a new meaning to 
the wine), gives it to each, and speaks identifying himself with the gift, commanding disciples to 
both consume the gift and repeat the gift in remembrance of him.725   
More than a consecration of the bread and wine, Jesus’ speaking these words and freely 
giving these gifts which embody love express consecration of himself to and for his disciples.  
Christ’s self-consecration aims at communion with his disciples.726  The Institution Narrative 
describes the way Christ ‘reconfigured himself’ as an embodied gift of love.  More than a 
miracle of transformation (or transubstantiation) of the bread and wine, this loving and self-
consecrating desire of Christ calls for recognition: for Christ’s giving this embodied gift of 
himself inspires the gratitude that enables abiding in his word and keeping his commandments, 
not willpower-motivated behavior modification.  Thanksgiving -- ‘eucharistia’ -- finds its ‘source 
                                               
724 The text continues with Jesus’ command ‘Do this in memory of me,’ which will be examined separately below.  
725 Cf. This pattern was proposed in 1945 in Gregory Dix, The Shape of the Liturgy, new edition with an 
introduction by Simon Jones (London: Bloomsbury, 2005); esp. 48-70.  Subsequent scholarly research has raised 
serious questions concerning the roots of this structure being found in the historical Jesus; cf. Paul F. Bradshaw, The 
Search for the Origins of Christian Worship, 2nd edition (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), 7; cf. 6-8.  No 
claim is being made here for such a historical-critical standard.   
726 This communion is best expressed in the gospel without the Institution Narrative, John: ‘Those who love me will 
keep my word, and my Father will love them, and we will come to them and make our home with them.... Abide in 
me, as I abide in you.’ (Jn. 14:23; 15:4) 
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and summit’ in recognition, acceptance, and imitation of Christ’s (God’s) personal and embodied 
loving desire, not wonder at a miracle that transforms objects.727   
5.2.4.3.2.  ‘Do This in Memory of Me:’ Repeat the Gift of Self-Giving 
Christ’s command ‘Do this in memory of me’ bestows several gifts.  In its most literal 
meaning it is a command for his disciples to re-present ritually what Christ has just done, in 
honor of his memory.  If the Last Supper occurred within a Passover context as the scriptures 
attest, Christ was redirecting the meaning of the unleavened bread and wine to refer to himself.   
In another sense, the meaning of Christ’s command goes much deeper: it is a command 
for his disciples to give of their own ‘body and blood’ in memory and honor of Christ, loving 
others as Christ has loved them.  This is because Christ’s radical gift changed the horizon of 
what is possible, not simply in a miraculous transformation/transubstantiation of the bread and 
wine.  Christ’s giving revealed that any person is capable, in some sense, of giving one’s life, 
one’s ‘body and blood’ in a loving gift to and for someone else.  The Eucharist changes the 
horizon of what is possible, whether most realize it or not: the Eucharist is God’s gracious and 
scandalous gift of His loving desire.   
As full reception of a gift is verified in its being given again (Marion), so fullest reception 
of the Eucharist -- fullest possible expression of thanksgiving -- occurs through a ‘full, 
conscious, active’ gift of even one’s ‘body and blood:’ one’s life, in grateful memory of Christ.  
The ‘shape’ of one’s gift of body and blood can vary widely, according to one’s vocation, 
historical circumstance, and so forth.  Husbands and wives give their bodies to each other in their 
mutual commitment and sexual love.  Parents give of their lives for their children; religious and 
                                               
727 An opportunity for further study is to explore the Last Supper in the Johannine gospel as a gift of Jesus’ loving 
desire.  Does not the evangelist privilege the gift of Jesus’ desire -- the Holy Spirit -- above any ritual action?  The 
Johannine gospel does not have any institution narrative but tells of Jesus washing the feet of his disciples 
(embodying humble service), giving the commandment to ‘love one another as I have loved you’ (an imitation of 
desire, expressed in action: Jn. 13:34), and Jesus speaks more extensively than in any other gospel of the gift of the 
Holy Spirit, precisely in connection with his ‘going to the Father.’   
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clergy give their lives for worship of God and apostolic work.  Such a gift, born of thanksgiving 
for Christ’s gift of incorporating us into his living ecclesial body, is possible for all and becomes 
a unique ‘return gift’ by each disciple.   
To borrow from Marion’s phenomenology, from Christ’s example we learn that one’s 
body and blood are ‘givable’ -- able to be given, at least in reconfigured ways, if not literally in 
martyrdom.  Since we do not have anything that we have not received (cf. 1 Cor. 4:7), there is 
furthermore nothing we have that we are not called to give, for we are not even ‘our own’ (1 Cor. 
6:19).  Everything -- body, life, opportunity, etc. -- is grace, and everything is givable.  Not only 
are we called to such giving that we may do so in love, but we can discover that living goes far 
beyond the bounds of ‘ownership,’ ‘possession,’ or exchange.   
This goal of communion, moreover, is suggested most strongly by Christ’s words: ‘Do 
this in memory of me.’  To ‘abide in’ Christ is neither a static nor purely contemplative action 
but the ‘full, conscious, active’ giving of self to and for others in memory of Christ, to love 
others as he has loved us (cf. Jn. 13:34, 15:12), namely, reconfiguring and dedicating ourselves 
to embody gracious loving action.   
5.2.4.3.3.  God’s Gracious and Scandalous Gift of Desire: Provoking ‘Crisis’ 
Within the liturgy of the Eucharist the Institution Narrative is an advent/encounter of the 
Incarnate Word with the assembly.  By citing Christ’s direct address spoken in the first person, 
the assembly ‘is cited’ by the words of the Lord (Chauvet): “by citing Jesus at the Last Supper, 
the church sees itself in fact cited by him, its Lord, cited to act.... This story is central for the 
church; it is the effective norm of its actions.”728  As, (according to the biblical texts), Christ 
gave of himself at the Last Supper in the historical past, so this encounter manifests Christ’s self-
giving now, sacramentally.  This first-person address by the Lord to the assembly presents an 
                                               
728 Chauvet, Sacraments, 134.   
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‘icon’ of Christ, meant to bring awareness that the assembly is addressed, is being looked at by 
an Invisible Other, the risen Christ.  Members of the assembly are ‘dative subjects,’ addressees, 
l’adonnés of an anamorphosis (Marion).  An encounter, a ‘crossing of gazes’ is occurring in 
which, not only is the assembly beholding the elevated host or chalice, but is being beheld as a 
‘You’ by the divine ‘I.’  Such recognition of the Invisible Giver is essential to fuller celebration 
of the liturgy of the Eucharist.   
As Girard revealed, archaic sacrifice is a violent resolution of an identity crisis -- but 
Christian ‘sacrifice’ (‘anti-sacrifice,’ as Chauvet calls it) is radically different, the utter reversal 
of the sacrificial process.  Christian ‘sacrifice’ begins with Christ’s ‘lover’s decision’ (Marion): 
not a decision to ‘do something to’ anything or anyone else (Daly) but to give and empty one’s 
self, reconfigured through charity and as an embodied gift.  The risen Christ who reconfigured 
himself as the gifts of bread and wine to give his body and blood to disciples millennia ago now 
gives again his sacramental body and blood, again reconfigured as bread and wine, to present-
day disciples.  God ‘re-gives’ the gracious gift of loving communion with human beings. 
This reconfigured and ‘impossible’ gift of Christ causes a crisis of its own, however, for 
the recipient: “How can this man give us his flesh to eat?” (Jn. 6:52)  Neither logical 
understanding nor self-preserving ego can comprehend or accept this gracious gift, which is why 
it is also a scandalous gift.  What does it mean to commune with the body and blood of Christ?  
What does this gift demand of me?  Whose desire do I serve?  As I receive Christ’s body and 
blood, who am I?  Each recipient becomes, like Augustine in his crisis, ‘a great question’ to 
oneself, in the midst of an ‘ordeal of truth.’  The excessive gift of Christ’s body and blood raises 
questions that have decisive outcomes, in favor of either an egoic self or a self-as-gifted 
(l’adonné), that is, gifted with grace beyond what imagination, reason, or language can bear.   
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5.2.4.3.4.  Resolution: Reconfiguration by Blessing, Overaccepting, Thanksgiving 
The disciple’s ‘identity crisis’ in light of the Eucharistic gift, however, is not resolved by 
violence but by a threefold work of blessing, ‘overaccepting,’ and thanksgiving.   First, the 
liturgical work of blessing is the threefold recognition of the elements of a gift: the giver, gift, 
and self as ‘givee’ (recipient).  Blessing enables ‘full, conscious, active’ reception of the 
eucharistic gift: recognizing God as the giver of the eucharistic gifts as an expression of love to 
oneself, personally.  This recognition guides fuller awareness and acceptance that: a) God is 
giving the gifts; b) the gifts are what Christ says they are: his body and blood, the most precious 
‘things’ imaginable; c) one’s self is intended by God as a recipient of these gifts.   
Second, the work of ‘overaccepting’729 is to ‘take’ or accept reality as it is, but also to 
take responsibility for transforming that reality and responding for good as one is able, through 
some embodied form, whether practical or symbolic.  One accepts Christ’s call to deny oneself 
(one’s ego), take up one’s cross, and follow after him; one stops wishing or waiting for another 
to correct a situation, reconcile, or become charitable, and does the correcting, reconciling, or 
loving oneself.  Ritually or liturgically, this occurs in the reception of communion, offering one’s 
own ‘body and blood’ at the service of God’s loving desire amid the time, place, and situation in 
which one lives.  (This will be covered in greater detail later.)  This work includes decision to 
live existentially according to the gift one receives (the body, blood, and desire of Christ) and to 
step into the ‘Christic role’ of ‘trinitarian play.’   
Awareness and acceptance of these elements, brought about by the recognition work of 
blessing and ‘overaccepting,’ begets gratitude, the loving desire motivating the work of 
                                               
729 ‘Overaccepting’ is a term coined by Girardian theologian Scott Cowdell, explained above in the Girard chapter 
(4.2.3.3. ‘Third Stage: Christ’s Nonviolent Fidelity to His Mission Unto Death’).  As I describe it there, ‘Neither 
despair, nor resignation, nor utter passivity in the face of evil, ‘overacceptance’ is a subversive use of others’ 
oppressive actions or a situation against its intended evil purpose.’  Cf. Cowdell, RGNG, 173-201, 206-209, 235-
237.   
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thanksgiving (eucharistia), giving self, and loving others as Christ has loved us (cf. Jn. 13:34; 
15:9-12).  Thanksgiving, ‘re-giving the gift’ by imitating Christ’s loving desire, begins in the 
liturgy but is meant to continue beyond the dismissal, to encompass one’s vocation, 
relationships, and life.  By reconfiguring oneself according to Christ’s gift, one imitates Christ’s 
decision and desire to embody self-giving charity, beyond a demand for reciprocity.  Imitation of 
Christ is born of thanksgiving.   
Moreover, full recognition of the gifts of Christ extends beyond what one might receive 
‘directly’ through the sacramental gifts (of the consecrated bread and wine).  For not only does 
the risen Christ give himself through sacramental communion but through the rest of the 
assembly, the gift of his ecclesial body, to be discerned and recognized as such lest one share in 
the meal in an unworthy manner (1 Cor. 11:27-33).  This is fuller recognition of the gift God 
makes of Christ’s (ecclesial) body, and again no less important for fuller celebration of the 
liturgy.  Mutual recognition among the members is critical for a true sharing of Christ’s loving 
desire among one another; this is reinforced by recitation of the Lord’s Prayer which includes 
petition for forgiveness ‘as we forgive those who trespass against us.’  The assembly does this 
work of discernment and recognition, as Saint Paul teaches, along with each member’s 
discernment of their own behavior (cf. 1 Cor. 6:9-20; 11:27, 29) to let itself be judged and 
disciplined by the Lord ‘that we may not be condemned with the rest of the world’ (1 Cor. 11:32-
33).   
This result of an ecclesial body united by the Spirit of Christ is the exact opposite of 
archaic sacrifice, which does violence to another to reconfigure a community’s relationships: the 
result is an existential resolution of the crisis, to manifest charity more fully as a member of the 
body of Christ.  Initiating charity beyond mere exchange or reciprocity in a violent world, one 
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witnesses to having received the gift of Christ’s loving desire.  This reception, however, is not a 
once-and-done event, it must be repeated, nurtured, and verified again and again.  One is enabled 
to live according to such desire only by remaining incorporated into Christ’s body by faith, the 
sacraments, and living out an ethics according to the gift one receives, God’s loving desire.  This 
desire does not seek its own interests (cf. 1 Cor. 13:5; Heb. 10:7; Rom. 15:3; Phil. 2:5-11) but 
does the will of the Father (Jn. 6:38), extending charity through embodied works of mercy (cf. 
Mt. 25:31-40; Gal. 5:6; James 2:14-26).   
The rest of the liturgy, from the anamnesis to the dismissal, is the response which 
reconstitutes participants through ‘overaccepting’ and thanksgiving-by-conforming to Christ, 
living more fully, consciously, and actively as members of the ecclesial body of Christ.  
Together, the liturgy’s public work (‘leitourgia’) of blessing (recognizing the divine Lover, 
Love, and oneself as recipient), overaccepting (offering one’s body to God: ‘Here I am’), and 
thanksgiving (‘re-giving’ the gift), when done ‘fully, consciously, actively,’ opens the self to the 
gifts God seeks to give: Christ’s body, blood, and loving desire, to be taken up existentially in 
one’s own life.  Such is the res of the sacrament, unity as the ecclesial body of Christ.   
5.2.4.4.  Memorial Acclamation, Anamnesis, Oblation 
 The very first response after Christ’s citation of the assembly and the priest’s 
genuflections is proclamation of the ‘mystery of faith,’ the saving death of the Lord until he 
comes again (cf. 1 Cor. 11:26).  It is memorial (anamnesis) of events in both the past (Christ’s 
death and resurrection) and future (the Parousia), the sources of Christian hope; it is also an 
implicit blessing, with its first-person address of God, acknowledgment of the gifts of Christ’s 
death and resurrection, and implicit recognition of ourselves as recipients of the grace from these 
gifts.   
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In light of such hope and gratitude for the Eucharistic gifts just received again, the 
assembly then offers oblation of the sacramental body and blood of the Lord in an immediate 
‘giving again’ of the gifts.  This is the closest the assembly can get to a ‘direct return-gift’ to the 
Lord, for the moment; its return gift must be made more fully beyond the liturgy in daily life.  
With the offering of the body and blood of the Lord, who is head of the Church, the rest of the 
(ecclesial) body is offered as well; oblation of the sacramental body implies oblation by the 
ecclesial body.  The faithful offer the sacramental body as an act of worship and adoration; the 
offering will intensify further by the reception of communion and in going forth into the world to 
love as Christ has loved us.   
5.2.4.5.  Second Epiclesis & Eschatological Prayer  
As noted already, transformation of the gifts (alone) is not the final goal of the liturgy; 
the vital task remains for the assembly to “become what it has just received ... and what it has 
received will be ritually completed in Communion.”730  Having just received and offered the 
sacramental body of Christ, the assembly prays that it become more fully the ecclesial body of 
Christ, the res of the Eucharist: the unity of the Body of Christ.  This is meant to occur not 
merely within the time frame of the liturgical assembly but in lives witnessing to Christ.   
In hope of enjoying eternal life with God, the assembly asks “participation by the 
ecclesia here assembled in the reign fully realized,”731 praying for unity in charity with the 
Church throughout the world.  Brief as it is, this section includes recognition of not only the pope 
and local bishop but all the deceased and the communion of saints, expressing hope of being 
granted the gift of praising God forever.  The doxology and Great Amen, which continue the 
                                               
730 SS, 271.   
731 SS, 271. 
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liturgical work of blessing/recognition and thanksgiving, conclude the Eucharistic prayer as 
such.   
5.2.4.6.  Our Father & Sign of Peace 
 The assembly prays as Christ taught his disciples, in a prayer for fuller reception of God’s 
loving desire.  This prayer is its own instruction in what disciples ought to desire: recognition 
and address of the one heavenly Father of us all, honoring his name, seeking his kingdom and 
will, and asks for daily bread as a gift.  Forgiveness of others is the one task the assembly takes 
up actively as a ‘we,’ indicating the primary importance of a humble and reconciling desire; 
Christ’s new covenant founded in forgiveness of sins (referred to in giving the wine as his blood) 
is reinforced here.  Recognition of all members of the assembly as brothers and sisters is implied 
as well.   
 Not least among what Christ desired for his disciples was the gift of peace, which comes 
from the Advocate whom the Father sends in Christ’s name (cf. Jn. 14:26-27).  On behalf of the 
assembly the priest asks God ‘look not on our sins but on the faith of your Church;’ this faith 
will find expression from the assembly soon after.  Peace and unity are asked for ‘in accordance 
with [Christ’s] will,’ an indication of Christ’s desire with which the assembly is to be reconciled.   
 In an echo of the greetings at the beginning of mass and the eucharistic prayer, the priest 
says ‘The peace of the Lord be with you always,’ eliciting the response ‘And with your spirit,’ 
another sharing of good will.  Signs of peace are exchanged, encouraging the kind of 
reconciliation Christ exhorted before presenting one’s gift at the altar (Mt. 5:23-24) and the 
recognition of Christ present in the neighbor (cf. Mt. 25:31-40; 1 Cor. 11:27-33).   
5.2.4.7.  Fraction Rite / Lamb of God 
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 The priest’s fraction of the host follows; it was upon the ‘breaking of the bread’ that the 
risen Christ was recognized (cf. Lk. 24:35).  The Agnus Dei is sung, the assembly acclaiming and 
petitioning Christ as the Lamb of God who takes away the sins of the world (cf. Jn. 1:29, 36), the 
title by which John the Baptist witnessed to Christ in the gospel according to John.  Acclamation 
of Christ by this title is instructive, as it teaches all a deeper recognition of Christ.  The Lamb of 
God is the chief image for the risen Christ in glory (cf. Rev. 5:6-8:1; 14:1-4; 19:7-9).  The 
assembly is celebrating an exodus (cf. Lk. 9:31) wherein God himself provides the lamb for 
sacrifice (cf. Gen. 22:8), as He did not withhold His own Son that nothing might separate us 
from the love of God in Christ Jesus (Rom. 8:32, 38-39).  The ‘Forgiving Victim’ is manifested, 
having emerged from the Holy of Holies as in the Day of Atonement rites (Alison); this grace of 
forgiveness makes our repentance possible (Schwager).  The assembly’s humble petitions for 
mercy (‘have mercy on us’) and peace (‘grant us peace’) teach the assembly to recognize 
themselves as recipients of these gifts, from their source and giver, Christ.   
 After genuflection in adoration before the sacrament, the priest elevates a host and the 
paten with the acclamation again echoing John the Baptist: ‘Behold the Lamb of God, behold 
him who takes away the sins of the world.  Blessed are those called to the supper of the Lamb.’  
It is a convergence of manifestation (elevation and presentation) and proclamation (of symbolic 
title and forgiveness) which give witness to Christ as the Forgiving Victim, the vita beata 
(Augustine, Marion), the wedding banquet of the Lamb (Rev. 22:9) when Christ will again drink 
the fruit of the vine (cf. Lk. 22:18).  The goal of all desire is attested, lifted up (cf. Jn. 3:14), and 
presented in sacramental form, as an iconic gift of grace that all might be drawn (cf. Jn. 6:44) to 
it, desire it.  All in the assembly are not only ‘witnesses of these things’ (Lk. 24:48) but engaged 
in a ‘crossing of gazes’ encounter in which all are looked at, beheld by an invisible Other 
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(Marion); they are called and empowered to be the Lord’s witnesses ‘to the ends of the earth’ 
(Acts 1:8).   
The assembly responds initially with words echoing the Roman centurion’s profound 
faith: ‘Lord, I am not worthy that you should enter under my roof, but only say the word and my 
soul shall be healed’ (cf. Mt. 8:8,10; Lk. 7:6-7,9).  This is a dual confession (Augustine) of 
personal unworthiness and of God’s power and glory, a posture of proper ‘distance’ and praise 
vis-à-vis God (Marion).  Their response merely begins with such a confession, but will expand 
into reception of communion, entering the Christic place of ‘trinitarian play,’ and giving one’s 
own ‘body and blood’ to Christ present in the world (cf. Mt. 25:31-40) in grateful remembrance 
of Christ’s gift of love.  This response includes a change of one’s primary concern from an ego-
centered ‘Does anybody love me?’ to an other-directed ‘Can I love first?’  The worldly universe 
of values -- egoic desire for self-preservation and pleasure, exchange-for-profit, and violence to 
protect them -- is overturned by the superabundantly gracious and scandalous embodied gift of 
God’s loving desire.   
5.2.4.8.  Rite of Communion: ‘Le Jeu Trinitaire’ 
 As Christ bade his disciples take and eat, so now the members of the assembly ‘take and 
eat’ to receive the gifts of Christ as he embodied them.  In their own face-to-face encounter, the 
priest or eucharistic minister holds up the host with the affirmation that it is ‘The body of Christ,’ 
to which the recipient responds ‘Amen.’   
Eucharistic theology rightly prioritizes the gift Christ makes in communion, bestowing 
communion with his divine nature to the Church; too often, however, a proper response is not 
specified sufficiently.  Fully understood and appreciated, this ‘Amen’ with the reception of 
communion is far more crucial than most imagine.  This ‘Amen’ upon reception of communion 
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is best understood not as a metaphysical affirmation but as confession of an implicit ‘Here I am’ 
-- a giving-of-one’s-body to take up the work of charitable living, to take up loving service in 
memory of Christ.  It is a critical moment for courageous confession-acceptance of responsibility 
to make a return-gift, of ability to respond in embodied charity through one’s own ‘body and 
blood:’ the disciple steps into a Christic role in trinitarian play.  The recipient takes the 
responsibility to embody God’s loving desire in and through one’s own life of blessing (as 
threefold recognition), taking responsibility (‘overaccepting’ situations as they are), and 
thanksgiving (as embodied ethical service).  In this way the recipient’s ‘Amen’ confesses assent 
not merely that the Eucharist is the body of Christ, but that the self has been joined to Christ’s 
ecclesial body and has responsibility to fulfill loving desire in action. 
Earlier in the Eucharistic Prayer, the assembly offered the sacramental body as an act of 
worship and adoration; now by receiving communion they offer themselves to ‘give God a body’ 
in a very particular time and place, presenting their bodies as a ‘living sacrifice’ (cf. Rom. 12:1).  
This ‘return-gift’ is obligated by Christ’s gift, but redirected in work toward the needy and 
suffering of the world, ‘the least’ of Christ’s brothers and sisters (cf. Mt. 25:31-40).  Each 
recipient of communion offers God his or her own ‘body and blood,’ in the service of charity 
within each person’s particular circumstances of place, time, and situation, in memory of Christ.  
As Christ has risen to the right hand of the Father, divine goodness and love therefore ‘take on a 
body’ in the recipient, for through acts of charity “the recipient donor becomes integrally and in 
person -- hypostatically -- a gift.”732  A person takes on the likeness of the divine giver, who 
initiates creative and reconciling love.   
The recipient, empowered by full recognition of the Giver, Gift, and self as ‘givee,’ now 
has the task of recognizing Christ as he is present among the hungry, poor, outcast, ill, naked, 
                                               
732 Ibid., 168.   
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and imprisoned of the world, for “every face is given as an icon.”733  To cease demanding 
reciprocal exchange from others but enter into a ‘Christic role’ of ‘trinitarian play’ by emptying 
oneself in embodied kenotic love: this verifies full reception of the gift, acceptance of oneself as 
‘gifted’ (l’adonné) who desires to initiate love rather than remain within the slavery of 
reciprocity.  This is a radical transformation in desire, made possible only by the gift of God’s 
own loving desire, which transforms one’s identity and relationships to oneself and with others.  
One’s body and blood become ‘givable’ to others, in grateful memory of Christ’s grace to us.   
This communion with Christ in his sacramental and ecclesial body is also a reversal of 
the world’s ‘single victim mechanism’ of scapegoating, bringing about community through 
charity rather than exclusionary violence.  The same affirmations occur with the gift of Christ’s 
Precious Blood (‘The Blood of Christ’/ ‘Amen’), a fuller sharing and reception of Christ’s 
embodied gifts.   
5.2.4.9.  Closing Prayer and Dismissal 
 After the closing prayer and dialogue of recognition (The Lord be with you -- And with 
your spirit), a final blessing is given in the name of the Trinity.  All that follows: activity and 
passivity, speech/song/music and silence, is meant to be ‘done’ as an expression of thanksgiving 
in le jeu trinitaire.  The Christian is meant to step into the Christic role of embodying God’s 
loving desire for others, the self-giving love which alone opens relation, reveals meaning, 
creates, forgives, redeems, sanctifies.  The reconfiguration of disciples, individually and 
collectively, the res of the liturgical celebration, comes to fruition.   
5.3.  Liturgy of the Eucharist: Exchange Redeemed 
 The liturgy of the Eucharist accomplishes not merely transubstantiation of the bread and 
wine into the body and blood of Christ: it is also a transformation of the desire, relations, and 
                                               
733 Marion, GWB, 19. 
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identity of its participants.  These transformations occur through the dynamics of gift, both an 
initial gift and an imitative and transformative return-gift, which is not exchange but a 
broadening of recognition and alliance.  The impact of the liturgy’s gifts on desire (5.3.1.), 
relations (5.3.2.), and new reconfigured identity (5.3.3.) are explored below.   
5.3.1.  Gift of Desire 
 As noted above in 3.4.4., the liturgy of the Eucharist is a ‘gift of desire’ in two primary 
senses: as the expression of God’s loving desire for human beings, and as a gift of loving desire 
(in an objective sense) to take up existentially, imitating Christ’s love with one’s own life.   
5.3.1.1.  Expression of God’s Desire for Us 
“No one has greater love than this, to lay down one’s life for one’s friends” (Jn. 15:13): 
the Eucharist is an expression of such love Christ -- i.e., God -- has for human beings.  Through 
Christ, God does not merely give a material gift or opportunity of value but Himself, the 
paradigmatic gift (Marion), exceeding our capacity to understand (cf. Phil. 4:7; 1 Cor. 13:8) or 
receive in full.  Offering communion and the life of God to sinners (cf. Rom. 5:8), this gift of 
love ‘saturates’ our imagination and concepts of meaning, but the basic core reality of the 
Eucharist as an expression of God’s personal love must be kept in view.  Through the Eucharist, 
God exceeds and advances past our usual notions of ‘worthiness’ to act in ways that are ‘closer 
to our good than we are.’  This love is greater than the desire to preserve one’s own life, 
forgiving the other, taken hostage by the other in order to liberate, a lavish grace (cf. Eph. 1:7-8).  
It hopes for a reciprocal sharing of love for the sake of the other, but initiates loving action 
without the need, demand, or expectation of such reciprocity.   
Encounter with and acceptance of this love God has for oneself can ‘put to rest’ the 
existential question, ‘Does anybody love me?’  The answer is yes: a divinely-affirmed and 
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demonstrated yes, in the past and in the present.  By blessing’s threefold acknowledgment -- the 
gift of God’s grace (i.e., loving desire), oneself as the recipient, and God as the giver -- the 
l’adonné’s predominant concern (‘Does anybody love me?’) is quieted, if not answered.  An ego, 
however, is never satisfied or content, even with such an advent by God Himself: only as 
l’adonné, only as a ‘me’ grasped by Christ (cf. Phil. 3:12), as a servant member of Christ’s body 
-- who now has stewardship but not ‘ownership’ of one’s own body and blood -- can one receive 
and ‘abide in’ Christ, ‘the true vine’ (cf. Jn. 15:1-17).  The challenge is that the self must 
surrender its endless pursuit of security and, through deciding to initiate loving, leave the self 
vulnerable, particularly when speaking prophetically against the world’s deceit, violence, and 
indifference.  This is the ‘scandalous’ element of the gospel, what Dietrich Bonhoeffer calls ‘the 
cost of discipleship.’   
The only way to be ‘capable’ of paying that cost is to receive a gift of desire to love like 
Christ.  The desire to love as Christ does is beyond the ego’s capacity or willingness, so a 
surrender to the gift is required.  This surrender -- “Here I am” -- is an existential step into the 
‘Christic role’ of embodying God’s love from one’s own particularity.   
5.3.1.2.  Gift of a Desire for Us to Embody for Others 
 A sensus plenior of the injunction ‘Do this in memory of me’ clarifies how the Eucharist 
is (in an objective sense) a gift of desire which the recipient is called to embody.  Traditionally 
Jesus’ injunction has been interpreted as a command to repeat the ritual he had just enacted.  This 
is a correct but incomplete interpretation.  When ‘this’ is understood not merely as ‘break bread 
and share wine, repeating my words’ but ‘give of your own body and blood out of love for 
others,’ the recipient shares existentially in the loving desire Christ has expressed.   
317 
 
With Christ’s command to ‘Do this in memory of me,’ the disciple learns and receives 
from the Teacher the desire to initiate loving action.  chief question for the recipient becomes 
‘Will I love first?’  Can I reconcile, forgive, make peace first, without insisting on receiving 
something first in exchange from the other?  Continuing to live according to this desire requires 
far more than benevolence: it entails love toward one’s enemies, forgiveness of others’ sins, 
seeking reconciliation, serving others, overaccepting imperfect situations and dealing with them 
responsibly.  In these and similar ways, the disciples is closer to the other’s good than the other is 
to himself, as Christ is.   
 While a ‘gift of desire,’ the Eucharist is not a ‘gift of pure autonomy’ -- if anything, it is a 
gift of even stronger communion and dependence upon God.  It is fuller recognition of one’s 
responsibility, stewardship, and accountability before God, not liberty at the expense of these.  
One is emboldened to begin taking incremental steps of initiating honesty, kindness, and concern 
toward others in imitation of Christ.  This surrender to God’s loving desire, practiced again and 
again throughout one’s lifetime, is the reconstitution of the self as ‘full, conscious, active’ 
member of the ecclesial body of Christ, the resolution of the crisis, and the transformation of 
sanctification.   
5.3.2.  Gift of New Relations 
 This section responds to the supplemental question given at the beginning of this chapter: 
‘How does or ought the Eucharist concern the relationships between the persons involved?’  
5.3.2.1.  New Relations to Particular Subjects 
First and foremost, participants in the liturgy receive a gift of communion with the Body 
of Christ, becoming more fully the ecclesial body into which they were baptized.  Chauvet 
pointed out how the liturgy of the Eucharist functions as a prime example of symbolic gift 
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exchange: not ‘this-for-that’ market exchanges but a ritual set of exchanges -- greetings, 
responses, shared acclamations -- for the sake of mutual recognition of subjects and 
strengthening of alliances.  The gift of communion may be understood fruitfully in this way as 
well.  Exchange of gifts verbal and tangible lead toward becoming as a social body what is 
received sacramentally: the body of Christ.  This occurs through the sacramental gifts of Christ’s 
body and blood which express and mediate God’s loving desire, the Holy Spirit, the true source 
of unity.  In addition to this ‘gift of desire’ are the gifts of new relationships and new ways of 
relating to others in the world.   
Most of the prayers in the liturgy of the Eucharist is an address of God the Father through 
Christ in the Holy Spirit; the Penitential Rite, part of the Gloria, and just before the sign of peace 
are exceptions.  The liturgy is more than sets of prayers to these divine persons, whom anyone 
could address in private prayer as well.  By uniting as an assembly to receive anew God’s gifts, 
the participants express and embody their Christian identity as members of the ecclesial body of 
Christ, living out their adoption in Christ by praying in the Holy Spirit, ‘Abba! Father!’ (Gal. 
4:6).  As Marion showed in his commentary on Christ’s Ascension, it belongs to the Church to 
take up the Christic role of blessing the Father.   
Christ’s eucharistic giving reveals a new way of relating to oneself, gifts, and others.  
Christ’s scandalous teachings, which already provoke serious questions about the nature of the 
self,734 are reinforced in the Institution Narrative wherein Christ demonstrated the freedom to 
give one’s own body and blood.  His own reconfiguration of his body and blood given as bread 
and wine revealed that one’s body and blood are ‘givable,’ calling the nature of the egoic self 
                                               
734 “If any want to become my followers, let them deny themselves and take up their cross and follow me.  For those 
who want to save their life will lose it, and those who lose their life for my sake, and for the sake of the gospel, will 
save it. For what will it profit them to gain the whole world and forfeit their life?  Indeed, what can they give in 
return for their life?” (Mk. 8:34-37).   
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into question.  This challenge to the ego turns out to be quite deliberate, to transform 
communities not through violent sacrifice but through reception and re-giving God’s gifts.   
Similarly, the scandal provoked by the eucharistic gifts is not to be resolved by 
intellectual discourse on transubstantiation occurring in an object but by existential 
reconfiguration of self according to the gift.  The ego cannot abide the saturated phenomenon of 
the Eucharistic gift, only as a reconfigured l’adonné can one receive the gift, which is to say the 
gifts are only received by being given again through oneself.  This ‘existential reconfiguration of 
the self according to the gift’ occurs through full, conscious, active participation in the work of 
reception of Christ’s eucharistic gifts.  These gifts are his body, blood, and desire (the loving 
desire of God), received through the work of blessing (recognition of Giver, Gift, givee), taking 
responsibility (‘Here I am’ from one’s own body), and thanksgiving (re-giving through ethics, 
becoming a giver).  Reconstitution of the Christian self therefore occurs through blessing, 
ownership of responsibility, and thanksgiving, but all these still remain fully dependent upon 
Christ’s gifts.  These three elements have their source in Christ’s gifts and enable imitation of 
Christ.  Christ’s gifts bestow an agency according to the Holy Spirit.   
5.3.3.2.  New Ways of Relating 
 Relations toward other people both within and beyond the Church also change, as the 
gospel includes an implicit call to end scapegoating or creating group identity through violence 
toward others.  Within the Church, one is part of Christ’s new covenant rooted in forgiveness 
rather than exclusionary violence.  Others within and beyond the Church are icons of Christ, 
fellow sinners who themselves ‘know not what they do’ (Lk. 23:34) and need liberation from 
egoic autonomy, reciprocity, and violence.  Forgiveness becomes a possibility beyond 
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relationship with God.  To imagine initiating charity beyond reciprocal exchange, in a radical gift 
of self, creates new possibilities.   
5.3.3.  Gift of Identity: ‘Become What You Are’ 
If you receive well, you are what you have received. 
Receive what you are. 
-- St. Augustine of Hippo735 
 
 With the work of receiving the Eucharist through blessing, overacceptance, and 
thanksgiving, one’s identity as a member of the body of Christ is thoroughly strengthened and 
confirmed.  The ego’s scandalous ‘crisis’ brought about by Christ’s radical gift is resolved 
through a reconstituted as l’adonné, as ‘gifted’ with Christ’s body, blood, and loving desire: “In 
the measure in which the ethical life of service to others is lived as a response to this primary 
gift, and therefore takes its source in the sacraments, in that same measure it finds its Christian 
identity.”736  As l’adonné one does not aim at permanent ownership or retention of gifts but at 
becoming one who gives these gifts to others, sharing further the gifts of recognition, alliance, 
and charity.  Having learned from Christ’s loving example, one seeks to imitate his humility (cf. 
Phil. 2:5-11) and service (Mk. 10:45; Jn. 13:34).  Moreover, the gifts of life -- physical, social, 
intellectual, etc. -- are held in stewardship, not possession.  The liturgy is an exercise in 
reception-by-deciding-to-give-again, appreciating God’s gifts by full and contemplative 
recognition of the radical love with which we are loved and called to imitate.  The assembly is 
there to receive stewardship of and be transformed by the gifts of God which include, not least of 
all, the gift of God’s loving desire.   
                                               
735 Sermons 227 and 272 (PL 38: 1999 and 1247). 
736 Sacraments, 41.   
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The liturgy tells a story into which we are called to enter existentially.  By doing so, one 
joins a creative initiative and service to redirect creation and history toward their divine end, to 
reintegrate the world toward a more divinely inspired order.  
5.4.  The Liturgy as a Whole 
I am carried by desire, not reason (desiderio feror, non ratione). 
-- St. Bernard of Clairvaux, SC 9.2, cf. SC 75.1 
 
The fundamental question guiding this inquiry into the liturgy of the Eucharist is ‘What is 
going on relationally in the Eucharistic celebration?’  The answer: the liturgy of the Eucharist 
offers a special gift of encounter through direct address, a radical call and gift: God’s gracious 
and scandalous gift of His own loving desire, which breaks from egoic autonomy, reciprocity, 
and violence into self-giving, responsibility, and grace.  This gift is received in full by an 
existential reconfiguration according to the gift, occurring through specific ‘tasks’: blessing’s 
threefold recognition (of Giver, Gift, and givee), overaccepting one’s situation and 
responsibility, and re-giving the gift in thanksgiving.  This enables imitation of Christ.   
In light of this understanding we are better equipped to answer the other questions posed 
at the beginning of this chapter as well.   
5.4.1.  Participation in the Paschal Mystery of Christ 
When Christ came into the world, he said,  
‘Sacrifice and offerings you have not desired, but a body you have prepared for me;  
in burnt offerings and sin offerings you have taken no pleasure. 
Then I said, ‘See, God, I have come to do your will, O God.’’ 
-- Hebrews 10:5-7; cf. Ps. 40:6-8 (LXX) 
 
Understanding the liturgy of the Eucharist as a gift of desire helps express a rich kind of 
participation in the paschal mystery of Christ.  It promotes an understanding and appreciation of 
love deep enough to dispossess itself and empty itself in embodied forms of charity, especially as 
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it calls participants to act with the same love themselves in their own lives.  It emphasizes the 
need for an embodied response to divine grace, hopefully less from a mindset of moralistic 
obligation and more from a personal sense of gratitude, opportunity, and responsibility toward 
those who are suffering in one way or another.   
Regarding the traditional mysteries of Christ’s paschal event, this ‘relational approach to 
the Eucharist’ aims at more honest encounter with the distance and absence  maintained by the 
sacrament even as it provides Christ’s presence.  In this way it incorporates the way Chauvet and 
Marion point to post-resurrection narratives as paradigmatic of mature faith: just as the risen 
Christ manifests himself in the breaking of the bread, he disappears (cf. Lk. 24:31); Mary 
Magdalene is not allowed to cling to the risen Lord (cf. Jn. 20:17); just as the apostles ask if the 
kingdom will now be restored, he ascends to heaven (Acts 1:6-9).  In the same way, rather than 
speaking only of Christ’s presence, the mature disciple accepts a call to take on an embodied 
Christic role, but with one’s own body and blood; the mature disciple ‘gives God a body’ 
through which others can be served tangibly in the present world.  
The liturgy of the Eucharist as a gift of desire aims at a mature acceptance of absence 
(Chauvet) and responsibility, motivated by gratitude, precisely through a lover’s decision to 
‘love first’ (Marion) with an indirect ‘return-gift’ of offering one’s own ‘body and blood’ at the 
service of God’s gracious and scandalous loving will.  This participation is not verified by 
enthusiastic liturgical responses or the intensity of one’s prayer during mass, but only occurs 
through ‘re-giving’ the gift of love expressed and embodied; it emphasizes not the ‘acquisition of 
grace’ but decisions to love first, embodied in the particularities of one’s everyday life.  This 
kind of ‘thanksgiving’ sends disciples from the liturgy into the chaos of the world.  One offers 
true Christian sacrifice through an interior decision to embody a grateful response to grace -- as 
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best one can -- through obedience to what is truly charitable, holy, responsible, compassionate, 
understanding, practical.   
 In sum, the tangible sacramental gifts of Christ’s Body and Blood bestow mystical 
participation and communion in Christ.  The assembly receives these as gifts: it is dependent 
upon God to bestow them, which cannot be claimed as rights, they are pure grace.  It is pure 
grace, but also, by virtue of its very goodness, obligatory of the recipient to sharing in, imitating, 
and becoming like the loving it expresses.  To be a member of a living body is to be active in 
charity in the world, thus communion with Christ means something greater, more abundant than 
mere membership in the Church.   
5.4.2.  Liturgy of the Eucharist as Celebration  
Language of celebration (priest as celebrant, celebrating mass, etc.) often accompanies 
Church language concerning liturgy of the Eucharist, without it being especially clear what is 
celebrated or how.  Specifically, what does the Church celebrate in its liturgy of the Eucharist?   
 The liturgy of the Eucharist is a celebration of Christ’s own eucharistic giving -- and the 
‘love behind the gift.’  It does so first by recognizing the divine Giver, Gift (which is God’s self-
gift), and the assembly as recipient of God’s gifts.  True and real acceptance of this gift assumes 
the responsibility to re-give that gift through one’s own self, one’s own life, one’s own ‘body 
and blood,’ as thanksgiving and as sharing in the totally free loving it expresses in the first place.  
The liturgy gives Christ’s body and blood sacramentally so that we might receive Christ’s gift of 
desire existentially, embodying it in loving action in our own particular time and place in history.   
 In the proposed model, the liturgy is the public celebration of God’s ‘lover’s advance,’ 
the encounter -- gracious and ‘scandalous’ -- of the risen Lord Jesus with present-day disciples, 
made possible through the Holy Spirit and the generosity of the Father, the giver of every perfect 
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gift (James 1:17).  Through proclamation of the Word and the response of re-presenting the 
sacrament, the celebration prompts this encounter with Christ and his self-gift in the Eucharist. 
The liturgy is also the reversal of violent sacrifice, transposing sacrificial action into decision for 
loving action, whatever form that might take.  It is re-presentation and bestowal of the good 




Christianity in its explicit and full form is not merely an abstract theory, a reality that is thought of, 
ultimately, as objective and thing-like, and towards which one subsequently, as something extra, 
takes a position personally.  Christianity really does understand itself, in its most distinctive 
essence, as an existential event: what we call a personal relationship to Jesus Christ.737 
-- Karl Rahner 
As stated in the first chapter of this dissertation, the desired goal is to work toward a 
Eucharistic theology which is faithful to scripture and tradition, can dialogue with contemporary 
philosophy, and addresses existential questions.  We seek to articulate a Eucharistic theology that 
can and ought to illuminate “God’s design for humans’ total vocation, and thus direct minds to 
that which is human.”  To do just this, we looked at that which relates the divine and the human: 
how God acts by means of the liturgy of the Eucharist upon human desire, identity, and 
relationships: we attend to all that God gives through the liturgy.  The theme of gift provides the 
root metaphor through which universal existential concerns and the deepest human desire can be 
offered reasons for gratitude, acceptance of responsibility, and self-giving, so as to participate 
‘fully, consciously, and actively’ in God’s own loving.  The theme of gift has also provided a 
means of access for discussion of the ‘I-You’ relationship between God and human beings.   
                                               
737 Foundations of Christian Faith, p. 306, as quoted in and translated by Philip Endean, “Rahner, Christology and 
Grace,” Heythrop Journal, Vol. 37, p. 298.  
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This effort hopefully changes the notion of what the Church celebrates through the 
Eucharist, that it might be not merely ‘summit’ of the Church’s activity (as an end unto itself) but 
‘source’ as well -- of our participation in the Paschal Mystery, namely, fuller participation in the 
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